June 17, 2013

The Honorable Robert P. Casey, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Casey:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of April 24, 2013, regarding the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled “Emergency Preparedness: NRC Needs to Better Understand Likely Public Response to Radiological Incidents.” You expressed particular interest in ensuring that the Federal Government understands how “shadow evacuations” of populations outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) around a nuclear power plant would impact the evacuation times for those closest to the plant. A shadow evacuation is the evacuation by persons outside of any officially declared evacuation zone.

The GAO report supports the NRC’s position that emergency preparedness and planning within the 10-mile EPZ provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological incident at a nuclear power plant. However, as you are aware, the GAO recommended that, to better inform radiological emergency preparedness and planning efforts, the NRC obtain information on public awareness and likely public response outside the 10-mile EPZ and incorporate insights into guidance, as appropriate. GAO acknowledged that the NRC generally disagreed with GAO’s finding on shadow evacuations, stating that NRC’s research shows that public response outside the EPZ would have no significant impact on evacuations; a summary of this NRC research is provided in the enclosure. Nevertheless, GAO stated that it continues to believe that its recommendation could improve radiological emergency preparedness efforts and is consistent with NRC guidance.

Even though the NRC believes shadow evacuations do not significantly impact EPZ evacuations, they were specifically included in the NRC guidance document, NUREG/CR-7002, “Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies,” as a factor that licensees should consider in developing their evacuation time estimates. In addition, the staff is considering other ways of directly engaging Federal, State and local governments; response organizations; non-governmental entities; and the public, to ensure there is a clear understanding of the NRC’s emergency preparedness requirements. Finally, as part of the follow-up to the accident at Fukushima, the NRC plans to use insights from ongoing technical studies to inform, as necessary, the NRC’s regulatory approach to emergency planning around nuclear power plants.
Please be assured that we take your concerns very seriously, and are committed to ensuring that our licensees have sound emergency planning in place. If you need any additional information, please contact me or Ms. Rebecca Schmidt, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Allison M. Macfarlane

Enclosure:
As stated
Summary of NRC Research on Evacuations

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff has conducted extensive research into evacuations, including the impact of shadow evacuations on evacuation outcomes. The agency also has published two NRC-sponsored studies¹ that provide information on how the general public actually responds to life threatening circumstances, such as wildfires, chemical fires, malevolent events, and spills. These studies examined over 60 large-scale evacuations that have occurred within the United States since 1998. More than 12 million people were evacuated in the studied events. Although the studies acknowledged the shadow evacuation phenomenon, the NRC concluded that shadow evacuations have no significant impact on traffic movement for the specified evacuee population.

The NRC sponsored an additional study² to research the views of the public and emergency response personnel toward emergency preparedness. The study used telephone surveys and focus groups to determine people’s understanding of emergency preparedness and response. In response to a specific question related to shadow evacuation practice, approximately 23% of the respondents indicated that they had been in an emergency that required evacuation of part of their community and had chosen to self-evacuate even though they had not been directed to do so.

Several NRC licensees performed sensitivity analyses on the impact of shadow evacuations of populations beyond the EPZ boundary on the evacuation time estimates for their sites. For example, at the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station north of New York City, the nuclear power plant site with the largest nearby population in the nation, assuming that 60% of the population outside the EPZ participated in shadow evacuation, the analysis results showed a maximum increase in evacuation time of about 40 minutes (approximately 6% above the baseline of 11 hours). Areas of smaller populations showed similarly small to negligible impacts of shadow evacuation on baseline evacuation time estimates. From these analyses, the NRC staff concluded that increasing the percentage of population assumed for shadow evacuations does not proportionately increase baseline evacuation time estimates.

Further, there was no significant effect of shadow evacuations on evacuations occurring within the EPZ. There are two principal reasons why a shadow evacuation has limited impact. First, the only impact on evacuees within the EPZ would be if shadow evacuees created congestion on routes used to exit the EPZ. This would need to occur relatively near the EPZ boundary to affect the outbound evacuees before they disperse within the larger roadway network. In addition, the roadway networks expand as the distances increase away from the nuclear power plant site; in other words, there are more roads available as the distance from the plant site increases. This increased roadway capacity reduces the potential for congestion. Second, evidence from the NRC-sponsored studies shows that shadow evacuations occur in a graded manner, with an increased percentage of population nearer the incident and tapering to zero at greater distances from the incident. At some point, typically not too far from the incident, the shadow evacuation approaches zero. For an EPZ evacuation, the shadow evacuation begins at a distance 10 miles from the incident and decreases from there.

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