Event Desc|En No|Site Name|Licensee Name|Region No|City Name|State Cd|County Name|License No|Agreement State Ind|Docket No|Unit Ind1|Unit Ind2|Unit Ind3|Reactor Type|Nrc Notified By|Ops Officer|Notification Dt|Notification Time|Event Dt|Event Time|Time Zone|Last Updated Dt|Emergency Class|Cfr Cd1|Cfr Descr1|Cfr Cd2|Cfr Descr2|Cfr Cd3|Cfr Descr3|Cfr Cd4|Cfr Descr4|Staff Name1|Org Abbrev1|Staff Name2|Org Abbrev2|Staff Name3|Org Abbrev3|Staff Name4|Org Abbrev4|Staff Name5|Org Abbrev5|Staff Name6|Org Abbrev6|Staff Name7|Org Abbrev7|Staff Name8|Org Abbrev8|Staff Name9|Org Abbrev9|Staff Name10|Org Abbrev10|Scram Code 1|RX CRIT 1|Initial PWR 1|Initial RX Mode1|Current PWR 1|Current RX Mode 1|Scram Code 2|RX CRIT 2|Initial PWR 2|Initial RX Mode 2|Current PWR 2|Current RX Mode 2|Scram Code 3|RX CRIT 3|Initial PWR 3|Initial RX Mode 3|Current PWR 3|Current RX Mode 3|Event Text|
Part 21|57243|RSCC dba Marmon||1|East Granby|CT|||N||||||Phillip Sargenski|Adam Koziol|07/25/2024|11:05:00|07/23/2024|0:00:00|EDT|3/28/2025 1:07:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(d)(3)(i)|Defects And Noncompliance|||||||Lilliendahl, Jon|R1DO|Feliz-Adorno, Nestor|R3DO|Azua, Ray|R4DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/31/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLAINT INSULATED CONDUCTOR    The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:  A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to nine plants.  Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse.    Reporting company point of contact:  RSCC Wire and Cable LLC  dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure  20 Bradley Park Road  East Granby, CT 06026    Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager  Phone: 860-653-8376  Fax: 860-653-8301  Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com    * * * UPDATE ON 08/23/24 AT 1315 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *    The vendor provided the final report for this event listing corrective actions and the estimated completion dates.  Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 09/04/24 AT 1044 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * *    The vendor notified the NRC that they plan to send additional finding data regarding this notification via fax and/or email within the next day or two.  Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 09/06/24 AT 1327 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *    The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor.  Affected plant: Calvert Cliffs  Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 9/17/24 AT 1641 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor.  Affected customer: Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division.  Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Ziolkowski), R4DO (Azua), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 9/26/24 AT 1030 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *    The vendor is continuing to conduct inventory sampling which involves a 14 day aging test. Due to the length of testing, the vendor plans on submitting their final report the week of October 7, 2024.  Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R3DO (Havertape), R4DO (Young), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 10/28/24 AT 1121 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *    The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter.  Additional time is needed to complete this review.  Notified R1DO (Eve), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Warnick), and Part 21 group (Email).    * * * UPDATE ON 02/13/25 AT 1125 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO IAN HOWARD * * *    The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter. RSCC is reviewing shipments from the past 18 months to ensure it has accounted for all non-conforming products. Additional cables related to this scope have been identified and impacted customers have been notified.    ***UPDATE ON 03/28/2025 AT 1039 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO RODNEY CLAGG***    The vendor has identified cable(s) that could be affected and have advised customers of the issue and requested that samples be returned to the vendor facility for further verification testing, which is a process that remains ongoing.  This testing will confirm the cable's safety related function.  Once the testing is complete, the vendor will notify the NRC with an updated and final Part 21 report.    Notified R1DO (Arner), R3DO (Gilliam), R4DO (Deese), and Part 21 group (Email).|
Part 21|57402|Catawba|Duke Energy Nuclear Llc|2|York|SC|York||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Ari Tuckman|Natalie Starfish|10/28/2024|13:55:00|08/20/2024|0:00:00|EDT|3/13/2025 1:25:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(a)(2)|Interim Eval Of Deviation|||||||Suber, Gregory|R2DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Startup|0|Startup|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT WITH CIRCUIT BOARD    The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email:    The licensee received two alarms due to direct current (DC) output voltage fluctuating between 127.4 to 131.3 volts.  After troubleshooting, the DC output voltage fluctuations were caused by the battery charger printed circuit board.  The part has been sent to the vendor, AMETEK, for evaluation. Catawba is the only plant known to have this issue at this time.    The evaluation is expected to be completed on January 31, 2025.    Catawba condition report number: 02526388    AMETEK Part Number: 80-921-4031-90  AMETEK failure analysis number: 24-006    * * * UPDATE ON 01/31/25 AT 1548 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO KAREN COTTON * * *    AMETEK is continuing its evaluation of the circuit boards. The original evaluation completion date was January 31, 2025. AMETEK is extending the evaluation completion date to February 28, 2025. Remaining steps include completing the cause analysis, identifying all affected equipment, finalizing any corrective action measures, and determining actions required.    Notified R2DO (Suggs), Part 21 Group (email)    * * * UPDATE ON 02/28/25 AT 1509 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO ERNEST WEST * * *    The following is a synopsis of the information provided from AMETEK:    AMETEK has submitted their final report for the evaluation of the circuit boards in question. AMETEK identified two failed capacitors on a charger control printed circuit board with part number: 80-9214031-90. The two failed capacitors are C35 (part number: 03-010003-00) and C36 (part number: 03-011006-00). These capacitors have been identified to fail prematurely prior to the 10-year replacement schedule in a few identified cases. AMETEK will be conducting further design evaluations on printed circuit board (PCB) 80-9214031-90 and considering design and/or component changes that will further enhance the reliability of the charger control board.    AMETEK reviewed the last 10 years of jobs and identified the following potentially affected U.S. nuclear power plants:    Farley  Braidwood  Byron  Dresden  Fitzpatrick  Ginna  Nine Mile Point  Quad Cities  Millstone  North Anna  Surry  Catawba  Robinson  Harris  McGuire  Oconee  Beaver Valley  Davis Besse 3  Columbia Generating Station  Arkansas Nuclear One  Grand Gulf  River Bend  Waterford  Hatch  Vogtle Unit 1 and Unit 2  DC Cook  Seabrook  Turkey Point  Point Beach  Diablo Canyon  Sequoyah  Watts Bar  Comanche Peak  Prairie Island  Palisades (ISFSI)  Three Mile Island (ISFSI)    Notified R1DO (Defrancisco), R2DO (Penmetsa), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Roldan-Otero), Part 21 Group (email)    * * * UPDATE ON 03/13/25 AT 1301 EDT FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO KERBY SCALES * * *    AMETEK provided an update to their final report to include additional variations of the charger control board. There is no change to the affected users, findings, or resolution.    Notified R1DO (Schussler), R2DO (Pearson), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Warnick), Part 21 Group (email)  |
Agreement State|57481|SC Dept of Health & Env Control|Mitsubishi Chemical America, Inc.|1|Greer|SC||036|Y||||||Andrew Roxburgh|Sam Colvard|12/26/2024|10:21:00|12/24/2024|21:00:00|EST|3/6/2025 10:06:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Elkhiamy, Sarah|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/7/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SAFETY INSTRUMENT    The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Control (the Department) via email:    "At approximately 2100 EST, on December 24, 2024, the licensee's staff noticed a tear in the Mylar window on one of their Thermo-Fisher FC-185 beta gauges, thus causing the system to be shut down. The system was put back into service at approximately 0000 on December 25, 2024. The licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Department to report the incident at 1502 on December 25, 2024. The Thermo-Fisher Model TFC-185 contains 1250 mCi of Kr-85. The source model number is a Kr85-4, and the serial number is KA-2197. There were no radiation exposures resulting from the service of the gauge."    * * * UPDATE ON 03/06/2025 AT 0840 FROM ANDREW ROXBURGH TO BILLY NYTKO * * *    "The licensee submitted its 30-day written report on January 16, 2025. The report indicated that the Mylar window was replaced at 2350 on December 24, 2025. The report also indicated that there were no increased radiation exposures to individuals during the repair. The Department considers this event closed."    Notified R1DO(Ford) and NMSS Events (email)|
Part 21|57483|Ametek Solidstate Controls||3|Columbus|OH|||Y||||||Zachary Rumora|Bill Nytko|12/28/2024|11:01:00|10/29/2024|0:00:00|EST|3/11/2025 4:46:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(a)(2)|Interim Eval Of Deviation|||||||Elkhiamy, Sarah|R1DO|Franke, Mark|R2DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/12/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: PART 21 - INTERIM REPORT FOR REGULATING TRANSFORMER    The following is a synopsis of information provided by AMETEK Solidstate Controls Inc. (AMETEK) via email:    During regulating transformer system operations, the transformer may be experiencing short circuiting between coils to ground.    Visual inspection for severe darkening or charring of coils, magnetic shunts, or core, and/or the use of thermal probes or infrared guns monitoring for excessive temperatures greater than 180 degrees Celsius or 355 degrees Fahrenheit may detect affected regulating transformer systems.    Affected systems exhibit signs of transformer insulation system deterioration, increased audible noise from the units, blackening on any areas of the transformer, or signs of electrical shorting between windings or coil to core.    The cause of the short circuiting is unknown. Component failure impact analysis and regulating transformer system electrical testing are in progress.    Recommend all units currently in service with internal components, which include but are not limited to capacitors, wire harnesses, and transformer materials, with temperatures in excess of 180 degrees Celsius or 355 degrees Fahrenheit be removed from service.    COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:  The AMETEK SCI model numbers listed are for regulating transformers that are intended to take in AC power at 460 VAC plus or minus 10 percent and output AC power at 120 VAC plus or minus 2 percent with low harmonic distortion.    Models: 85-IS0075-12 and 85-IS0150-14    AFFECTED PLANTS:  Southern Nuclear Company - Vogtle  Constellation Energy - Ginna    * * * UPDATE ON 03/11/25 AT 1530 EDT FROM ZACHARY RUMORA TO KERBY SCALES * * *    The following is a synopsis of the information provided from Ametek:    Test were performed on both models (85-IS0075-14 and 85-IS0075-12).     Model 85-IS0075-12 was found to be functioning as expected during testing and did not present a failure mode. Therefore, Ginna is not affected by this component.    Regarding model 85-IS0075-14, dielectric testing was performed and the apparent source of the failure was a short-circuit between the secondary coil of the transformer and the magnetic shunts and center leg of the transformer core. The suspected cause of this short circuit is the design of the magnetic shunt. Various actions are being reviewed to enhance model 85-IS0150-14 specifically regarding the insulation system of the transformer around the coils and magnetic shunts. An updated report is expected to be completed in May/June.    Notified R1DO (Schussler), R2DO (Pearson), Part 21 Group (email)  |
