Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

524th Meeting

Docket Number: (not applicable)

Location: Rockville, Maryland

Date: Wednesday, July 6, 2005

Work Order No.: NRC-496 Pages 1-281

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

	
1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3	+ + + +
4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS)
5	524TH MEETING
6	+ + + +
7	WEDNESDAY,
8	JULY 6, 2005
9	+ + + +
10	The meeting was convened in Room T-2B3 of Two
11	White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
12	Maryland, at 8:30 a.m., Dr. Graham B. Wallis,
13	Chairman, presiding.
14	MEMBERS PRESENT:
15	GRAHAM B. WALLIS, Chairman
16	WILLIAM J. SHACK, Vice-Chairman
17	GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS, ACRS Member
18	RICHARD S. DENNING, ACRS Member
19	THOMAS S. KRESS, ACRS Member
20	MARIO V. BONACA, ACRS Member
21	DANA A. POWERS, ACRS Member
22	JOHN D. SIEBER, ACRS Member-at-Large
23	
24	
25	

	1
1	ACRS STAFF PRESENT:
2	SAM DURAISWAMY, ACRS Staff
3	JOHN H. FLACK, ACRS Staff
4	JOHN G. LAMB, ACRS Staff
5	JOHN T. LARKINS, Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW,
6	Designated Federal Official
7	CAYETANO SANTOS, JR., ACRS Staff
8	MICHAEL L. SCOTT, ACRS Staff
9	ASHOK C. THADANI, Deputy Executive Director,
10	ACRS/ACNW
11	
12	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
13	KIRSI ALM-LYTZ, NRR
14	RAJ ANAND, NRR/DRIP/RNRP
15	CHRISTINA ANTONESCU, RES/DET/ERAB
16	PETE APPIGNANI, RES
17	STEVEN ARNDT, RES/DET/ERAB
18	HANS ASHAH, NRR/DE/EMEB
19	RAJENDER AULUCK, NRR/DRIP/RLEP/RL
20	JUAN AYALA, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
21	GOUTAM BAGEHI, NRR/DE/EMEB
22	DAN BARSS, NSIR/DPR/EDO
23	LETA BROWN, NRR/DSSA/SPSB-C
24	JOSE CALVO, NRR/DE/EEIB
25	NORBERT CARTE, RES/DET/ERAB/ICS

1	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
2	KENNETH CHANG, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
3	THOMAS CHENG, NRR/DE/EMEB
4	MATTHEW CHIRAMAL, NRR/ADPT/DE/EEIB
5	OM CHOPRA, NR/RDE/EEIB
6	KURT COZENS, NRR
7	GREG CRANSTON, NRR
8	ROBERT DENNING, NRR/DSSA/SPSB
9	YOIRA K. DIAZ, NRR/RLEP
10	LAURA DUDES, NRR/DRIP/RNRP
11	MICHAEL EVANS, RES/DET/ERAB
12	JOHN FAIR, NRR
13	ANTONIO FERNANDEZ, OGC
14	NEIL HAGGERTY, NMSS
15	BRAD HARVEY, NRR/DSSA/SPSB-C
16	RAUL HERNANDEZ, NRR/DSSA/SPLB
17	AMY HULL, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
18	DEBBIE JARVIS, RES/DET/MEB
19	PETER J. KANG, RES/DET/MEB
20	YOUNGDOO KANG, NRR/DZ/ZZZB
21	BILL KEMPER, RES/DET/ERAB/I&CS
22	STEPHEN KLEMENTOWICZ, NRR/DIPM
23	BILL KOO, NRR
24	P.T. KUO, NRR
25	CAROLYN LAURON, NRR

