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Plant License Renewal Subcommittee

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	(ACRS)
6	PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL SUBCOMMITTEE
7	+ + + +
8	TUESDAY,
9	NOVEMBER 4, 2003
10	+ + + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	+ + + +
13	
14	The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory
15	Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B3, 11545
16	Rockville Pike, at 12:30 p.m., Mario V. Bonaca,
17	Chairman, presiding.
18	
19	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
20	MARIO V. BONACA, Chairman
21	F. PETER FORD, Member
22	GRAHAM M. LEITCH, Member
23	STEPHEN L. ROSEN, Member
24	GRAHAM B. WALLIS, Member
25	

		2
1	ACRS STAFF PRESENT:	
2	MARVIN D. SYKES	
3		
4	NRC STAFF PRESENT:	
5	RUSSELL J. ARRIGHI, NRR	
6	BARRY ELLIOT, NRR	
7	FRANK GILLESPIE, NRR	
8	SAM LEE, NRR	
9	MICHAEL MODES, Region I	
10	JONATHAN ROWLEY, NRR	
11		
12	ALSO PRESENT:	
13	GERRY GEIKEN	
14	GEORGE HERRICK	
15	JARRED JACKSON	
16	MARY ELLEN McGRAW	
17	ROBERT C. MECREDY	
18	DAVID WILSON	
19	GEORGE WROBEL	
20		
21		
22		
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24		
25		

	3
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	12:32 a.m.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The meeting will now
4	come to order. This is a meeting of the Advisory
5	Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on
6	Plant License Renewal.
7	I am Mario Bonaca, Chairman of the
8	Subcommittee.
9	ACRS members in attendance are Graham
10	Wallis, Peter Ford, Steve Rosen and Graham Leitch.
11	Marvin Sykes is the designated federal
12	official for this meeting.
13	The purpose of this meeting is to
14	discuss the license renewal application for the
15	Robert E. Ginna nuclear power plant and the
16	associated NRC separate evaluation report with open
17	items.
18	During this meeting we will hear
19	presentations by the applicant, Rochester Gas and
20	Electric and the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
21	Regulation.
22	The Subcommittee will gather
23	information, analyze relevant issues and facts and
24	formulate report positions and actions as
25	appropriate for deliberations by the full Committee.

1	The rules for participation in today's
2	meeting have been announced as part of the notice
3	of this meeting previously published in the Federal
4	Register on October 22, 2003. We have received no
5	other written comments or requests for time to make
6	oral statements from members of the public regarding
7	today's meeting.
8	A transcript of the meeting is being
9	kept, and will be made available as stated in the
10	Federal Register notice.
11	It is requested that speakers first
12	identify themselves and then speak with sufficient
13	clarity and volume so that they can be readily
14	heard.
15	We will now proceed with the meeting,
16	and I call upon?
17	DR. LEE: Yes. My name is Sam Lee.
18	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Lee.
19	DR. LEE: I am the Section Chief in the
20	License Renewal Program. Dr. PT Kuo, Program
21	Director, she is not able to here today. And we
22	expect our Deputy Division Director.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Mr. Gillespie?
24	DR. LEE: Mr. Frank Gillespie, he should
25	be here shortly.

1 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. But you can 2 start the meeting? I will start. 3 DR. LEE: I would like to 4 you know, I guess, for ACRS continue support of the license renewal activities. 5 And there's a lot of activity going on 6 7 in License Renewal. I guess, about a half an hour ago Jim Dyer just signed the renewal license for 8 9 Fort Calhoun. So now we have, I guess, with that 21 approved units for license renewal and 16 under 10 11 review. 12 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. With that today, the purpose 13 DR. LEE: 14 today is to discuss the staff review of the Ginna 15 application for license renewal. And the Project Manager is Russ Arrighi, and he is supported by John 16 17 Rowley. And we have eight open items, and John is going to go over the status with you. 18 19 And I guess we will turn over to RG&E, 20 the licensee, to make their presentation. 21 MR. WROBEL: Shall I start? Yes. 22 DR. LEE: 23 MR. WROBEL: Okay. My name is George 24 I am the license renewal project manager 25 for Ginna Station. I'd like to have the other

1	people that worked on the license renewal project
2	introduce themselves from RG&E.
3	MR. HERRICK: George Herrick, license
4	renewal engineer from RG&E.
5	MR. MECREDY: Bob Mecredy, Vice
6	President of Nuclear Operations, RG&E.
7	MR. WILSON: David Wilson, license
8	renewal engineer at RG&E.
9	MR. GEIKEN: Gerry Geiken, general
10	engineer at RG&E.
11	MS. McGRAW: Mary Ellen McGraw,
12	mechanical engineer at RG&E.
13	MR. JACKSON: Jarred Jackson, electrical
14	engineer support at RG&E.
15	MR. WROBEL: Thank you.
16	This is the plan we're talking about,
17	it's the review. The contents of today's
18	presentation with RG&E. We are going to go over the
19	background and history of the plant a little bit.
20	Talk about some of the unique features, issues that
21	are in the works now. Some current issues.
22	MR. LEITCH: Just while we're getting
23	that set up, George, I was looking at the
24	photograph. It doesn't show so well on the one that
25	you have, but there is a odd looking building, I

1	guess, in the foreground of the picture. I was just
2	curious as to what that is? It's a brick building,
3	is it? I was just curious as to what
4	MR. WROBEL: The simulator building is
5	here.
6	MR. LEITCH: I was asking about the one
7	to the right.
8	MR. WROBEL: That's the training center.
9	MR. LEITCH: Oh, that's the training
10	center?
11	MR. WROBEL: That's the beginning of the
12	training center. There's been an addition put on
13	since then.
14	MR. LEITCH: I see.
15	MR. MECREDY: That was the original
16	visitor center, information center on the site. The
17	first structure on the site.
18	MR. LEITCH: Okay. Thank you. Just a
19	curiosity question.
20	MR. WROBEL: Okay. We thought we'd talk
21	about some of the current issues of interest right
22	now. I know there's a lot of the interest in the
23	cracked vessel head and the bottom head inspections
24	that we did this past outage. And then some issues
25	on the containment recirculation sump.

1 If there's any other current issues that 2 could be considered, we can talk about those also. I want to talk a little bit about how we 3 4 put the licensed renewal application together. 5 then talk about some of the specific results, particularly in the TLAAs programs. We have several 6 7 commitments that we have made that we'll implement in the future. And we do have a couple of open 8 items to be talked about mostly by the NRC. 9 So, back to the background and history. 10 11 Most of you probably know, it's a Westinghouse two 12 loop 1520 megawatt PWR, upstate New York. The initial license was granted in 13 14 September 18, 1969. We were one of the Systematic 15 Evaluation Program plants. We'll talk about that on the next slide a little bit. 16 17 We did have our provisional operating license to full-term operating license that was as a 18 19 result of the Systematic Evaluation Program. 20 started in '72 and ended in '84; a 12 year process 21 then. So license renewal seems pretty quick now. 22 We also had our CP-OL recapture that was 23 Construction permit was 41 months for Ginna. 24 And that changed our operating license from 4-25-06 25 to the current 9-18-09.

confused by the history, I guess. I don't quite understand the process that was used at that time. Basically my question is the 40 years dates from 1969, not 1984, is that correct? MR. WROBEL: That's correct. MR. LEITCH: Yes. MR. WROBEL: The 1984 was when we got our full-term operating license. We were operating under a provisional operation license, which is how we got into the Systematic Evaluation Program in the first place. MR. LEITCH: I see. MR. WROBEL: So we had, I think it was year-to-year, we got the provisional operating license extended. MR. LEITCH: Oh, okay. MR. WROBEL: And then since then so I guess we could have just stayed with that forever, continued forever. MR. LEITCH: Yes. Yes. MR. WROBEL: And the recapture was just the construction period. MR. LEITCH: Construction period, yes. MR. WROBEL: Some of the major projects	1	MR. LEITCH: George, I'm a little
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	23	the construction period.
MR. WROBEL: Some of the major projects	24	MR. LEITCH: Construction period, yes.
II	25	MR. WROBEL: Some of the major projects

1	that we've had Ginna Station, there were a lot of
2	them before '96. But the more recent ones, we
3	replaced our steam generators in 1996. One of the
4	side benefits of that was that we were able to
5	reduce our TF, which has helped in subsequent issues
6	from 573½ down to 561 currently that we're operating
7	at.
8	We were, I believe, the first
9	Westinghouse plant to convert to improved standard
10	technical specifications. We did that in 1996 also.
11	DR. WALLIS: Did you have power uprates,
12	totally new ones?
13	MR. WROBEL: The only power uprate that
14	we had was from the initial 1300 megawatts in 1520.
15	We have not had one since then.
16	In 1999 as part of the reactor vessels
17	internal inspection, we did a baffle-bolt
18	inspection. We inspected a large number of the
19	baffle bolts and we replaced enough to there was
20	plant specific analysis done by Westinghouse and we
21	added a lot of baffle variables to the internals.
22	And then this year we just finished
23	replacing our reactor vessel head.
24	CHAIRMAN BONACA: This thing with the
25	baffle-bolt.

1 MR. WROBEL: Okay. 2 CHAIRMAN BONACA: You did that as a replacement. Now, if I remember in the application 3 4 you stated you don't have to make any further 5 inspections of the bolts? MR. WROBEL: Well, we feel at this point 6 7 that with the number of bolts that we put on and the very, very small number of failures that we 8 9 experienced, I believe it was less than one percent 10 of the bolts that we evaluated actually were 11 degraded. Between that and the fact that we have 12 link-before-break completed for all of our 10 inch 13 14 lines. So the next larger line that does not have 15 link-before-break analysis on the primary system is a 4 inch line. So the forces resulting from that 16 17 with the number of new bolts we have and the number of bolts that we inspected that were good, we don't 18 believe that we need to do any additional work in 19 20 baffle-barrel bolt inspections and/or replacement. 21 That's our current position. 22 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So no further 23 And we'll hear from the staff later inspections? 24 During your presentation, that's fine.

Okay.

MR. WROBEL:

1	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let's remember that.
2	Okay.
3	MR. WROBEL: Okay. Again, we replaced
4	our reactor vessel head with the Inconel 690
5	penetrations including and we also added new
6	control rod drive mechanisms. That was just
7	completed in 2003, last month.
8	And I guess it's not a
9	background/history, but we do anticipate selling the
10	plant in the middle of next year.
11	I said I wanted to talk a little bit
12	MR. LEITCH: Has a deal been struck and
13	it's just a matter of implementation or is
14	MR. WROBEL: It's not struck yet. The
15	bids are due mid-November.
16	MR. LEITCH: I see. Thank you.
17	MR. WROBEL: Systematic Evaluation
18	Program has got an interesting program that
19	developed.
20	All of the plants that have original
21	operating licenses and I believe a couple of the
22	older plants that might have had full term operating
23	license, we're evaluated under what's called the
24	Systematic Evaluation Program which began in 1977.
25	The project there was, was to review Ginna against

the then current Standard Review Plan, which is 75087. If you look at that compared to the current 0800, they're pretty comparable. So it's almost a review against the current Standard Review Plan.

It wasn't against the whole plan. There were 92 risk topics that were reviewed. Sometime or later, whenever, if you want to know what the topics were, I can highlight those also. But there was pretty extensive review of the plant against the Standard Review Plan.

And what happened there is that we really ended up with a very good short licensing basis. We got SERs on 92 topics, and some of the topics like seismic had multiple SERs written against them because there were structures, systems, tanks. So our FSAR was substantially upgraded with all the SERs that we out of the Systematic Evaluation Program. So it was a major benefit. It helped us define our current licensing basis and, therefore, helped us to define which structure systems and components would be in the scope of license renewal because we had such good documentation. It made scoping much easier.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: The reason why I asked the question to put on the agenda was, I'd like to

understand what changes you have to make physically to the plant, if any. For example, other SEP plants, they were plants that started up without any CCS system, without low-pressure injection systems. You know, Conn Yankee was one. Without safety injection tanks.

MR. WROBEL: Yes. We kind of lucked out there. We had all of those systems, but we did make some improvements in the systems. Many of the changes that we made were related to natural phenomena.

The Ginna Station design for tornadoes, for example, we don't get many. We're stuck with snow a lot, but we don't get many tornadoes and so the tornadoes design was almost none existent. We beefed up critical structures for tornado protection. We did an extensive review of the seismic analysis of Ginna. We made a quite a few changes both as a result of Bulletin 7902 and 14 NSEP. So we made quite a few seismic modifications to Ginna.

Flood protection, quite a bit of flood protection. And we relooked at high-energy line breaks both inside and outside containment. We changed the definition of high-energy and moderate-

1 energy consistent with the O'Leary letter, the '73 2 O'Leary letter where if it was either 212 or 200 pounds, it became a high-energy line. So that added 3 4 some additional lines like steam heating lines into 5 the scope of high-energy lines. And we did it both inside and outside containment. And we made a far 6 7 number of modifications to improve separation from 8 physical effects. Those are the main ones. 9 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, for example, I 10 11 was reading through that you have a two-train 12 auxiliary feedwater system. And you have a separation between the two of them. And for SEP 13 14 purposes you could not exclude the possibility that 15 an external event would eliminate with a common cause both trains. 16 17 MR. WROBEL: Yes, that was --CHAIRMAN BONACA: So you have a reliance 18 19 on a third train now that is an independent train 20 that ran somewhere else. And, you know, my question 21 when I was reading was how do you treat methodology 22 wise, how do you treat this third train? I mean, is 23 it self-degrading. 24 MR. WROBEL: Yes, it's situated in

That really occurred, background, 1974 when

scope.

it was determined that the high-energy line break criteria was such that the main steam and feedwater lines are in what's called our intermediate building. Intermediate building also on another floor had both motor driven aux feed pumps and a turbine driven aux feed water pump. approximately the 102 line break intermediate building we could not guarantee the operability of those three pumps. So we added, basically, a bunker at our separate standby aux feedwater system completely separate from the main steam and feedwater lines. The penetrations didn't go through the intermediate building. It was all completely separate. We would use that in the event -- at the time it was in the event of a high-energy line break.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.

MR. WROBEL: Subsequent to that we were able to take credit for the standby aux feedwater system for additional phenomena, for example tornado protection for the original aux feedwater system was not tornado, but the standby system was. And so we didn't have to modify anything.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Those fuel aux feed lines, they're both steam driven by the pumps?

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1	MR. WROBEL: Motor driven.
2	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Both?
3	MR. WROBEL: Both motor driven.
4	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The design one and the
5	backup?
6	MR. WROBEL: We have 200 percent turbine
7	driven.
8	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
9	MR. WROBEL: Two separate 100 percent
10	motor driven. And then two 100 percent motor driven
11	backups. We have 600 percent capacity.
12	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
13	MR. WROBEL: And aux feedwater never
14	seems to show up in our risk equation very high
15	because of that.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: No. All right. It
17	wasn't clear in the application. I mean, I'm not
18	saying I thought it was a very clear application
19	in general, but I just couldn't understand how many
20	systems you had in the aux system. All right.
21	MR. WROBEL: Okay.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Any other changes of
23	substance? I mean, you pointed out the design basis
24	is better than modern one because you went through
25	the SEP. Yes, but your design maybe is not as

1 robust as, you know, as a plant where you don't have 2 to worry about that wall in between two trains to 3 collapse and take out both. 4 MR. WROBEL: Right. 5 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So I just, I was looking for some insights that you may have outside 6 7 of that specific system I describe. Anything else 8 that --Most of the changes that we 9 MR. WROBEL: made, we did make some changes for high-energy line 10 11 breaks with osculated breaks, not just in the 12 intermediate building but wherever there was a highenergy line break and assured ourselves that we 13 14 would have a system that's available to mitigate 15 that high-energy line break separate from the break itself. And we did have to do a fair amount of 16 17 separation in that area. We did some, and for say tornado 18 19 protection or block wall protection. That was 20 another big issue. 21 We had to protect individual components, like our main steam isolation valve. Actuators were 22 23 separated -- were protected, we build enclosures 24 around those that that if a block wall fell them, it

So we could do that.

would not impact them.

1	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now I have a question.
2	So for those components that serve as a backup to
3	makeup for the fact that you could not meet the SLP,
4	okay, like you know the extra auxiliary for those
5	trains.
6	MR. WROBEL: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN BONACA: So did you treat them
8	as safety grade systems or are some of them are non-
9	safety grade.
10	MR. WROBEL: Some are safety grade and
11	some are what we call safety significant or
12	augmented quality.
13	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Okay.
14	MR. WROBEL: If it was done purely for
15	tornado or flood protection, then those components
16	did not necessarily become safety related. They
17	became augmented quality or safety significant. But
18	we did treat them in the scope of license renewal as
19	(a)(2) components.
20	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. So you did
21	include in the scope?
22	MR. WROBEL: Yes.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: That was your
24	methodology?
25	MR. WROBEL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. That's it.

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MR. WROBEL: The other thing that we got out of the Systematic Evaluation Program is early use of risk perspective. Just after WASH 1400 was used, it wasn't a global PSA for the plant but on an individualized basis the NRC did use cost benefit analysis to determine whether or not or to what extent we should make some modifications. One of the ones that comes to mind particular containment isolation valves. Our containment isolation valve arrangement is not consistent with the current GDC 53 through 57. And on another defined basis we're able to show that for the most -- except for one case, I believe, all our containment isolation valves or the differences from the GDC did not make them risk significant if we maintained them as it was.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.

MR. WROBEL: So that was a good insight on risk perspective.

And like I mentioned, we did make some cost beneficial plant changes, primarily the ones that I already talked about.

MR. FORD: Could we go back to the risk perspective aspect? The topic that will come for

conversation is the justification for one time inspections. When you are making those justifications, did the whole question of the risk perspective come in? What if you are wrong? Did you ask the questions what if in terms of the risk perspective?

MR. WROBEL: On the one time inspections, what we did is we tried to pretty much follow the guidance that was in the Generic Aging Lessons Learned. We looked at the types of inspections that we felt there was a material environment combination that could result in potential damage. And so we looked at what type of current procedures we had, our preventive maintenance program, we looked at that. If we didn't have something there and there was like a water chemistry and the only program that we had was water chemistry and there was potential for damage, then we added that into the scope for our one time inspection. And the way that we determined which components to inspect had some risk significance to it.

Now, Gerry, if you want to go into a little more detail as to how we picked the particular one time inspection components, but it

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1 did have elements of risk. 2 MR. FORD: The reason for my question 3 is, maybe it's out of turn here in the discussion, 4 but much of your justification for some of the one time inspection source, well at such-and-such a date 5 we looked, we saw no problem, therefore essentially 6 7 we won't again. Now, that's a one time look in a time dependent aging mechanism, which is not 8 necessarily linear with time. So if your rational 9 10 was wrong, what would the impact be on the safety of 11 your plant? That's why I'm bringing it up under the 12 risk perspective? All right. Well, that 13 MR. WROBEL: 14 certainly didn't come up in SEP. 15 MR. FORD: Right. MR. WROBEL: Not to that level anyway. 16 17 I believe that the one time inspections that we committed to do are quite extensive and 18 19 they're really only in the areas where we thought 20 that the degradation mechanisms were either very 21 slow or nonexistent, but we thought we would look 22 anyway. 23 A lot of the inspections that we have 24 focused on for the next 33 years, we put them in

what we call our PSPM program, periodic surveillance

1 and preventive maintenance program. So what a lot 2 of people might have put into one time inspections, 3 we thought this is worth repeating. And so we 4 actually have a lot of the inspections that are part 5 of our PSPM program, the ones that we thought are low risk significance, we put in --6 7 MR. FORD: Okay. The nice thing about being 8 MR. WROBEL: 9 this old, not me but the plant, was that we actually have a lot of operating time on the equipment. So if 10 11 we do not see anything, we're talking about not 12 seeing anything after 35, 36, almost 40 years of So, you know, the aging would have had a 13 14 good chance to envision itself, or come about 15 already. So that's how we picked those. Anybody else wants to pick up more. 16 17 MR. ROSEN: Let me ask you a little bit more about the risk perspective. Do you have an 18 19 internal events PRA? 20 MR. WROBEL: Yes. Our current PRA 21 includes internal events, external events but not 22 seismic. Fire and shutdown. 23 MR. ROSEN: It does. 24 MR. WROBEL: We've a very comprehensive 25 PSA. We've just gone through our peer review and

1	make a few adjustments, but nothing spectacular.
2	But, yes, it's quite a full PSA.
3	MR. ROSEN: Good.
4	MR. LEITCH: Was it this early use of
5	risk perspective that led you to see the need for
6	the installation of the backup aux feed pumps or was
7	that some other kind of regulatory action?
8	MR. WROBEL: No, that was purely
9	deterministic.
10	MR. LEITCH: Yes, the SEP?
11	MR. WROBEL: Yes, it was pre-SEP even.
12	You have a steam line in the same room as your
13	protection system, it didn't seem like a good idea
14	at the time.
15	MR. LEITCH: Yes. Yes.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I still am surprised,
17	pleasantly surprised about the capacity of the
18	pumps, that you have two additional 100 percent
19	capacity pumps.
20	MR. LEITCH: And you have some kind of a
21	wall or a moat or something that divides the
22	circulating water pump house? Was that a result of
23	this perspective?
24	MR. WROBEL: A flood dam.
25	MR. LEITCH: Yes, a flood dam. Was that