Agreement State|57550|SC Dept of Health & Env Control|Mitsubishi Chemical America, Inc.|1|Greer|SC||036|Y||||||Adam L. Gause|Ernest West|02/15/2025|12:24:00|02/14/2025|0:00:00|EST|3/5/2025 5:09:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Henrion, Mark|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/6/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED FIXED GAUGE    The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "The licensee informed the Department on February 14, 2025, via telephone, that it had discovered damage (tear) to the film covering the window of the source side of a fixed gauging device. The licensee discovered this event on February 14, 2025. The licensee reported that a representative from the manufacturer of the fixed gauging device was on-site and repaired/replaced the source side window on February 14, 2025. The licensee reported that the the fixed gauging device shutter closed as expected, and the licensee did not report any ongoing health and safety concerns or overexposures.     "The fixed gauging device is a Thermo EGS Gauging LLC, Model TFC-185 (source holder serial number KA2196), housing a 1250 mCi Kr-85 sealed source. The sealed source is a Isotope Product Laboratories Model NER-588. This event is still under investigation by the Department."    South Carolina Event Number: TBD    * * * UPDATE ON 03/05/2025 AT 1423 FROM ADAM GAUSE TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (the Department) via email:    "The licensee submitted a 30-day written report on February 26, 2025. The details of the written report were consistent with the initial notification. The serial number of the source is also KA2196. The internal South Carolina Event Number is SC250002. This event/investigation is considered closed. The report for NMED item number SC250002 was uploaded today."    Notified R1DO (Ford) and NMSS Events Notification (email).|
Agreement State|57568|Maryland Dept of the Environment|Johns Hopkins Imaging|1|Bethesda|MD||31-314-01|Y||||||Krishnakumar Nangeelil|Karen Cotton-Gross|02/24/2025|13:16:00|02/20/2025|0:00:00|EST|2/24/2025 1:44:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Defrancisco, Anne|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE    The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) via email:    "On February 20, 2025, an incident involving a sealed radioactive source [leaking source] at the PET/CT Department of Johns Hopkins Imaging, Bethesda was reported to the MDE. The issue was identified during a routine leak test conducted by the facility's health physics consultant, Krueger Gilbert Health Physics. The sealed vial source, Cs-137 (Serial Number 16694, activity 0.199 mCi as of March 1, 2002), was used for quality control of the Capintec CRC dose calibrator.    "Upon detection of the issue, the sealed source was immediately withdrawn from service, placed in a polythene zip-lock bag, and securely stored in the hot lab. A comprehensive contamination survey was conducted by collecting wipe samples from the dose calibrator, handling tools, storage container, storage area, and other relevant locations. The survey results confirmed no detectable radioactive contamination.    "As a precautionary measure, the licensee was instructed to maintain the sealed source in double-sealed polythene packaging within a secure container. The licensee is currently awaiting a return kit for the proper disposal of the source through an authorized agency or supplier. Upon completion of the disposal process, all relevant documentation will be submitted to MDE.    "MDE will provide follow up to this reactive investigation until the source is securely disposed."  |
Agreement State|57569|NE Div of Radioactive Materials|Nebraska Methodist Hospital|4|Omaha|NE||010702|Y||||||Michael Gries|Brian P. Smith|02/24/2025|12:34:00|02/21/2025|9:00:00|CST|2/25/2025 5:10:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Roldan-Otero, Lizette|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following summary was received via phone from the Nebraska Division of Radioactive Materials (DHHS-NE):    At 0830 CST on February 24, 2025, DHHS-NE was notified by the licensee of a medical underdose occurring during the morning of February 21, 2025. A patient received a Y-90 treatment of 47.25 mCi intended for the right lobe of the liver.  However, only 74 percent of the intended dose reached the right lobe of the liver. DHHS-NE is continuing to follow up on the event.    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.    * * * RETRACTION FROM BRYCE DAVIDSON TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1657 EST ON FEBRUARY 25, 2025 * * *    DHHS NE informed the Headquarters Operations Center that upon further review the Y-90 treatment that underdosed the patient involved shunting and therefore is not a medical event.  The event thus is not reportable.    Notified R4DO (Roldan-Otero) and NMSS Events Notification (email)|
Agreement State|57570|Tennessee Div of Rad Health|World Testing Inc.|1|Cumberland City|TN||R-95009|Y||||||Andrew Holcomb|Brian P. Smith|02/25/2025|12:12:00|02/24/2025|0:00:00|EST|2/25/2025 12:24:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Defrancisco, Anne|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA    The following report was received via email by the Tennessee Division of Radiation Health:    "During a scheduled work visit to the TVA Cumberland City facility, a radiography crew was descending an outside set of stairs covered with ice. The worker slipped on the stairs and released the camera which dropped approximately 20 feet to the ground. The team surveyed the area to ensure it was safe to approach the device. After ensuring the device was secured, it was placed into an overpack and transferred back to the licensee's facility. A minor amount of damage was incurred to the rear of the device.  The team had no indication that the source was compromised.     Manufacturer:  QSA Global   Model:  Sentinel 880D   SN:  D9269   Source:  Ir-192; 89.6 Ci   Source Model:  424-9    Source SN:  12835P    "Corrective actions or reports as well as additional information will be updated with a NMED report within 30 days."    State Event Report ID No.: TN-25-014|
Agreement State|57571|California Radiation Control Prgm|Hoag Hospital Irvine|4|Irvine|CA||8034-30|Y||||||Robert Greger|Kerby Scales|02/25/2025|19:22:00|02/25/2025|0:00:00|PST|2/25/2025 7:40:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Roldan-Otero, Lizette|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following information was received from the California Department of Health (CDPH) via email:    "The radiation safety officer for Hoag Hospital in Irvine called the California Office of Emergency Services to report a potential medical event that occurred during a research treatment that involved a targeted alpha radionuclide therapy. The authorized user prescribed 289 microcuries of Ac-225 in the form of FPI-2265 also known as [225Ac] PMSA imaging therapy; however, the Biodex pump used to administer the dose leaked, and only approximately 80 microcuries were administered.      "The treatment was for metastatic castrate resistant prostate cancer primarily located in bone marrow. CDPH will conduct an investigation of the circumstances of the medical event."    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  |
Agreement State|57573|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Ascend Performance Materials Inc.|4|Alvin|TX||L06630|Y||||||Art Tucker|Brian P. Smith|02/26/2025|18:56:00|02/26/2025|0:00:00|CST|2/26/2025 7:34:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Roldan-Otero, Lizette|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTERS    The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department):    "On February 26, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee that during routine testing, the shutters on three nuclear gauges were found stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operating position for the gauges. The gauges are all Texas Nuclear gauge models; a '5200' model containing a 20 millicurie source, a '5201' model containing a 100 millicurie source, and a '5208' model containing a 4,000 millicurie source. All sources are cesium - 137 sources. The licensee reported that there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to this on/off mechanism failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."    Texas Incident Number: I-10173  |
Agreement State|57574|North Carolina Department of HHS|IQS Inspections|2|Kernersville|NC||041-0766-1|Y||||||Travis Cartoski|Natalie Starfish|02/27/2025|11:00:00|02/27/2025|9:35:00|EST|2/27/2025 11:15:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Defrancisco, Anne|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|Smith, Todd|INES|Logan, Allen|NMSS|Crouch, Howard|IR MOC|||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/12/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA    The following is a summary of an email received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch (NC RMB):    "The NC RMB is currently investigating a missing industrial radiography camera. It is unknown at this time whether the camera was missing or stolen. The licensee reported that they stayed the night at a hotel in Kernersville, NC, and discovered the next morning that the camera was missing. They immediately notified NC RMB and the local police department. They are currently reviewing hotel surveillance cameras and waiting for the police to arrive."    NC Event Number: 250003    Device Info:  Model: Spec 150  S/N: 0320  Source: Ir-192  Activity: 74.0 Ci    Notified external:  DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and FEMA National Watch Center. Emailed: Nuclear SSA and CWMD Watch Desk.    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days.  These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|57576|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Exon Mobile Corporation|4|Mont Belvieu|TX|Chambers|L 03119|Y||||||Arthur L Tucker|Troy Johnson|02/27/2025|17:11:00|02/27/2025|0:00:00|CST|2/27/2025 12:00:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Roldan-Otero, Lizette|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER    The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services:    "On February 27, 2025, the licensee reported that the shutter on a Vega model SH-F2C-45 containing a 500 millicurie (original activity) cesium-137 source was found stuck in the open position during routine testing. Open is the normal operating position. The licensee reported that there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers, due to this on/off mechanism failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."    Texas Incident Number: I-10175  NMED number: TX250014|