1	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
2	TOMMY LE, NRR/RLEP
3	ERIC J. LEE, NSIR/DNS/NSP/RSS
4	JAY LEE, NRR/DSSA/SPSB
5	SAMSON LEE, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
6	MICHAEL LI, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
7	Y.C. (RENEE) LI, NRR
8	YONG LI, NRR/DE/EMEB
9	PATRICIA LOUGHEED, NRC/RIII
10	GREG MAKAR, NRR
11	DAVID MATTHEWS, NRR/DRIP
12	DANIEL MERZKE, NRR
13	LESLIE MILLER, NRR
14	SIKHINDRA K. MITRA, NRR/DRIP/RLEP
15	CLIFF MUNSON, NRR/DE/EMEB
16	BRUCE MUSICO, NSIR/DPR/EPD
17	DAT T. NGUYEN, NRR
18	MANAN PATEL, NRR/DE/EEIB
19	PAUL PRESCOTT, NRR/DIPM/IPSB
20	JAI RAJAN, NRR/DE/EMEB
21	PAUL REBSTOCK, NRR/DE/EEIB-I&C
22	BILL ROGERS, NRR/DIPM
23	JONATHAN ROWLEY, NRR/RLEP
24	SIMON SHENG, NRR/DE/EMCB
25	BELKYS SOSA, NRR/DRIP/RNRP

	3	
1	NRC STAFF PRESENT:	
2	RAMACHANDRAN SUBBARATNAM, NRR/DRIP/RLEP/RL	
3	GREGORY SUBER, NRR/DRIP/RLEP	
4	GEORGE TARTAL, RES/DET/ERAB	
5	MIKE WATERMAN, RES/DET/ERAB	
6	ADAM WILSON, RES/DET/MEB	
7	KATARYN WINSBERG, OGC	
8		
9	ALSO PRESENT:	
10	REZA AHRABIE, ENTERGY	
11	TONY BANKS, DOMINION	
12	PATRICIA CAMPBELL, MORGAN LEWIS	
13	ALAN COX, ENTERGY	
14	RICHARD CROTEZO, NRL	
15	STEVEN DORT, FENOC	
16	DAN FADEL, AEP	
17	JOEL GEBBRE, AEP	
18	RICHARD GRUMBIR, AEP - D.C. COOK	
19	MIKE HEATH, PGN	
20	JOE HEGNER, DOMINION	
21	BOB KALINOWSKI, AEP/I&M	
22	RICHARD KISNER, ORNL	
23	DAVID KUNSEMILLER, FENOC	
24	PAUL LEONARD, AEP - COOK	
25	WILLIAM R. LETTIS, WILLIAM LETTIS & ASSOCIATES	

1	ALSO	PRESENT:
2		SCOTT LINDVALL, WILLIAM LETTIS & ASSOCIATES
3		CLIFFORD R. MARKS, ISL
4		ROBIN MCGUIRE, RISK ENGINEERING, INC.
5		MATTHEW MILLER, AREVA
6		MANO NAZAR, AEP - COOK
7		MARK RINCKEL, AREVA
8		ROGER RUCKER, FENOC
9		MICHAEL SCARPELLO, AEP
10		MARVIN SMITH, DOMINION
11		MIKE STROUD, ENTERGY
12		SPYROS TRAIFOROS, LINK
13		KEN WIERMAN, FEMA
14		RICHARD WOOD, ORNL
15		GARRY G. YOUNG, ENTERGY
16		GEORGE ZINKE, ENTERGY/NUSTART
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

ĺ	7
1	INDEX
2	Opening Remarks of ACRS Chairman 8
3	Final Review of the License Renewal Application
4	for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1
5	and 2
6	Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to 53
7	North Anna Early Site Permit Application
8	Draft Final Regulatory Guide, DG-1137, 143
9	"Guidelines for Lightning Protection for
10	Nuclear Power Plants"
11	Draft Final Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 219
12	1.152, "Criteria for Use of Computers in
13	Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants"
14	Adjourn
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 8:31 A.M. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The meeting will now 3 4 come to order. 5 This is the first day of the 524th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 6 7 During today's meeting, the Committee will consider the following: Final Review of the License Renewal 8 9 Application for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to 10 11 North Anna Early Site Permit Application; Draft Final 12 Regulatory Guide, DG-1137, "Guidelines for Lightning Protection for Nuclear Power Plants"; Draft Final 13 14 Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for 15 Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants"; and the preparation of ACRS Reports. 16 17 This meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory 18 19 Committee Act. Dr. John T. Larkins is the Designated 20 Federal Official for the initial portion of the 21 meeting. We have received no written comments or 22 23 requests for time to make oral statements from members

A transcript of portions of the meeting is

of the public regarding today's sessions.

