

# NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC  
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

# 2019 State of Reliability Report

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**RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY**



- High Reliability in 2018, No Non-Weather Category 3, 4, or 5 events
  - Hurricane Michael and Florence Category 3
- Extreme weather events continue to be leading contributor to the largest generation and distribution outages
- Better than expected performance from Texas generation fleet helped meet 2018 summer peak demand; reliability risk in 2019 due to continued capacity deficit
- Continued downward misoperation rate trend
- Improving or stable frequency response performance in all interconnections
- Emerging reliability challenges identified as more inverter-based generation is added

**4,353,740,908 MWh**

2018 Actual Energy

**1,028,629 MW**

2018 Summer Peak Capacity

**469,842 mi**

Total Transmission Circuit Miles > 100kV

**5,816**

Number of Conventional Generating Units > 20MW

**99.92%**

Time with no operator-controlled  
load shedding

**0**

Category 3, 4, or 5 Events  
(non-weather related)

The ERO Enterprise: NERC and 7 Regional Entities



TEXASRE



**15** Reliability Coordinators

**4** Interconnections

**184** Transmission Operators

**991** Generator Owners

**73** Balancing Authorities

**398** Distribution Providers

## Bulk Power System Situation Awareness Inputs and Products in 2018

**2,963**

Intelligent Alarms

**4,239**

FNet Notifications

**1,855**

RCIS Messages

**233**

DOE OE-417 Reports

**459**

EOP-004-3 Reports

**2**

EOP-002-3 Reports



NERC BPS Situational Awareness



**255**

Daily Reports

**5**

Special Reports






**0**

Level 1 Alert

**1**

Level 2 Alerts

# Event Analysis (2018, Trends, Causes)



## 2014-2018 Event Analysis Trends



**856 Event Reports**

**378 Identified Root Causes**




**116 MW**


Overall (Five-Year) Average Load Loss of  
Non-Weather Driven Events with Load Loss



Number of Non-Weather Events with  
Load Loss and Annual Average Load Loss




- Management/Organization
- Design/Engineering
- Equipment/Material
- Other
- Communication
- Individual Performance
- Training
- No Causes Found
- Overall Configuration



2014-2018 Identified Root Causes  
(Processed to-date)

Total Category 1 Events by Year and  
Subcategory







A stylized map of North America, including the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The map is divided into three horizontal sections by a wide, semi-transparent blue band that runs across the middle. The top section, covering Canada, is a light purple color. The middle section, covering the United States, is the same blue as the band. The bottom section, covering Mexico, is a light gray color. The title "Reliability Indicators" is centered within the blue band.


# Reliability Indicators

# Reliability Indicator – Transmission Related Events Results in Loss of Load





**Annual Protection System Misoperation Rate**




**Five-Year Protection System Misoperation Rate by Region**


***Q4 2013 through Q3 2018***




## Severity Risk Index



# Severity Risk Index (SRI) - Sorted







- Concerns with inverter-based resource persist and mitigation strategies are being developed by the NERC Inverter-Based Resources Task Force.
- NERC Alert helped inform industry of the vulnerabilities associated with momentary cessation.

## NERC Alert 1


Susceptible to Erroneous Frequency Calculations?



Inverter cease output during abnormal voltages?



## NERC Alert II



1 - Continue improving their ability to understand, model, and plan for a system with a significantly different resource mix. Priority should be given to:

- Frequency response under low inertia conditions
- Contributions of inverter-based resources to essential reliability services
- Increasing protection system and restoration complexities with increased inverter-based resources
- Resource adequacy with increasing energy constraints

2 - Develop comparative metrics to understand the different dimensions of resilience during extreme events and system performance changes over time.

3 - Better understand and share information on cyber and physical security threats and mitigate the risks through a variety of approaches, including resilient system design, consequence-informed planning and operation, and practicing response and recovery processes.

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## EMP Task Force Status Update

NRC

Mark Lauby, Senior Vice President and Chief Engineer

**RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY**





- **May 2019:** NERC launched a Task Force to identify reliability concerns associated with EMPs and potential methods for promoting resilience
- The Task Force advises NERC, regulators, Regional Entities, and industry stakeholders to establish a common understanding of the scope, priority, and goals for the **development of next-steps to address resilience to HEMP events**

# EMP Task Force: Phased Approach



- The Task Force has broken up the topic of EMP as it relates to the utility industry in the following categories:
  - **Policy** – What needs to be clearly defined by industry and federal government
  - **Research** – What research is needed to prudently inform utilities that need to make decisions
  - **Vulnerability Assessments** – How does the utility industry take the policy and research to understand its vulnerability
  - **Mitigation Guidelines** – Fundamental suggestions and guidelines on prudent mitigation strategies
  - **Response and Recovery** – Based on the vulnerability assessments and any mitigation guidelines, for any impacted facilities, how does a utility respond and recover



# Questions and Answers