Hospital|57577|Goshen General Hospital|Goshen General Hospital|3|Goshen|IN||13-18845-01|N||||||Kelly Stoneberg|Troy Johnson|02/28/2025|16:34:00|05/20/2022|0:00:00|EST|2/28/2025 5:30:00 PM|Non Emergency|30.50(b)(2)|Safety Equipment Failure|||||||Feliz-Adorno, Nestor|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|DAMAGED I-125 SEED    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "During a surgical excision procedure [that occurred on 5/20/2022] in the operating room (OR), a lesion which was previously localized with an I-125 seed was extracted from the patient. A trunode [gamma probe] device was used to identify the location of the seed and to guide the surgeon for the dissection of the breast tissue. After the dissection, the physician visualized the seed on the outside of the tissue specimen while it was still within the breast. Once the specimen was removed and scanned, there were no counts obtained in the patient. The specimen was then placed in a faxitron [x-ray machine] and an image was taken, but no visualization of the seed [occurred]. The surgeon immediately scanned the breast tissue to evaluate if the seed had been left behind. There were zero counts within the breast. The physician then scanned the drapes and sponges and did not identify the seed. The surgeon then proceeded to scan the suction tubing and ultimately the manifold of the suction equipment and was able to identify the seed in the manifold. The OR team then contacted nuclear medicine [personnel] and informed them to secure the suction manifold and secure it in the specimen safe in the frozen room. The manifold was placed in a red biohazard bag and secured in the safe. The operating room and the suction equipment were then surveyed by the surgical techs; the room and equipment measurements were background.     "A nuclear medicine technologist retrieved the manifold from the safe and took the manifold to histopathology to remove the seed. The manifold had to be opened with a screwdriver and trained personnel in histopathology removed the seed. The seed was recovered, but it was in two pieces. One half was the titanium capsule, and the other half was the titanium capsule and the silver rod with the chemically affixed iodine-125. The two halves were then placed in a lead pig. The biohazard bag, manifold, and contents of the manifold measured radioactive and were labeled and placed in storage in the nuclear medicine hot lab.     "All personnel in histopathology and the nuclear medicine technologist were checked for radioactive contamination. Everyone was negative for radioactive contamination. The trash and work area were also tested and were negative. The nuclear medicine technologist then notified his direct report authorized user (AU), the surgeon, and the radiation safety officer (RSO). The AU and surgeon, after hearing the seed was in two halves, made the decision to recall the patient to the hospital to verify background for a third time. The survey was again background, and the AU determined to not initiate potassium iodide treatment regimen. The RSO and nuclear medicine technologist then surveyed the OR personnel, biohazard containers, surgical trash, and operating room. All measurements were background. Wipe tests were performed of the neptune suction machine and the I-125 source. The wipe test of the Neptune was background, and the wipe test of the source indicated to be I-125.     "The RSO has been in constant communication with an Ohio Medical Physicist Consultant (OMPC) health physicist, to make sure all protocols were followed correctly. The RSO also contacted the NRC regional III Health Physicist, to see if this is an incident that needs to be reported to the NRC. 10 CFR part 20, 30 and 35 were reviewed over the phone and it was determined at that time the broken seed was not a reportable event. The NRC regional III Health Physicist later emailed OMPC health physicist with two other reporting requirements for review to determine if a report was needed. After reviewing 10 CFR 30.50 and 10 CFR 35.3067 it was determined it was not a reportable event. The seed and the contaminated suction module will be stored in the nuclear medicine hot lab until it is deemed safe to dispose of properly."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    The I-125 seed contained an estimated activity of 291 microcuries.   |
Power Reactor|57578|Turkey Point|Florida Power And Light|2|Miami|FL|Dade||Y||4|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|Arturo Alvarez|Tenisha Meadows|03/01/2025|5:30:00|03/01/2025|1:01:00|EST|3/6/2025 10:23:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||||||Penmetsa, Ravi|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Standby|0|Hot Shutdown||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 3/7/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 0101 EST on 03/01/25, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single main steam isolation valve '4A MSIV' did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected.     "This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).     "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    Unit 4 will remain in mode 4 until corrected. The MSIV was closed by isolating instrument air.       * * * RETRACTION ON 03/06/2025 AT 2023 FROM BOB MURELL TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    The following information was provided by Florida Power and Light (FPL) via phone and email:    "The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 57578. Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of a single main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The `4A' MSIV failed to fully close on demand during a planned refueling outage shutdown.     "Subsequent to the initial report, FPL has concluded that the '4A' MSIV would have fully closed during an accident scenario based on steam flows that would have been present.     "Therefore, this event is not considered an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is not reportable to the NRC pursuant [to] 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).     "The NRC resident inspector has been notified."    Notified R2DO (Penmetsa).  |
Agreement State|57580|Florida Bureau of Radiation Control|Comprehensive Hematology Oncology|1|Trinity|FL||4657-3|Y||||||Monroe A. Cooper|Ernest West|03/03/2025|12:37:00|02/25/2025|0:00:00|EST|3/4/2025 12:50:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|Miller, Andy|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/11/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following is a summary of information provided by the State of Florida, Bureau of Radiation Control (the BRC) via email:    "[BRC was notified of a medical event involving a high dose rate (HDR) prostate treatment that] occurred on 2/25/25, was identified during the weekend of 3/1/25 to 3/2/25, and was determined to have been a medical event by the facility on 3/3/25. During [delivery of] the second fraction of two fractions, Comprehensive Hematology Oncology incorrectly typed the catheter length into the procedure's software. This resulted in the dose being received 5 cm short of the intended location. The prostate received no dose during this fraction, and the rectum received an estimated 60 percent of its expected dose. The patient and primary physician have been notified. The second fraction has been rescheduled."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    The prescribed dose for the second fraction of the HDR prostate treatment was unknown at the time of the notification. This event is similar but involved a different patient than EN 57581 (FL25-019).    Florida Incident Number: FL25-018    * * * UPDATE ON 03/04/2025 AT 0847 EST FROM MONROE COOPER TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    Current information, retrieved by BRC, states that the intended total dose was 2700 cGy delivered over two fractions.     A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  |
Agreement State|57581|Florida Bureau of Radiation Control|Comprehensive Hematology Oncology|1|Trinity|FL||4657-3|Y||||||Monroe A. Cooper|Josue Ramirez|03/03/2025|12:39:00|02/25/2025|0:00:00|EST|3/4/2025 12:56:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|Miller, Andy|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/11/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following is a summary of information provided by the State of Florida, Bureau of Radiation Control (the BRC) via email:    "[BRC was notified of a medical event involving a high dose rate (HDR) prostate treatment that] occurred on 2/25/25, was identified during the weekend of 3/1/25 to 3/2/25, and was determined to have been a medical event by the facility on 3/3/25. During [delivery of] the second fraction of two fractions, Comprehensive Hematology Oncology incorrectly typed the catheter length into the procedure's software. This resulted in the dose being received 5 cm short of the intended location. The prostate received no dose during this fraction, and the rectum received an estimated 60 percent of its expected dose. The patient and primary physician have been notified. The second fraction has been rescheduled."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    The prescribed dose for the second fraction of the HDR prostate treatment was unknown at the time of the notification. This event is similar but involved a different patient than EN 57580 (FL25-018).    Florida Incident Number: FL25-019    * * * UPDATE ON 03/04/2025 AT 0847 EST FROM MONROE COOPER TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    Current information, retrieved by BRC, states that the intended total dose was 2700 cGy delivered over two fractions.     A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  |
Power Reactor|57582|Limerick|Exelon Nuclear Co.|1|Philadelphia|PA|Montgomery||Y||2|||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|David Holcomb|Ernest West|03/03/2025|18:09:00|03/03/2025|10:44:00|EST|3/3/2025 6:36:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 1044 EST, Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable per technical specification 3.5.1.C.1 during planned surveillance testing due to test equipment failure and subsequent inadvertent isolation of the outboard HPCI turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker primary containment isolation valve. The test equipment was removed, and the vacuum breaker isolation valve was re-opened. HPCI was restored to operable status at 1351.    "Due to inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(D).    "There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  |
Power Reactor|57583|Turkey Point|Florida Power And Light|2|Miami|FL|Dade||Y||4|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|Arturo Alvarez|Ernest West|03/03/2025|22:32:00|03/03/2025|18:03:00|EST|3/3/2025 10:42:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|Degraded Condition|||||||Penmetsa, Ravi|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Refueling||N|0||0|||N|0||0||DEGRADED CONDITION    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 1803 EST on 03/03/25, it was determined that the reactor coolant system pressure boundary does not meet American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, 'Acceptable Standards' due to a through wall leak where the thimble tube connects to penetration number 6. The cause of this event is currently being investigated. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  |
Agreement State|57584|California Radiation Control Prgm|Keck Hospital of USC|4|Los Angeles|CA||5592-19|Y||||||L. Robert Greger|Adam Koziol|03/04/2025|7:38:00|02/27/2025|0:00:00|PST|3/4/2025 7:44:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Gepford, Heather|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch, via email:    "On February 28, 2025, the radiation safety officer (RSO) at Keck Hospital of University of Southern California, contacted the Los Angeles County Radiation Management office to report a possible medical event that occurred on February 27, 2025, during a Y-90 Therasphere radioembolization treatment of a liver cancer patient. The RSO indicated that due to abnormally high readings from the waste container associated with one of two dosage vials, he was unable to confirm the dosage administered to the patient. He sent the waste container to the vendor, Boston Scientific, for evaluation, in order to determine the administered dosage.    "On March 3, 2025, [the RSO] reported via e-mail that the patient was prescribed a total dose of 1300 Gy, but only 695.5 Gy was delivered during the treatment, which was attributed to the dosage from one of two dosage vials being stuck in the tubing. The underdosage meets the criteria for a reportable medical event. The incident did not cause any harm to the patient. Further analysis will be conducted by Boston Scientific to determine the reason for the dosage being stuck in the tubing."    CA Event Number: 022825    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|57585|Florida Bureau of Radiation Control|Central Florida Testing Laboratories|1|Clearwater|FL||1062-1|Y||||||Monroe A. Cooper|Robert A. Thompson|03/04/2025|16:00:00|03/04/2025|10:30:00|EST|3/4/2025 4:24:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/12/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE    The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:    "The BRC received notification from Central Florida Testing Laboratories at 1500 EST 03/04/2025 of a missing Troxler soil moisture density gauge (8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am-241/Be). The transporter was returning to the storage location from a worksite when they were notified by another driver at a stoplight that something fell out of the vehicle. When [the transporter] turned around to see what had fallen, they noticed the gauge was no longer in the back of the vehicle. [The transporter] retraced their steps, returning to the worksite, and could not locate the gauge. The last confirmed possession of the gauge was at approximately 1030 EST on 03/04/2025."    Florida incident number:  FL25-021    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|57586|Monticello|Nuclear Management Company|3|Monticello|MN|Wright||Y|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|Aaron Mann|Robert A. Thompson|03/04/2025|21:46:00|03/04/2025|10:30:00|CST|3/4/2025 9:54:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|97|Power Operation|97|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY - PROGRAMMATIC FAILURE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "On March 4, 2025, fitness-for-duty (FFD) program administrators identified a site employee who was required to be part of the FFD program random testing pool, had been inadvertently removed from it on August 5, 2024. The employee's protected area access has been placed on hold in accordance with the station process. The issue has been placed into the site corrective action program for further review and evaluation to determine the cause. This event notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4)."    The NRC resident inspector has been notified.|