24

being kept and it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

I have a couple of items of current interest. I'd like to introduce Mr. Cook Lai who is a graduate student studying Electrical Engineering at the University of Maryland. He has joined the ACRS staff as a summer intern. He will be assisting the Committee in its review of the Digital I&C Research Plan. Please welcome Mr. Lai.

(Applause.)

In the items of interest which are being handed out, you'll notice a couple of speeches from Commissioners and there is an SRM dated June 30th. In the first paragraph, I noticed the sentence, "the Staff should continue to emphasize the importance of effective implementation of a good, corrective action program." This was one of the points that we made in our last meeting.

I now would like to begin with this meeting, the agenda. The first item on the agenda is the Final Review of the License Renewal Application for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

I will invite my esteemed colleague, Dr.

Bonaca to get us going.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MEMBER BONACA: Good morning. We're here to review the license renewal application for D.C.

Cook Nuclear Power Plant and the associated final SER prepared by the NRC Staff.

Our plant license renewal subcommittee met on February 9, 2005 to review this application and the interim SER. At the time, there were a couple of open items and also some confirmatory items still to be addressed by the licensee. All those items have been closed now and I think we are ready to hear from the licensee and the Staff, the final conclusion of the safety evaluation.

So I'll turn to Dr. Kuo.

DR. KUO: Thank you, Dr. Bonaca. I'm Today, the Staff is ready to happy to be back here. make a presentation to the Committee Members on the evaluation D.C. Cook safety final safety evaluation. As you are aware, when we prepared the draft evaluation, we had two open items and two confirmatory items. And that since then, actually before the ACRS subcommittee meeting, those issues were resolved.

For the record, I'm P.T. Kuo, the Program Director for the license renewal and the environmental

impacts program. And to my right is Dr. Samson Lee who is the section chief for the project management section. And to my far is the project manager,

Jonathan Rowley. And Jonathan is going to lead today's presentation for the Staff. And we also have all the tech staff that was involved in this review, sitting in the audience. Also, we have our regional representative, Patricia Wilson, in the audience, in case that you have any questions about performance.

Perhaps Pat will be able to answer that.

Unless you have any further questions, I'd like to again now first turn over the presentation to the Applicant. Take it over, if there's no questions. Thank you.

MR. GRUMBIR: Good morning, I'm Richard Grumbir. I'm the project manager for the D.C. Cook license renewal effort. I brought along a number of support staff with me. Bob Kalinowski is our technical lead. We have a number of people from Framatome and Entergy that were also supporting us in the application, as well. We have a few people that are a little bit late coming in and that will be Joel Gebbre, the engineering program manager; Michael Scarpello, our regulatory affairs supervisor; Paul Leonard is a design engineering supervisor; Dan Fadel,

1 our vice president of engineering is also coming; and 2 Mr. Mano Nazar, our chief nuclear officer is here. 3 thank you for this opportunity to share some 4 infirmation about Cook. 5 What I'll run through here real quickly in the interest of time and I know you all aren't shy to 6 7 ask questions as we go, so please feel free to do 8 that. 9 I just want to run through just a quick description of the plant, our asset management, the 10 11 ice condenser containment system, there was some question or some interest in that; system walkdown; a 12 quick discussion on we'll talk 13 TLAA and 14 implementation and commitments. 15 The information here is pretty self-16 explanatory. We're on the Lake Michigan, where we use 17 Lake Michigan as our ultimate heat sink. We do have 18 an 18-month fuel cycle. We are somewhat unique in 19 that we have an ice condenser containment and our 20 original period of operation started in 1974 for Unit 21 1 and 1977 for Unit 2. 22 This slide here, this was just to bring up 23 some examples of where Cook or Indiana Michigan Power 24 is clearly committed to operating

We have a number of long-range projects

facility.

