

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

# Staff Recommendations to Disposition Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1

#### Improving NRC's Regulatory Framework January 10, 2014

### Agenda

#### **1. Recommendation 1**

- Background and Conclusions
- Overview of Improvement Activities
- Details of Improvement Activities
- Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Perspective
- Next Steps
- **2. Status of Tier 1 Activities**
- **3. Concluding Remarks**

Michael Johnson Jennifer Uhle Richard Dudley

Gary Holahan Michael Johnson

**Dave Skeen** 

**Mark Satorius** 

### Background

- Establish "a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework"
- Pursue Recommendation 1 "independent of ... other Task Force recommendations"
- "[P]rovide options and a staff recommendation to *disposition*"
- Consensus was difficult
- Recommendations represent a balance of diverse views

# **Staff Conclusions**

- Current regulatory framework is robust and can maintain safety
- Can implement Fukushima lessons learned under current framework
- Some improvements to framework are warranted to enhance clarity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NRC's regulatory process

#### Process

Staff from all program offices;
 Oversight by Office Director
 Steering Committee

Substantial public outreach

# **Improvement Activities**

- 1. Establish design-basis extension category of events and associated regulatory requirements
- 2. Establish Commission expectations for defense-in-depth
- **3. Clarify role of voluntary industry initiatives in NRC regulatory process**

# **Improvement Activities**

- Not mutually exclusive options
- Maximize potential benefits while minimizing resource impacts
- Recommendations will likely result in modest safety enhancements

# **Coordination with RMTF**

- Considered Risk Management Task Force (RMTF) framework recommendations for power reactors in NUREG-2150
- Commission direction on Recommendation 1 will be considered when staff addresses RMTF recommendations

# Improvement Activity 1: Design-Basis Extension Category of Events and Associated Regulatory Requirements

### **Current Regulatory Structure**





Severe Accident Management Guidelines?

- Generic basis
- Adequate protection and cost-justified substantial safety enhancements
- Regulatory attribute guidance in NUREG
  - Treatment requirements, quality assurance, change process, Final Safety Analysis Report documentation, training, analysis methods, etc.
- Implement via internal staff guidance

- Applies to current and future licensees/applicants
- Applies to new/additional design-basis extension requirements

### **Identification of New Issues**

- Use existing processes to identify and address candidates for this category, e.g. operating experience program, industry trends program, etc.
- Thus, no retroactive search for additional design-basis extension events is needed

### Potential Benefits of the Design-Basis Extension Category

- Promotes openness
  - Clarity and a common terminology
  - Consistent/complete approach to future requirements for all regulatory attributes
  - Aids the public's understanding
- Improves efficiency
- Increases alignment with international standards

# Improvement Activity 2: Establish Commission expectations for defense-in-depth

# Defense-in-Depth (DID)

- Improvement Activity 2 will develop
  - DID definition
  - DID structure
  - Set of DID principles
  - Set of levels of defense
  - DID decision process
  - Set of DID decision criteria
    - Include in Regulatory Analysis guidelines
    - Integrate with risk-based decision criteria

### Potential Benefits of the Defense-in-Depth Activity

- Promotes efforts to ensure safety
  - Uniform, technically-justified concept
  - Enhances risk-informed decisonmaking
- Promotes openness, clarity, reliability
  - More efficient, timely, predictable decisions
- Involves international community

# Improvement Activity 3: Clarify the role of voluntary industry initiatives in the NRC regulatory process

# **Current NRC Policy**

- Industry initiatives may not be used for adequate protection issues
- NUREG-BR-0058, Rev. 4
  - Supports reliance on industry initiatives
  - Credits them in decisionmaking
- No uniform review/acceptance process
- No formal verification process

# **Improvement Activity 3:**

- Re-affirm industry initiatives may not be used to address adequate protection issues
- Credit only when well-documented and highly likely to be maintained
- Develop oversight guidance
- Review existing initiatives; verify implementation as appropriate

### **Potential Benefits of Activity 3 on Voluntary Initiatives**

- Safety benefits consistently maintained over time
- Improves clarity of NRC regulatory processes
  - Clear criteria on use of voluntary initiatives
  - Visibility to all stakeholders
  - Defines oversight of voluntary initiatives

# **NTTF Tasking Memo**

- Called for the Task Force to:
  - "evaluate all technical and policy issues to identify...adjustments to the regulatory framework" and
  - "determine whether the agency should make additional improvement to our regulatory system and make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction"

### **Task Force Evaluation**

- The current regulatory approach has served the Commission and the public well
- The NTTF also concluded that the regulatory system could and should be enhanced

### **NTTF Recommendation 1**

... establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.

... enhancing ... the NRC regulatory framework to encompass beyonddesign-basis events

### **Task Force Envisioned:**

- 1. Coherent risk-informed and defense-in-depth regulatory framework
- 2. Addressing safety-significant issues beyond the design-basis (including severe accidents)
- **3. Generic and plant-specific issues**

### **Task Force Envisioned:**

 Requiring plant-specific PRAs
 Increased clarity of the role of defense-in-depth in integrated regulatory decision-making
 Increased clarity and oversight

of voluntary initiatives

### **Proposed Activities:**

- Positive and practical steps toward a clearer, more riskinformed regulatory process
- More can and should be done:
  - consistent with PRA Policy
  - consistent with NTTF vision
  - consistent with ACRS views
  - embracing Risk Management and other PRA initiatives

# Recommendation 1 Next Steps

- Staff will provide implementation plans 6 mo. after SRM on Recommendation 1
- Recommendation 1 implementation plans will be integrated with plans for addressing the Risk Management Task Force recommendations

### Overview

- Implementation of lessons-learned is progressing at all plants
- Plants are better prepared for beyond design-basis events today than they were 3 years ago and will be even more prepared by the end of 2016
- Still a lot of work to do over the next 3 years

# **Status of Tier 1 Activities**

- Orders
  - Mitigation strategies for beyond design basis external events
  - Containment venting system for Mark I and II containments
  - Spent fuel pool water level instrumentation

# **Status of Tier 1 Activities**

- Request for Information
  - Seismic and flooding walkdowns (completed Nov. 2012)
  - Seismic and flooding hazard reevaluations
  - Emergency Preparedness staffing and communications

# **Status of Tier 1 Activities**

- Rulemakings
  - Station Blackout Mitigation
    Strategies (SBOMS)
  - Onsite Emergency Response
    Capabilities
  - Filtering Strategies

### **Backup Slides**

**Events/Requirements** 



#### Nuclear Power Reactor Defense-in-Depth May Consist of Four Levels