1	a result of risk perspective.
2	MR. WROBEL: No. That was as a result
3	of the condenser failure at Brunswick, I think back
4	in '72.
5	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
6	MR. WROBEL: Where we decided that if it
7	could happen there, it could happen to us.
8	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
9	MR. WROBEL: So we did an analysis on
LO	what would be the result of a condenser failure and
L1	we added some flooding failures to the plant as a
L2	result of that.
L3	MR. LEITCH: So I guess I'm trying to
L4	understand if the early use of risk perspective led
L5	you to any physical modifications of the plant back
L6	in that time frame?
L7	MR. WROBEL: Yes, it did. It either
L8	both led us to some additional modifications. I
L9	believe there were some penetrations that had
20	thermal overload that it didn't have, and we checked
21	the risk perspective and put them in there. So
22	there's thermal overload protection, I believe, on
23	two to four containment electrical penetrations that
24	were put in.
25	There was also, like I said, the risk

1	perspective showed we'd have to do some
2	modifications, like modify our containment isolation
3	valve arrangement.
4	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
5	MR. WROBEL: And these were all early
6	PSA analysis that were done by the staff and
7	reviewed by us. But really it was their call on
8	those.
9	MR. LEITCH: Yes. So this was mid-'70s
LO	time frame?
L1	MR. WROBEL: This was about 1980 by the
L2	time we got to that point.
L3	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
L4	MR. WROBEL: It started in '77. By the
L5	time we got to the NUREG-0821 it was 1981 or '92.
L6	MR. LEITCH: Yes. Okay. Thank you.
L7	MR. ROSEN: You've done an interesting
L8	job talking about the early use of your risk
L9	perspectives. Can you update us a little bit about
20	what you're doing with the risk perspectives now?
21	Are you risk, for example, for configuration risk
22	management or
23	MR. WROBEL: Yes. We have online risk
24	monitor called EOS at Ginna. And evolutions that
25	are done at Ginna Station are punched into what we
	I and the state of

1	call EOS to determine whether or not the risk
2	profile changes significantly. If we get to a
3	profile level of an orange, what's equivalent to an
4	orange, I'm not sure exactly what level our first
5	step is, but you hit an orange you have to go
6	through PORV review in order to even make the
7	evolution. And you don't make an evolution that
8	goes to red. So that's on a daily basis, any MODs,
9	maintenance get done that way.
10	MR. ROSEN: So you're using this to
11	comply with 56.65(a)(4)?
12	MR. WILSON: Partly, yes. It is part of
13	the stuff we use for 84, but it goes beyond what 84
14	requirements are.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: You need to come up to
16	the microphone. Thank you. And speak with
17	sufficient clarity and volume.
18	MR. WILSON: David Wilson, RG&E.
19	The risk monitor and EOS is used for
20	maintenance rule determinations, but it's also used
21	in addition to that for normal ways of doing
22	business just to make sure that even though it's not
23	a maintenance activity, that we're not putting
24	ourselves in an unsafe configuration.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: So it's capable of

1	quantifying multiple components out of service?
2	MR. WILSON: That is correct.
3	MR. ROSEN: So would you characterize
4	your current risk, use of risk tools as aggressive
5	or part of a
6	MR. WROBEL: I would say fairly
7	aggressive. I don't know what else we would use it
8	for. I guess day-to-day operation
9	MR. ROSEN: Risk-informed in-service
10	inspection?
11	MR. WROBEL: We have not done risk-
12	informed in-service inspection yet. However, we
13	have used it in quantification designs or in
14	evaluating modifications.
15	We have looked at a risk-informed ISI at
16	one point, have not done it. Probably looking at it
17	again now that we have, hopefully, another 20 years
18	of capable operation.
19	I think Gerry Geiken wants to say
20	something.
21	MR. GEIKEN: I'm Gerry Geiken with Ginna
22	Station.
23	We have looked at the cost benefit
24	analysis of going to risk-informed inspections. And
25	at the present time have concluded that there isn't

sufficient savings economically to justify the 2 analysis that would be required to going to risk-3 informed inspections. As a result, we continue to do 4 ISI as under the current requirements of ASME 5 Section XI. This is going to go quite a 6 MR. WROBEL: 7 bit faster, I believe, because we have covered quite 8 a few of these already. Again, we're the oldest operating PWR. 9 We talked about the standby auxiliary feedwater 11 system as a unique feature. 12 We do have -- this is actually fairly comparable to what you heard at Robinson last month. 13 14 We do have grouted containment tendons, but we have 15 rock anchors that are grouted right into the -- so the tendons go right into the ground block. 16 have the rock anchors and tension bars that are at 17 the base of our containment. 18 I don't know if this is a good time to 19 20 talk about it, but also have station blackout 21 recovery. We do have a sketch. I think that's 22 I don't know if you want to ask questions 23 about the level of --24 CHAIRMAN BONACA: You have an open item, is that correct?

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1	MR. ROSEN: We do want to hear about
2	that.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, when we get
4	there.
5	MR. WROBEL: Okay. We can wait on that.
6	The sketch is next. We'll go back to that sketch
7	when we get to station blackout recovery.
8	MR. ROSEN: It's apparently a phenomenon
9	that happens in upstate New York.
10	MR. WROBEL: Yes.
11	MR. ROSEN: Were you affected by it?
12	Were you one of the sections of the trip, by the
13	way?
14	MR. WROBEL: Yes. We did get an
15	automatic trip, but we didn't have a station
16	blackout. Our diesels worked fine.
17	MR. ROSEN: You have two of them, right?
18	MR. WROBEL: Yes.
19	MR. ROSEN: They both started and ran
20	and loaded?
21	MR. WROBEL: Yes. So we didn't get a
22	station blackout.
23	MR. ROSEN: No. No blackout.
24	MR. WROBEL: We just have snow.
25	I just wanted to let you know, our

1	performance indicators are green, inspections
2	findings are all green so I didn't put a slide on
3	that. But I think the NRC has one. It looks kind of
4	a like a metal
5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.
6	MR. WROBEL: Skip this until we get to
7	station blackout.
8	We're going to talk a little bit about
9	what currently is happening at Ginna Station or has
10	just happened.
11	We just changed our reactor vessel head.
12	It's a one piece construction. And we put in new
13	controller rod mechanisms. We have the old ones as
14	spares. We did put those in while we were at it.
15	I'll go to the next slide just to show a
16	couple pictures of it. That's the head in the shot.
17	The next one is with the ventilation installed. And
18	we have 400 more slides of that, but we won't show
19	you those today.
20	MR. ROSEN: Do you have an access patch
21	big enough to get
22	MR. WROBEL: Yes, and it was really a
23	good picture. Should have brought that one in. As
24	it was going through the equipment hatch, did not
25	have to modify it as opposed to when we did steam

generators and had to cut a hole in top of the
containment.
MR. ROSEN: Pardon me. I didn't
understand what you said.
MR. WROBEL: Oh, as opposed to when we
replaced steam generators, we had to cut holes on
top of containment. This came in through the
equipment hatch.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now you use 690 TT if
I remember, correct?
MR. WROBEL: Yes.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: And CRDM, I mean are
they now differently than in the design that we had
on the 600, or is there a different
MR. WROBEL: No, I believe they're the
same. Gerry, are they any different than I mean,
they 304 stainless steel, but I don't think the
designs any different than we had before.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Because the weld
material is different, if I remember, too.
MR. GEIKEN: Yes. This is Gerry Geiken.
The weld material is Inconel 52.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right.
MR. GEIKEN: Joining the penetration to
the head. It's all I-52. Bare wire cake.

1	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
2	MR. WROBEL: In addition to replacing
3	the upper reactor vessel, we did a detailed lower
4	reactor vessel head inspection. We took off the
5	insulation off the bottom or lowered the insulation
6	so we could look at it. We did detailed visual, VT-1
7	examinations at all 36 nozzles. And there were no
8	indications of any boric acid.
9	MR. ROSEN: Taking the insulation off,
10	was it designed to have come off or
11	MR. WROBEL: No. No. We had to take it
12	off. And we have a new system put in now that makes
13	access easier. There's room where you can put a
14	snake through a camera for future inspections. So
15	we've redesigned the bottom of head insulation.
16	MR. FORD: I'm assuming that with the
17	lower T, that temperature, that you are a low
18	susceptibility plant, is that correct?
19	MR. WROBEL: That's correct. For the
20	bottom, and as well as the top.
21	MR. FORD: The top?
22	MR. WROBEL: Because of the material
23	differences also.
24	MR. FORD: But even without the change
25	of material, it would still be a low susceptibility

1	plant, is that right?
2	MR. WROBEL: Bottom or top?
3	MR. FORD: The top?
4	MR. WROBEL: I think we would be medium.
5	MR. GEIKEN: George, it would have been
6	medium.
7	MR. FORD: So you changed it purely just
8	for insurance purposes, technical insurance?
9	MR. WROBEL: We did an economic analysis
10	of how much it would take to every outage gear
11	for it just in cases and it was economically viable
12	to replace it other than do that every year. And we
13	will still being inspections, but on less frequent
14	basis.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. So now the head
16	has been replaced and the plant is running now?
17	MR. WROBEL: Yes. Yes, it went quite
18	smoothly.
19	MR. MECREDY: This is Bob Mecredy.
20	On the reactor vessel head replacement,
21	there were really two pieces. One was the economics
22	in looking at the costs of inspections between 2003
23	and the end of the current license, 2009.
24	The other piece is intangible, which is
25	with replacing the head we're in control of our

1	destiny. With overhead and inspection techniques,
2	one could envision going in and looking at the CRDM,
3	identifying things that might be real, might not be,
4	might be an artifice of the examination techniques
5	and the impacts on outages. So, it really made
6	sense from several standpoints to replace the head.
7	And so we made that decision early on to do that.
8	MR. FORD: You're one of the stations,
9	few stations that have come in front of us, who have
10	actually gone through this head replacement. Just
11	for our interest, what sort of quality control was
12	applied for welding Alloy 52? Do you know that
13	answer offhand
14	MR. MECREDY: I don't, but Gerry Geiken.
15	MR. GEIKEN: Yes. This is Gerry Geiken.
16	The head was fabricated at Babock &
17	Wilcox in Cambridge, Ontario.
18	MR. FORD: Okay.
19	MR. GEIKEN: Their own internal quality
20	organization is very good. And we augmented that by
21	multiple visits to the plant. We had our own NDE
22	people providing some oversight to various critical
23	activities. And we had a constant presence of our
24	welding engineer during the entire fabrication

process. So I would say we didn't necessarily rely

on the quality control measures that they could or would apply and use, but we tried to exercise some of our oversight. And I think the overall quality of the fabrication is excellent.

MR. FORD: True.

MR. MECREDY: The other advantage we had was with purchasing new control rod drive mechanisms. We were able to get those on site prior to the outage and complete the welding of those onto the new head outside, you know prior to the outage. So we had the advantage of more accessible environment and really a better environment for people working on it, inspections oversight. And so that was done. And, of course, it was facilitated by the size of our head, being able to go in through the equipment hatch.

MR. WROBEL: The other major issue that we looked at was on the lower reactor vessel head inspection. This detail of the penetration, as you can see, the paint and weld pad, everything was in excellent condition. There was no leakage, no indication of leakage through the nozzles, boric acid and, again, it came out as good as we would expected on the bottom head.

MR. ROSEN: You know, that's not the

1	dialogue I would have given, given this picture. I
2	would have said there was some indication or leakage
3	from it. Or what am I looking at when I look right
4	on top of that nozzle?
5	MR. GEIKEN: I think it's the paint.
6	MR. WROBEL: Right there?
7	MR. ROSEN: Go a little to your left.
8	Put the dot back on. Yes, what's that stain there?
9	MR. WROBEL: Paint.
10	MR. ROSEN: And that's paint also above
11	that? There's no
12	MR. GEIKEN: It's zinc-rich paint. It's
13	painted with a zinc-rich Carbozinc-11. They got a
14	little sloppy and they got some of it onto the
15	penetration.
16	MR. ROSEN: Okay.
17	MR. WROBEL: We'll have a better picture
18	for the next presentation.
19	MR. FORD: Given the observations at
20	South Texas, you could be awkwardly minded, if you
21	like, and say here you just painted over the annulus
22	with paint and there's boric acid on top of that.
23	Is that a reasonable question?
24	MR. WROBEL: That would not be allowed.
25	No.

1 MR. FORD: You mean it wouldn't be 2 allowed to have occurred or not a good --3 MR. WROBEL: You can't cover up 4 something like that. Now if we found any -- we 5 looked real well for boric acid there, because we knew what happened out at South Texas. So we really 6 7 wanted to know if there was anything. We were prepared to make repairs, if necessary. But we 8 9 didn't find anything to make repairs to. 10 I'm not sure exactly the frequency at 11 which we'll be inspecting these in the future. I 12 think it's very outage. 13 MR. GEIKEN: Every outage. 14 MR. WROBEL: We'll be looking. So next 15 year's picture is really going to look good. 16 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okav. 17 The other issue that is a MR. WROBEL: more recent issue that came up is in our containment 18 19 sump, what we call our B sump. That's a depiction 20 of what it looks like. The sump is -- a wire mesh 21 And the RHR entrance with a bell mouth screen. 22 entrance piping at the bottom. And we did do an 23 inspection of that this outage, and we did find 24 things. We did find some minor bypass flow issues.

We did find some openings that were greater than the

size of the mesh, the 3/16" by 9/16'. 1 2 Foreign materials we found dried boric 3 acid in the bottom of the sump where there had been 4 leakage in the past and then just evaporated. And 5 that was not of any safety significance. We did find some metal parts in there, 6 7 clamps a file. And less than 6 ounces of some other foreign material. 8 So there was some foreign material in 9 We had a detailed NRC 10 the bottom of the sump. 11 inspection that concluded last week. Preliminary 12 findings are that we had 2 non-cited green violations of our corrective action program as a 13 14 result of that inspection. 15 MR. ROSEN: Because of the materials found in the sump or --16 One was materials found in 17 MR. WROBEL: the sump and one was the bypass flow. If you want 18 19 to point to the next picture. That's the mesh size 20 that it was supposed to be. 21 MR. ROSEN: Yes. 22 That's an opening that MR. WROBEL: 23 clearly is larger than that. That's inside the sump 24 underneath the floor. So, next picture is our repair as well 25

as the plates over that. So there are no more openings greater than that mesh size. So you can see that less than a day later that was done. So there were several openings like that that were found.

The NRC, at least preliminary indication from the inspection, was that they were very low safety significance, but we did get two non-cited green violations. Preliminary.

MR. LEITCH: Absent that bypassing, can you make any comment on the adequacy of the screens that do exist? In other words, have you revised your operating procedures or is there ongoing analysis to confirm that?

MR. WROBEL: Yes, we did a detailed analysis in accordance with, I believe, it's Reg Guide 182, Rev 2 or 3 when we did a steam generator replacement in 1996. We did a transport analysis with the current state of the art then, which I think still is pretty close to what we are now given that it's still evolving. And we did analysis of the screen as it was supposed to be, and it did indicate that there would be some head loss. I think we modified the bottom of the fibrous insulation from reflective metal insulation to a type of more

fibrous insulation that insulated better. put catchers up by the steam generator so that it wouldn't get into the sump, but then we also did an analysis of what the transport analysis would be to the sump, how much head loss there would be, did all the NPSH calculations for our HR. And, obviously, we found that there is margin there. The latest analysis was did was in '96, to my recollection, unless somebody can remember. That's a curious discussion, MR. ROSEN: George. You say you went from reflective metal insulation to a more fibrous insulation? In that one, in the bottom MR. WROBEL: There's more efficiency. of the steam generators. That reflective metal was just allowing too much heat out. But we did compensate for that by putting a fibrous debris screen right underneath the steam generators, right in that vicinity. So we didn't just willy-nilly change it. We thought about it, changed it out with a better insulating properties, but we didn't compensate for it by putting the screens down underneath the generators. Well, I guess my question, MR. LEITCH: it seems to me that there's some kind of an NRC correspondence to all PWR licensees. I don't know if

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1 it's a generic letter or just what the document is, 2 that requires a response. And I guess what I'm saying is have you responded to that, and if so, how 3 4 did you respond. 5 MR. WILSON: This is David Wilson, RG&E. The responder will respond. 6 MR. WROBEL: 7 MR. WILSON: In fact, these inspections that identify the bypass flows were done in 8 9 accordance to our response. The Bulletin 2003-01 10 requires to look at certain attributes and try and 11 determine what we could do right now to reduce the 12 risk consequences of screen fouling. And there were several things that we committed to doing, including 13 14 these inspections that we are in fact doing right 15 now. They're not all required to be done at this 16 instant. One of the Bulletin key items was to 17 modify your operating procedure such that perhaps 18 19 you would refill your RWIC or add more water volume 20 to containment. Within our current licensing basis 21 and accident analysis that would be something that 22 would not be allowed under 50.59. In fact, may have more detrimental effects than positive effects. 23 24 But what we committed to in that

Bulletin response, and what we are doing, is working

with the industry, with particularly the

Westinghouse Owners Group in order to analyze and

evaluate the consequences and possibilities of

adding more water or reducing ECCS flow, or securing

a train of spray if you didn't reach a certain

volume in order to delay the injection times to

minimize the sump volume and increase the transport

times.

All that being said, the jury's still out from an analysis standpoint. We're participating. And we committed to in our Bulletin response was that we would follow through. And once the science is done, we would evaluate whether or not we can actually execute those changes. Because just because it comes out of a Westinghouse Owners Group or some generic emergency response guidelines does not necessarily mean it's still appropriate for your facility. You still have to do individual.

The other things that we looked at were debris in containment. Not just how to filter the debris out, but what the debris source terms.

We took detailed high resolution videos and walk downs and measurements of the insulation sources for the loop areas and for those connections.

1 We don't know necessarily what the 2 generic letter that's going to come out will look 3 like with respect to what we have to protect 4 against. There's issues right now with water 5 chemistry. There's issues with flocculents and things like that. 6 7 So our thrust this outage was to reduce the risk. And the things we could do to reduce the 8 9 risk that were most appropriate were evaluate and then, unfortunately in our case, repair our screens 10 11 to be consistent with our design basis and to remove 12 debris. 13 And the debris sources that we found 14 that were removable, we found paper tags. We made 15 significant and major modifications to our procedures for closing out containment and for 16 17 modifying our debris control as we escalated the modes from a refueling mode up towards power 18 19 operation. 20 And beyond that, you know, it's business We've got the commitment letters in and 21 usual. 22 we're following through on them. 23 CHAIRMAN BONACA: What's the volume of 24 your RWST? MR. WILSON: About 300,000 gallons. 25

1 MR. WROBEL: We might as well talk a little bit about the license renewal application 2 now, since we're mostly done with the presentation. 3 4 The preparation, we did not have too 5 many contractors. We primarily did the application in-house. We have matrixed staff, everybody 6 7 participated in here except me. Because I worked part time on license renewal and part time on other 8 9 jobs, like looking through sumps. We did use specialty contractors where 10 11 we needed to. We had several areas that we didn't 12 have the expertise in-house to do the work, so we had Framatome, for example, do some analyses. 13 14 Westinghouse did analyses. And we did not a fatigue 15 monitoring program, and we had a contractor come in and install, initiate a fatigue monitoring program 16 17 for us which turned out to have great results. So, we do 95-10, Standard Replant 18 We were the third plant to do that. And, of 19 20 course, all three plants came pretty closely after 21 each other, so there was not much opportunity for 22 lessons learned. But we did use the Standard 23 Replant format. 24 One of the bigger portions of our 25 application, as you might have seen, is the GALL

1 3.x-2 tables. Those are tables that are 2 material/environment combinations, programs that are 3 not consistent with the GALL. For the most part, or 4 almost completely, they were additional material/environment combinations that were not in 5 the GALL, possibly due to the fact that the lessons 6 7 learned were from problems and if there were material/environment combinations that had no 8 9 problems, then they wouldn't be in the GALL. So we ended up putting them in a 3.x-2 table. 10 And that 11 added many pages to our application. 12 Also, the use of systems. When we had a material/environment combination in one pipe system 13 14 and it wasn't in the GALL, then we put it in a 3.x-215 table, even though we could have gone to another system, FECCS system or something, but we found it 16 17 in the CBCS, so that's why we put it in that format. We did all the interim staff guidance 18 that were available at the time. We addressed those 19 20 in the application. And all the interim staff 21 quidance documents that were out. 22 Subsequent to that we appear to have 23 answered to in RAI space, so I believe we're up to 24 date on all of our interim staff quidance documents.

We do have some scoping open items, but

1 we'll be talking about that when the NRC makes their 2 presentation. 3 MR. LEITCH: Without getting into the 4 details of those open items, I guess I had the 5 impression that a number of these open items had somewhat more substance and still somewhat more 6 7 areas of disagreement than we normally see at this 8 stage in the process. I mean, frequently at this stage the 9 staff comes and tells us well there's so many open 10 11 items, but they're all basically resolved. We're 12 awaiting formal documentation of the resolution and so forth. It seems like some of these, although 13 14 there are only eight, but I think there are about 5 15 or 6 that seem to me to represent some significant 16 areas of disagreement. Is that a correct 17 perception? MR. WROBEL: I think when we go through 18 19 that we'll find that we're significantly reduced 20 from 8 to possibly 1 by now. 21 MR. LEITCH: Okay. 22 But let me go over them MR. WROBEL: 23 when Russ goes through them. 24 MR. LEITCH: Okay. Fine. Yes, that's 25 good.