1	that are either in work or have been completed
2	recently.
3	I did put the Traveling Water Screens, I
4	changed that to red to represent we did receive an
5	industry award through NEI for that project.
6	MEMBER BONACA: Could you comment to the
7	Committee on those two additional diesel generators
8	that you have added?
9	MR. GRUMBIR: We are in the process of
10	adding two supplemental diesels. That's an in-
11	progress item. That's to provide backup power source
12	for it will help us with our PRA numbers, as well
13	as supporting an 14-day allowable outage time on the
14	main diesels.
15	MEMBER BONACA: So I understand that
16	they're not safety-related.
17	MR. GRUMBIR: That's correct. They are
18	not safety-related.
19	MEMBER BONACA: But the size is such that
20	they can support a full division of what's the size
21	of this?
22	MR. GRUMBIR: I don't know the specific
23	size. I think they are not as large as the main
24	safety-related diesels, if that's what you're
25	thinking.
ı	T and the state of

1	MEMBER BONACA: Okay.
2	MR. GRUMBIR: They're significantly
3	smaller. There's a smaller set of loads that we're
4	planning to apply to them.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: These sump strainers
6	that you're putting in, they are not traveling screens
7	or anything, they're just static, aren't they?
8	MR. GRUMBIR: That's correct.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And how much bigger are
10	they than the original ones?
11	MR. GRUMBIR: I'd have to defer that to
12	Paul.
13	MR. LEONARD: I'm Paul Leonard. I'm the
14	structural design supervisor and also the technical
15	lead for our sump strainer project. Right now, we're
16	projecting approximately a 2,000 to 2,200 square foot
17	sump strainer area for our containment from our
18	current 85 square feet.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So that is a significant
20	change by any measure?
21	MR. LEONARD: Yes, that is a significant
22	change, sir.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: These supplemental
25	diesels, is this for hydrogen controlled severe

1 accidents, is that one of the loads that you're 2 planning to put on them? 3 MR. GRUMBIR: That's one of the loads that 4 we're planning to put on, yes. 5 MEMBER BONACA: So both are igniters? The other piece --6 MR. GRUMBIR: Yes. 7 clearly, I didn't put any financials on here, but this significant financial 8 is commitment the neighborhood of \$65 million, I believe, this year, and 9 10 more than that even next year when we have the heads going in. 11 Ice condenser. 12 I think the best thing is to skip ahead to the pictures. This is just a large 13 14 pictorial representation and then on this one you can 15 see some of the more intricate details. Most of the items that you see in here are in scope. 16 The various deck doors, in scope of license renewal: the various 17 deck doors, the frames, the turning vanes down on the 18 19 bottom, the lower support structure, number of the 20 structural elements are in the scope. 21 The picture is an older picture. 22 little misleading in that the bridge crane cannot be 23 manipulated into the ice condenser any more. 24 (Laughter.) 25 This was part of the original design and

1 there's an end wall door that has now been closed and 2 sealed, preventing it from going in and we've also 3 disabled any power in the area, so in the event that 4 it -- it just removes some unnecessary wiring there. 5 From a surveillance perspective, we do have surveillance that require us to measure the ice 6 7 weight, boron concentration and the pH levels of the 8 ice to verify that the flow passages are clear from 9 any ice build up. The top deck doors which are not visible on this picture, are verified to be closed. 10 They're actually taped in place to prevent any air 11 exchange between the actual containment and the ice 12 condenser. 13 14 And then the intermediate deck doors on 15 the lower inlet doors are verified that they're 16 operable or free to move, free to move operation. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Why does the flow go up the ice condenser? 18 19 MR. GRUMBIR: I think maybe the best thing 20 is for Paul to --It's a colder region. 21 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 22 You might think it would flow down. 23 I believe it flows up. MR. GRUMBIR: 24 MR. LEONARD: I can answer that question. 25 This is Paul Leonard. What happens is we have a