Power Reactor|57587|Browns Ferry|Tennessee Valley Authority|2|Decatur|AL|Limestone||Y||2|||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|Stewart Wetzel|Ian Howard|03/05/2025|9:45:00|03/05/2025|4:18:00|CST|3/5/2025 10:05:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(xii)|Offsite Medical|||||||Penmetsa, Ravi|R2DO|Felts, Russel|NRR EO|Crouch, Howard|IR|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown||N|0||0|||N|0||0||TRANSPORT OF CONTAMINATED PERSON OFFSITE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "On March 5, 2025, at 0418 CST, a contract employee was transported to an off-site medical facility for treatment. The individual was determined to have low levels of contamination prior to being transported.    "This event is reportable [in accordance with] 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an off-site medical facility for treatment."    The NRC resident inspector has been notified.    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    A qualified radiation health physics technician traveled with the contaminated individual to ensure no spread of contamination to the ambulance or to the medical facility.  |
Power Reactor|57588|North Anna|Dominion Generation|2|Richmond|VA|Louisa||Y|05000338|1|2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|Bob Page|Robert A. Thompson|03/05/2025|14:32:00|03/05/2025|10:15:00|EST|3/5/2025 3:34:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Penmetsa, Ravi|R2DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.    The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  |
Agreement State|57590|Wisconsin Radiation Protection|Gundersen Clinic, Ltd|3|La Crosse|WI||063-1121-01|Y||||||David Reindl|Robert A. Thompson|03/05/2025|15:46:00|02/04/2025|0:00:00|CST|3/5/2025 4:15:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSC (Canada), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IODINE-125 SEED    The following information was provided by the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Radiation Protection Section (the Department), via phone and email:    "On February 7, 2025, the Department received a notification that Gundersen Clinic, Ltd (the licensee) was unable to locate a radioactive seed containing a maximum of 100 microcuries of iodine-125. The seed was identified by the licensee as missing on February 4, 2025. The licensee completed an investigation by February 7, 2025, and submitted a written report to the Department. The licensee determined that the seed was likely disposed of as non-radioactive waste following the successful implantation of other seeds. The exact date of the disposal is unknown, but the licensee determined it occurred between November 20, 2024, and February 4, 2025, which are dates when the licensee's seed inventory was fully reconciled. The Department performed a reactive inspection on February 27, 2025, and considers this event closed. The seed is an IsoAid model IAI-125A from lot number 95130; the seeds are not assigned individual serial numbers."    Wisconsin event report ID:  WI250002    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|57591|Kentucky Dept of Radiation Control|Cardinal Health 414, LLC|1| Louisville|KY||KY   202-206-32|Y||||||Angela Wilbers|Karen Cotton-Gross|03/05/2025|14:44:00|02/27/2025|8:00:00|CST|3/5/2025 3:49:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ELUATE EXCEEDED PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATION    The following information was summarized from an email submitted by the Kentucky Department of Radiation Control:    An eluate exceeded the permissible concentration listed in 10 CFR 35.3204(a) at the time of generator elution. The permissible concentration cannot exceed a ratio of 0.15 microcuries of molybdenumm-99 per millicurie of technetium-99m. The eluate measured 34.6 microcuries Mo-99 to 16.6 millicuries Tc-99m which is a ratio of 2.1.     No doses went out to patients from this elution. The generator had been eluted earlier in the week without incident.     The manufacturer of the generator (Curium, lot number 914-025-023) was notified. The generator has been segregated awaiting return to Curium.|
Agreement State|57592|MA Radiation Control Program|QSA Global, Inc.|1|Burlington|MA||12-8361|Y||||||Bob Locke|Robert A. Thompson|03/05/2025|17:03:00|03/05/2025|0:00:00|EST|3/5/2025 5:43:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Ford, Monica|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE    The following information was provided by the Massachusetts Division of Radiation Control, Bureau of Climate and Environmental Health (the Agency), via email:    "On 3/5/2025 at 1549 EST, QSA Global, Inc. notified the Agency that a source imported from India was leaking. QSA Global performed two leak tests on the source upon receipt. The results of the leak tests were 0.008 micro-curies and 0.004 micro-curies. QSA Global confirmed that no contamination exists outside of the container where the source is stored."    "Isotope: Co-60  "Source model number: A424-13  "Source serial number: 102732(B)  "Form: sealed source  "Activity: 13 Ci    "The reporting requirement is immediate [per] 105 CMR 120.288, reports of leaking or contaminated sources."|
Agreement State|57593|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Honeywell International Inc|4|Orange|TX||G 02243|Y||||||Art Tucker|Robert A. Thompson|03/05/2025|17:31:00|03/05/2025|0:00:00|CST|3/5/2025 5:54:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Gepford, Heather|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER    The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "On March 5, 2025, the Department was notified by Honeywell International Inc (the licensee) that prior to performing maintenance on a vessel, it was found that the shutter on an Ohmart model SH-F2 gauge was stuck in the open position. Open is the normal position for the gauge. The gauge contains a 375 millicurie (original activity) cesium-137 source. The licensee reported that a service provider has been contacted, and the gauge should be repaired by March 7, 2025. The licensee reported the area around the vessel the gauge is mounted to has been isolated and posted 'No Entry'. The licensee reported that there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers, due to this on/off mechanism failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."    Texas incident number: 10178  NMED number:  TX250015  |
Agreement State|57594|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Days & Crawford Scrap Metal|3|Crystal Lake|IL||GL 9223735|Y||||||Zach Mengel|Bill Nytko|03/06/2025|12:32:00|03/05/2025|0:00:00|CST|3/6/2025 12:37:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER    The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email.    "On March 6, 2025, the Agency made the determination that Days & Crawford Scrap Metal (GL 9223735), lost an X-Ray fluorescence analyzer device (Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC, XLp-828q, s/n 11540). The Agency reached out to the registrant on February 11, 2025, to inquire about delinquent payments for the device's registration. The registrant responded to the Agency on March 5, 2025, that they were unable to locate the device. The device contains three sealed sources: 14 mCi of americium-241; 40 mCi of cadmium-109; and 0.005 mCi of americium-241. At this time, this is considered an accidental loss due to poor oversight and is not related to any criminal theft or diversion. This event is currently under Agency investigation. Further details will be entered as they are received."    Item Number: IL250010    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|57596|Texas Dept of State Health Services|National Inspection Services, LLC|4|Mentone,|TX||I 05930|Y||||||Art Tucker|Robert A. Thompson|03/06/2025|20:31:00|03/06/2025|16:00:00|CST|3/13/2025 7:20:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Gepford, Heather|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|Dafna Silberfeld|NMSS|Crouch, Howard|IR|Alex Brown|ILTAB|INES National Officer|Email|NMSS INES Coordinator|Email|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA    The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "On March 6, 2025, the Department received a call from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO). He reported that at around 1600 hours a radiography crew reported losing a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 95.4 curie iridium-192 source. The RSO stated that the source was in the fully shielded position. The RSO stated that the radiographers had completed an exposure on a pipeline and the radiographer trainer told the trainee to store the exposure device. [The radiographer trainer] then went to the cab of the truck to do some paperwork. The trainee set the exposure device on the back of the truck with the guide tube removed but the 35-foot crank outs still attached. The trainee failed to secure the device in the truck. The radiographers drove [toward] the next site. The RSO stated that they traveled about a mile and realized the exposure device was no longer on the back of the truck. The radiographers turned around and retraced the path they had traveled. They did not find the device. The RSO stated that while looking for the device [the radiographers] passed two trucks, which they stopped and asked if anyone had seen the device. Both said they had not seen it. The RSO stated that they have 4 radiography crews searching in the area for the device. The operations manager is also in the area searching for the device. The RSO stated that he has tried to contact the sheriff for the area and has not been able to do so. He stated he will continue to call them until he reaches someone. The radiographers were working approximately 10 miles east of Mentone, Texas, north of state highway 302. The RSO said he would provide GPS coordinates as soon as he received them.     "Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."    Texas Incident Number: 10179  NMED Number: TX250016    Notified:  DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), CNSNS (Mexico) email.    * * * UPDATE ON 03/13/2025 AT 1843 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "On March 13, 2025, the licensee contacted the Department and stated they had received a phone call from an individual who stated they had found its exposure device. The individual stated they found it on March 13, 2025, where the licensee believed it had been lost. The individual stated they had taken it to their home in Pecos, Texas. They stated this was their first day back at work since they found the device and saw the posting about the device. They agreed to meet at the individual's home at 1700 CDT. The licensee's radiation safety officer, corporate safety officer, the local sheriff, and two deputies arrived at the individual's home at 1715 CDT. The individual took them to a small shed behind their house. The shed was locked. The individual stated the gauge remained in the locked shed from the time they brought it to their home until then. The exposure device was found on the floor in the shed. The crank outs were still attached, and the dust cover was still on the front of the device. Both the exposure device and the crank outs appeared to be undamaged. The individual stated they had not attempted to operate the device. The licensee took the device to their vehicle to transport it back to its normal storage location. The licensee stated that dose rates off the device were normal and no individual would have received any significant exposure due to this event."    Internal notifications:  R4DO (Warnick), NMSS (Silberfeld), ILTAB (Brown), IR MOC (Crouch), NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (email), ILTAB, (email), INES National Officer (Smith), NMSS INES Coordinator (Allen).    External notifications:  DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), CNSNS (Mexico) email.    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days.  These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  |