1 MR. WROBEL: We'll be available for 2 comment also. Yes. 3 MR. LEITCH: 4 MR. WROBEL: In case you want to ask us 5 what we think of them. Selected TLAAs. I just wanted to provide 6 7 a few of them that I thought were more interesting. 8 If you have any questions on the rest of them, that's fine. 9 Pressurized thermal shock, we thought 10 11 that would be an important issue. We did analyze the 12 Ginna reactive vessel with outline materials, both the plate and the weld out to the end of the 13 14 extended period of operation. You can see that the 15 RT_{prs} value where the beltline is 270.6, which is 16 significantly below 300. We've done the analysis 17 out to 80 years, and still quite a bit below 300 degrees. And the plates, you can see there's a lot 18 19 of margin over there. 20 This is one of the open items that staff 21 is independently reviewing. I think they'll be done 22 relatively soon and, hopefully, agree with us. 23 MR. ROSEN: To what do you attribute all that margin, given this is an old plant and the 24

technology for building vessels was somewhat less

1 mature at the time? 2 Yes. I think we got a MR. WROBEL: really good vessel from B&W. It was all fabricated 3 4 at the -- where was? Mount Vernon, Indiana facility. It wasn't moved around. A lot of the B&W 5 vessels back then were moved from one place to 6 7 another. And I think the cooper and nickel 8 content that we had is relatively low, .25 and .36 9 So we were able to -- so those values 10 11 indicated relatively low -- fluence isn't 12 particularly high either, so that helps us out. 13 MR. ROSEN: And why is the fluence low? 14 MR. WROBEL: We went to a low leakage 15 back in the mid-'80s, I believe. And we've maintained that since that time. 16 17 We did the analysis out to, I believe, 54 EFPY just in case there might be an upgrade. 18 19 Certainly 80 percent used to be the standard 20 capacity factor, but it certainly isn't anymore. 21 More like 95 percent now. So rather than 48, we 22 went out to 54 EFPY with these analyses. And so it 23 seems to be holding true. 24 MR. ROSEN: So 54 would represent a 90 25 percent capacity factor averaged over the life of

1 the vessel? 2 MR. HERRICK: That's correct. Now, say, 3 if we do an upgrade, that will bump that up a little 4 bit. So then it might be 85 percent with an upgrade 5 or something. And, obviously, if we have to redo the calculation with a higher fluence rate, then we'll 6 7 do that also. But it looks like we have significant 8 amount of margin. Also it helped that we had credible 9 If we had used simply the Reg 10 surveillance data. 11 Guide 199 Revision 1.1, the generic data, I think 12 that our PBS value is about 290. But having credible surveillance data got it 270. 13 CHAIRMAN BONACA: You have an open item 14 15 on the specimen, right? That's right. 16 MR. HERRICK: not related to the analysis, it's related to when we 17 test it. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right. 20 MR. HERRICK: We'll go over that later. 21 MR. WROBEL: Factor toughness of the 22 reactor vessel, we have taken four capsules out, we have two left to go. Some of the capsule Charpy V-23

notch data would indicate that our upper shelf

energy was approaching or could be below 50 foot

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pounds. So rather than the next time we do the test
to find out that maybe it actually is below 50, we
decided we would contract with the reactive vessel
manufacturer and do a fracture mechanics, a detailed
fracture mechanics evaluation called equivalent
margins analysis, which is an alternative to the
code analysis for upper shelf energy. We had that
performed for this reactor vessel for license
renewal out to 54 EFPY. And there's significant
margin under Section XI Appendix K. If you want more
details on that, Gerry will answer them. But there
is significant margin in the fracture toughness of
the reactor vessel from an upper shelf energy
standpoint.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
MR. WROBEL: But we did use that, but
equivalent margins analysis.
MR. FORD: And that question will also
be covered later and the whole question of us of the
specimens.
MR. WROBEL: Yes.
MR. GEIKEN: George, you ought to pull
out that we don't know that the upper shelf energy
is below 50.
MP WPORFT: Vec

1	MR. GEIKEN: The last capsule we tested,
2	the Chaprys came in at 55. And they seemed to
3	plateau out at 55. The last three capsules, the
4	upper shelf energy was nearly the same balance
5	between 52 and 55.
6	MR. WROBEL: Right. Yes. So we don't
7	know if it'll be below 50, but we did the analysis
8	just in case.
9	MR. FORD: But it's fair to say that
10	these are two open items which have not been
11	secured?
12	MR. WROBEL: As far as I know, this one
13	is closed. There's nothing open on this one.
14	MR. ARRIGHI: I'm sorry, which open item
15	was it?
16	MR. WROBEL: Fracture toughness
17	equivalent margins analysis. Hopefully, that's an
18	open item.
19	MR. ARRIGHI: When I get there, we'll
20	address it.
21	MR. WROBEL: Gerry said it's not.
22	MR. GEIKEN: No, shelf energy is closed.
23	MR. WROBEL: The other major TLAA that
24	we did is we did the T calculations for all of the
25	RCS and put the details. We did do these

1	calculation in accordance with the ISG. At 15, it
2	talks about the environmental effects. We did use
3	15.35 for stainless steel and 2.53 for carbon steel.
4	We did these for 60 years, and you can see that all
5	the values are quite a bit below 1.0, even for 60
6	years including maximum environmental effects. So we
7	did surge line, nozzle, charging nozzle; we did all
8	those detailed analyses because of the fatigue
9	monitoring program that we had installed. And did
10	all the calculations.
11	So there's no open items on fatigue of
12	the RCS.
13	In terms of programs, we have 33 aging
14	management programs that we took credit for; 20 of
15	them were consistent with the GALL. I'm sure we'll
16	hear more about that.
17	Twenty were consistent with the GALL.
18	Ten were consistent with exceptions. Of those 10,
19	probably 5 or 6 the exceptions were quite minor.
20	They were possibly a different addition of a
21	reference, but there were no major exceptions taken
22	through the vast majority of the programs that took
23	exception to the GALL.
24	All the exceptions were discussed with
25	the NRC staff. We have plant specific operating

experience and results, and I don't believe there's any open items left on programs that are consistent with GALL. They've been reviewed several times and all the differences are justified.

We did have 3 plant specific programs that were not GALL programs, mentioned earlier. The periodic surveillance maintenance program, thimble tube inspection program and systems monitoring program. Those are programs we already had in place. They weren't in the GALL, but we do take credit for those for aging management so we described those in our application.

The vast majority of programs we already had. We either made minor enhancements to them; 6 programs that we enhanced. A lot of it was like the boric acid corrosion program, which we had a boric acid corrosion program but it didn't extend to the same level that the current guidance would have you go to. So we added not just reactive cooling system in the vicinity of coolant leaks, but anything —but any carbon steel that could get leaked on by boric acid, whether it's in the CVCS line, whether it's electrical conduit, whatever it is that could leak onto boric — boric acid could leak onto carbon steel is covered on our current boric acid program.

1	MR. ROSEN: Does it include, for
2	instance, the pressurizer nozzles? Pressurizer
3	heater?
4	MR. WROBEL: Yes. Yes. I mean, if it
5	can leak from there, then it's covered.
6	MR. ROSEN: And you looked at the
7	pressurizer heater, the bottom of the pressurizer?
8	MR. WROBEL: I don't know if we've
9	looked at did we look at that?
10	MR. GEIKEN: Yes, we looked on this
11	outage. We took the insulation off.
12	MR. ROSEN: Pardon me? Again?
13	MR. GEIKEN: Sorry. I'm Gerry Geiken.
14	We did ISI examinations this outage on
15	the pressurizer surge nozzle.
16	MR. WROBEL: Oh, that's right.
17	MR. GEIKEN: And we uncovered the bottom
18	head, a significant portion of it.
19	MR. ROSEN: You covered the bottom head,
20	is that what you said?
21	MR. GEIKEN: We uncovered.
22	MR. ROSEN: Okay. And you looked at the
23	bottom head, you looked at the pressurizer heater?
24	MR. GEIKEN: We looked at yes. The
25	bottom head is where the pressurizer heaters

1 penetrate. And we looked all around there. 2 We don't have any Inconel 82/182 welds 3 in our pressurizer. So if the issue is primary 4 water stress corrosion cracking, which I suspect 5 you're thinking of, what you may be thinking of, we don't have that. All our pressurizer penetrations 6 7 are stainless steel, welded with stainless steel 8 weld metal. We did generate four new 9 MR. WROBEL: programs that we didn't have before. We have a 10 11 fatigue monitoring program, cable condition 12 monitoring program. We did make a commitment to look at 13 14 reactor vessel internals in the future and to try to 15 look at finer cracks than we have currently expertise to do that. And we're committed to do 16 17 that by 2009 or have a program sent in, I believe, by 2007 and approved by the NRC. We don't feel that 18 19 that's going to be a major issue. 20 Reactive vessel head penetration, we 21 were looking and we now have a formal program. 22 was committed to more from the current Bulletins 23 than from license renewal, but the two intersected 24 and we took credit for those.

MR. LEITCH:

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I have a numbers question,

1 I guess. I am not sure if this should go to the 2 licensee or the staff. But in an inspection report 3 the staff said they looked at 28 programs of 33 that 4 the licensee claimed were consistent with GALL. 5 MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. This is Russ Arrighi. 6 7 During our aging management program audit we did look at 28 of the 33. For those other 8 9 2 programs there were some differences. And in the application the licensee had the ten attributes for 10 11 that program. And that was reviewed in-house by the 12 staff. 13 MR. LEITCH: Yes. 14 MR. ARRIGHI: So when we said we 15 reviewed those 28, Mr. Wrobel is correct, there were only 3 that are plant specific, but the wording on 16 17 that may have been misleading in the report. Again, any attribute that was different than GALL was 18 19 reviewed in headquarters by the staff. 20 MR. LEITCH: Now, I'm still not sure I 21 understand. I guess my question is going into this 22 inspection we thought that 28 programs were 23 consistent with GALL and coming out of the 24 inspection we found that there were only 20

consistent with GALL. Is that correct or am I

missing the point here?

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MR. ARRIGHI: When I put the report together, looking at the spent fuel pool neutron absorber program, Ginna's program, it covers the ten attributes but it doesn't match the attributes explicitly. So when I was reviewing it, I didn't consider that a GALL program when actually, already when I sit back and reevaluate it and talking with George, you know, for consistency I should probably should have put that that program is a GALL program and even though they have the 10 attributes discussed in the application, I should have said that it wasn't a plant specific program, it was a GALL program. However, that program was viewed by the staff, because again the attributes were included in the application. And in the in-house the NRC staff could review that here because the applicant, again, the information regarding the attributes in the license renewal application. And that's the same for the other programs also.

MR. LEITCH: Okay.

MR. FORD: I have a more technical question. I must admit, reading through the application and the SCR I was a good deal frustrated by the lack of detail, factual detail.

1 For instance, in your fuel oil 2 chemistry, the AMP, you are not going to put any biocide or corrosion inhibitors to protect the 3 4 internals of that tank. No justification is given 5 it, apart from the fact that you haven't seen MIC or any other corrosion event there. 6 7 There are a few questions asked by the staff regarding to your thimble tube AMP. 8 the aspects of the justifications for the one time 9 inspection. And, unfortunately, in both the SER and 10 11 the application the justifications for the actions 12 that are going to be taken, are supposed to be taken are all verbal. There is no data to support your 13 14 assertions. 15 Can you give us a feeling as to the extent of the actual engineering data driven 16 17 discussions that went on between your organization and the NRC to back up those? 18 The actual data --19 MR. WROBEL: Yes. 20 MR. FORD: Were the graphs people were 21 looking at, or the data meet your justifications? 22 MR. WROBEL: I think a lot of it was 23 operating experience. We did rely heavily on 24 operating experience. Some of it we did rely on

science.

A lot of the information that was
actually useful in documentation is in what we call
our program basis documents. Program basis
documents are where were we implement all the
programs. Those were available to the staff for
detailed review, but they did not go into the
application. They're all about 30 pages long, have
all the procedures that implement the programs and a
lot more of the operating experience and history.
MR. FORD: So they did do more than
Appendix B, the AMPs?
MR. WROBEL: Oh, my goodness, yes. I
mean, everyone of those programs has a 30 pages
program basis document behind it.
MR. FORD: And there's data,
extrapolations of data?
MR. WROBEL: Yes.
MR. FORD: Uncertainties, all of these
are what happens if?
MR. ELLIOT: Barry Elliot.
I thought restricted at thimble 2?
MR. WROBEL: Yes.
MR. ELLIOT: They had done a whole lot
of inspections of the thimble 2 for wear. And they
have data from the early '90s on. And they based

1 their inspections based on that actual data from 2 inspections on the thimble 2. So they actually have data there from their previous inspections, which 3 4 they base their inspection program for the thimble 2. 5 So the guide tube, that was an issue that we brought up that they had originally had a 6 7 mitigation program, but no monitoring program. we've discussed that with them with great detail, 8 9 and you can see in our SER. And it's still open, but they have proposed a monitoring program now. 10 11 MR. FORD: Okay. 12 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I had some similar questions, because for example I ask them now. 13 14 Above ground carbon steel tanks says that you will 15 perform a one time inspection on the reactor makeup It doesn't say what inspection you're 16 water tank. 17 going to perform. I would like to know is it automatic inspection, visual? 18 19 MR. WROBEL: Gerry's got the details on 20 that. 21 MR. GEIKEN: This is Gerry Geiken. 22 can offer the details on that. 23 We've already done that inspection. 24 drained the tank completely. Did a 100 percent 25 visual inspection of the painted interior of the

1 vessel and an ultrasonic examination of the bottom, 2 flat bottom of the tank. 3 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. And you found? 4 MR. GEIKEN: We found no evidence of 5 degradation whatsoever. Okay. All right. 6 CHAIRMAN BONACA: 7 MR. FORD: I can understand your Let me give you a hypothesis and then you 8 9 shoot it down. You find no corrosion in your fuel 10 11 tanks, presumably because your fuel supplier has met 12 certain specification limits. Assume that you get a bad lot and you get an attack of bacterial-assisted 13 14 corrosion, induced corrosion, that can go extremely 15 fast locally. Now the way you've justified the one 16 time inspection, which I believe is what the fuel 17 oil tank you've got because you haven't seen any 18 19 corrosion, what happens if next year you get this 20 rapid corrosion? You've got no process apart from I 21 understand it a ten year inspection periodicity for 22 You're not going to catch that. that tank. 23 And then the follow question is what the 24 consequences? Well, actually our diesel 25 MR. GEIKEN:

1	fuel oil, every batch is tested by various ASTM
2	methods.
3	MR. FORD: Okay.
4	MR. GEIKEN: As in accordance with the
5	requirements of the GALL program.
6	MR. FORD: Yes.
7	MR. GEIKEN: Prior to being delivered to
8	the site and prior to being dumped into the tanks,
9	or prior to the tanks being filled.
10	In addition, I think our frequencies now
11	for internal inspections.
12	MR. WROBEL: Nine years.
13	MR. GEIKEN: They're still every 9
14	years.
15	We just went into them this outage and
16	they're pristine. But in terms of the potential for
17	getting a bad batch, we're as proactive as we feel
18	we can be in terms of inspecting every load of fuel
19	oil. And we do multiple inspections. We inspect
20	not only before the tanks are filled, but after
21	they're filled from three locations. We follow all
22	the guidance that's in the GALL, and I think we've
23	committed to some additional particulate testing.
24	But your concern is biocides?
25	MR. FORD: Well, biocides, corrosion
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1 inhibitors. I'm just bringing up those as for 2 instances. 3 My concern is that not just your 4 stations, all the previous stations we've had 5 exactly the same discussion about what is your justification for a one time inspection for a 6 7 possibly nonmelior degradation mechanism. find no corrosion of degradation today? And that's 8 9 20 years into the process. But what's to say that you're not going to have a MIC problem or pitting 10 11 problem because you don't have inhibitors or don't 12 have biocides in next year? Well, actually --MR. GEIKEN: 13 14 MR. FORD: And you haven't done your 15 consequence analysis, but that's what you told me in the very beginning. 16 17 Actually, the diesel fuel MR. GEIKEN: oil testing program and the internal inspections of 18 the diesel fuel oil tanks, they're not one time. I 19 20 mean, they're periodic. 21 MR. FORD: Okay. 22 MR. GEIKEN: So we've been into the 23 diesel fuel oil tanks once every outage, up to 1990 24 -- what was it, George? 25 MR. WROBEL: '92.

1 MR. GEIKEN: '92. So for 20 some years 2 we had a history of data there that showed that there was no internal degradation of the vessels. 3 4 And we've done the first 9 year inspection since 5 then this outage, and found the same thing. MR. FORD: I guess I'm excessively 6 7 susceptible to this having worked in this industry in the cracking side. And you can bet your bottom 8 9 dollar, tomorrow figuratively speaking you're going to have an "oh, heck" hitting you, which you never 10 11 realized you were going to happen, because you've 12 had a good 20 years experience beforehand. what I'm pushing to. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Just operating 15 experience is not, by itself, a good --16 MR. FORD: A good measure necessarily. 17 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Necessarily a good project for the next 20 years when you get from 40 18 19 And, of course, it's unchartered territory. to 60. 20 I mean, nobody's gone that far. On the other hand, I think that some of 21 22 the issues for the tank, you would measure leakage 23 from it before you get to the point where you have 24 no sufficient inventory, I would suspect. 25 and I will expect that you would have a corrective

action program taking because, I mean, you have
spec restrictions of those tanks. And you have the
fuel levels that you have maintain, right?
MR. WROBEL: Right.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: And so you would have
to have I mean, if you get below a certain level
and you cannot maintain it, you have to shutdown the
plant and fix it.
MR. ROSEN: Well, it's also true I
think, Mario, that you wouldn't expect to have both
tanks leak at the same time.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Absolutely. So you
have a number of
MR. FORD: Okay, guys. But you're making
the answer for them, and I asked them have you a
done a consequences?
CHAIRMAN BONACA: No, no. I think there
are issues where this is very significant because
you have much less margin. Here is an example where
you do have more margin than most cases, because you
have two and you do have probably small leakage in
the beginning. If that is to happen, you probably
can monitor it.
But I agree with you, the issue in
general, it's a significant issue for the whole

1 industry, making these projections based on past 2 experience. 3 I had some other questions here. One I 4 would like to ask is about your neutron noise 5 monitoring system. Now, that's a system that is in place to detect and monitor significant loss of 6 7 axial preload and core support barrel -- we just heard from another applicant for license renewal, 8 that program was very significant on their site to 9 identify in time thermal shield problems. 10 11 fixed those problems. And they're using it to 12 prevent further problems to develop. I see that you're not including this 13 14 program in your license renewal or crediting the 15 program for it? No, we did not credit that 16 MR. WROBEL: 17 program for license renewal the way we do our 10 year ISI and our internals. We haven't really had 18 19 any comparable issues --20 CHAIRMAN BONACA: But you still have 21 this program implemented on site? 22 MR. WROBEL: I don't believe there is a 23 program on site. 24 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, it's called 25 neutron noise monitoring.

1	MR. WROBEL: Neutron noise monitoring.
2	No, we don't.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: D2-120.
4	MR. WROBEL: Yes, we don't have that. I
5	think the application should have said that that's
6	the name of the program but we don't have it and we
7	don't credit it.
8	MR. ARRIGHI: This is Russ Arrighi the
9	program manager.
10	In Ginna's application I think every
11	GALL program, I think the applicant had a bullet
12	that there is such a program. But in Ginna's case,
13	even though they mention the program, they said it's
14	not utilized at Ginna. So it's essentially a place
15	holder.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. So you do not
17	have it at all. I misunderstood.
18	MR. WROBEL: Sorry.
19	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I thought that still
20	you had the program and I just all right. So you
21	do not have that program?
22	MR. WROBEL: We don't have a program
23	like that.
24	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. And you do have
25	a thermal shield?

