


BRIEFING ON DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

Commission Meeting October 25, 2018



Speakers

- Margaret Doane, Executive Director for Operations
- Ho Nieh, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
- Eric Benner, Director, Division of Engineering (DE), NRR
- Rossnyev Alvarado, Electronics Engineer,
 Instrumentation and Control Branch B, NRR/DE
- Michael Waters, Chief, Instrumentation and Control Branch B, NRR/DE
- Dinesh Taneja, Sr. Electronics Engineer,
 Instrumentation and Control Branch A, NRR/DE

Significantly Modernizing our Digital I&C Infrastructure

- Making real progress, in terms of flexibility and external engagement
- Considering experiences, internal and external to NRC
- Embracing a vision that safely enables new technologies and innovation



Shippingport Control Room ~ 1957



NuScale Control Room Simulator

Focused on the Most Significant Regulatory Challenges

- Addressing near-term challenges identified by external stakeholders
 - Clarify common cause failure (CCF) expectations
 - Clarify and expand use of 10 CFR 50.59
 - Improve licensing and certification processes
 - Clarify commercial grade dedication expectations
- Identifying broader improvements to modernize the regulatory infrastructure
 - Leverage international and non-nuclear approaches
 - Expand use of risk information

The IAP Implements Commission Direction and Stakeholder Priorities

- Enable performance-based and technology neutral approaches
- Use same regulations for new and operating reactors, with tailored guidance if necessary
- Ensure common understanding with stakeholders on challenges, priorities, and potential solutions

Recent Accomplishments Enabled by Changes in our Approach

- Self-critical assessment of NRC practices:
 - Implementation of Commission policy on CCF
- Creating support networks to ensure effective implementation of new guidance:
 - RIS 2002-22, Supplement 1
- Revisiting what information is necessary to make a regulatory decision:
 - Operating Reactor License Amendments (ISG-06)
 - New Reactor Design Certification (NuScale DSRS)

Clarifying CCF Expectations

Evaluated:

- Policy in SRM-SECY-93-087
- Feedback from industry
- Lessons learned from regulatory reviews

Concluded:

- Current policy adequate and supports near-term improvements (i.e., graded approach, alternative standards, alternative methods of diverse actuation)
- Implementation has been inconsistent and, in specific cases, overly restrictive

• SECY 18-0090:

 Documents staff evaluation and identifies guiding principles to improve policy implementation

SECY 18-0090 Guiding Principles

- Continue to address CCF
- Diversity and Defense-in-Depth analysis typically warranted, but can be:
 - Best estimate or design basis
 - Graded commensurate with safety significance & may not be necessary for low safety significance
- Alternate means to accomplish safety function acceptable:
 - Non-safety or safety-related
 - Manual or automatic
 - Mitigation of consequences through other means
- Justification for defensive measures can be commensurate with safety significance

Clarifying and Expanding the use of 10 CFR 50.59

- Operating reactors seek to implement majority of upgrades under 10 CFR 50.59
- RIS 2002-22, Supplement 1
 - Focused on lower safety significance I&C systems
 - Clarifies appropriate use of qualitative factors when performing 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations
- Appendix D to NEI 96-07
 - Addresses all I&C systems
 - Includes improved 50.59 screening guidance

Demonstrated Improvement in Recent Licensing and Certification Actions

- Hope Creek PRNMS
- NuScale Design Certification
- APR-1400 Design
 Approval
- Vogtle Unit 3&4
 Amendments




Purdue-1 Digital I&C System

- MIT Nuclear Safety System
- Purdue I&C System Upgrade

Improving the Licensing Process

- Operating reactor licensees seek to obtain regulatory approval before making significant capital investment
- Revising ISG-06 to:
 - Provide alternate review process for earlier approval of digital systems
 - Clarify information needed to initiate regulatory review
 - Incorporate other lessons learned from operating and new reactor reviews

Licensing Processes Comparison



Clarifying Commercial Grade Dedication Expectations

- Vendors seek to demonstrate achievement of domestic nuclear safety standards through international safety certification
- Will expand the number of systems and components available for use by domestic licensees
- EPRI currently developing process which NEI will submit for NRC review

Continuing to Identify Broader Improvements to Modernize the Regulatory Infrastructure

- Evaluating international and non-nuclear approaches to identify best practices
- Expanding use of higher level design principles applied in NuScale to improve advanced reactor reviews
- Engaging industry to identify alternative standards they are most interested in using
- Evaluating broader use of risk-information in licensing, certification and oversight

Making Progress on Achieving an Efficient and Effective Digital I&C Framework

- Continue our efforts to modernize our decision making in the use of DI&C systems
- Continue to effectively communicate with all stakeholders to understand their challenges, priorities, and potential solutions
- Continue to transform with risk-informed and innovative approaches

Acronyms

- APR Advanced Power Reactor
- BTP Branch Technical Position
- CCF Common Cause Failure
- CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- D3 Diversity and Defense-in-Depth
- DI&C Digital Instrumentation and Control
- DSRS Design Specific Review Standard
- ESFAS Engineered Safety Actuation System
- FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- HW Hardware
- IAP Integrated Action Plan
- I&C Instrumentation and Control
- IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

- IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
- ISG Interim Staff Guidance
- LA License Amendment
- LAR License Amendment Request
- MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
- PRNMS Power Range Neutron Monitoring System
- QA Quality Assurance
- RIS Regulatory Issue Summary
- RPS Reactor Protections System
- SIL Safety Integrity Level
- SW Software
- V&V Verification and Validation