Agreement State|57597|Texas Dept of State Health Services|WSB, LLC|4|Melissa|TX|Collin|06986|Y||||||Bruce Hammond|Josue Ramirez|03/08/2025|11:15:00|03/07/2025|0:00:00|CST|3/8/2025 11:20:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Gepford, Heather|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE    The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "On March 7, 2025, at approximately 1700 CST, the Department was notified by the licensee that a Troxler 3440 moisture density gauge containing an 8 mCi Cesium-137 source (original strength) and a 40 mCi (original strength) Am-241/Be source were damaged by being run over by construction equipment at a job site in Melissa, Texas. The radiation safety officer (RSO) was onsite, the sources were intact, but the gauge was damaged to an extent that the cesium source could not be retracted into a safe position. The RSO, in coordination with the Department, removed the gauge from the accident site, and made the device safe by placing it in a container filled with sand. The damaged gauge was then secured to the container, the container was secured to the licensee's vehicle, and the damaged gauge was transported to their vault which was less than 1 mile away. The manufacturer, who has a local repair facility, was already closed for the weekend so the damaged device was placed in the vault at the licensee's facility for transport to the manufacturer on Monday. The RSO performed several surveys at the accident site, with the gauge in the truck, and at the licensee's vault. All readings were well within normal limits. No overexposure occurred as the only time the source was exposed was when the RSO transferred it from the ground to the sand filled container. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."    Texas Incident Number: I-10181  Texas NMED Number: TX250018|
Agreement State|57598|WA Office of Radiation Protection|Terra Associates Inc.|4|Redmond|WA||I0246|Y||||||Dane Blakinger|Kerby Scales|03/11/2025|16:32:00|03/07/2025|14:30:00|PDT|3/21/2025 7:52:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 3/24/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/FOUND GAUGE    The following information was received from the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:    "On March 7, 2025, at 1613 PDT, the Department was notified that a portable gauge (Troxler 3411-B) had fallen from a vehicle. This notification initially came from the Washington State Emergency Operations Officer of the Washington Military Department. The notification stated that the licensee had submitted a police report and was actively searching for the source.    "At 1633, the Department Emergency Response Duty Officer (ERDO) forwarded the notification to the Radioactive Materials Section Manager. At 1711, the Materials Section Manager contacted the licensee by phone to determine the scope of response necessary. The licensee informed the Department that the gauge was contained in a locked box and was believed to be lost or stolen. The licensee called back at 1716, informing the Department that the gauge had been found with the box locked, intact, and no signs of damage to the source contained within the shielded gauge. The gauge was found along the side of the road, in a ditch and away from any pedestrian traffic. No exposure is believed to have occurred to the public when considering the source was in a shielded position and inside of a locked Troxler class A container.    "The source was verified to be intact and sealed. Operational verifications of the gauge were performed, and the gauge is functioning normally. The gauge is in the possession of the licensee.     "A final report will be submitted to the NRC after the licensee has responded with corrective actions."    Washington Incident Number: WA-25-005    * * * UPDATE ON 3/21/2025 AT 1947 EDT FROM DANE BLAKINGER TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *    The following information was received from the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:    "The licensee corrective actions include mandatory retraining of gauge handling and locking procedures for all gauge users at Terra Associates Inc., an increased [frequency] of user audits of locking procedures from every 6 months to every 3 months, and GPS trackers installed on all gauge transportation boxes. The Department will review corrective actions during future inspections, to include a review of this report and ensure licensee is demonstrating compliance with proposed corrective actions."    Notified R4DO (Bywater) and NMSS Events Notification (email)  |
Part 21|57599|Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.||3|Middleburg Heights|OH|||Y||||||Timothy Franchuk|Kerby Scales|03/12/2025|13:15:00|01/07/2025|0:00:00|EDT|3/12/2025 1:47:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(a)(2)|Interim Eval Of Deviation|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION    The following is a synopsis of information provided by Curtiss-Wright via email:    On January 7, 2025, Rosemount notified Curtiss-Wright Middleburg Heights regarding Generation 3 quick disconnect connectors (QDCs) with no connection on at least one wire, with the bad connection not favoring one specific wire. Rosemount identified five Generation 3 QDCs out of 122 tested, where the issue is specifically in the continuity of the wires. All Generation 3 QDCs from the order are currently on hold at Rosemount and have not been shipped to any customer.    On January 9, 2025, Rosemount sent Curtiss-Wright two of the five questionable Generation 3 QDCs. Curtiss-Wright performed an initial evaluation to confirm the issue. The results were initially confirmed, but with minor manipulation the Generation 3 QDCs no longer showed negative results. Curtiss-Wright and Rosemount have agreed to send all the questionable Generation 3 QDCs to an outside testing entity to help perform a failure analysis to assist in determining the root cause.     Curtiss-Wright anticipates completing the evaluation by Tuesday, May 6, 2025.    There are no known plants affected.    Contact Information:  Tim Franchuk  Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division  Director of Quality Assurance  (513) 201-2176  tfranchuk@curtisswright.com  |
Power Reactor|57600|McGuire|Duke Power|2|Cornelius|NC|Mecklenburg||Y|05000369|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|Daniel Peeler|Kerby Scales|03/12/2025|17:03:00|03/12/2025|12:00:00|EDT|3/12/2025 5:12:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Suber, Gregory|R2DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|95|Power Operation|95|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 3/18/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  |
Non-Agreement State|57601|Carewell Health|Carewell Health|3|Royal Oak|MI||21-01333-01|N||||||Dan Lake|Robert A. Thompson|03/13/2025|16:46:00|03/10/2025|9:00:00|EDT|3/13/2025 4:59:00 PM|Non Emergency|20.2201(a)(1)(ii)|Lost/Stolen LNM>10x|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|LOST AND RECOVERED PET CAMERA    The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:    The licensee reported that on March 6, 2025, a positron emission tomography (PET) camera with a 1490 microcurie germanium-68 sealed source was inadvertently shipped offsite without first removing the source. The licensee discovered that the source was unaccounted for on March 10, 2025, and concluded that it had been inadvertently shipped offsite with the camera. On March 13, 2025, the licensee's vendor for the camera located the camera in a vendor-contracted warehouse in Cudahy, WI. The vendor warehouse is not a licensed radioactive materials facility. Vendor personnel (field services engineer and health physicist) inspected the camera, which was secured in its storage container with the source in the shielded position, and determined there was no radiological impact. The vendor personnel secured the camera in a locked location at the warehouse and made warehouse personnel aware of the camera's location. The vendor is making arrangements to retrieve the camera.    The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 3 office. The vendor will be notifying the State of Wisconsin.    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|57602|Wolf Creek|Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.|4|Burlington|KS|Coffey||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|Travis Tillman|Kerby Scales|03/13/2025|16:55:00|03/06/2025|6:16:00|CST|3/13/2025 5:20:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    A non-licensed employee brought an illegal substance into the protected area. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
Power Reactor|57603|Turkey Point|Florida Power And Light|2|Miami|FL|Dade||Y||4|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|Steve Murano|Robert A. Thompson|03/13/2025|19:40:00|03/13/2025|19:02:00|EDT|3/14/2025 5:36:00 AM|Unusual Event|50.72(a) (1) (i)|Emergency Declared|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|Mark Miller|R2RA|Greg Bowman|NRR|Crouch, Howard|IR|Dave Gasperson|R2 PAO|Russell Felts|NRR EO|Craig Erlanger|NSIR|||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 3/17/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 1902 EDT on 3/13/2025 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Unit 4 declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power [to the '4B' 4KV bus]. The '4B' 4KV bus was re-energized from the '4B' emergency diesel generator (EDG). The '4A' 4KV bus is de-energized as part of the pre-planned outage scope. The cause of the loss of Unit 4 startup transformer is not known at this time. All plant parameters are stable."    State and local agencies were notified. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.    Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    The licensee is evaluating the startup transformer before transferring the '4B' 4KV bus back to offsite power. Spent fuel pool cooling remained in-service as it was powered from Unit 3. Unit 3 was unaffected and remains at 100 percent power.    * * * UPDATE ON 03/13/2025 AT 2318 EDT FROM DANIEL BITTNER TO KERBY SCALES * * *    "At 2056 EDT on 3/13/2025, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Unit 4 terminated the Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The event was terminated due to more than one emergency power source being available; `4B' emergency diesel generator and `4D' bus station blackout tie."    Notified R2DO (Pearson), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).    * * * RETRACTION ON 03/14/2025 AT 0518 EDT FROM DANIEL BITTNER TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *    "Turkey Point Nuclear Station Unit 4 is retracting this notification based on additional information not immediately identified at the time of notification. Following the loss of the '4B' 4kV bus event on 3/13/25, the emergency action level (EAL) technical bases document for CU2.1 was reviewed and identified that more than one emergency power source was still available at the time of the event and could have been credited. Specifically, the '4B' EDG and the '4D' bus station blackout cross tie (powered by Unit 3) emergency power sources were still available. The initial report was based on the available information at the time pursuant to emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements.     "The NRC Resident has been notified."    Notified R2DO (Pearson), Region 2 RA (Miller), NRR (Bowman). IR MOC (Crouch), Region 2 PAO (Gasperson), NRR EO (Felts), and NSIR (Erlanger)  |
