


2016 State of Reliability

Summary of Findings

Mark Lauby, Senior Vice President and Chief Reliability Officer NRC and FERC Joint Commission Meeting February 23, 2017

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY











Key Finding #1: Misoperations

Reduced Protection System Misoperations

- Total misoperation rate (CY14 to CY15) 10.4% to 9.4%
- Early 2017 SOR results indicate further improvement in CY16

Recommendation

- Target the top three causes of misoperations
- Focus on education on instantaneous ground overcurrent protection and relay system commissioning tests

Aggressive CY17 target(s)

- Threshold less than 9%
- (Stretch) Target less than 8%





Improved Severity Risk Index (SRI) - resiliency to severe weather

- No 2015 SRI days in the Top 10 (Winter 2014 has two days in the Top 10)
- Extreme winter weather similar to 2014 in parts of the Eastern Interconnection (see 2015 Winter Review Report)¹


Recommendation

- Consider performing daily SRI calculations on a Regional basis
- Investigate the feasibility of correlating performance with weather data

1http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/ColdWeatherTrainingMaterials/2015_Winter_Review_December_2015_FINAL.pdf



BPS Resiliency to Severe Weather Improved




NERC Annual Daily Severity Risk Index (SRI) Sorted Descending




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Risk Profile of Transmission Events



- 2012-2015 Risk Profile
- Significant Positive Correlation With Transmission Severity
- Significant Negative Correlation with Transmission Severity
- No Significant Correlation with Transmission Severity



Correlation with Transmission Severity

- Misoperation 1 Lightning 7
- Other 8 Failed ac Substation Equipment 2
 - Power System Condition 3 Failed AC Circuit Equipment 9 Combined Smaller ICC Groups 10 Human Error 4
 - Weather, Excluding Lightning 11 Fire 5
 - Unknown 12 Contamination 6
 - Foreign Interference 13



Key Finding #3: Transmission Outages

Reduction in human error initiated outages

- Automatic Alternating Current (AC) Circuit Outages initiated by Human Error
 - o 2015 = 0.028 per circuit
 - 2014 = 0.039 per circuit
 - 0.047 per circuit

Recommendation

Continue HP training and education focus

Enhanced CY17 activity

 NERC and North American Transmission Forum (NATF) to co-sponsor Sixth Annual HP Conference



Key Finding #4: Event Analysis

Event Analysis

- No Category 4 or 5 events
- Only one Category 3 event
- Reduction in total events of Category 2 or higher
- Published 16 Lessons Learned
- Significant number of registered entities that contribute to lessons learned



Key Finding #5: Modeling Improvements

Modeling improvements - improved blackout risk assessments

- Supports accurate assessment of blackout risk and other threats
- Deploy of synchrophasor technology for dynamic model verification
- Develop load models for dynamic studies, such as fault induced delayed voltage recovery (FIDVR)

Recommendation

Improve system models using synchrophasors and other technologies



Key Finding #6: Essential Reliability Services (ERS)

- ERS Frequency Response (FR)
 - Eastern Interconnection Increasing trend but continued withdrawal²
 - Western Interconnection Inconclusive; Insufficient candidate events
 - ERCOT Interconnection Increasing trend
 - Québec Interconnection Slight decreasing trend
- Measure frequency response with changing resource mix
- Monitor the size of resources providing frequency response

² Withdrawal of primary frequency response is an undesirable characteristic associated with certain generator control systems that negate the primary frequency response prematurely



Essential Reliability Services (ERS)

ERS – Voltage Support

- Impacts of a changing resource mix on voltage support
- Increase in reactive-only generators for voltage support
- Retirement of conventional generators
- Increase in variable energy resources

Recommendations

- Monitor generator reliability that provide voltage support, including low voltage ride-through
- Work with North American Generator Forum (NAGF) to monitor and improve ERS





- BPS cyber and physical security events
 - No load loss due to reported cyber security events
 - One physical attack that resulted in loss of approximately 20 MW
 - Increase in global cyber security vulnerabilities and incidents
 - Increase in reportable physical security events
- Strengthen situational awareness for cyber and physical security
- Providing timely and coordinated information to industry



- Instances of protection system misoperations have decreased
 - Remains a key focus area for improvement
- Improved BPS resiliency to severe weather
 - Weather has biggest impact on grid
- Human error has decreased
 - Industry focus on Human Performance (HP) showing dividends
- No Category 4 or 5 events in 2015
 - Event severity reduced in 2015
- Frequency and voltage remained stable
 - ERS managed during resource changes
- Physical and cyber security maintained under increasing threats
 - Constant vigilance required in both areas





Questions and Answers