1	MR. WROBEL: Yes, and it's in scope.
2	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Yes, I imagine
3	so.
4	Several more questions I wanted to ask
5	at this stage.
6	Okay. A couple of questions for my
7	consultant that performed the review here and sent
8	some comments out. One is relating to the special
9	blackout and the confidence that we have that based
10	on the experience I think we'll hear from that
11	from the staff.
12	Fire protection. We noted that you do
13	not include jockey pumps, for example, in scope.
14	MR. WROBEL: That's correct. That's one
15	of the open items.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: That's right. And I
17	just am trying to understand the logic. If I
18	understand it, NFPA requires that you have jockey
19	pumps. They maintain pressure, doesn't it?
20	MR. WROBEL: It recommends that you have
21	them, it doesn't require it. We have a large
22	pressure maintenance tank that we feel is enough
23	has enough of a size that we don't need really need
24	the jockey pumps to maintain pressure. And, again,
25	the intended function is for the pumps to operate

1	just fine without a jockey pump.
2	CHAIRMAN BONACA: But essentially the
3	function of jockey pumps was the one of maintaining
4	pressure maintenance function.
5	MR. WILSON: This is Dave Wilson,
6	Rochester Gas & Electric.
7	Our configuration at Ginna Station,
8	although includes a pump that could be considered as
9	a jockey pump. It's actually a key filled pump for
10	this tank. And the way the system is configured I
11	think is unique in that the staff hasn't recognized,
12	necessarily, how the physically plant is laid out.
13	What we have is a 15,000 gallon over
14	pressure tank on the discharge of the pumps.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
16	MR. WILSON: And that tank maintains
17	10,000 gallons of water which makes up for system
18	leakage, or whatnot. The tank has a couple of ways
19	of being refilled. One is this, what we call a
20	booster pump which the staff calls a jockey pump.
21	So if the tank gets a low level, it can be through
22	that.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.
24	MR. WILSON: The other method is when we
25	run our fire pumps for maintenance, particularly the

1 motor driven fire pump, we can refill the tank 2 during that running evolution. 3 And so the position that the staff has 4 taken is because we have something called a jockey 5 pump, and we're reviewed against Branc Technical Position 951, which is the early fire protection 6 7 requirements, they've said that because Branch Technical Position 951 endorses NFPA 20, then 8 therefore we must endorse NFPA 20 even those 9 configuration is not an NFPA 20 configuration. 10 11 So that the argument there is not that 12 we need a pressure maintenance source. It's whether or not this key filled pump is in fact a jockey pump 13 14 required by NFPA 20 --15 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I understand now. But it's still an open issue? 16 17 MR. WILSON: It's still an open issue. MR. HERRICK: We'll go into that. 18 19 MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, we'll discuss it. 2.0 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Okay. 21 MR. LEITCH: While you're on the 22 protection of fire protection -- go ahead, Mario, 23 you finish. 24 CHAIRMAN BONACA: No, no. You go ahead. I guess I had a couple of 25 MR. LEITCH:

1	questions about fire protection that related to the
2	inspection of June 23 through 26th. Is the staff
3	going to cover that? There were a couple of issues
4	with respect to frequency of Halon testing,
5	frequency of fire door inspections, frequency of
6	hydrant inspections?
7	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. This is Arrighi, the
8	program manager
9	MR. LEITCH: There seem to be a lot of
10	lacking areas there in the fire protection.
11	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, we have a slide on
12	that. If you want, I'll discuss it now or later.
13	MR. LEITCH: No, we can wait until that
14	part of the presentation.
15	Excuse me, Mario.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Oh, no. No problem.
17	The other question I had was relating to
18	the all volatile water treatment building. That
19	building houses the tech support center it says.
20	MR. WROBEL: That's correct.
21	CHAIRMAN BONACA: And it is not designed
22	to resisted high winds or tornado/missiles. And the
23	question that this consultant had when he reviewed
24	was, in fact there is a requirement for the tech
25	support center to be designed to withstand. So how

1 do you have this tech spec? Do you have a backup --2 MR. WILSON: This is Dave Wilson, RG&E. 3 The technical support center is an 4 addition to our treatment water building and it was 5 added to satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737 in order to have an emergency planning space, so to 6 7 speak, and we put a diesel in there for backup power 8 and whatnot. There were no requirements to make 9 that seismic or to tornado missile protect it. we had a seismic event or a tornado event, then the 10 11 control room is where we operate from. 12 So the building is non-seismic and nonsafety related. It is, however, important enough 13 14 to be within the scope of license renewal. 15 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I thought --16 MR. WROBEL: I'm not sure where the 17 qualification is. I know that it's required to be habitable, as habitable as a control room. 18 19 don't believe that it need to be designed for 20 external phenomena. 21 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I thought the 22 emergency plan required that, but maybe I'm wrong. 23 MR. WROBEL: Not to our knowledge. 24 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So you have a tornado, 25 you got a missile and it gets knock out, you have to

MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, that is correct.w We also have an EOF facility that's about 25 miles away that probably the same tornado wouldn't hit it. CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. Okay. I'd like to find out more if it was a requirement, in fact, of the emergency plan or not. MR. ARRIGHI: This is Russ Arrighi. I don't have the answer for that right now, but I'll write it down and get back to you. CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Yes. At this stage, I don't have anymore questions for you. MR. WROBEL: I'm over my hour, so let me get through this last one. CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. MR. WROBEL: We had 29 how level commitments. It was actually 31. There were 2 more that were added that were not the docket yet. So these were 29 that were dockets. There's actually 31 commitments. All of the commitments have been put into what we call our CAT system, our commitment action tracking system. They've all been assigned responsible personnel.	1	rely on the control room?
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	23	into what we call our CAT system, our commitment
25 responsible personnel.	24	action tracking system. They've all been assigned
	25	responsible personnel.

I would say about one-third to one-half of the commitments have already been completed. We plan on completing the vast majority of the commitments within the next couple of years. We're not going to wait until 2009.

Some of the commitments, and George can explain this even better, he sequenced them between now and 2009 to fall within a natural, like the tendon testing for 2005. We picked 2005 because that's when our next tendon testing test is scheduled. So, well, we're doing a lift off test that we would retention them at the same time. So that's why 2005 was picked. We probably could have done it out to 2007 or eight or nine.

So they're all assigned. They're internal documents. The fact that we had a matrixed organization, we don't really have a license renewal project person to turn over, because all the commitments were made in concert with the primarily engineering people that were assigned to the project. So there's not a major turnover process developed.

We do have a program to configuration management process that we're developing now. We're finding some of the ones that are not specifically

1 assigned, but in detail. We have that process. We 2 haven't written a procedure yet, but we're following 3 them on an individual basis for now until we get the 4 whole program integrated with our configuration 5 management information system. And we don't -- you know, they're all being followed in CATS right now, 6 7 so I don't see any real issues in long term maintenance and meeting all of our commitments. 8 9 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. 10 MR. WROBEL: They're all scheduled with 11 due dates. 12 And one last question. CHAIRMAN BONACA: If you look at the SER on number of systems, the 13 14 staff performed the review of the application, 15 looked at your methodology for the defined components is scope. And then they identified cases 16 17 where they disagree with you. They informed you, and you agreed that something else had to be added 18 19 to the scope, there were a number of changes that 20 were identified by the staff. 21 And, you know, we have to make a 22 determination, as the staff has to do, that there is reasonable assurance that the items in scope have 23

You know, how based on the fact

been identified. So I have the question also for

the staff later on.

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that the staff, every time they perform the review of an LRA they find enough additional items that are in scope, and the applicant agrees. A thorough reviewer like yourself is left with the question in the mind, you know, do we have reasonable assurance to the fact that items in scope have been identified and proper programs have been implemented. And I would like to have your comments.

Sure. We did a review again MR. WROBEL: today looking at all the RAIs. We identified three items that were put into scope because of the staff Now, we have a couple of open review to date. Those were the house heating boiler in the screen house where it as a (a)(2) issue. We have a safe shutdown methodology that includes being able to safely shutdown without the screen house at all. We have a separate independent system that we can So we felt that even if the boiler shut down. degraded under (a)(2) and damaged the surface water system, that we could still safely shutdown.

What the staff pointed out in their review is that if the boiler degraded at the time that we were having recovery from a loss of coolant accident, that we would not be able to. So we hadn't put a house heating boiler degradation from

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aging management program together with the recovery from loss of coolant accident together. We didn't do the analysis. But I think we have a pretty low probably. From a strictly(a)(2) reading it would have fallen in scope. And so we decided we would put that in scope.

The other two we were disagreeing with the staff for a while. We currently agree that we would have spent fuel pool makeup from the refueling water storage tank. We had called that a hypothetical event, and we didn't feel a hypothetical event needed to be in scope. We decided it would be prudent to put that into scope. It was a very minor amount.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.

MR. WROBEL: And the CCW, the rest of the component cooling water system, was really already being covered by component cooling water system program.

So those are the only three, other than some typographical errors. And I think that's what you're finding in the RAI responses is that there were some errors that were -- when we did our initial drawings that we sent in, and there were some errors when we were translating the magenta

1	lines to cyan lines. There were some errors that
2	were made there. And they were covered very quickly.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. In fact, don't
4	worry about those. Because, I mean, I don't worry
5	about where you have a logical disagreement. I
6	mean, you may be right. And I think you have to
7	present your perspective and position, and that's
8	only fair.
9	I'm worrying more about where there, for
LO	example, the ends of pipe missed purely because
L1	somebody made a mistake and then they're excluded.
L2	And that's really where
L3	MR. WILSON: This is David Wilson,
L4	Rochester Gas & Electric.
L5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.
L6	MR. WILSON: I'd like to field that for
L7	a second.
L8	There's really two administration issues
L9	that happened, I think just because of the timing of
20	our application.
21	The first one and most significant to
22	your question or comment was when we originally had
23	discussed with the staff how to prepare and package
24	and transmit the application, we had prepared and
25	packaged the application with a set of drawings that

had the colors of magenta showing the scope. And about 5 days before we were scheduled to submit, the staff realized that magenta was not a color that they could use for the rank and file reviewers that would print out on a laser jet printer. It would show no color, and they wouldn't be able to see the boundary. So we had to go back very quickly and modify the drawings, which was a total redrew. And errors were introduced in that. Those errors were not reflected in the actual analysis that was in the application.

And we had had a discussion with the staff. And, in fact, put in our application that this was going to happen. Everybody recognized it. But we felt at the time because of the data in the application was correct and reflected the correct boundaries, that we would be able to quickly navigate and get through this. And, in fact, we did. It was not a significant issue with the issue.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.

MR. WILSON: The second administrative issue was purely GALL related, and that's in that we had to both educate ourselves and we had a staff learning how to use the GALL. And when we were translating components that were within the scope of

license renewal -- see, the way it works, is a 2 reviewer actually has a drawing in front of him. 3 can put his finger on a component and say tell me 4 about valve 123. But nowhere in the application do you see valve 123. You see carbon steel components and spent fuel systems. 6 And so there's a lot of discussion that goes back and forth using the standard review plan 8 9 on where is that component exactly in your And because we had to do this in a 10 application. 11 public venue, the discussion takes the form of an 12 RAI. But, you know, they're easy enough to 13 14 work through. And, in fact, we found very few 15 other than what was discussed omissions. And, of course, then the region comes in after the NRR staff 16 is done and does their own review. 17 And so we understand what you're seeing, 18 19 but we don't think it's representative of a 20 technical problem. 21 I appreciate it. CHAIRMAN BONACA: 22 MR. WROBEL: All right. That was our 23 last slide. 24 You have station blackout covered in yours?

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1	MR. ARRIGHI: I have a slide I'll put up
2	if they need to see the boundaries.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: We're going to take a
4	break. We are due for a break at 2:45. I don't know
5	if we want to break now and then go through the
6	staff presentation?
7	MR. ROSEN: I'd like a break.
8	CHAIRMAN BONACA: You would like a
9	break? Let's take a short break. Let's together
10	here again in ten minutes, would you say?
11	(Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m. a recess until
12	2:15 p.m.)
13	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Let's get back
14	into the session.
15	And now we have Mr. Arrighi that is
16	going to summarize for us the SER.
17	MR. ARRIGHI: Good afternoon. My name is
18	Russ Arrighi, I'm the project manager for the safety
19	review of Ginna plant license renewal application.
20	With me is John Rowley. John assisted
21	me in putting together the SER, and he's going to
22	make the presentation on Section IV.
23	Also we have Mike Modes from Region 1.
24	He's a team leader at the region 1 Inspection Teams,
25	and he'll present the section on those inspections.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.

MR. ARRIGHI: The application for Ginna was submitted in July 2002. Ginna is a two loop PWR located in Wayne County, New York. As one of the oldest PWRs, Ginna did go through the Systematic Evaluation process review by the NRC. The Systematic Program was utilized by the staff, the review that document. It was utilized during the scoping and screening methodology audit. Also the staff review of scoping and screening in headquarters and during the regional inspection.

That Systematic Evaluation Program, SER, was used in the same manner as the UFSAR in that it established the current licensing basis of the plant.

RG&E requested a 20 years extension for Ginna through September 18, '29. Ginna's the third plant that implemented the GALL process with Fort Calhoun being one and Robinson being the other.

The staff review of the license renewal application resulted in eight open items. Four of those open items are presently resolved. The applicant has provided responses for the other open items. Preliminary review indicates that two or three of those other open items can be resolved in

this preliminary review. So, that's why we did not show that they are resolved.

There are seven confirmatory items. One of the confirmatory items, and we'll talk about these, based on a response the applicant provided to one of the open items, this confirmatory item is now considered essentially an open item. And when I get there in the application, I'll talk about that in a little detail.

The LRA resulted in several components being in scope. The applicant mentioned those. The heating steam boiler, the component cooling water piping and the fueling water storage tank, the makeup supply to the spent fuel pool.

As the applicant stated, a lot of the other components that you indicated, we had a number of RAIs bringing stuff into scope. Our questions with the applicant, they said they are in our database on site. They are already in scope. But, again, we had to get that on the docket, so that's where a lot of those things are that made the review seem like there was a lot of additional components added.

MR. LEITCH: Russ, is that house heating boiler sometimes referred to as the screen house

1	steam heating boiler or is there a difference?
2	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, steam heating boiler.
3	I think we might have used the term steam heating
4	boiler in the SER. I don't know all the
5	terminology.
6	MR. LEITCH: I thought I saw it a screen
7	house.
8	MR. WROBEL: It's in the screen house.
9	Yes, it is the same boiler. It's physically in the
LO	screen house.
L1	MR. LEITCH: Okay. Same boiler.
L2	MR. WROBEL: Yes.
L3	MR. LEITCH: Okay. Thank you.
L4	MR. ARRIGHI: Also, as result of the
L5	SER review there was one new aging management
L6	program added, and that was in the electrical
L7	section. It had to do with electrical cables not
L8	subject to EQ requirements, used an I&C circuit.
L9	That's using circuits with sensitive low voltage
20	signals, and that program was added based on staff
21	questions.
22	For Ginna, we did have 224 RAIs were
23	issued at Ginna. This is a reduction from the
24	previous applications, however it is still a high
2.5	number. Again, due to the three GALL applications

1	being submitted relatively close together, the full
2	benefits of GALL weren't realized.
3	MR. ROSEN: When is that going to wear
4	out?
5	MR. ARRIGHI: Probably after at least
6	Summer.
7	MR. ROSEN: Summer. We get another pass
8	on Summer and then after Summer?
9	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, we'll see what
10	happens then. But with the new process, we expect
11	that the number of RAIs should be reduced.
12	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. We review Summer
13	in the winter. In mid-December. And then
14	MR. ROSEN: To warm us up.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: that no open items,
16	I understand.
17	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. Summer has no open
18	or confirmatory items.
19	All right. The NRC audits and
20	inspections, there were two inspections and two
21	audits performed at Ginna. Each of these will be
22	discussed as we progress through the presentation.
23	Structures and components. The staff
24	review and audit determine that the applicant's
25	scoping and screening methodology satisfied the

1	rule. During the audit, again, as a result of the
2	audit we did bring in the screen house, the heating
3	steam boiler in scope. And, again, the applicant
4	discussed that based on the SEP seemed to have an
5	alternate means to shut down the plant. Alternate
6	service water supplied to the diesels.
7	Plant level scoping results. A staff
8	review of this section determined there were no
9	plant level systems, structures or commodities
10	omitted from the application.
11	Scoping and screening of mechanical
12	systems. Before I go a little further on this
13	slide, I know a question normally arises regarding
14	the pressurized spray head. The pressurizer spray
15	head at Ginna is not in scope. The defuser portion.
16	The spray nozzle
17	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The spray nozzle is?
18	MR. ARRIGHI: is in scope and that's
19	the pressure boundary portion.
20	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now, is this normal?
21	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The nozzle is in
23	scope?
24	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. The pressure
25	boundary function of the spray is always in scope at

1 all applications. 2 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. 3 MR. ARRIGHI: Again, at Ginna and I 4 think at the previous applications, the failure of 5 the pressurizer spray head wouldn't prevent the safety accomplish to depressurize the plant. As part 6 7 of Ginna's current licensing basis, they rely on an alternate means to depressurize a plant for fire 8 protection safe shutdown analysis. And the way they 9 depressurize would be through their PORVs. 10 11 normal plant operation, they would use the 12 pressurizer. And, again, any indication that they had a problem with the pressurizer function, again, 13 14 normal plant operations the operators would be aware 15 of it, it would go in their corrective action process and they would fix it. But for the purpose 16 17 of license renewal, again, the current licensing basis to depressurize during a cool down is the 18 19 PORVs. Section 2.3 Scoping and --20 Okay. 21 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Could you go back to 22 This is for the fire, right? 23 MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. For the fire protection safe shutdown analysis.

Okay.

Okay.

CHAIRMAN BONACA:

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1 MR. ARRIGHI: They rely on the PROVs. 2 CHAIRMAN BONACA: The PROV. 3 MR. ARRIGHI: Okay. 4 MR. LEITCH: I guess there's one issue 5 that I find just a little confusing in the SER in page 1-10 there's a statement made that redundancy 6 7 is not an adequate basis in itself to exclude a 8 system from the aging management review. 9 guess --10 If the current licensing MR. ARRIGHI: 11 basis specifies it be redundant equipment, then all 12 that equipment if it's part of the CLB, would need 13 to be in scope. Just because there are other 14 components that can perform the same function, those 15 types of components, you know, you might have ten means to fill up a tank. If the CLB relies on two 16 17 of them, both of those means have to be in scope, not the remaining ten. Or in the case of the CLB 18 19 only requires one method, just because you have 20 other methods to perform that function if you're not 21 managing the aging, we can't credit those and we 22 have to rely on the CLB. And therefore, those 23 systems that are defined by the CLB have to be in 24 scope.

MR. LEITCH: So I'm just trying to go

1 back to this pressurizer spray nozzle. There are 2 other methods of depressurizing, but --3 MR. ARRIGHI: And the licensing basis of 4 this plant relies on the PORV, the power operated relief valve. 5 6 MR. LEITCH: Okay. 7 MR. ARRIGHI: So therefore the staff, since it's part of the CLB, can require that that 8 9 component be in scope. And if that component is not part of the design in the CLB, then we can't rely on 10 11 it and it would essentially be -- we can't force the 12 applicant to put it in license renewal. MR. LEITCH: 13 Okay. 14 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Normally the position 15 taken is that if the spray head fails, you can still depressurize with a spray at a lower rate, but still 16 17 adequate to get into closer down with 24 hours, or whatever the requirement is. And now this is a new 18 19 one, I haven't seen before, you use a PORV to 20 depressurize as a means. I guess I hang my hat more 21 on still using the pressurizer. 22 I'm sure the applicant MR. ARRIGHI: 23 could probably perform that same analysis and make 24 the same case. 25 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right. Yes.

1 MR. ARRIGHI: But their licensing basis 2 was clear in this regard. CHAIRMAN BONACA: 3 Yes. Okay. MR. GILLESPIE: Frank Gillespie with 4 5 NRR. This comes up. The safety case is first 6 7 versus the compliance case. And part of that safety case is, it wasn't relied upon in the CLB for a 8 And the reason it wasn't relied upon is 9 some of the things you articulated. 10 11 The other thing is the spray heads, and 12 this is only the heads, it's a low-DP system and it's used frequently. So while it is a passive 13 14 component, it's kind of in active use. And so now 15 you have to postulate the sudden degradation of this head falling off, not in daily use. At the same 16 time you have the accident that needs it, and you 17 still have water flow through a depressurizing the 18 19 pressurizer anyway. 20 So the safety reason is the first reason 21 why it's out, but that manifests itself in not being 22 in the current licensing basis. So it's not just 23 compliance, it is safety. 24 MR. ARRIGHI: Again, Section 2.3, 25 mechanical system review. The staff review of this

section resulted in three open items and three confirmatory items. Three of those open items have been resolved.

Several components that were initially omitted from the scope, again, we stated these earlier. Steam heating boiler, component cooling water piping and spent fuel pool makeup path were all added to scope based on the staff review.

Again, the steam heating boiler was brought in as a result of the scoping and screening methodology audit questions that were asked them. The other two components, CCW piping and spent fuel pool makeup. they were added as a result of applicant's response to these open items that follow.

Open item 2.3.3.2-1 is resolved. The staff identified that failure of out-of-scope CCW piping could result in failure of the system and the ability to cool down the plant.

The piping in question here is nonsafety related piping that is subject to AMR and review that ends at an open boundary valve. In this case it's a 3 quarter inch valve piece of pipe that the applicant had an open boundary valve. And initially they deemed that hey would sufficient time to isolate those valves prior to losing the component

cleaning water surge tank and have sufficient capacity to water. The staff asked the applicant to address the basis to support that information; what size leak, etcetera.

Preliminary review of different types of failure, the applicant came back and said as a result of your question, we will add in whole component cooling water system piping down stream of that valve. So the CCW system is in scope of license renewal at this point in time.

Open item 2.3.3.3-1. The staff identified that the spent fuel pool makeup source was not in scope. Again, the applicant's position was initially that it would take over 5 hours. If the hypothetical event, it would take over 5 hours to initiate boiling and then over 2 days before you need to add water. The applicant didn't account for potential leaks in the spent fuel pool liner. And, again, the rerack of the spent fuel was based in part on having a makeup water supply to the spent fuel pool.

As a result of communications with the applicant, they agreed that they would add in the feeding water storage tank into scope, and therefore this item has been resolved.

1	CHAIRMAN BONACA: So the issue was
2	whether or not a leak from the pool had to be
3	addressed?
4	MR. ARRIGHI: Correct.
5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right.
6	MR. ARRIGHI: Exactly.
7	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I mean, the design
8	basis of the spent fuel pool was not clear about
9	that?
10	MR. ARRIGHI: In some of the
11	documentation it talks about a hypothetical failure
12	and whatnot. And it doesn't really address leakage.
13	During our review of some, you know, rerack analysis
14	and just the staff thought it was needed, that they
15	needed to address leakage.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Has this been done for
17	the other previous applications?
18	MR. ARRIGHI: I believe all the other
19	applicants have a makeup source to the pool. I'd
20	have to ask the reviewer.
21	MR. JONES: This is Steve Jones, Plant
22	Systems Branch of NRR.
23	In the case of Ginna, the earlier
24	amendments regarding spent fuel capacity or pool
25	expansion did address leakage through the liner and

relying on makeup to maintain pool level.

Ginna has a somewhat different licensing basis, in that they have a temperature limit on the pool below boiling, so they rely on the cooling system to maintain the temperature limit. And I think that's the -- in general we bring the makeup systems into scope based on boiling. In this case it was to address leakage that could render the cooling system inoperable and then you would not be able to maintain the temperature below the design temperature.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right. Okay.