Power Reactor|57604|Turkey Point|Florida Power And Light|2|Miami|FL|Dade||Y||4|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|Dan Bittner|Jordan Wingate|03/14/2025|0:18:00|03/13/2025|18:47:00|EDT|3/14/2025 12:47:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF '4B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR     The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 1847 EDT on 3/13/25, with Unit 4 in mode 6 and defueled, an actuation of the 4B emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred when the Unit 4 startup transformer '4B' 4kV Bus Supply Breaker '4AB05' tripped open. The '4B' EDG automatically started and energized the '4B' 4kV Bus as designed when the undervoltage condition caused the '4B' sequencer loss of offsite power signal to be received.    "This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).     "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    All systems responded as expected for the loss of voltage.  There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.  The cause of the breaker opening is under investigation. Power remains available to the '4B' 4kV Bus via both the '4B' EDG and the station blackout tie bus.  |
Power Reactor|57605|Vogtle 3/4|Southern Nuclear Operating Company|2|Waynesboro|GA|Burke||Y|05200025|3|4||[3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000|Sarah Gillham|Tenisha Meadows|03/14/2025|7:58:00|03/13/2025|11:57:00|EDT|3/14/2025 8:06:00 AM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    A licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a test specified by the FFD testing program. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  |
Power Reactor|57606|LaSalle|Exelon Nuclear Co.|3|Marseilles|IL|La Salle||Y|05000373|1|2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|Matthew Tutich|Jordan Wingate|03/14/2025|11:48:00|03/13/2025|13:00:00|CDT|3/14/2025 11:48:00 AM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Edwards, Rhex|R3DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    A licensed employee violated the FFD policy. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  |
Agreement State|57607|New Mexico Rad Control Program|Lovelace Medical Center|4|Albuquerque|NM||MI210|Y||||||Bobby Bicknell|Sam Colvard|03/14/2025|18:46:00|03/14/2025|0:00:00|MDT|3/14/2025 7:07:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following information was provided by the New Mexico Environment Department, Radiation Control Bureau via email:    "The New Mexico Environment Department, Radiation Control Bureau was informed of a medical event at approximately 1605 MDT on Friday, March 14, 2025.    "Incident date: March 4, 2025. Discovery date: March 14, 2025.    "Lovelace Medical Center, license number (MI210)  "Prescribed Activity: 0.5 GBq  "Delivered Activity: 0.4 GBq  "Percent Delivered: -20 percent  "Possible cause: low dose prescribed and/or possible issues with the catheter.     "The facility stated they are working on the 15-day report."    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  |
Agreement State|57608|California Radiation Control Prgm|Stronghold Inspection|4|Martinez|CA||TX L06918|Y||||||L. Robert Greger|Robert A. Thompson|03/14/2025|20:26:00|03/14/2025|2:00:00|PDT|3/14/2025 8:36:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CRIMPED SOURCE GUIDE TUBE    The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch via email:    "A reciprocity licensee, Stronghold Inspection (TX license number L06918), was conducting industrial radiography at a laydown yard located on the Martinez Refining Company site (RML #3590). At about 0200 PDT, a pipe that was being radiographed rolled onto the guide tube of the exposure device (QSA Global 880 Delta, s/n D17238), crimping the guide tube and preventing the 2.73 TBq Ir-192 sealed source (QSA Model 8424-9, s/n 12805P) from retracting into its shielded position. The licensee reports that a perimeter spanning about 200 feet in radius was established. The exposure rate at the perimeter is less than 2 mR/hr and is under constant surveillance. The source is currently located in the collimator at the end of the guide tube. The licensee has requested the assistance of QSA's source retrieval team.  Source retrieval is scheduled to begin upon arrival at approximately 1800 PDT.  RHB inspectors arrived onsite at about 1000 PDT and will observe the operations until the source has been secured."    California 5010 number:  031425  |
Power Reactor|57609|Grand Gulf|Entergy Nuclear|4|Port Gibson|MS|Claiborne||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|Mike Riehl|Sam Colvard|03/15/2025|15:32:00|03/15/2025|12:48:00|CST|3/15/2025 3:47:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||||Warnick, Greg|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC START OF THE DIVISION III EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "On March 15, 2025, at 1248 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was operating in mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power when a grid disturbance (degraded voltage) resulted in a valid specified system actuation (automatic start) of the division Ill emergency diesel generator (EDG). The division Ill EDG started and repowered the '17' AC safety-related electrical bus as designed.    "GGNS is currently in mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event and no other safety system actuations occurred.    "This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that results in a valid specified system actuation due to the automatic start of the division Ill EDG on bus undervoltage due to a grid disturbance.    "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."  |
Agreement State|57610|Texas Dept of State Health Services|Ninyo & Moore Geotech & Env. Sci.|4|Houston|TX||L06379|Y||||||Sindiso Ncube|Robert A. Thompson|03/17/2025|11:30:00|03/17/2025|6:30:00|CDT|3/17/2025 12:07:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Bywater, Russell|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE    The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:    "On March 17, 2025, the Department received a notification from the licensee regarding the theft of a moisture density gauge. The stolen gauge is a Troxler 3430 containing an 8 mCi Cs-137 sealed source and a 40 mCi Am-241/Be sealed source. The theft is believed to have occurred between 1700 CDT on Saturday, March 15, and 0630 CDT on March 17, 2025. According to the licensee, a technician worked at a scheduled site in Fulshear, Texas on March 15, 2025, but failed to return the gauge to the office for storage. Instead, the technician without approval took the gauge home and left it in the back of a truck. The gauge was stored in its transport container, secured with double locks and placed in the uncovered bed of the truck. The licensee stated that the thieves cut both locks before stealing the gauge in its container. At around 0630 CDT on March 17, 2025, the technician discovered that the gauge had been stolen. The technician immediately reported the theft to the licensee's radiation safety officer and the Houston Police Department. The licensee is currently investigating the matter. The licensee reported that there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the public.     "Additional Information will be provided in accordance with SA300."    Texas Incident Number: I-10183  NMED number: TX250019    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.|
Agreement State|57611|Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency|Alton Steel|3|Alton|IL||IL-01738-01|Y||||||Gary Forsee|Sam Colvard|03/17/2025|17:12:00|03/17/2025|0:00:00|CDT|3/17/2025 7:01:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SEALED SOURCE    The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:    "The Agency was contacted on March 17, 2025, by Alton Steel Inc., to advise of an incident earlier that day in which molten steel overflowed and damaged a 2.3 millicurie Berthold P-2608-100 Co-60 sealed source. Agency staff performed a reactive inspection the same day and determined the damage was limited to the source's pinned-on threaded connector (i.e., not the `active' portion of the source containing the Co-60 wire). Workers appropriately implemented updated emergency procedures, stopped production, isolated the impacted source/mold and notified the radiation safety officer. Extensive Agency surveys and a review of actions taken indicate there were no exposures or site contamination as a result of this incident.    "Both pieces of the source were recovered and placed into secure storage. Shielding was adequate to keep unrestricted areas below 2 mrem per hour. Surveys of the casting mold, the lid, the casting floor, produced billets, and casting remnants evidenced no contamination. The broken piece of the source evidenced no activity, consistent with expectations after a review of the engineering drawings of the source. Due to fouling of the source, the serial number could not be immediately read. A qualified service provider will be contacted to perform leak tests and obtain the source serial number.    "Notably, the licensee has had three similar incidents in which sealed sources were damaged as a result of casting overflows. The root cause is an inherent design issue with the continuous casting molds where severe overflows can penetrate a lubrication circuit and flow directly down the dip tube holding the sealed source. As a result of previous enforcement action, the licensee has completed engineering and prototyping of an improved design which will protect the sealed sources. Agency staff have asked for an expedited timeline and will seek appropriate enforcement action for implementation. Agency action on the license, enabling these changes, will be issued March 18, 2025. Previously identified concerns of personnel exposure and site contamination have been addressed through updated training and new procedures."    Illinois Incident Number: IL250011|
Agreement State|57612|California Radiation Control Prgm|California State Univ Long Beach |4|Long Beach|CA||0217-19|Y||||||L. Robert Greger|Robert A. Thompson|03/17/2025|23:34:00|03/14/2025|0:00:00|PDT|3/17/2025 11:36:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Bywater, Russell|R4DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|ILTAB,    (EMAIL)|EMAIL|CNSNS (Mexico), -|EMAIL|||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN    The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health via email:    "On Monday, March 17, 2025, the California State University - Long Beach alternate radiation safety officer reported the loss of one tritium exit sign from their campus' Carpenter Performing Art Center. This exit sign was an Isolite tritium exit sign, made on April 5th, 2015, Model 2000, S/N H50630, with an initial tritium activity of 0.281 TBq (7.6 Ci). The exit sign was officially declared lost on March 14, 2025, after a thorough search by campus environmental health and safety personnel could not locate the exit sign. A contamination survey of the exit sign's designated location did not show the presence of tritium contamination. The licensee will continue to look for the exit sign and provide additional information when available. Corrective actions included refresher training, increased physical inventories of all campus tritium exit signs, and review of methods of securing of exit signs to mounting surfaces."    California 5010 number:  031725    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL    Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|57613|Florida Bureau of Radiation Control|UES Professional Solutions, LLC|1|Orlando|FL||4696-1|Y||||||Mark Seidensticker|Bethany Cecere|03/18/2025|13:17:00|03/18/2025|10:36:00|EDT|3/18/2025 1:19:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Elkhiamy, Sarah|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO A TROXLER GAUGE    The following is a summary of information provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:    BRC was notified by Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) dispatch at 1036 EDT on 03/18/2025 that an FHP trooper was on the scene of a multi-vehicle accident involving a pickup truck transporting a soil moisture density gauge. BRC spoke to the FHP trooper on-scene, who reported the gauge case was intact, with no apparent damage, still secured in the back of the pickup truck.    A BRC inspector responded to the scene and confirmed the gauge and case were both intact and secure, with no apparent damage. No injuries were reported to the driver of the truck. Radiation readings of the gauge were normal, and a swipe survey revealed no leakage. The gauge was released to the owner.     The gauge is a Troxler, model 3440, serial number 25401, containing a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source, serial number 47-21689, and an 8 mCi Cs-137 source, serial number 75-8235.    FL incident report number:  FL25-023.|
