

NOTATION VOTE


RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: COMMISSIONER JACZKO
SUBJECT: **SECY-05-0233 - PLAN FOR DEVELOPING
STATE-OF-THE ART REACTOR
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES**

Approved Disapproved Abstain

Not Participating

COMMENTS: See Revised Comments.



SIGNATURE

2/9/06

DATE

Entered on "STARS" Yes No

**Revised Commissioner Jaczko Comments on SECY-05-0233:
Plan for Developing State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses**

I approve of the staff's plan for developing a state-of-the-art consequence analyses; however, I disapprove of the staff's proposal to perform analyses only for scenarios of a radiological release frequency greater than one in one million per reactor year. The analyses should cover scenarios that the models can reliably calculate. Based on the bounding limits proposed, the consequences of events that are within the design basis of the plant, such as the large-break loss-of-coolant-accident, would not be analyzed.

The staff's efforts to perform consequence analyses using state of the art modeling tools and to incorporate lessons learned on source term behavior and emergency preparedness, weather influence, and mitigation strategies since the 1982 NUREG/CR-2239, "Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development," was published is an appropriate use of resources. It seems, however, that a driving force behind the effort to redo the NUREG is to preclude the misuse of information that exists in that report. The staff states in its plan that members of the public usually cite the extremely unlikely consequences for early fatalities and latent cancers in the 1982 study and that such an interpretation or application of this data is misleading. The NRC cannot preclude individuals or groups from drawing inappropriate conclusions from technical information but moreso, the NRC should not tailor its analyses such that physically possible consequences are excluded.

Should the staff proceed on this plan, the resultant study may lead to criticism that the Commission revised the 1982 study to obtain more desirable results. The staff's stated goal is to assess the realistic consequences of a spectrum of risk-informed radiological releases to support decision making. This is a worthy goal; however, that goal should not be achieved by not informing the public of radiological consequences that while highly unlikely, are physically possible to occur to the extent the models used by the staff can determine. Instead, the staff should use updated techniques and lessons learned to analyze an appropriate spectrum of accident scenarios and not exclude scenarios based on an arbitrarily chosen threshold of a frequency of radiological release greater than one in one million per reactor year.

I do support a separate, secure document that describes the consequences of terrorism initiated scenarios.

The staff should make SECY-05-0233 publicly available.

 2/19/06

Gregory B. Jaczko Date