MR. LEITCH: Can we talk about the steam heating system in the diesel generator building? It seems as though what they did was see where the steam heating system could fail in such a way that it would damage safety related system. Even though the steam heating system in itself is not safety related, it could fail in such a way that it would damage the building or damage safety related equipment. And those parts of it that could fail were brought into scope.

Now, I guess a number of applicants that we've see in the past have said, well, basically if you have a two over one kind of a situation if

1 anything in that building would be brought into It sounds like what they did here was part 2 3 of the steam heating system and the diesel generator 4 was brought into scope and other parts of it were 5 I mean, I would think that in that kind of a situation, I think what we've seen most previous 6 7 applicants do is just bring the whole steam heating system in the diesel generator building into scope? 8 9 MR. WILSON: This is David Wilson, Rochester Gas & Electric. 10 11 And, in fact, that is what occurred. Ι 12 think what you're seeing in our case is we're the first applicant to actually address the nonsafety 13 14 specs safety ISG in their application. 15 And so the original thrust, when we did our original reviews, we did an analytical review 16 17 based on our current licensing basis, which did not identify house heating steam as being in scope. 18 19 Then we did a spacial analysis that identified in certain areas of the plant house heating steam could 20 21 in fact cause a failure that would affect the safety 22 That brought the entire house heating function. 23 steam system into scope, but you screened out the 24 components that didn't cause that failure.

So, the system, house heating steam, was

1 in scope but only the components in the diesel rooms 2 initially were within the scope of license renewal. MR. LEITCH: 3 Yes. 4 MR. WILSON: And then later on, based on RAIs and the audit which identified that post-5 accident we could have a failure in the screen house 6 7 that would affect our ability to manage the accident, we bought in additional components. But 8 9 the system was already in scope in the original 10 application. 11 MR. LEITCH: Okay. Okay. thanks. 12 understand. Item 2.3.3.6-1 is the MR. ARRIGHI: 13 14 jockey pump. The staff identified that the fire 15 service water booster pump of the jockey pump was Loss of this function could cause of 16 not in scope. the fire pumps and damage them, therefore the staff 17 thought it should be in scope of the rule. 18 19 And you heard the applicant state that 20 they do have the pressurized storage tank, which is 21 a 1,000 gallon tank pressurized with 100 pound air. 22 And that's what they state maintains the pressure in 23 the system. 24 Again, initial discussions the applicant 25 included the tank for personal safety reasons and it

1 wasn't initially because of maintaining the pressure 2 in that tank. The staff's review is that the 3 4 applicant's 1979 submittal for the fire protection 5 evaluation and the FSAR are both clear, and they both state that both the jockey pump and the storage 6 7 tank maintain system pressure, not just one. Therefore, it's the staff's position that both the 8 9 jockey pump and the storage tank need to be in scope of the rule. 10 11 Again, the applicant and the staff are 12 in a little disagreement at this time. And we're working toward resolution on this item. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Is this one of the 15 outstanding? MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, this item is not 16 resolved and this is still --17 CHAIRMAN BONACA: One of the two? 18 19 MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. This is essentially 20 one of two open items that we have that we're still 21 evaluating. 22 Confirmatory item. This has to do with 23 the component water surge tank, the makeup not being 24 in scope. It was the initial response from the 25 application on the docket said that the makeup water

1 source would be included in scope. However, due to the open item regarding the component cooling water, 2 the -- related to open boundary valves. By putting 3 4 the whole component cooling water system in service 5 in scope. It's the applicant's position that the 6 7 makeup water supply to the surge tank does not need to be in scope and that the component cooling water 8 9 surge tank has adequate capacity to accommodate for 10 any leaks. 11 It's the staff position that it's the 12 USSAR and the safety evaluation review of the Systematic Evaluation report both specify that you 13 14 can postulate a leak following an accident. And in 15 there it goes on to state that the makeup capability should be able to cope with normal system leakage 16 17 Therefore, it's the staff's position post accident. that the makeup water is part of the current 18 19 licensing basis and that makeup supply is required 20 to be in scope. 21 And, again this is a second item that 22 the staff and the application are discussing. 23 CHAIRMAN BONACA: But you say though 24 there, was initially brought into scope and now?

MR. ARRIGHI:

25

Well, again, when we put

the SER on the, with open arms in the docket, at that time we had a response on author affirmation from the applicant that said yes we will include the makeup supply. But at that point in time they didn't have an aging management program to monitor, to mitigate aging of the whole component cooling water system. So they thought, all right, to accommodate any leakage, since that piping's not in scope, we'll have the makeup. But now that they've added the whole system in scope, they said that packing leakage would be small and therefore our surge tank would have adequate capacity.

Section 2.4 structures and structural components. There were no open or confirmatory items in this area.

For Section 2.5 electrical systems and instrumentation and controls. The electrical components were evaluated on a plant wide basis versus system basis. There was one open item in this area. The staff identified that two cables from off-site power that brings power to safety buses which power the service water pumps were not in scope of license renewal. And the staff asked can the applicant get to cold shutdown without the use of service water pumps.

1 The applicant stated that they have the 2 capability to get to a safe shutdown condition 3 without the use of service water. On a station 4 blackout, they would essentially use the aux 5 feedwater to supply water to the steam generator to go solid and cool down through a feed and bleed on 6 7 the secondary side. And use the PORVs, essentially, 8 to depressurize. So it's the applicant's position that 9 those components are not relied on. The service 10 11 water pumps are not relied on as part of the current 12 licensing basis to get to a cold shutdown condition. MR. ROSEN: Are the PORVs qualified at 13 14 passing water, solid water? 15 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Good question. I don't know. 16 MR. ARRIGHI: 17 qualified? MR. WILSON: This is Dave Wilson, 18 19 Rochester Gas & Electric. 20 The PORVs in the pressurizer, they're 21 only used to depressurize the RCS later on in 22 determination of this evolution. The feed and bleed 23 actually occurs using auxiliary feedwater into the 24 steam generator and then draining the water out of 25 the steam generator through manual valves, not

1	through main steam safety valves or main steam
2	atmospheric relief valves.
3	MR. ROSEN: So it's the secondary side?
4	CHAIRMAN BONACA: It's a secondary.
5	MR. WILSON: Secondary side. Correct,
6	sir.
7	MR. ARRIGHI: And the PORVs would just
8	maintain the depressurization for the primary,
9	And the applicant did supply the
10	response to that. And the staff is currently
11	reviewing this issue.
12	Scoping and screening summary. Pending
13	the final resolution of the four open items, being
14	the docketed information and resolving the other
15	open item, the scoping and screening results include
16	all structure system component within the scope of
17	license renewal and subject to an AMR.
18	At this point of the presentation, I
19	would now like to turn it over to Mikes Modes. He's
20	with Region 1. He was the team leader that did the
21	inspections at the site, the scoping inspection and
22	the aging management review inspections.
23	MR. MODES: This is Michael Modes.
24	We followed the prescribed license
25	renewal guidance insofar as the inspections were

concerned using primarily IP 71008. And the inspection plan was developed specifically for that site. It was the first goal at Region 1 I've ever done. So the inspection started with what the goal called for and worked its way completely through to the actual procedure reviews and aging reviews at the plant, interviews with individuals and walkdowns.

And we used a number of individuals in the plant in the region. We tried to use a structural individual with that kind of -- metallurgical, mechanical and operations. We's borrow heavily from the experience of the resident inspector.

Next slide.

For the scoping and screening, for example, it was a pretty clean inspection. It seemed to be more a matter of timing. We appeared to have arrived when there was a review being performed, for example, by the fire protection engineer to determine whether or not the right number of valves and stuff were being called out in the scoping. There was a corrective action generated as a consequence of the inspection to bring closer correspondence between the two databases.

We also found in example for the screening for the aging inspection that a lot of the stuff was more a degree of refinement. We had sort of caught them in a point where they were transitioning from the processing of being philosophical about aging license to the actual implementation. So there were a number of corrective actions that were identified in the nature, per se.

They were taking advantage of a certain program that contained a procedure that didn't clearly identify, for example, what aging mechanisms ought to be regularly reviewed for bolting. So in that regard, we had to dig pretty deeply to come up with any issues. The documentation was comprehensive. They have excellent database. And it's been my personal experience with Ginna there's a lot of pride in craftsmanship. You don't see a large turnover in personnel, so you get a lot of corporate knowledge answers. Pretty good inspection.

MR. LEITCH: Mike, were you involved with the June inspection? I'm a little confused. I have some questions regarding the June inspection.

MR. MODES: The scoping?

1	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
2	MR. MODES: Yes.
3	MR. LEITCH: Okay. It seemed to me that
4	there were a number of issues there dealing with
5	fire protection and with the fire program.
6	MR. MODES: Yes.
7	MR. LEITCH: I guess a number of those
8	had to do with frequency, that is the frequency of
9	Halon testing, the frequency of fire door
10	inspection, the frequency of hydrant inspection.
11	Also some issues concerning the frequency of flow
12	testing, qualification of personnel and so forth.
13	I guess I came away with a little bit of
14	an uneasy feeling regarding the fire protection
15	program. And I don't know if that's justified or
16	not, or
17	MR. ARRIGHI: Can I answer that?
18	MR. LEITCH: Go ahead.
19	MR. ARRIGHI: I think the inspection
20	you're talking about is the aging management program
21	audit, which is a little later, which the staff
22	reviewed the project manager and a number of people
23	from the staff.
24	MR. LEITCH: Right.
25	MR. ARRIGHI: And, again, I'll be

getting to this. But we were doing a consistency with GALL audit to make sure that the applicant's ten attributes meet the GALL attributes.

It was, as you state, in the application they said these two fire protection programs were consistent with GALL.

MR. LEITCH: Right.

MR. ARRIGHI: When we went on site and looked at the basis document, those issues that you brought up were clearly stated in the applicant's basis document that they had exceptions for these specific attributes. And I believe it was, I guess, an oversight on the applicant's part. I don't know if these programs were developed after the submittal of the application, but they didn't -- once they identified these exceptions, due to an oversight or whatnot on their part, they didn't inform the staff of those exceptions. So during the aging management program audit we identified them. Again, they jumped out off the page. And we issued a RAI request of information to the applicant. And they forwarded those responses to the staff. And they were subsequently reviewed and approved.

But, again, the applicant was aware of those exceptions. But, again, you'd have to put the

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SM why it wasn't forwarded.
MR. LEITCH: Okay. Well, the inspection
report seems to indicate that in some cases these
exceptions have been identified, but in other cases
they weren't identified.
MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. There were eight
exceptions. Six or seven of those exceptions were
clearly called out in their basis document. There
was one, I can't recall which specific one it was, a
frequency test of 6 months versus 2 years; I can't
recall off the top of my head which exception wasn't
clearly called it.
MR. LEITCH: I think there was one
related to the qualification of personnel doing
MR. ARRIGHI: It may be the one that the
staff identified on their own. And, again, the
applicant included that as an exception and put that
response on the docket. And that exception was
reviewed by the staff.
MR. LEITCH: So these frequencies were
then brought into compliance with GALL or they stand
as exceptions?
MR. ARRIGHI: They stand as exceptions
and the staff reviewed those exceptions. And based
on surveillance test or results, the staff approved

those exceptions based operating history and whatnot. I'd have to go to --

MR. LEITCH: I guess my question is that perhaps one or two of these exceptions may be understandable, but it seems to me that there's so many exceptions all related to the frequency of doing certain testing with respect to fire protection equipment, which is real important stuff. I mean, I just wonder why there are so many exceptions in this one particular area?

MR. WROBEL: George Wrobel.

We refined the program basis document quite a bit, and we had a lot more extensive review of the docket when we submitted the application.

Subsequent to that, we did a lot more analysis and evaluation of the attributes.

We have a plant specific design analysis that was done was specifically for the exceptions that were taken there. And so those particular exceptions were justified based on the information that was plant specific. We're doing all of the testing and surveillances that are requested by the GALL, but aren't the specificity of the -- you know, the timing is different, but we have a plant specific design analysis that justified that.

1 So some of that was just caught as we 2 were going through a more detailed review developing 3 our program basis document that we had when we did 4 the application. And we didn't supplement our 5 application when we found those, because we knew there audits coming and they would be developed at 6 7 that point. So, there's no open items and there's no 8 inconsistencies. I mean, they're different, but 9 10 they're not bad for us. 11 Yes. But I guess all the MR. LEITCH: 12 frequencies that -- I mean, there are a number of things where the frequencies are just less than that 13 14 prescribed in GALL. 15 MR. FRUMKIN: This is Dan Frumkin from the staff. 16 17 I think what we found in reviewing these, for example, the fire doors and the Halon 18 19 system frequencies, is the frequencies for aging 20 management does not need to be nearly as strict as the frequencies for the wear and tear on the active 21 22 component wear and tear. 23 So a fire door might be inspected every 24 week or every day that they might walk through a 25 fire door. But to go look at the door for aging

1 features like aging degradation, that could be done 2 on a less frequent basis. 3 So as far as operability, those things 4 are being analyzed and are going to be done on a 5 fairly code compliant basis, whereas aging management type inspections, which can be much more 6 7 intense, are going to be done on less frequent basis. 8 9 Okay. That's good. MR. LEITCH: 10 answer make sense to me, although it perhaps raises 11 the question about there's nothing really different 12 about Ginna. Perhaps the GALL is overly restrictive in what it's suggesting as far as aging management 13 14 frequency. 15 MR. WILSON: This is Dave Wilson, Rochester Gas & Electric. 16 17 One of the things we found in both fire protection and service water systems that comes into 18 19 play here is the water chemistry of the water source 20 lead for our fire water system. It's either city 21 water or its Lake Ontario water. And Lake Ontario 22 water's got a pH of 7 and very low chemical content. 23 And that actually does come into play when you look 24 at how you system degrades. 25 And so a plant that might use a

1 different type of water or have different water 2 chemistry for their water source would have, by 3 necessity perhaps, a different frequency of 4 inspections. 5 So for our facility being fed from Lake Ontario or having treated water, one of the two, 6 7 we're able to have lots and lots of operating experience that shows how often we need to go in to 8 9 flush or whatever process we need to do. And it may be different for every facility. 10 11 Not that I want to defend the GALL. 12 MR. LEITCH: Okay. Thank you. I have a question for you, 13 MR. FORD: 14 Michael. You said a curious phrase. You said that 15 the aging management programs were conceived and they're full in philosophical sense, I think it is. 16 17 MR. MODES: Yes. MR. FORD: But the intimation, the 18 19 reduction to practice wasn't what it should be. 20 what you meant? 21 MR. MODES: No. When you do the 22 inspections from the viewpoint of if you will, where 23 the rubber actually meets the road versus the 24 esoteric reviewing a license application, what you 25 find out is many times the timing of the inspection

to support the NRR review process does not, in fact,
arrive at a period of time when the programs have
been fully revised or fully implemented. So
although they may in the application identify a
certain program, when you get down to the procedure
level you find out that certain nuances haven't been
included. That's what I meant; the difference
between a philosophical approach and I'm speaking
from a very pragmatic viewpoint.
MR. FORD: Yes. So this question the
details
MR. MODES: Yes. Right.
MR. FORD: as you say, it's precisely
those details that I'm questioning. For instance,
on the one time inspection and many others. It's
the details that I'm concerned about. And are you
saying that from your view they haven't yet reached
those level of details?
MR. MODES: No. I'm saying in a number
of cases that's what we identified.
MR. FORD: Okay.
MR. MODES: Or to put it another way,
the things that we did identify were the nuances.
It's supposed to be a positive comment, not a

Thank you. 1 MR. FORD: Okay. 2 MR. MODES: And the last slide, what did 3 you call that "a meadow?" I don't know if I like 4 that. Being from the region and working so 5 arduously on that set of green indicators. yes, it is a meadow. 6 7 DR. WALLIS: Well, there are unexpected things to be found in meadows. 8 It looks more like a lawn to 9 MR. FORD: A meadow has flowers in it. 10 11 MR. MODES: Although I will quote him. 12 MR. ARRIGHI: All right. Moving on. MR. LEITCH: Just another question for 13 14 Mike regarding plant security, the inspection report 15 states the plant security is not within the scope of license renewal, yet I think we have seen certain 16 17 elements of plant security, particularly those elements necessary to support emergency planning 18 activities in the scope of other license renewal 19 20 applications. 21 MR. MODES: Well, there were some 22 components. I believe the whole security -- I don't 23 remember how the break is. If you could help me 24 here, Dave. I did assign one of the inspectors the 25 task of looking at the security system. And I don't

1	recall if it was because that part of the system was
2	out of scope or in scope, but we did review it and
3	it was appropriate.
4	MR. LEITCH: Yes. Okay. I wasn't
5	thinking so much about this security system, per se.
6	MR. MODES: It's not that it's in the
7	GALL.
8	MR. LEITCH: As perhaps the building.
9	MR. MODES: Right.
10	MR. LEITCH: And the ventilation system
11	is okay with the building, and things of that nature
12	where you need to maintain that functional.
13	MR. MODES: And the parts, for example
14	MR. LEITCH: For example, the planning
15	sense, not necessarily the
16	MR. MODES: The UPS, the uninterruptable
17	power source to the security computer system,
18	etcetera?
19	MR. LEITCH: Right.
20	MR. MODES: That was all looked at.
21	MR. LEITCH: Okay.
22	MR. MODES: Yes. It's not like we
23	didn't look at it.
24	MR. LEITCH: Okay. Thank you.
25	MR. MODES: Yes.

1 MR. ARRIGHI: Okay. Moving on to 2 Section 3, the aging management review of a GALL 3 divides a system, the system into six groups. 4 Aging management programs. There are a 5 total of 33 aging management programs and 30 were consistent with some deviation, and three were non 6 7 GALL AMPs. Again, in the application enhancements means that those that augment the GALL and 8 deviations are those that do not agree with GALL. 9 10 And again, we had AMP, one aging 11 management program was added. And in this section 12 of aging management programs, there were two open items and one of those is currently resolved. 13 14 You brought up the June inspection or 15 audit here. This is the staff's aging management program audit. Again, the purpose of the audit was 16 17 to verify consistency with GALL. The bottom line was that the staff concluded that AMPs were 18 19 consistent with GALL except with those two exceptions on the fire protection program and the 20 21 fire water systems programs. And we discussed those 22 a little earlier. 23 In the reactor system, Section 3.1, 24 systems are broken down into --25 MR. LEITCH: I just noticed that the

1 fire protection requirements had originally been 2 specified in the technical specifications. And then I think they were moved to the FSAR? 3 4 MR. ARRIGHI: Or the Technical 5 Requirements Manual. MR. LEITCH: And now they're in the 6 7 Technical Requirements Manual. Do you see any connection, I mean between -- I don't know of the 8 9 Technical Requirements Manual is less rigorous from the licensee's viewpoint in the tech specs, but I 10 11 mean does that suggest, perhaps, why some of these 12 differences in frequencies and so forth crept into the fire protection program? 13 14 MR. ARRIGHI: In my experience as an 15 inspector in my past life, I would say no. Even if the systems in tech specs are not in tech specs, you 16 17 know my experiences that the applicant, you know, implements those requirements. You know, I think by 18 19 putting them in the Techs Requirement Manual they 20 can make changes easier than getting a tech spec 21 amendment. But from my experience, I wouldn't 22 attribute it to that. 23 I don't know if you have a --24 MR. WILSON: This is Dave Wilson, Ginna Station. 25

In fact, the equipment that's in the scope in our application for fire protection, it's greater than the sum of the equipment described in our Technical Requirements Manual or UFSAR. reasoning behind that is pretty straight forward. The staff had a lot of early issues that resulted in an ISG which had to do with the identification of equipment required for 10 CFR 50.48, I think it is, fire protection rule, and Appendix R. And the staff had, you know in my opinion or our opinion, a pretty reasonable position on some utilities having a complex and hard to understand licensing basis. Ι believe the early applicants had just Appendix R equipment in scope for the rule, and later on went back and adjusted.

We did not fall into that trap. When we scoped our fire protection system, we laid out our entire licensing basis, you know, original construction up through Appendix R and today, and put all of that equipment in scope, regardless of whether or not it was TRM. Where we differentiated was, you know, it's clear in the application that certain fire protection features are included for insurance purposes in out buildings and things like that. So that did not come into play in these fire

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protection questions.

I am a little bit you know not taken back but concerned, I guess, if we're leaving you with an impression of the utility that we're not managing our fire protection system. I think what we're seeing here is more growing pains in the GALL and the Standard Review Plant format than any technical issues.

We put a lot of stuff into scope. And, you know, the really argument that we have really with the staff is over the jockey pump, which costs \$274.

MR. LEITCH: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: I have a question before we move on. I asked the question before regarding the battle former bolts, you know, they replaced 56 out of 728. And that's because they found defect-like. And what I found is that they have committed no further inspections to be performed. And I was asking the question of why would it be a logic that says you know, you don't need to inspect them anymore. Any comment on how you accepted? This is not an open item, I understand.

MR. ARRIGHI: Barry Elliot.