Power Reactor|57614|Prairie Island|Nuclear Management Company|3|Welch|MN|Goodhue||Y|05000282|1|2||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|Timothy Thomas|Ernest West|03/18/2025|14:04:00|03/18/2025|10:59:00|CST|3/18/2025 2:17:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 1059 [CDT] on March 18, 2025, it was determined that a licensed operator failed a [random] test specified by the fitness-for-duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.     "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  |
Power Reactor|57615|Millstone|Dominion Generation|1|Waterford|CT|New London||N||3|||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|Kevin Woods|Ernest West|03/18/2025|16:59:00|03/18/2025|10:26:00|EDT|4/4/2025 11:03:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel|||||Elkhiamy, Sarah|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 4/7/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY INOPERABLE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax:    "At 1026 [EDT] on March 18, 2025, it was discovered that the secondary containment boundary door was found fully open, rendering the secondary containment boundary inoperable, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The door was closed at 1029 on March 18, 2025, and the secondary containment boundary was declared operable.     "There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.     "There has been no impact to Unit 2 and Unit 3 continues to operate at 100 percent power."      * * * RETRACTION ON 04/04/25 AT 1049 EDT FROM RYAN ROBILLARD TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax:    "This report retracts the 8-hour notification made on March 18, 2025, for NRC Event Number EN #57615.  "NRC Event report number 57615 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) where a secondary containment boundary door was found fully open, rendering the secondary containment boundary inoperable. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.  "Upon further review of the conditions that existed at the time, MPS3 has concluded that the door was not blocked open. The time duration from the activation of the door security alarm to the arrival of security personnel and the subsequent closure of the door was less than four minutes. The door was left unattended for less than 40 seconds, which is less than the five-minute criteria for entry and egress without special provisions. The supplementary leak collection and release system drawdown test has sufficient margin to accommodate this unattended door time. The evaluation concluded that the secondary containment boundary remained operable throughout this event and did not lose the ability to perform its safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.    "The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    This event was originally reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee confirmed that the retraction is applicable to both notifications.    Notified R1DO (Bickett)|
Power Reactor|57616|Perry|Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company|3|Perry|OH|Lake||Y|05000440|1|||[1] GE-6|Clifford G. Jones, Jr.|Bethany Cecere|03/18/2025|19:53:00|03/18/2025|9:30:00|EST|3/18/2025 8:01:00 PM|Non Emergency|26.719|Fitness For Duty|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|FFD Group, |EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|Y|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Refueling||N|0||0|||N|0||0||FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 0930 EDT, March 18, 2025, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a [random] test specified by the fitness-for-duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Agreement State|57617|Minnesota Department of Health|IRISNDT, Inc.|3|St. Paul Park|MN||1238|Y||||||Tyler Kruse|Ernest West|03/19/2025|11:31:00|03/13/2025|0:00:00|CDT|3/19/2025 12:23:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE    The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email:    "On March 13, 2025, during a radiography exposure, the radiography crew noted that too much drive cable extended into the guide tube. The radiographer cranked in to investigate and was unable to return the source to the exposure device. The radiation safety officer (RSO) was notified, and the crew began expanding their boundaries. The RSO initiated source retrieval operations. After shielding the source with lead shot, and performing some tests, it was determined that the source had not disconnected and that the guide tube was not attached to the camera. The RSO then `jiggled the drive cable' and was able to crank the source back into the shielded position. The RSO estimates that the source was exposed for less than 1 hour.    "After investigation, the RSO determined that the guide tube was never properly secured to the quick connect at the end of the exposure device. Cranking the source out to the end of the guide tube disconnected the guide tube from the exposure device. When retracting the source, the source pigtail caught on the quick connect port on the end of the exposure device due to the weight of the guide tube on the drive cable. To determine if the source was still connected, the RSO pulled on the controls and thus the drive cable and pig tail were pulled out of the guide tube. With the weight of the guide tube now off of the drive cable, the RSO was able to jiggle the controls and dislodge the pigtail from the quick connect at the end of the exposure device and retract the source completely.    "MDH was notified of the event on March 18, 2025, at approximately 1350 [CDT]. MDH is considering enforcement action due to the late notification of the event. An on-site investigation is planned for March 20, 2025.    "The device is a Source Production and Equipment Company (SPEC) model 150 radiography camera."    Minnesota Event Report ID: MN250002  |
Power Reactor|57618|Monticello|Nuclear Management Company|3|Monticello|MN|Wright||Y|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|Tom Johnson|Ernest West|03/19/2025|16:12:00|03/19/2025|11:36:00|CDT|3/19/2025 4:30:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS Actuation - Critical|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|97|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At approximately 1136 CDT on March 19, 2025, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 97 percent power, a reactor water level transient occurred which resulted in an automatic reactor scram on low reactor pressure vessel water level. The scram was uncomplicated with all systems responding as expected. The cause of the event is under investigation. Containment isolation valves actuated and closed on a valid group 2 signal.     "Operations responded and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.    "This event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group 2 isolation signal.     "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.     "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The state of Minnesota as well as Wright and Sherburne counties will be notified."    The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:    At the time of the event, condensate flushing evolutions were ongoing. It should be noted that prior to the reactor scram, a single feedwater pump tripped which would lower reactor water level.|
Agreement State|57619|New York State Dept. of Health|NRD, LLC|1|Grand Island|NY||C1391|Y||||||Nathaniel A. Kishbaugh |Ernest West|03/20/2025|13:53:00|03/07/2025|0:00:00|EDT|3/20/2025 2:34:00 PM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Elkhiamy, Sarah|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|Allen, Logan|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE    The following information was received from the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) via phone and email:    "New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) received an email on the morning of 3/20/2025, from the Chief Operating Officer of NRD, LLC to report a potential overexposure of a production worker.     "On 3/7/2025, a production worker had received an acid burn on his forearm resulting in a first-degree burn where the skin was reddened but not visually broken. The chemical agent causing this burn is suspected to be nitric acid with Am-241 contamination used in routine production activities for Am-241 foils. The exact nature of the work being performed, cause of this burn/contamination, and personal protective equipment (PPE) worn by the affected individual is unknown at this time. The initial skin contamination was 8,900 disintegrations per minute (dpm) according to NRD. After 7 hours of decontamination, using water and mild soap, NRD states that they were able to successfully decontaminate some of the areas on the individual's forearm, however, 5,900 dpm remained on the skin. Nasal swabs and whole-body surveys returned as below background levels according to NRD. NRD, LLC stated that only this one worker had been contaminated from this event.     "NRD states that they believed that this contamination was localized to skin contamination with no evidence of internal uptake. However, this individual has been removed from work and a series of bioassays were performed (24-hour composite urine collection) on 3/8/2025, 3/11/2025, and 3/16/2025 and sent to GEL Laboratories for rush analysis. The 3/8/2025 result showed 22.9 picocuries per liter of Am-241, further confirmed via gamma spectroscopy. This preliminary report was provided to NRD on 3/19/2025.    "NRD states that they performed dose reconstruction from this event using the baseline bioassay, last monthly routine bioassay (collected on 3/5/2025), and the singular reactionary bioassay result available from the collection on 3/8/2025 (reported to NRD on 3/19). NRD, LLC used the integrated modules for bioassay (IMBA) using an ingestion-specific intake model, which indicates 5.47 rem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) and 128 rem committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the bone surfaces. These doses are not confirmed as official, but estimates provided the information available at this time. Given the nature of intake and the suspected pathways for intake (e.g., dermal absorption), NYSDOH is awaiting clarification for the assumptions and rationale used in estimating this intake as well as seeking additional information on the nasal samples collected/analyzed and the whole-body surveys performed pre-, during and post-decontamination.    "Prior to reporting this event to NYSDOH, NRD, LLC contacted Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) on the evening of 3/19/2025. NRD, LLC informed NYSDOH that REAC/TS was notified and did not recommend any medical intervention. NYSDOH called REAC/TS independently on March 20, 2025, and spoke to the medical team that spoke to NRD. It was noted that REAC/TS did not have enough information at the point of discussion with NRD to determine if any intervention was necessary and requested NRD, LLC to provide additional information on this event. NYSDOH shared information on this event reported by NRD with REAC/TS following this call. NYSDOH immediately recommended to NRD, LLC that they continue timely follow-up with REAC/TS to determine if medical intervention may be necessary per their clinical recommendation, particularly since two additional bioassay samples (3/11/2025 and 3/16/2025; collection dates) were being analyzed and may strengthen the confidence in performing dose reconstruction. If medical intervention is deemed clinically necessary, the timeliness of medical intervention may directly impact the amount of dose received by the affected worker. Because of this, NYSDOH strongly recommended to NRD that they prioritize resolving any information needed for REAC/TS to make this determination.    "NYSDOH has requested a significant amount of additional information and documentation on this event including, but not limited to, the modeled pathways and methods for dose reconstruction, the extent of personnel and area contamination, immediate protective actions, and causes and corrective actions from this event. NYSDOH has also identified several suspected items of noncompliance pertaining to this event and will follow up on these observations.     "It is not suspected that there is any risk to public health or the environment from this event. NYSDOH is monitoring this event and has assigned NYSDOH Incident Number 1523 to internally track this event. NYSDOH will provide an update to this notification once additional information is available."    NMED Event Report ID Number: NY-25-04|
