

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment

Risk-Informed Emergency Core Cooling Requirements (10 CFR 50.46a)

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Speakers and Topics

- Opening: Bill Borchardt, EDO
- Introduction: Eric Leeds, NRR
- Rule Concept and Staff Views: William Ruland, NRR/DSS
- Background and Rule Requirements: Richard Dudley, NRR/DPR
- Generic Supporting Studies: Rob Tregoning, RES/DE

Summary of Rule Concept; Staff Thoughts on Issuance

William Ruland Director, Division of Safety Systems Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

\$ **50.46a Final Rule Concept**

- Alternative to existing ECCS requirements (§50.46)
- LOCAs divided into 2 regions based on break frequency – by transition break size (TBS)
- Requirements unchanged for 1st region (≤ TBS)

\$ **50.46a Final Rule Concept**

- In 2nd region (> TBS) LOCA mitigation requirements relaxed for lower frequency breaks
- Plant changes "enabled" by new requirements also evaluated by a risk-informed process

\$ 50.46a Final Rule Concept

- Transition break size
 - PWRs largest attached pipe to the main coolant piping
 - BWRs largest attached feedwater or residual heat removal line inside containment

ECCS Analysis Requirements

- Breaks < TBS
 - No change from current \$50.46
- Breaks > TBS
 - No single failure assumption
 - Credit for offsite power
 - Credit for non-safety equipment
 - Acceptance criteria: coolable geometry & long term cooling

- Maintains adequate protection
- Provides design and operational flexibility
- Incorporates stakeholder input
- Regulatory analysis shows large potential benefits

- Risk assessment requirements consistent with Risk-Informed Fire Protection - 10 CFR 50.48(c)
- Design constraints consistent with ACRS recommendations on defense-in-depth

- Rule has been much debated
- Base changes on experience
- Investment to evaluate benefits is unlikely until rule is issued
- Potentially useful for GSI-191

- Uncertainties are important
- Frequency curves developed by expert judgments based on best available information
- Rule developed in consideration of uncertainties associated with rare events

Stakeholder Concerns

- Burden for beyond TBS breaks not commensurate with safety significance
- TBS too large

Stakeholder Concerns (con't)

- Requirements should not be relaxed until ECCS acceptance criteria in 50.46(b) are finalized
- Current ECCS models and criteria are non-conservative and therefore relaxing other input conservatisms is unsafe

Background and Rule Requirements

Richard Dudley Senior Project Manager Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Background

- Proposed rule November 2005
- Industry commented on rule burden
- 2 public meetings
- November 2006 ACRS concerns on defense-in-depth
- Current rule balances safety with essential burden

Overview of §50.46a Rule Process and Requirements

Conversion to *§***50.46**a

- Demonstrate applicability of expert elicitation report and seismic study
 - To ensure the generic conclusions on adequate safety apply
- NRC must review and approve licensee's application

For Changes Enabled by §50.46a

- Re-analyze ECCS for the new configuration
- For non-safety equipment credited in >TBS analysis:
 - List in Administrative Controls section of Tech Specs (no LCOs)
 - Provide capability for on-site power

For Changes Enabled by §50.46a

- Perform risk-informed evaluation
 - Demonstrate adequacy of:
 - defense-in-depth
 - safety margins
 - monitoring program
 - Demonstrate that risk acceptance criteria are met ("very small")

Operational Requirements

- Review all future plant changes to ensure applicability of generic studies
- Periodically confirm via PRA update that total risk increase "very small"
- Do not operate in condition not meeting > TBS acceptance criteria for more than a short time

Applicability to New Reactors

- Can use rule if new reactor is "similar" in design and operation
- Applicant must propose and justify

 "similarity" and appropriate TBS
- NRC design-specific review
 - approve similarity and TBS

Generic Studies Performed to Support Determining the Transition Break Size

Robert Tregoning Senior Advisor for Materials Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Background

- March 2003 SRM directed staff to estimate LOCA frequencies
 - Realistically conservative
 - Incorporate margins for uncertainty
- LOCA frequencies documented in NUREG-1829

NUREG-1829: Scope and Significant Assumptions

- Scope: Generic BWR and PWR passive-system LOCA frequencies
- Assumptions
 - Typical plant history and operation
 - No future plant changes that affect LOCA frequencies

NUREG-1829: Results

- Panelists provided quantitative estimates supported by rationale
 - Rationale: Good agreement
 - Estimates: Large uncertainty
- Results sensitive to aggregation scheme

NUREG-1829: Use of Results

- Use in § 50.46a
 - Starting point for TBS values
 - Account for other considerations
 - Promote regulatory stability
- Additional staff evaluation
 - Assessed other LOCA contributors
 - Evaluated risk due to seismic events

NUREG-1903: Scope and Significant Assumptions

- Scope: Determine if seismic risk is acceptable for breaks > TBS
- Assumptions
 - Plant information remains applicable
 - Stresses associated with rare seismic event are representative

NUREG-1903: Results

- Direct piping failures
 - -Negligible risk if piping is not degraded
 - -Flaws leading to failure in degraded piping are expected to be large
- Indirect piping failures
 - Acceptable risk for two plants studied
 - Results are highly plant-specific

NUREG-1903: Use of Results

- Use in § 50.46a
 - Risks of seismically induced LOCAs are expected to be acceptable
 - TBS selection is appropriate
- Limitations
 - Analyses may not be applicable
 - Indirect failure risks not generically evaluated

Regulatory Guide Development

- DG-1216 published for comment
 - Maximizes use of prior submittals
 - Provides multiple options
- Stakeholder comments
 - Guidance is too complex
 - Costs may limit application of rule
- Pilot plant study proposed

Acronyms

- **NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission**
- **ECCS** emergency core cooling system
- **TBS** transition break size
- **LOCA** loss of coolant accident
- **PWR** pressurized water reactor
- **BWR** boiling water reactor
- **DBA design basis accident**
- **LCO** limiting conditions for operation

Acronyms

- ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
- **GSI Generic Safety Issue**
- **PRA probabilistic risk assessment**
- **CFR Code of Federal Regulations**
- **RG Regulatory Guide**

Backup

Optional Self-Approval Process

- If self-approved change process is desired, submit risk-informed process
- Criteria for self-approved changes:
 - "minimal" risk increase
 - \$50.59 is satisfied

Backup

Applicability to New Reactors

- Risk change acceptance criteria
 - Same as current plants, but further limited to not allow significant reduction in level of safety provided by new Part 52 design