1 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. This is the 2 baffle former bolts where they in 1999 after 30 years of operation they found a number of them were 3 4 defective. They replaced them. There were 56 out 5 of 700 plus. MR. ELLIOT: I'd say our position on the 6 7 baffle bolts were --CHAIRMAN BONACA: I would like to 8 9 understand what your views of, you know, the fact that they don't need to inspect anymore this baffle 10 11 former bolts. 12 We don't agree with MR. ELLIOT: Okay. that entirely, that they don't have to inspect. 13 14 Our position on the baffle former bolts 15 is that they're part of the reactor vessel internals 16 program. 17 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right. MR. ELLIOT: And the industry through 18 19 the MRP is developing data on baffle former bolts, aging effects like irradiation assisted stress 20 21 corrosion cracking, fracture toughness. And from 22 this data they are going to propose a program for 23 industry. 24 As far as this particular application is 25 concerned, they have committed to implement the MRP,

whatever that program is. Our concern is that this
application, this particular applicant is going to
go into license renewal in 2009 and that the MRP
program may not be completed by then. So we've asked
them to commit that prior to entering the license
renewal program, that they will have either the MRP
program or submit one of their own for all the
internals. And that's our position; that there
needs to be part of the license renewal term an
internals inspections program. And, of course,
baffle former bolts would be part of that.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: And they have agreed
to that? They have agreed to that?
MR. ELLIOT: Yes, they have.
CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
MR. ELLIOT: Well, they could talk for
themselves.
MR. WROBEL: Yes. George Wrobel from
RG&E.
We agreed that we would submit an
internals inspection program prior to the period of
extended operation. We haven't decided exactly what
we're going to do on baffle former bolts. We're one
of the four plants in the country that have looked.
No one else has even looked yet. And we found so

1 little degradation, and we feel that there's so much 2 margin that at this point we're not ready to commit 3 to actually doing more detailed inspections of the 4 bolts. But, you know, that could change. Right now 5 we don't see the need for it. And I'm not sure what the schedule for MRP is on that. 6 7 I'll pass that along. 8 MR. ELLIOT: I'll pass that along. I want to give you some information. 9 We had a meeting with the MRP within, I don't know, a 10 11 week or two ago. And I told them that you needed 12 this stuff by 2009. And I think you better get on them, because they were under the impression the 13 14 lead plant was Oconee. And they could use Oconee as 15 a lead plant. But I think you come before Oconee as 16 far as needing this program. 17 So, I think you need to talk to them. CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, I hear two 18 19 things here. I hear that they need to do this, and I 20 hear you saying that you're not committing to 21 anything particular? Are you committing to a list, 22 say with MRP, and follow industry insights and 23 recommendations? 24 MR. WROBEL: We do that as a matter of 25 course, so we'll continue following MRP and what's

	123
1	going on.
2	The internals commitments that we made
3	were a little bit different then that. We did commit
4	that we would look. Before 2009 that we would have
5	a program that could detect cracking .0005 mil or
6	something like that. That's a program that we're
7	more actively pursuing, because we haven't done that
8	one before.
9	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
10	MR. WILSON: And we're following what
11	the boilers are doing in that area. The baffle
12	bolts, like we say, we had one percent degradation
13	so it seems to be a lower priority. But we will
14	continue working with MRP and if they develop an
15	industry position, then we'll be evaluating that.
16	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Why did you replace
17	those 56 bolts if you didn't find there was a
18	problem with those?
19	MR. GEIKEN: This is Gerry Geiken.
20	Actually, I'd like to clarify one thing.
21	We found one bolt, out of all of those bolts that we
22	inspected, that exhibited evidence of ISACC.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
24	MR. GEIKEN: All the other indications,

UT indications were false/positives. We extracted a

1	number of bolts and tested them to distraction of
2	the Westinghouse hot cell. We couldn't verify one
3	indication.
4	So we really saw very, very little
5	evidence of IASCC.
6	The other thing is, we did a proactive
7	replacement. Those 56 we decided to proactively
8	simply extract and replace with 316.
9	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Hopefully, by the time
10	we get to the final Committee meeting, there will be
11	some particular understanding of how this is going
12	to be handled. I think I understand it. But, you
13	know, if you have expectations, there has to be
14	responding willingness to meet the expectation.
15	So, okay.
16	MR. GILLESPIE: Hey, Russ. Frank
17	Gillespie.
18	What is the expectation today? Because
19	it's not zero.
20	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I'm asking, you know,
21	you have stated an expectation that 2009 there will
22	be in fact a clear commitment of what they're going
23	to do.
24	MR. ELLIOT: No. The commitment is now.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.

1	MR. ELLIOT: But prior to 2009 they have
2	to have given us a program for the reactive vessel
3	internals for inspection for what they think needs
4	to be inspected, the frequency of inspection, the
5	acceptance criteria; all of their requirements for
6	an inspection program has to be submitted and
7	approved by us by 2009.
8	CHAIRMAN BONACA: And that will have to
9	include the baffle
LO	MR. ELLIOT: And the baffle bolts will
L1	be part of that program.
L2	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now, they may still
L3	convince you by that time that they don't need to
L4	inspect those baffle bolts. Can they convince you
L5	of that?
L6	MR. ELLIOT: Have they convinced us that
L7	they don't have to inspect them?
L8	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Can they convince you
L9	by the time they submit the program?
20	MR. ELLIOT: Well, see, the MRP is
21	looking at the bolts.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right.
23	MR. ELLIOT: And I think if I was them,
24	I would look and say certain amount of radiation
25	causes a certain amount of degradation, and then I'd

1	just look at my core and say, okay, how many of
2	those do I have to look at before you know, and
3	that's it. And then you would say I would inspect
4	so often to assure that it doesn't degrade.
5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
6	MR. ELLIOT: And that's what I'm hoping
7	the MRP is going to come up with. Right now they're
8	just generating the data about what it takes to get
9	irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking of
10	baffle former bolts.
11	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, I understand.
12	MR. ELLIOT: So we don't have that data
13	yet.
14	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Have more data that
15	aspire of this MRP program, they will come up
16	recommendations on what need to be inspected and how
17	frequently?
18	MR. ELLIOT: Yes.
19	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Now their
20	recommendation may not include a recommendation for
21	inspection of baffle former bolts, right?
22	MR. ELLIOT: It might not. That's
23	right.
24	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Might not, and you
25	would leave that?

CHAIRMAN BONACA: And I think you both agree on this issue. So I don't see disagreement of that. No, I'm trying to understand it. MR. ELLIOT: That's good. Because I hear CHAIRMAN BONACA: I hear this professional side, and I'm waiting to hear some other things from the other side. MR. GILLESPIE: So right now they're committed to following the MRP when the MRP results come out. And if the MRP don't come out by 2009, they're committed to submitting a plan for NRC
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II.
14 approval?
MR. ARRIGHI: Yes.
MR. GILLESPIE: Is that a condition of
17 the license?
MR. ARRIGHI: That's a commitment. It
is a commitment at this time.
MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. And there's a
commitment that they'll submit it. That's not
review and approval. So what we have
MR. ARRIGHI: Pretty straight. No, it
was a commitment to review and approval.
MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. So that that

1	limit is on there.
2	Mario, because we're not going to know
3	any more technically between now and the full
4	Committee meeting.
5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: That's right.
6	MR. GILLESPIE: So what we've got is a
7	process in place that the licensee is going to
8	submit for approval a plan prior to 2009 or MRP,
9	whichever comes first.
10	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, it took me this
11	long to understand
12	MR. GILLESPIE: And
13	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now I understand it,
14	and I think we can go to the full Committee meeting
15	with that.
16	MR. ARRIGHI: Okay. All right. I'll
17	move forward.
18	Again, Section 3.1, reactor systems.
19	There were two open items. One was resolved.
20	Item B2.1.28-1 had to do with the
21	reactor vessel surveillance program. This item
22	involved testing of the surveillance capsule in the
23	core after it received a neutron fluence of 60
24	years. Initially the applicant wasn't planning on

1 with GALL. The applicant subsequently came back and 2 agreed that they will test the capsule once it 3 reaches a fluence for 60 years. 4 The open item B2.1.36-1 thimble tube GALL doesn't have a 5 inspection program. corresponding program and this was reviewed the 6 7 Standard Review Plan. Several of the attributes, I think five of the eight attributes the staff needed 8 further clarification and information to approve 9 10 this program. 11 The applicant has subsequently provided 12 the information. Again, preliminary information looks like the information is okay, however it's 13 14 still under staff review. So this item is not 15 resolved, but we're evaluating the information they 16 provided. 17 MR. FORD: Now that information included things such as the qualification of inspection 18 19 techniques for cracking and things of this nature? 20 MR. ARRIGHI: Barry Elliot. 21 MR. ELLIOT: This is Barry Elliot. 22 I'm just going to give you a whole 23 picture of the thimble tube programs. 24 There's two parts of the thimble tube. 25 There's a thimble tube and the guide tube.

original thimble tube inspection program was for flow induced vibration. And when the applicant made the evaluation of the thimble tube and the guide tube, they also identified that cracking was an aging effect for both the thimble tube and the guide tube because they're stainless steel and they're in a PWR environment water.

The problem is they didn't have an inspection program for cracking. So we asked them to provide the ten attributes that we have in our review plan for programs and to identify how the existing thimble tube inspection program would satisfy for cracking. The existing one was for flow induced in vibration.

They modified the thimble tube inspection program to use eddy current inspection, use the same eddy current but look for cracking, qualify it to their experience with inspection by eddy current, their eddy current in the plant. And the acceptance criteria, since you can't really detect the depth using eddy current, any defect would be considered to be unacceptable and they would do whatever was necessary.

Now, they do not do a eddy current inspection of the guide tube. So what they're doing

1 is for the thimble tube -- for the guide tube is the 2 thimble tube will be a precursor for the quide tube 3 because it's inside the thimble tube. 4 surrounded by reactor coolant water and is just the 5 same temperature as the inside of the quide tube. So that would be a precursor. 6 7 The small problem we had with that is that there is a weld on the outside of the quide 8 tube between the penetration and the guide tube. And 9 there's no any current would inspect that. 10 11 So they agreed to do so far is to do the VT-1 examination of that location at the same time 12 they do the bottom head location. And the VT-1 13 14 would be looking for cracks. Normally this location 15 wouldn't even be in the ISI program. So this would be an enhancement of the ISI program. 16 17 And as far as the VT-1, the ASME code specified the qualification that is necessary to 18 19 ensure that you detect cracks using the VT-1. 20 And right now we're going through that. 21 We haven't finished the review of it, but that's 22 basically where they are right now. 23 MR. FORD: Now in the SER it talks about 24 eddy current also. Is that no longer a monitoring

technique or to be used for this particular

1 degradation? 2 MR. ELLIOT: Excuse me? What. 3 MR. FORD: In the SER you talk about 4 eddy current. 5 MR. ELLIOT: Yes. Eddy current is going to be used on the thimble tube and the inspection of 6 7 the thimble tube will be for cracking and flow induced vibration. And if any cracking is observed 8 on any thimble tube, it will be replaced, the 9 thimble tube. But also that would mean that the 10 11 guide tube that is surrounding it would also become 12 within inspection, and they would have to develop some kind of inspection for the guide tube at that 13 14 time. 15 MR. FORD: Okay. MR. ARRIGHI: Alloy 600. Again, the 16 17 reactive vessel head, the control rod drive mechanisms and the penetrations were placed on the 18 19 past refueling outage with Alloy 690 thermally treated penetration. The Alloy 600 components in the 20 21 vessel include the bottom mounted instrument 22 penetrations and the radial core support pads. 23 Barry mentioned earlier the reactive 24 vessel internal programs. This slide is just to

indicate that they have committed to submit this

1	program for review and approval to the staff prior
2	to a period of extended operation.
3	Section 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, those three
4	systems resulted in one confirmatory items, and this
5	was in the auxiliary system regarding the need to
6	make a tech spec change to incorporate particular
7	testing requirements for the diesel fuel oil.
8	MR. FORD: Now, on this particular one,
9	they've confirmed that they were looking for
10	particulates in the fuel oil, is that correct?
11	MR. ARRIGHI: I want to ask
12	MR. FORD: And they're looking for
13	exception on biocides and corrosion inhibitors.
14	MR. ARRIGHI: Krzystof?
15	MR. PARCZEWSKI: I didn't hear the
16	question.
17	MR. FORD: On this confirmatory item.
18	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes?
19	MR. FORD: On the confirmatory item
20	associated with the fuel oil, there's a tech spec.
21	My understanding is that they are confirming that
22	they will monitor for particulates, but they will
23	not asking for an exemption on the goal requirement
24	that you will have biocides and corrosion
25	inhibitors. I think that's essentially the essence

1	of this particular AMP.
2	Could you give us an idea of, first of
3	all, factually why did you agree with their
4	statement that they do not need biocides and
5	corrosion inhibitors? I just want your thought
6	process.
7	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Well, I really don't
8	I'm sorry. Repeat the question. I did not
9	understand it.
10	MR. FORD: Well, maybe also the
11	applicant can tell me if I'm stating it incorrectly.
12	On this issue about the corrosion of the
13	internals of the diesel fuel oil tanks.
14	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes.
15	MR. FORD: They ask for an exemption
16	from GALL in that they would not be using biocides
17	or corrosion inhibitors. But they confirm that they
18	would look for particulates.
19	Now my question here is, just for my
20	information
21	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes.
22	MR. FORD: what was your thought
23	process in terms of factual data to back up their
24	exemption request that they do not content biocides
25	and corrosion inhibitors?

1	MR. PARCZEWSKI: They didn't have any
2	MIC during their operation. So they felt they
3	probably don't need to biocide, because the
4	microbiological degradation during this operation
5	period. So I felt that they're justified not to
6	have a biocide.
7	MR. FORD: And corrosion inhibitor,
8	presumably that's because of the tech spec requiring
9	some control of the water content of the
10	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Again, this is similar,
11	you know. They didn't have any significant
12	degradation due to corrosion. Therefore, I felt that
13	since they have this operational experience.
14	MR. FORD: Okay.
15	MR. PARCZEWSKI: I felt that we can
16	accept their request for not including that in their
17	program.
18	MR. FORD: It just makes me feel
19	uncomfortable a little bit that we are blindly
20	looking to the future, as you as you said Mario,
21	looking into the future and making judgments based
22	on what you see today, especially for nonlinear
23	degradation processes, time dependent processes.
24	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes.
25	MR. FORD: But thank you for your

1 answer. 2 MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes. 3 MR. FORD: It doesn't make me feel good. 4 MR. WILSON: This is David Wilson from 5 Rochester Gas & Electric. I just can chime in that as an 6 7 applicant, as a licensee we're not opposed to 8 modifying aging management programs when they make 9 But it's important to note that adding biocides and additives to your fuel oil also have 10 11 unintended consequences, just like not adding them. 12 MR. FORD: That's true. So if you look in the MR. WILSON: 13 14 aggregate over the industry, which we've done, and 15 you say well what's the right thing to do at this instant? Well, the right thing to do is continue on 16 17 with what's been successful, that's operating experience, trust but verify and keep looking. 18 19 MR. FORD: I accept that entirely. We 20 are pragmatic. You've got to be pragmatic about all 21 these things. That's the answer I would have liked 22 I've been asking these questions for to have heard. 23 quite some time now and that is, if you like, the 24 correct answer. But I want some rational, technical

rational.

1	MR. GEIKEN: Yes. This is Gerry Geiken.
2	We did actually investigate fairly
3	extensively those utilities which do add biocides
4	and corrosion inhibitors.
5	MR. FORD: Right.
6	MR. GEIKEN: And looked at their
7	geographical distribution in the United States, and
8	we found that they're mostly in the south. And
9	those nuclear power plants that are in the northern
10	climes with cooler weather have not, typically, been
11	required or found it necessary to make those
12	additives.
13	And the other part of that whole issue
14	is, just as Dave said, we've seen that there are
15	some other negative consequences for making these
16	additives.
17	So in the sum total of our
18	investigation, the research, we thought the best
19	course to take is the course we're on.
20	MR. FORD: I'm happy that there's a
21	quantity to judgment being made rather than we
22	haven't seen a problem so far. Good.
23	Thank you.
24	MR. ARRIGHI: In Section 3.5,
25	containment structures and components. There were

1	no open or confirmatory items identified in this
2	section.
3	Aging management of in-scope
4	inaccessible concrete. You can see from the chart
5	here, ground water samples indicate that the below
6	grade environment is non-aggressive at Ginna.
7	Therefore, a plant specific program is not required
8	by GALL.
9	The applicant will inspect areas when
10	excavations allow and when aging effects on
11	accessible portions indicate detrimental effects are
12	occurring.
13	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. I think they're
14	doing the right thing of using opportunistic
15	inspections.
16	What surprises me, of course, they have
17	true non-aggressive environment. What surprises me
18	is that we have the same requirement, essentially
19	the opportunistic inspection also for very
20	aggressive sites.
21	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: That maybe it's a
23	problem. I mean, we discuss this issue.
24	MR. MUNSON: Cliff Munson, civil
25	engineering.

1	For aggressive sites we do more, require
2	more than and Ginna is not an aggressive site, as
3	we have established.
4	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right.
5	MR. MUNSON: But we require that they
6	enhance their aging management programs for
7	aggressive sites. And I don't know if we want to
8	get into that now.
9	CHAIRMAN BONACA: No, no. It's true
10	that you have more inspections or at least inferring
11	potential degradation from accessible locations.
12	That's true. Okay.
13	MR. ARRIGHI: And the last section in
14	aging management review Section 3, there was one
15	open item and one confirmatory item in this area.
16	The open item has been resolved and it had to do
17	with thermal relaxation of the bus duct bolt
18	connections. And the applicant has committed to
19	perform those in sections. So that item is
20	resolved.
21	And, again, there was one aging
22	management program added as a result of staff
23	questions.
24	That concludes my presentation on
25	MR. FORD: I have a question on this

1	one, too.
2	In the SER it states for this particular
3	item, 3.6.1, which was the first item, I believe, it
4	says that there's reasonable assurance that in this
5	case the insulting materials and antioxidants will
6	be sufficient to not give degradation. How do you
7	agree with the phrase "reasonable assurance?"
8	What's your metric?
9	MR. ARRIGHI: I'm going to have Jim
LO	Lazevnick, the reviewer
L1	MR. FORD: It also appears in other
L2	areas in this SER, the words "reasonable assurance."
L3	MR. LAZEVNICK: This is Jim Lazevnick.
L4	I'm the electrical reviewer from the electrical
L5	branch.
L6	Yes, I think your statement is with
L7	regard to the bus duct insulation.
L8	MR. FORD: Yes.
L9	MR. LAZEVNICK: Internal bus duct
20	electrical insulation.
21	MR. FORD: Yes.
22	MR. LAZEVNICK: They committed to do a
23	visual inspection of the bus duct. Essentially
24	consistent with other visual inspections we've
25	approved for things cable insulation, degradation,

1 etcetera. 2 There's an industry aging management quide that deals with that and deals with the 3 4 inspections. And it's on the basis that operating 5 experience and the industry work that was done on license renewal has determined that in effect these 6 7 inspections will provide reasonable assurance. Speaking just as an informed 8 MR. FORD: member of the public and not as an expert in this 9 particular area, I think it might help in the SER, 10 11 because I assume it's an open document, that that 12 rational is stated. Well, and just looking on reasonable assurance as the reason for your 13 14 approving. Purely perception. 15 MR. LAZEVNICK: Okay. 16 MR. FORD: Thank you. 17 DR. LEE: Russ, just a reminder. Earlier ACRS has a question about station blackout. 18 19 So since Jim is here, can you put up the station 20 blackout drawing? 21 MR. ARRIGHI: This is the applicant's 22 diagram of the electrical components in the 23 application.

first isolation device that's in the -- which is

The evaluation boundary begins at the

24

1	right here. This green portion is the off-site power
2	system subject to aging management review. But just
3	upstream of the disconnect switch here and the other
4	train, is in scope of license renewal.
5	And the blue portion is a 4160 portion
6	to the safety buses.
7	So for station blackout, again, the
8	boundary is at the isolation devices.
9	I don't know what specific questions you
10	may have that myself or a reviewer could answer.
11	If there are none
12	MR. ROSEN: What page are you on?
13	MR. ARRIGHI: Oh, this was just a
14	handout.
15	MR. FORD: Yes, it was in the very
16	beginning, I think.
17	MR. ARRIGHI: The licensee had a
18	diagram, but due to time
19	CHAIRMAN BONACA: They had an open item
20	on
21	MR. ROSEN: Well, I don't have it.
22	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes. The open item we had
23	had to deal with this
24	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The cables.
25	MR. ARRIGHI: cabling to the safety

1	bus. This was the bus that ties on the service
2	water bus. Again, the cabling for the normal ESF
3	component, safety components is in scope. And, of
4	course, in the diesel you can power that bus and the
5	diesels. But what we had in the open item was that-
6	- that cabling.
7	CHAIRMAN BONACA: And now they're
8	included?
9	MR. ARRIGHI: And that is not included.
10	And, again, we're reviewing the response from the
11	applicant to see if that's adequate.
12	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. The concern is
13	that you have is that you cannot go to cold shutdown
14	without the
15	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes, what was in that
16	knowledge, the cold shutdown without the service
17	water pump, correct.
18	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
19	MR. ARRIGHI: How long they could stay
20	in that condition.
21	CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right. And it is
22	still an open item. Okay.
23	MR. ARRIGHI: I do have a slide of that.
24	I don't know if you want it for yes, the
25	applicant had it in their handout.