Non-Agreement State|57620|Protect, LLC|Protect, LLC|3|Joplin|MO||15-29301-02|N||||||Matt Slaymaker|Tenisha Meadows|03/21/2025|13:03:00|03/21/2025|10:43:00|CDT|4/4/2025 12:26:00 PM|Non Emergency|30.50(b)(2)|Safety Equipment Failure|||||||Havertape, Joshua|R3DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|EN Revision Imported Date: 4/7/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE    The following is a summary of information provided by Protect, LLC via phone:    At 1043 CDT on 3/21/2025, the radiography crew was unable to retract the source for a radiography camera while performing work at a customer's manufacturing facility in Joplin, MO. The crew went to retract the source into the radiography camera, but the source did not move. The crew established boundaries to limit exposure to less than 2 millirem/hr. The crew notified site personnel and is monitoring the posted boundaries until the source is secured. Additional licensee personnel are enroute to retrieve the source. No personnel exposures due to the malfunction have occurred.    Additional information:  Manufacturer and model number: QSA Global 880  Serial number: A424-9  Source: Ir-192  Activity: 13 Ci    * * * UPDATE ON 03/21/2025 AT 1712 EDT FROM MATT SLAYMAKER TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *    The following information was provided by Protect, LLC via email:    "On 3/21/2025, Protect, LLC had an industrial radiography source disconnect incident occur while at a customer's manufacturing facility in Joplin, MO.  At approximately 1043 CDT, during the crew's first source retraction, it was determined that the source had become disconnected from the drive cable. The crew immediately recognized the situation through the use of their dosimetry equipment and established the emergency 2 millirem/hr boundaries.  The regional radiation safety officer (RRSO) was immediately notified of the issue. The RRSO informed the crew to maintain surveillance of the restricted area barricades and to wait until the RRSO and corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) arrived before any further actions were taken.  The CRSO and RRSO arrived at the jobsite at approximately 1340 CDT to retrieve the source. The source was secured back into the exposure device at 1404 CDT. The CRSO received 4.5 millirem during the retrieval procedure and the RRSO received 0.6 millirem.     "Additional information on the manufacturer and model number of equipment involved in the incident:  "QSA Global 880 delta exposure device  "QSA Global Ir-192 source (13 curies), model A424-9  "QSA Global 35 ft control cables  "QSA Global 7 ft extreme weather source tube with a 4 half-value layer (HVL) collimator    "All three personnel on the job are carded radiographers."    Notified R3DO (Havertape) and NMSS Events Notifications (email)    * * * UPDATE ON 04/04/2025 AT 1142 EDT FROM MATT SLAYMAKER TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *    The following is a summary of information provided by Protect, LLC via email:    A thorough inspection of the exposure device, source pig tail and associated equipment was performed. The crank assembly failed the misconnect test but passed all of the no-go gauge checks. The extreme weather source tube showed minimal signs of wear with a slight bend on the end swaged connection. It is not exactly clear if the disconnect was caused by an operator error when the drive cable was connected to the exposure device or if somehow the source was able to become disconnected in the source tube while retracting the source back to the camera. As a precautionary measure the associated equipment was taken out of service.    A corrective action report was issued related to this incident. Notifications to all employees will be conducted in a mandatory in-person attendance safety stand down and will be documented. Safety stand downs and re-training will be completed by April 18, 2025.    Notified R3DO (Hills), NMSS Events Notifications (email).  |
Agreement State|57621|New York City Bureau of Rad Health|Mount Sinai Medical Center|1|New York City|NY||75-2909-04|Y||||||Erik Finkelstein|Robert A. Thompson|03/24/2025|10:49:00|02/26/2025|0:00:00|EDT|3/24/2025 10:56:00 AM|Non Emergency| |Agreement State|||||||Arner, Frank|R1DO|NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT    The following is a summary of information provided by the New York City Department of Health via email:    On February 26, 2025, the licensee reported a dose administered differed by more than 20 percent of the prescribed dose. During an administration of Lu-177-PSMA [lutetium-177-prostate specific membrane antigen], the administration was stopped because it was determined that the patient's creatine level was significantly elevated. The administered activity was estimated as 49 mCi, out of an intended/prescribed activity of 162 mCi.    New York Identification Number:  NYC-25-0226.    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Part 21|57629|	Southern Nuclear, Fleet Regulatory|Hatch 1 and 2, Vogtle 1 and 2|2|Birmingham|AL|||N||||||Catherine Galloway|Josue Ramirez|03/26/2025|17:49:00|03/26/2025|0:00:00|CDT|3/26/2025 5:59:00 PM|Non Emergency|21.21(d)(3)(i)|Defects And Noncompliance|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|Part 21/50.55 Reactors, -|EMAIL|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|N|N|0|Power Operation|0|Power Operation|PART 21 - SOFTWARE ERROR IN TRANSIENT STABILITY PROGRAM    The following information was provided by Southern Nuclear Operating Company via email:    "This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.    "Based upon the information provided by Operation Technology, Inc. (OTI) in [electrical transient analyzer program] (ETAP) error report ERCA-24-003, revision 1, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has determined that a substantial safety hazard could have been created by the error introduced in the transient stability program in the current release of ETAP software utilized at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 (VEGP1-2) were it to go uncorrected. While the nature of the software error detailed by OTI in ETAP error report ERCA-24-003, revision 1 had the potential to impact bus transfers and degrade essential safety-related equipment, SNC has verified that none of the HNP or VEGP1-2 calculations that utilized the transient stability program had false favorable results.    "The NRC Senior Residents at HNP and VEGP1-2 have been notified."    Affected plants:  Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2  Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2|
Power Reactor|57633|Palo Verde|Arizona Nuclear Power Project|4|Wintersburg|AZ|Maricopa||Y|05000528|1|||[1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE|Arthur Tadiar|Jon Lilliendahl|03/28/2025|7:38:00|03/28/2025|1:06:00|MST|3/28/2025 8:04:00 AM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|Accident Mitigation|||||||Deese, Rick|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 4/2/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP INOPERABLE    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "On 3/28/2025 at 0106 MST, Palo Verde Generating Station Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 due to discovering `A' essential chiller (EC) oil temperature at 80 degrees Fahrenheit, which is below the operability limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. `A' EC inoperable rendered the `A' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump inoperable. At the time of discovery, `B' HPSI was inoperable due to recirculating the refueling water tank for chemistry purposes (LCO 3.5.3 condition B entered on 3/27/2025 at 2127 MST). This resulted in inoperability for both trains of HPSI, leading to a loss of the HPSI safety function.     "On 3/28/2025 at 0115 MST, `B' HPSI was restored to operable condition, LCO 3.0.3 was exited, and the loss of safety function was restored.      "There were no power reductions (control rod insertions or boron concentration changes). The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any release of radioactive materials. Unit 2 and 3 remained at 100%.    "NRC resident has been notified of the event."|
Power Reactor|57636|Brunswick|Carolina Power And Light Co.|2|Southport|NC|Brunswick||Y||2|||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|Charlie Brookshire|Rodney Clagg|03/28/2025|19:07:00|03/28/2025|14:09:00|EDT|3/28/2025 7:19:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||||Pearson, Laura|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|1|Startup|1|Startup||N|0||0|||N|0||0||EN Revision Imported Date: 4/2/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At approximately 1409 EDT on March 28, 2025, with Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 1 percent power during reactor startup, an actuation of group 1 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., main steam line, main steam line drain, and reactor water sample line isolation valves) occurred during performance of the Unit 2 turbine control/stop valves tightness test procedure. The group 1 PCIV actuation resulted when the turbine stop valves were opened (with control valves remaining closed) while main condenser vacuum was below 10 inches Hg [inches of Mercury]. The PCIVs automatically closed as designed when the group 1 actuation signal was received.    "This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system.    "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|57638|Perry|Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company|3|Perry|OH|Lake||Y|05000440|1|||[1] GE-6|Robert McClary|Kerby Scales|03/29/2025|16:16:00|03/29/2025|9:15:00|EDT|3/29/2025 4:25:00 PM|Non Emergency|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|Valid Specif Sys Actuation|||||||Gilliam, Jasmine|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling||N|0||0|||N|0||0||AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR    The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:    "At 0915 EDT, on March 29, 2025, with Unit 1 in mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the emergency diesel generator system occurred during Unit 2 startup transformer testing. The reason for the auto-start was the loss of an electrical bus during testing. The division 3 diesel generator automatically started as designed on low safety bus voltage.    "This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency diesel generator system.     "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  |