

Developments in Safety Requirements for NPP Design


January 10, 2014

James E. Lyons


Director Nuclear Installation Safety
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security



Safety Standards Hierarchy



Global reference point for a high level of nuclear safety



IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency



Defence in Depth



- *Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety*, (INSAG-10, 1996)
- *Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design* (IAEA Nuclear Safety Requirements, No. NS-R-1, 2000)
- *Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design* (IAEA Specific Safety Requirements, No. SSR-2/1, 2012)




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Defence in Depth



NS-R-1, 2000



Design Extension Conditions

SSR-2/1, 2012



- Accidents that are either more severe than design basis accidents or that involve additional failures.
- Capable to withstand without unacceptable radiological consequences
- Derived on the basis of:
 - Engineering judgment
 - Deterministic assessments
 - Probabilistic assessments



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Design Extension Conditions

SSR-2/1, 2012



- Identify the additional accident scenarios to be addressed in the design.
- Plan practicable provisions for the prevention of such accidents or
- Mitigation of their consequences if they do occur.



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Design Extension Conditions

SSR-2/1, 2012



- Conditions that could lead to significant radioactive releases are practically eliminated
- If not practically eliminated
 - Only protective measures that are of limited scope in terms of area and time shall be necessary for protection of the public
 - Sufficient time shall be made available to implement these measures




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Defence in Depth

NS-R-1, 2000 versus SSR-2/1, 2012




NS-R-1, 2000



Defence in Depth

NS-R-1, 2000 versus **SSR-2/1, 2012**



SSR-2/1, 2012

Safety Features for Design Extension Conditions




- Capable of managing accident conditions in which there is a significant amount of radioactive material in the containment
- Plant shall be designed so that it can be brought into a controlled state and,
- Containment function can be maintained



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Working to Protect People, Society and the Environment