1	MR. ROSEN: It's very hard to see in
2	their handout. It's just blurry and fades away. You
3	have a better slide then this, you say?
4	MR. ARRIGHI: No. Mine is probably the
5	same thing as the applicant had. We had a big
6	drawing that we had to reduce.
7	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The applicant has only
8	the upper portion of that slide. Here it is. It's
9	the upper portion.
10	MR. ARRIGHI: And mine is probably a
11	reduction of the larger document. I'll give this to
12	you to see if it's any better.
13	MR. ROSEN: This is substantially
14	better, actually.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes.
16	MR. ARRIGHI: If there's no further
17	questions, and if you want to come back to this
18	later, we will. If there's no further questions, I'd
19	like to turn it over to John Rowley to discuss the
20	time limiting aging analyses.
21	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
22	MR. ROWLEY: Good afternoon.
23	Section 4 dealt with time limited aging
24	analyses, also know as TLAAs.
25	The applicant indicated that six TLAAs

1 were in accordance with criteria specified in 10 CFR 2 They include reactor vessel neutron embrittlement, metal fatigue, environmental 3 4 qualification of electrical equipment, concrete 5 containment of tendon pressures, containment liner plate and penetration fatigue and other plant 6 7 specific TLAAs. Section 4.2 was reactor vessel neutron 8 The analysis affected by irradiation 9 embrittlement. embrittlement identified as TLAAS. 10 They were 11 reactor vessel upper-shelf energy, pressurized 12 thermal shock and PT curves. Appendix G CRF 50 requires that the 13 14 reactor beltline materials have sharp USE values 15 throughout the life of the vessel less than 50 foot 16 pounds. 17 As you see in the chart, screening criteria is 50, but Ginna's project to be less than 18 19 A foot value less than 50 is acceptable if it is determined that lower values of the USE provide 20 21 marginal safety against fracture required ASME Code 22 Appendix G. 23 DR. WALLIS: Could you remind us how 24 much less than 50? MR. ROWLEY: Well, it's projected to be 25

	110
1	less than 50 during that period of extended
2	operation. As of right now it's now.
3	DR. WALLIS: This is calculated?
4	MR. ROWLEY: Yes.
5	DR. WALLIS: Well, what's the calculated
6	figure?
7	MR. ROSEN: What's the number?
8	MR. ELLIOT: This is Barry Elliot.
9	I don't know the actual number, but the
10	calculation method is Reg Guide 1.99 Rev. 2. I
11	don't know what number you get, but the number is
12	not what's important. What's important is once you
13	go below that, that you do the analyses.
14	Now, the analyses is a fracture
15	fractures mechanics evaluation, elastic/plastic
16	fracture mechanics evaluation. And that material
17	properties for that is a J-value of fracture
18	toughness. And that is dependent upon the cooper and
19	the fluence. And that material property is what
20	goes into the evaluation. It isn't the upper shelf
21	energy. It's the fluence and the cooper that goes
22	into the material property.
23	MR. ROSEN: We complimented the staff
24	last time, I think it was on the Robinson review,
25	when you gave this chart with the number.

1	MR. ELLIOT: We gave you a number of
2	how
3	MR. ROSEN: And you said that answers
4	all the questions.
5	MR. ELLIOT: Okay.
6	MR. ROSEN: And now what you've done is
7	left them all on the table again.
8	MR. ELLIOT: Well, our answer today is
9	that there is a J-value that is function of cooper
10	in fluence
11	MR. ROSEN: Don't go through it again,
12	Barry. We know
13	MR. ELLIOT: And that's what's
14	important.
15	MR. ROSEN: We know that. We just want
16	to be shown a chart that tells us that there is 49.6
17	or 29.6.
18	MR. ELLIOT: No, it's not. It's about
19	42, because I know the B&W data. So above 42. I
20	don't know how much above.
21	MR. ROSEN: Come back to the full
22	Committee with the chart.
23	MR. ELLIOT: I feel bad.
24	MR. ROSEN: Ah, see here you do it.
25	MR. ROWLEY: Licensee is required to

1	calculate the or RT pressurized thermal shock
2	value for each material located within the beltline
3	of the reactor pressure vessel. The materials
4	provide adequate protection against pressurized
5	thermal shock events if the referenced temperature
6	within limits. The criteria is less than 300 degree
7	fahrenheit, and Ginna's is at 271. So they're
8	within the criteria and the staff finds that
9	acceptable.
10	DR. WALLIS: This is all calculated
11	using a formula with fluence and all that sort of
12	stuff in it?
13	MR. ROWLEY: Yes.
14	DR. WALLIS: What happens when the
15	surveillance data take and they don't agree with the
16	calculation? What do you do?
17	MR. ELLIOT: This is Barry Elliot.
18	The 271 is from the surveillance data.
19	DR. WALLIS: It comes from the
20	surveillance data.
21	MR. ELLIOT: It comes from the
22	surveillance date. The original evaluation from
23	that licensee didn't have it. They just used the
24	original, as you said, calculation using the tables
25	cooper and the fluence. And it turns out that Ginna

1	is a very plant in the sense that the actual
2	limiting material for their vessel beltline is also
3	in their surveillance program. And so they were able
4	to actually take the data from their surveillance
5	program and calculate the amount of embrittlement
6	followed the guidance in Reg Guide 1.99 Rev. 2.
7	That's the only open issue we have. We
8	just have to go over that data to see that whether
9	or not it complies with the guidance in Reg Guide
10	1.00 Rev. 2.
11	DR. WALLIS: Okay.
12	MR. ELLIOT: If it does, then that's the
13	number.
14	DR. WALLIS: How do you get RT_{PTS} from
15	surveillance data? You take a sample and you test
16	it at various temperature, or what do you do with
17	it?
18	MR. ELLIOT: No, no. What you do is you
19	calculate the amount of embrittlement by the shift
20	in the 30 foot pound transition temperature. You get
21	it for the different capsule data for different
22	fluences. Then fit the data for the different
23	fluences to
24	DR. WALLIS: So it's another ASME semi-
25	curve.

1	MR. ELLIOT: It's not an ASME semi-
2	curve. It's a best-fit curve.
3	DR. WALLIS: Okay.
4	MR. ELLIOT: Of the data of shifted 30
5	foot pound energy versus temperature of fluence.
б	DR. WALLIS: More like the RT $_{ t pTS}$ direct.
7	MR. ELLIOT: And that gives you a
8	transition temperature shift.
9	DR. WALLIS: Okay.
10	MR. ELLIOT: You take that, you add it
11	to the initial plus to margin value and you get a
12	total RT_{PTS} value.
13	MR. ROWLEY: There was one open item,
14	and Barry just talked about that.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: So this open item
16	really is more like confirmatory item almost. This
17	open item is more of a confirmatory item?
18	MR. ELLIOT: Right. We have to just go
19	through the data to see if all the data not only
20	do they have the weld data for their vessel, but
21	they also have correlation monitor material. We have
22	to go to check that to see. We have certain parts of
23	the guidance in the Reg Guide which they have to
24	comply with.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.

1	MR. LEITCH: The open item in the SER
2	says in June 10, 2003 letter the applicant changed
3	its method of determining the referenced temperature
4	for pressurized thermal shock. What was that change
5	all about, or was that different than you're just
6	describing?
7	MR. ELLIOT: It's just exactly what I
8	said.
9	MR. LEITCH: Oh, I see. That is what
10	you're describing.
11	MR. ELLIOT: They originally did it
12	without the surveillance data.
13	MR. LEITCH: Okay.
14	MR. ELLIOT: And then they said in
15	the original application it was done without
16	surveillance data.
17	MR. LEITCH: Okay. I understand.
18	Barry, I wasn't sure if this was some other change.
19	MR. ELLIOT: No, that was the change.
20	MR. LEITCH: That was the change? Okay.
21	Thank you.
22	MR. ROWLEY: The applicant committed to
23	updating their pressure/temperature curves prior to
24	the period of extended operation. And they're going
25	to either do that in a pressure/temperature limit

1	report or in technical specifications.
2	The applicant identified metal fatigue
3	analysis of various components and systems as TLAAs,
4	of which the reactor cooling system is one of them.
5	And that's designed to a Class 1 of the ASME Code.
6	Design criteria for a failure of
7	analysis of ASME Code Class 1 requires a CUF of less
8	than one. All components at Ginna have a CUF less
9	than one for the
10	DR. WALLIS: That's the table we saw
11	from the applicant earlier?
12	MR. ROWLEY: Correct.
13	DR. WALLIS: They were much less than
14	one, except for one.
15	MR. ROWLEY: Right. Right.
16	And Ginna is the first applicant to have
17	CUFs less than one, even when environmental effects
18	are included. Just something matched with them.
19	There were two confirmatory items, and
20	both were dealing with updating their UFSAR.
21	Environmental qualification of
22	electrical equipment. The applicant has adequately
23	identified the TLAA for EQ components. The EQ
24	program's consistent with GALL. And staff concluded
25	EQ program will continue to manage equipment in

accordance with 10 CFT 50.49 and meets 54>21(c)(1)(i)(ii) and (iii). There are no open or confirmatory items.

MR. LEITCH: As I reviewed these TLAAs, there's a whole lot of specific TLAAs for various electrical components, you know, right down to the details of a discussion of the (1)(a) and (c) ASME safety injection pump motor and (1)(b) safety injection pump motor.

And I guess I was just curious as to how these were justified for 60 years of operation. when I looked at it, it was like so many of these things, it ended in a little bit of frustration for Because all it really says, well, in most cases it says it's just justified -- it's for 40 years now and by the time the 40 years is up, we'll take a look at it and see if we can extend the qualified life for replacement or refurbish it, but it doesn't really address the methodology for how this will be done, at least not so far as I can see. And it seems as though time after time here in all this qualification of electrical equipment it's another one of those things where we'll figure it out later, is basically what it's saying. Is that a fair assessment of what's going on here?

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1	MR. ARRIGHI: WE did have a meeting with
2	the applicant where they brought their calculation
3	for a number of components. They were, again, I
4	think some of them were originally calculated for 40
5	years and they recalculated for 60. And the staff
6	did review those calculations.
7	Our reviewer right now is not here
8	today. He's on vacation.
9	I don't know if George, if you remember
LO	some of the specifics and can help me out.
L1	MR. WROBEL: Yes. George Wrobel from
L2	RG&E.
L3	Yes. The EQ calculations that we did,
L4	we've recalculated probably 95 percent of the EQ
L5	components that are on a master list that we want to
L6	extend from 40 years to 60 years. Those calculations
L7	have all been completed. And a vast majority, I
L8	think well, 10 to 12 of those were reviewed by
L9	Mr. Saba during that review.
20	We're not putting off any of the
21	qualification calculations. They should all be done
22	imminently. The only ones we haven't done were a
23	few that we feel that we will not extend to 60
24	years. We're going to replace those anyway.
2.5	So all the calculations have been

1 completed already. We're not leaving a legacy or a 2 negative legacy here. So what I'm looking at here 3 MR. LEITCH: 4 are the exceptions then? I mean, it seems like none 5 of these are in this section, 4.4, none of these justified or qualified for 60 years. They all talk 6 7 about their existing qualification for 40 years, and 8 some cases 44 years. And it seems to say that in the future we'll decide whether that qualification 9 can be extended or whether we have to replace or 10 11 refurbish this. 12 Well, we can provide -- if MR. WROBEL: there's additional detail needed by the NRC, we can 13 14 provide that. But there are very few calculations 15 left that don't already go to 60 years. So the final SER should sound different than that. 16 17 MR. LEITCH: Okay. Again, the staff did 18 MR. ARRIGHI: 19 review, you know, ten or twelve of those 20 calculations, look at the methodologies and the 21 assumptions and they were satisfied with the 22 calculations. 23 So it is not as though MR. LEITCH: 24 there is more recent information than exists in this 25 document?

1	MR. ARRIGHI: And that's the SER or the
2	application?
3	MR. LEITCH: This is the application.
4	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Application. Because
5	the SER says
6	MR. ARRIGHI: I think the SER, he
7	specified which calculations he reviewed. I believe
8	he went in detail and made a listing of those
9	calculations that were reviewed, again by Saba.
10	Again, I didn't compare them against what's in the
11	application, though.
12	MR. ROWLEY: Section 4.5 concrete
13	containment tendon prestress. Prestress losses
14	estimated for 40 to 60 years. The applicant did
15	provide trending analysis. And the staff considered
16	the applicant's actions adequate during the period
17	of extended operations and there were no open or
18	confirmatory items.
19	CHAIRMAN BONACA: If I remember, they
20	had a program to retention some of them?
21	MR. ROWLEY: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: There's a commitment
23	to go to retentioning?
24	MR. ARRIGHI: I know they were planning
25	on retentioning them all in 2005, I think the

1	remaining ones that weren't retentioned in 1980, I
2	think. In 1980 they retentioned a 137.
3	I have to look at the commitment list.
4	I don't know if that was the commitment or not.
5	MR. WILSON: Our commitment was to
6	retention the remaining 23 tendons into 2005.
7	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I remember that.
8	MR. ARRIGHI: Okay. And that is the SER
9	in Appendix A.
10	DR. WALLIS: Now is "adequate" a good
11	grade or is that fairly adequate, or what's the
12	meaning of "adequate?" Do they do more than is
13	necessary? Do they do the bare minimum? What does
14	"adequate" mean?
15	MR. ARRIGHI: Cliff Munson.
16	MR. MUNSON: They're required to sample
17	5 percent of the population of their tendons, and
18	they do more than that. I can't remember the
19	specific percentage, but I think it's above ten
20	percent.
21	DR. WALLIS: Yes. I think, though, this
22	is a judgment. There is a metric you and just check
23	that they have actually met the requirements then?
24	MR. MUNSON: Right. Every five years
25	they do their lift-off measurements.

1 MR. ARRIGHI: And again, they do three times of the requirement. I think the requirement 2 3 is four percent, and they do 12 in their 4 surveillance. MR. ROWLEY: 4.6 is containment liner 5 plate and penetration fatigue. The staff requested 6 7 a list of the design transients and corresponding cycles that were specified in the design of the 8 containment liner penetration. The staff finds the 9 design transients and corresponding cycles 10 11 acceptable. They conclude that the TLAAs has been 12 projected to the end of extended period of operation. And there were no open or confirmatory 13 14 items. 15 And there were seven other plant specific TLAAs. All demonstrated that the TLAAs 16 17 have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. Also, there were no open or 18 19 confirmatory items. 20 MR. ARRIGHI: Well, that concludes the 21 staff presentation, unless there are any further 22 questions. 23 It's interesting. DR. WALLIS: 24 wheel is a moving part and I thought moving parts 25 didn't appear in these renewal.

1	DR. LEE: Yes. This is Sam Lee. For the
2	TLAA, the active components are also part of the
3	TLAA.
4	DR. WALLIS: They are also part. Okay.
5	Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Do we have any
7	additional questions for the presenters? If none,
8	then I think what we're going to do is, would you
9	like to take a break before we go around the table
10	and talk about two things we have to do. One is
11	some views by members about where we are, what we
12	need. And also some expectations for the full
13	Committee meeting, which is the second.
14	Okay. So, we can go to right now,
15	actually, and then complete our meeting. Take a
16	break later.
17	So why don't we go around the table.
18	Starting with you, Graham, if you could give us your
19	views?
20	DR. WALLIS: Well, I don't see any
21	significant issues. These are getting so routine,
22	these license renewal.
23	I do think that in terms of the
24	presentation to the full Committee, every time you
25	can have some numbers or some criteria or

1 something, or a table, it's more	
2 saying the staff finds the work a	adequate, or
3 something like that. And if you	can buttress it
4 with something quantitative or so	ome metrics, that
5 always is more convincing.	
So, I would just sugg	gest that.
7 MR. ARRIGHI: Thank y	you.
8 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Pet	ter?
9 MR. FORD: I'm cautio	ously satisfied with
disposition of all the open items	s and the
11 confirmatory items. And I, again	n, am cautiously
12 satisfied about the completeness	of the review
that's been done by the staff.	
14 And the reason why I	keep saying
cautious is that I'm being asked	to signed off or
approve a memo which really should	ld be based on data.
And, as Graham says, we haven't	seen a lot of data
18 upon which some of these judgment	ts are being made.
19 And that's maybe because of time	
I'd like to see in th	he future as
21 appropriate some of the analyses	that has been done.
22 And I'm going to dig into the que	estioning, I'm
23 pretty sure that data does exist	. It just hasn't
been presented.	
The one I feel I keep	p hitting on is

1 these questions of one time inspections and the opportunistic in terms of place and time and when 2 3 you're going to do these one time inspections. 4 I think somehow or another we've got to where 5 appropriate, and that means in the question of the consequence of the failure of these components 6 7 subjected to a one time inspection, I think we have to tackle that sometime in the future. 8 9 And, again, as I've said before, it's 10 not specific to this particular plant. It's specific to all the plants who we have been doing our LRAs 11 12 on. That's my main point. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. Well, let's talk 15 about briefly. Because, I mean, you're talking about in the future it could be valuable for us to 16 have an example, at least of some of the technical 17 information behind a specific issue. 18 19 MR. FORD: Yes. 20 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So that the Committee 21 will have an understanding that in fact, or a 22 confirmation that the judgments are not based purely on some quantitative consideration, but also there 23

is a technical basis behind that. You know, we're

not party to the kind of information normally.

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1 it may be a good exercise for us to do. It doesn't 2 have anything to do with this application. MR. FORD: 3 Exactly. 4 CHAIRMAN BONACA: But we may try to look 5 for a forum. And maybe the next application that comes, start with that, we could have some specific 6 7 example. 8 MR. FORD: Yes. CHAIRMAN BONACA: And an example could 9 be, for example, in a specific one time inspection. 10 11 Because this has come up again frequently the 12 concern the Committee has with the one time inspections as, you know, what they mean and why are 13 14 they adequate rather than a program. 15 Now, I always think that the one inspection could be the springboard for a problem. 16 17 What I mean is that if you expect once and you find that in fact your expectation is not supported by 18 19 the inspection, then you have to respond to the 20 program. And so I would see that coming through. But we've had a lot of questions about one time 21 22 inspections. 23 One has been should the confirmatory of 24 the fact that we do not expect to have something 25 happening, and not vice versa, okay.

1 And that's why I asked the question 2 about the former bolts. Because, you know, even in 3 case you have no expectations to have a need for it, 4 well since you did something before, it may be --5 but anyway, I don't want to get back on that issue 6 again. 7 So that could be helpful to this Committee if we took the next application, take one 8 9 of the one time inspections and expand on it so that we can see what the logic was behind and have a 10 11 better understanding of it. 12 MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, I think we can do that. In fact, we'll take under consideration. 13 14 Because this whole thing's going to get aggravated 15 more and more. 16 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. 17 MR. GILLESPIE: As we update GALL and bring in past practice into GALL. The premise of 18 19 GALL is reference GALL and keep the documentation on 20 site. 21 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. 22 MR. GILLESPIE: So two years from now 23 you're going to probably see significantly less in 24 an application than you even see today, which is why

we've got audit teams, and we had an audit team go

1 to Ginna to look at the biocabinets full of 2 background material. So for the audit team to bring some 3 4 details back on one of the audits, one of the 5 issues. We can document it maybe in the audit report and then we'll have a record. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. And you're absolutely right. And we are diverging from a 8 standard process of review of the SERS. 9 example, as I mentioned in the presentation to the 10 11 Commission, where I'm looking much more at unique 12 things about this plant that really are not addressed through GALL, but -- you know, and so if 13 14 we have plant where we have a thermal shield failure 15 with damage, I'm concerned about how to address the damage in the next 20 years: What kind of 16 17 inspection and so on. So this is unique to that plant. And so we're looking for those kind of 18 19 elements. 20 And I think we should do it in a way 21 that doesn't penalize the licensee that comes as the 22 next review, see if there's an example of what 23 you've done. 24 MR. GILLESPIE: CHAIRMAN BONACA: And that would be 25

1 helpful to us. 2 MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. CHAIRMAN BONACA: 3 Graham? 4 MR. LEITCH: Well, a couple of things. 5 I'm a little concerned about the qualification of electrical equipment. I mean, I see in the license 6 7 renewal application a lot of open issues. I see in the SER some of those are closed, apparently to the 8 satisfaction of the staff, but not all of them. 9 Now, I'm not sure if I'm just talking 10 11 about a timing issue here. In other words, maybe 12 they are more closed now and it'll become apparent in the final SER just what the status of those is, 13 but I'm just not sure about that. 14 15 But I see, for example, safety injection pump motors and I see a list in the SER of 16 17 calculations that have been reviewed. But the safety ejection pump motor EQ is not among those 18 calculations that have been reviewed. 19 20 Now I don't know. Perhaps in the month 21 or so since this has been written that's in 22 progress. I just don't know that. But I just think 23 that what we're saying here or what the license renewal application seems to be saying is we'll 24

worry about that in the future. And I think that

1	issue, perhaps, could be resolved now.
2	MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. I think the
3	disconnect that you heard was that the licensee in
4	parallel with having submitted the application was
5	doing these calculations. And we reviewed
6	illustrative applications of his process, but we
7	didn't review every single one of them. And you're
8	not going to see a one-to-one correspondence between
9	the applicant's chart on his submittal in the SE.
LO	So those are illustrative reviews in the SE.
L1	MR. LEITCH: So it's to gain confidence
L2	in the methodology, not necessarily a
L3	MR. GILLESPIE: Not a 100 percent
L4	confirmation of each component.
L5	MR. JACKSON: Do you mind if I make a
L6	comment on this? This is Jarred Jackson from Ginna.
L7	The basic process environmental
L8	qualification is such that you replace the component
L9	when you reach the limit that was previously
20	analyzed. That's actually the most conservative
21	state that you could be in.
22	So if we get to a situation where we're
23	saying we're not analyzing it right now, we're in
24	the conservative state that the EQ rule is already
25	going to replace that component.

1 So in some of these instances that 2 you're bringing up, we may actually be more 3 conservative than we need to be for license renewal. 4 At any point in the future we may redo that analysis 5 such that we say the temperatures are lower or not as much irradiation in the field. And those are the 6 7 types of data that comes into consideration for 8 these analysis. 9 MR. LEITCH: Yes. Okay. That's a good 10 explanation.

> I guess the other more general issue I had was related to this issue that was mentioned on the first couple slides regarding the sale of the plant. I don't know what the NRC's position would be if that is in some kind of progress at the time that this license renewal application is becoming In other words, are we dealing with final. Rochester Gas & Electric here or are we dealing with the new people, whoever they may be. It seems to me it would need to be one or the other, but not crossing over someplace in midstream here. Maybe that's not a safety issue, it's a legal financial kind of an issue. But I just wonder how we would deal with that.

> > MR. MECREDY: It's Bob Mecredy from

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1	RG&E.
2	In fact, license renewal will be done by
3	RG&E because the plant sale is contingent upon a
4	renewed license.
5	MR. LEITCH: Oh, okay.
6	MR. MECREDY: So license renewal is
7	first and then transfer. It makes sense. The new
8	owner, they're interested in 20 some odd years, not
9	2009.
10	MR. LEITCH: Sure.
11	MR. MECREDY: So that's the basis for
12	the sale.
13	MR. LEITCH: Yes, okay. Well, that
14	answers that question.
15	MR. ROSEN: And, Graham, the new owner
16	will have to meet all the certain tests for
17	financial resources and other things.
18	MR. LEITCH: Right. Understand that.
19	MR. ROSEN: In order to be able to
20	accept the new license.
21	MR. LEITCH: Yes, I understand that.
22	MR. MECREDY: Yes, that's right.
23	MR. ROSEN: And it makes logical sense,
24	and it's a two step process.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I think it's a good

1	question. Because I mean, that owner, I mean so
2	much of this this is a promise of maintaining
3	this plant to this level. And I think, actually,
4	that there are a lot of good commitments from this
5	plant. I mean, you know the commitment to replace
6	the head at this time, I think is a proactive one.
7	And so there'll be a new owner, they may think
8	differently.
9	So, but I agree with you that
LO	MR. ROSEN: The new owner did come in
L1	and say, "Yes, well that was the other guy. That
L2	wasn't us."
L3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, you may see
L4	that.
L5	MR. LEITCH: Well, I think as long as
L6	it's one side or the other and it's been explained
L7	this will be done before the transfer the ownership-
L8	_
L9	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, I agree.
20	MR. LEITCH: as long as that's clean,
21	I don't have any problem with that.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. I agree. I
23	agree.
24	MR. ROSEN: The new owner has to come in
25	and has to accept all the previous commitments of

1	the licensee?
2	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I agree. Right. I
3	agree.
4	MR. ROSEN: It's just a new licensee for
5	the old commitments.
6	MR. LEITCH: Yes, and there's no
7	question about that. It's just that if this process
8	was someplace midstream when that ownership was
9	transferred, it could be somewhat confusing. And
LO	that's what was concerning me. But we're hearing
L1	that that will not be the case.
L2	I don't know if you wanted us to talk a
L3	little bit about points to be emphasized at the full
L4	Committee meeting.
L5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. Yes.
L6	MR. LEITCH: And one of the things that
L7	I think is important in that context is the
L8	management of these commitments. And I guess RG&E
L9	may be in a little awkward position to defend
20	exactly how these commitments will be managed with
21	this transfer of ownership in the offing.
22	But I guess the thing that I would like
23	to hear addressed more is there are a number of
24	places here where there are future commitments. And
25	how are those commitments going to be tracked? Is

there an on-site organization that's going to track these commitments? As plant modifications over the years, how does that all factor into the license renewal program? And just how is this going to continue to be a dynamic process until the period of extended operation is entered?

And I don't know if you can shed any light on that at the full Committee meeting or now.

And it may be a somewhat difficult situation because of the change of ownership.

MR. MECREDY: This is Bob Mecredy again.

We can address that. George will address that at the full Committee. fundamentally it's the same process we use now to address commitments we have made in the past for things we have had to do subsequently or things that may still need to be done between now and the end of the current license. So the process for managing commitments is really just a case of how far in the future as opposed to anything that's different. certainly commitments we have made in the past remain commitments regardless of change in licensee, unless the new owner decides to come back to the staff and change the commitments. There's a standard process for that -- but we will talk about

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1 commitments and how we manage them. And we do have 2 a system and a process on-site that tracks 3 commitments and ensures that they're done, and 4 there's various categories with MRP and our sequence 5 being at the top of the list. And that is actively managed in accordance with our practices and 6 7 industry standards. So we can talk about. 8 MR. LEITCH: What concerns me is not so 9 much changing the commitments as assuring somehow what is the process for assuring that the 10 11 commitments will be tracked and completed by the 12 time of entrance into the period of extended operation. 13 14 MR. MECREDY: We'll address that. 15 MR. GILLESPIE: Graham, just from our side since they're making up the list and we have to 16 check it, the majority of things like participating 17 in the MRP program and those things are in the FSAR. 18 19 So that you've got as a minimum once a new license 20 is issued, a 50/59 type control on the FSAR. 21 there's a safety level -- it redefines the safety 22 level for the operating facility once they get the 23 new license. 24 The other thing is we have a custom

inspection procedure for each plant that's written

based on that commitment list, which the staff is then maintaining which will get inspected before the end of the term. And so that's being done for every single plant.

So you've got the FSAR list, there's other things, and then you've got a specific inspection procedure for each plant. And this actually came out of earlier ACRS staff discussions on how are you keeping up with the list. So there's a bit of formality in it. And the industry overall agreed to put these in the FSARs, which previously they did not do. So the first couple of plants didn't necessarily have that.

MR. LEITCH: Yes. I guess what I'd like to hear a little more about how the licensee plans to manage that.

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes.

MR. LEITCH: I mean, I know what you're doing. But I guess there have been some licensees that have come and told us basically that plant license renewal is just integrated into their normal process of doing business. Others have seemed to indicate that they kind of have a permanent license renewal organization that manages all these things and assures that they get done.

1	And I guess I'd just like to hear a
2	little discussion about how Rochester Gas & Electric
3	plans to do that. And I guess their plans, the
4	method by which they manage these things are
5	probably not hard and fast commitments. I mean the
6	commitments are hard and fast, but the method they
7	use to manage them are so that they have some
8	latitude there.
9	MR. GILLESPIE: Yes.
10	MR. LEITCH: And perhaps the new owner
11	may see it a little differently than Rochester Gas
12	and Electric. But at least I'd like to hear how
13	Rochester Gas & Electric
14	MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. The danger here is
15	that the onus is now shifted once the license
16	issued. The onus is kind of shifted to the staff to
17	confirm it.
18	MR. LEITCH: Yes.
19	MR. GILLESPIE: And if a commitment is
20	not met, then now we're into the compliance arena
21	relative to any actions we're going to take because
22	the license is gone.
23	MR. LEITCH: Right.
24	MR. GILLESPIE: So there's a kind of
25	shift of burden once we issue that license.

1 MR. LEITCH: Yes. Yes. 2 MR. MECREDY: Bob Mecredy again. 3 I would argue also that it's our 4 commitment and it's our obligation to meet it, so we 5 still have even with the new license, an extended period, it's still our nickel and we're obligated to 6 7 Staff has the role of inspecting to assure we've done it, but it's really no different, again, 8 than any other commitment we've ever made. 9 we've made the commitment, we're obligated to do it 10 11 as part of our license where it's part of our normal 12 correspondence with the staff. MR. LEITCH: Yes. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Any other issues? 15 MR. ROSEN: The difference is the magnitude, Bob. The magnitude of the number of 16 17 commitments and the length of time over which they are operable. You know, it's a question of degree 18 19 more than anything else. 20 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Steve, your views? MR. ROSEN: Well, I thought this was a 21 22 very well done application and I have only two 23 questions that remain. One is a commitment I made 24 earlier, I'll just reenforce it. 25 When you come back to the full

1	Committee, I really would like to reactor vessel
2	upper shelf energy chart revised to show the value,
3	just like the pressurized thermal shock chart that
4	shows the value.
5	And then I'd like to take you back to a
6	question on the station blackout diagram. Can you
7	put that back up again?
8	Now, there was a question, an open item
9	that staff had identified that there were two cables
10	from the off-site power path that bring power into
11	the safety buses that were not in scope.
12	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes.
13	MR. ROSEN: Now, are they now in scope?
14	MR. ARRIGHI: No. The applicant's
15	position is that these two cables that power the
16	MR. ROSEN: Which two are they?
17	MR. ARRIGHI: These outer two cables
18	here. Those two cables, their statement is that
19	they don't need to power the service water pumps
20	because they can get a cold shutdown within 72 hours
21	without those. That's their CLB.
22	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Without what?
23	MR. ARRIGHI: Without the service water
24	pumps.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Without the service

	1
1	water pump.
2	MR. ARRIGHI: And those cables supply
3	the service water. This bus supplies the service
4	water pump.
5	MR. ROSEN: And the way they will do
6	that is by feed and bleed of the secondary side into
7	the containment?
8	MR. ARRIGHI: Correct. Yes, they would
9	use the standby aux feedwater or the aux feedwater
10	pumps to
11	MR. ROSEN: To keep the speed of the
12	steam
13	MR. ARRIGHI: feed the steam
14	generators and then dump steam
15	MR. ROSEN: This is in station blackout
16	now, right?
17	MR. ARRIGHI: Yes.
18	MR. ROSEN: We're talking about station
19	blackout conditions where they have steam but no
20	power.
21	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, and they I'm
22	sorry.
23	MR. ROSEN: The DC power supplies to
24	control the turbine driven aux feed pump, refilling
25	the steam generators with the steam that the steam

1 generators are providing as the steam pressure 2 decays, and dumping water on the floor through manual valve into the containment? 3 4 MR. ARRIGHI: Correct. 5 MR. ROSEN: And they've got volunteers for this? 6 7 MR. WROBEL: Mr. Rosen, we've mixed up to licensing conditions here. 8 9 Okay. Help me unmix them. MR. ROSEN: 10 MR. WROBEL: Okay. Forgive me for this 11 if I contributed to it. 12 With respect to the 4160 volt cables going to the buses, should they be lost on a station 13 14 blackout event, that's one condition. 15 different than the fire condition that we were talking about earlier for the water solid steam 16 17 generator cool down, although there are issues with respect to a fire in the screen house that might 18 19 drive you to a water solid steam generator cool It's more than loss of just these cables. 20 down. 21 So the cable itself here, you are 22 correct in assuming that on a station blackout I 23 have lots of stored energy in my steam generators that I'm going to use to run my turbine drive 24 25 auxiliary feedwater pump. And in order to refill my

1	water source for the turbine driven aux feedwater
2	pump, I may elect to use my fire water system to add
3	water to my storage tanks.
4	MR. ROSEN: And you can do that because
5	it has a diesel driven fire pump?
6	MR. WROBEL: I can do that because it's
7	a diesel driven fire pump. So that's one of the
8	issues.
9	The other
10	MR. ROSEN: That's one issue. Now I
11	know how you're going to get sustained water into
12	the secondary side of the steam generators. Now,
13	how are you going to
14	MR. WROBEL: That's not a feed and
15	bleed.
16	MR. ROSEN: get steam to the feed
17	pumps.
18	MR. WROBEL: That's not feed and bleed.
19	That particular evolution is normal cool down in a
20	station blackout using turbine driven aux feed
21	water.
22	MR. ROSEN: And diesel fire pump.
23	MR. WROBEL: And diesel fire pump.
24	MR. ROSEN: You were telling me?
25	MR. WROBEL: The feed and bleed

evolution is an evolution that would occur if	we
lost service water for the component cooling v	<i>v</i> ater
system, the ultimate heat sink, so to speak.	So I
can run on an accident. I can run my diesel d	lriven
or my emergency diesel generators without serv	rice
water. And I do that by virtue of hooking th	ıem up
to fire water systems; that's one of those SOF	
topics. So I don't need service water in orde	er to
immediately mitigate the consequences of the e	event,
but long term if I want to go to long term coo	ol
down, because I don't want to stay in hot shut	down,
I want to drive myself to cold shutdown	
MR. ROSEN: In a station blackout.	No.
MR. WROBEL: In a fire event.	
MR. ROSEN: In a fire, not a stati	.on
blackout where you have the diesels running to	give
you power, on-site power	
MR. WROBEL: I still don't need se	rvice
water because I can use this water solid steam	n
generator cool down method, thereby avoiding t	he
necessity of having component cooling water for	or RHR
system, which would be normally feed from the	
service water which is lost because of fire.	
CHAIRMAN BONACA: See, one thing t	hat
concerns me about, and maybe I'm wrong but I w	vant to

1 bring up, some of this, you know, not orthodox ways 2 of providing for cooling, etcetera, seems to be 3 coming from the SEP. Okay. In the SEP you -- now 4 that was really a program that was tailored for 5 plants that were supposed to operate 40 years and did not meet the design basis or requirements of the 6 7 SRP, therefore you allow for, let's say, unorthodox ways of dealing with these issues. 8 9 Now you're using it to justify 20 more 10 years of operation. I am not sure that logically 11 there it's satisfying to me. I just throw it on the 12 table. MR. ARRIGHI: Again, we do have the open 13 14 item on this issue and we're still evaluating it. 15 MR. ROSEN: Is there more to be said or 16 is that the whole story? 17 In a fire evolution where MR. WROBEL: you would use the water solid steam generator cool 18 19 down method, the turbine drive auxiliary feed water 20 pump is not the water source. It's the standby 21 auxiliary feed water pump. Those additional two 22 pumps that we installed and talked about earlier 23 today, that's the water source that puts the water 24 into the secondary system. Those two are fed from 25 the city water system, if necessary.

1	If you lose service water, we have two
2	places that you can hook up the fire loop. One is
3	the emergency diesel generators, the other to the
4	suction of the standby auxiliary feed water pumps.
5	So what we've somehow mixed up here
6	today is two events; the station blackout and a fire
7	event.
8	MR. ROSEN: Station blackout is that
9	event where you
10	MR. WROBEL: Station blackout
11	MR. ROSEN: lose all the power on
12	that system right there.
13	MR. WROBEL: Correct. Where I lost my
14	essentially service water.
15	MR. ROSEN: Yes.
16	MR. WROBEL: And now I run my
17	initially I'm running my decayed heat removal via my
18	turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump. And then
19	as a remake or a refill capacity for my turbine
20	driven auxiliary feed water pump, I use fire water
21	from the diesel driven fire pump and I have an
22	inventory source at that point.
23	MR. ROSEN: And that's the justification
24	for not including those two lines in the scope of
25	license renewal?

1 MR. WROBEL: That's part of the 2 justification. 3 MR. ROSEN: What's the down side of 4 including them in? Anything? Or is this just an 5 argument, what we used to call academic arguments here, but we have a highly influential persons who 6 7 are in the academics sphere here. And we don't call them academic arguments, because that's the 8 9 pejorative term. 10 In essence, this is just a MR. WROBEL: 11 discussion for the staff over the breadth and the 12 scope of our current licensing basis and where it starts and stops. 13 14 MR. ROSEN: Okay. So if you are of a 15 mind to, you could say it's not in our current licensing basis but we could include -- we will 16 17 include these in our license renewal anyway? You could say that? I mean, that would clarify it? 18 19 MR. WROBEL: Yes. Yes, sir, we could 20 say that. CHAIRMAN BONACA: Other licensees that 21 22 don't say things of that kind. 23 MR. ROSEN: Well, I would suggest that 24 you try somehow for the full Committee to make this 25 clearer. Because even though I've listened to the

1 whole argument, I still am -- it' the fog of war, 2 But I don't understand it exactly, and you 3 know I have I some experience in this area. 4 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And, again, you know, 5 I love to point out what I did not like, and I didn't hear an answer to that. But they're using 6 7 some unorthodox ways by SRP that are being allowed for your plant because you did not meet the SRP 8 9 requirements to continue to justify certain unorthodox ways of getting to cold shutdown to 10 11 exclude components from scope. And I say, yes, it's 12 consistent with your licensing basis. But, you know, what if the plan now goes to 60 years of life, then 13 14 it goes to 80 years of life. You know, I just feel 15 less comfortable with that. And my concern is that you know the intent of the SEP was not one -- it was 16 a grandfathering of older plants to keep them 17 running for the 40 years of operation. 18 19 Now, I'm not saying that you're not 20 justified to go to 60, but I feel uncomfortable. I 21 got to think about this. 22 MR. JACKSON: I'd like to comment on 23 that for a moment. This is Jarred Jackson. 24 Part of what we're talking about here is 25 recovery from a station blackout. I'm sure you guys have heard this discussion before.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Sure.

MR. JACKSON: And the industry may have interrupted recovery different, understanding what the licensing basis for coping versus recovery. So as an industry, we did not have or did not feel we had recovery as a licensing basis issue. So when the staff had interpreted it in that way such that we are now addressing recovery, we looked at the CLB as a whole. So I don't want to misimpression as if this is an orthodox methodology, because it's also a differing opinion on interpretation of the CLB.

So, it's not as if this is very clear cut in the CLB and we're using an unorthodox method of achieving it. You know, we acknowledged the staff's understanding of recovery, and we've attempted to address it and in a manner that I think we both agree on.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: I'm saying, however, that most people to recovery station blackout, they want to use their service water. And that's what we have seen from other people; they have to recovery water or use it. And here you have an exception from recovery service water based on, I call it unorthodox when you tie fire water to the

1	secondaries and you keep generating steam for your
2	steam driven pumps by pumping fire water in a steam
3	generator.
4	MR. ROSEN: And draining by manual
5	valves into the containment.
6	CHAIRMAN BONACA: That's right. Into the
7	containment. I mean, you know
8	MR. ROSEN: Is that what I heard?
9	MR. WILSON: Dave Wilson, Rochester Gas
10	& Electric.
11	But the draining actually happens via
12	some connections into the yard. So you steam via the
13	normal method until you get steam pressure. So
14	you're steaming through the atmospheric relief
15	valves, main steam atmospheric relief valves. And
16	then when you get to a certain condition, you can't
17	get enough steam pressure, then you shift over to
18	adding water to the secondary side and draining that
19	water out, basically using a steam generator as a
20	heat exchanger, you know water-to-water heat
21	exchanger
22	MR. ROSEN: Now this is a steam
23	generator that has no tube leaks, I hope, because
24	you're not draining
25	MR. WILSON: That is correct, sir.

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1	MR. ROSEN: radioactive material to
2	the yard.
3	MR. WILSON: No tube leaks.
4	MR. ROSEN: You have the new steam
5	generators.
6	MR. WILSON: Right.
7	MR. ROSEN: Are they made of impervium?
8	MR. WILSON: They're not made of
9	impervium, but our licensing basis doesn't account
10	for having, you know, significant number of beyond
11	design basis events or unusual things happening at
12	the same time.
13	MR. ROSEN: Well, this whole thing is
14	rather curious is all I have. Mario calls them
15	unorthodox. He has used more stronger words in the
16	past. But I'll stay with that.
17	MR. WILSON: We're quite capable, I
18	think, the full Committee of making a nice
19	presentation on this issue and/or if we don't decide
20	before that point, just put the cables into scope.
21	MR. ROSEN: Okay.
22	DR. WALLIS: Yes. That would be the
23	simplest thing to do.
24	MR. WILSON: It's appearing to be that.
25	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Any other issues?
ı	ı

1 Steve? 2 MR. GILLESPIE: That's all. 3 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. 4 Insofar as my views, first of all what I think of the application. I think that it was a 5 very clear application insofar as the documentation. 6 7 I thought it was well organized. I mean, I could follow from table-to-table clearly. 8 So, I thought more highly of GALL after 9 10 reviewing this. 11 I think that I'm impressed by the way that some of the specific commitments have been 12 13 implemented. I commented on the auxiliary feed water 14 system. I've seen other SEP plants that did not go 15 that far, and so that seems to me like a serious commitment of the station in the past and present to 16 17 improvements to the plant. And I've been impressed by the quality 18 of the replacements in generators and then the head 19 20 being ordered now and implemented in 2003, although 21 you have no obvious leakage from the head. So there 22 is, again, I am sure that was driven also by your 23 intent of selling the plant, but whatever reason it 24 may be, it meant enough, and it's even better.

So that was significant to me.

With regard to the presentations to the full Committee, I think it would be helpful after you have the Systematic Evaluation Program, since most people are aware of that, if you could highlight in your slide the major issues. You know, you had off feed. You may have some others that you want to point out.

You do have this bleed and feed on the secondary side, which I have never seen by any plant except in Germany where they use it as a standard way of bleeding and feeding rather than the primary side. So that was interesting. I haven't seen it here. So, you may want to point out some descriptions. Because it was difficult a little bit for a reviewer to understand exactly how the plant is configured, and we did not have the benefit of a FSAR in front of us to look at those features.

And I think that pretty much I just don't have any additional comments really here. I think many of them have been by my colleagues here.

So for the full Committee, I think we should have some clarification of the SEP, as we said. And otherwise I think that the representation was good. I think you'll have to collapse it down.

We have much less time than we have at the

2.0

1	Subcommittee meeting.
2	MR. ROSEN: Short one side.
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: What?
4	MR. ROSEN: We need one revised slide.
5	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, we need revised
6	slide with some quantitative information.
7	But insofar again at the next renewal, I
8	think we should have an example of a quantitative,
9	for example a decision on time inspection that will
10	give us some comfort insofar as
11	MR. GILLESPIE: I think the next one on
12	the schedule is Summer.
13	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Summer.
14	MR. GILLESPIE: And Summer has no open
15	items right now. And we're not on a schedule for
16	about 3 months. So we'll come with one example so
17	we'll have something to talk about.
18	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. I don't have
19	any other comments on that.
20	So are there any other comments or
21	questions from the members? Any questions or
22	comments from the public? If not, then the meeting
23	is adjourned.
24	Thank you very much.
25	(Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)