1	differential pressure created. We actually have three
2	zones
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Oh, I see.
4	MR. LEONARD: If you go back to the
5	earlier, we have the three zones, the lower
6	compartment, ice condenser compartment and upper
7	compartment.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right.
9	MR. LEONARD: And since we have
10	essentially a sealed barrier between the lower volume
11	and the upper volume, any release and all our high
12	energy piping is in the lower volume, any release is
13	forced upward through the ice condenser.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So to get to the upper
15	containment, it has to go through the condenser?
16	MR. LEONARD: That is correct.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay, thank you.
18	MR. GRUMBIR: In addition, the flapper
19	doors, I'm sorry, the flapper valves let me back
20	up.
21	If you look down I guess I should have
22	brought a pointer, but if you look down in this area,
23	it doesn't show up, but there are some flapper valves
24	in there that allow water to flow down into the active
25	region of the sump.

1 In addition, the maintenance activities, 2 periodically, the baskets are emptied. We empty those 3 with a modified -- thank you -- with a modified 4 concrete vibrator. And after they're emptied we go in 5 and inspect them to make sure that there's been no damage caused during the emptying process and then 6 7 refilled. Same thing with flow passages. If there's 8 any ice build up during that time we would break that 9 10 off or check for that. And then also, we look at the door seals and the air boxes. The air boxes are 11 12 located -- let's see, which way? They're down behind there. 13 14 All of these surveillance and maintenance 15 activities are procedurally driven. We do also have an aggressive foreign material exclusion program. 16 coatings that are inside the containment are safety-17 related coatings or qualified coatings. 18 19 And then one of the other unique features 20 is we have an access port that allows us to look 21 between the ice condenser walls and the containment 22 liner so that there's some inspection opportunities 23 that can be performed through that. I believe we are the only ice condenser 24

that has that capability.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is a license
2	renewal. This is essentially the same as the original
3	design except that the sump strainers are much bigger.
4	That's the real change that's significant, isn't it?
5	MR. GRUMBIR: And the sump strainers,
6	that's the work that's in progress.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Otherwise, it's the same
8	as the original design essentially?
9	MR. GRUMBIR: That's correct. Any
10	questions? Next topic that I was going to discuss
11	real briefly was the system walkdown program. The
12	scope and the activities that are credited in the
13	license renewal application and through the REI
14	process are consistent
15	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Excuse me, this
16	substrainer issue again. What is your insulation?
17	MR. LEONARD: Our insulation is primarily
18	calcium silicate and RMI. We have very little
19	fiberglass. We have previously removed I would say
20	99.9 percent of all fiberglass from inside
21	containment.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: How much is CalSil?
23	MR. LEONARD: Our CalSil is a very limited
24	quantity. We have a much larger right at this
25	time, a larger quantity because our pressurizer relief

tank is insulated, but we will be removing that calcium silicate. What we have is right now like the CVCS charging system/letdown system and the lines coming from the pressurizer relief valves are the extent of the calcium silicate that would be affected by a break.

MR. GRUMBIR: Going back to the system walkdown, some of the enhancements that we've credited are that we're committing to perform our emphasizing the scope of the walkdowns, looking at nonsafety-related components and equipment and its impact on safety-related equipment. And then also emphasizing the need to perform inspections of areas that are infrequently available or accessible such as during the refueling outage.

We also increased the scope of the system walkdown to make sure that any significant changes in environmental conditions are also addressed. And then also putting in administrative controls, formalizing the procedure on this.

The system engineering effectiveness, there was some question during the subcommittee regarding is the system engineers going to have the time to do these activities and that was one of our concerns as well. And back in, I think it was 2004,

2 there's more lines of defense so that the system 3 engineers and the system managers can take a step back 4 and make sure that they're looking at the overall 5 health of their systems. There was also some question in the past 6 7 over the use of the 54 EFPY versus 48. What I'm 8 bringing up here is basically an indication or trying 9 to articulate that 48 EFPY is acceptable for Cook. 10 When we started the license renewal effort, we looked at our past capacity factor and then considered about 11 95 percent of that moving forward. Unfortunately, 12 2003 was not a very good year for us with the fission 13 14 trusion event that we had, so that actually changes 15 the capacity factor that we can maintain going forward So 48 is acceptable for Cook. 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And it's lower because 17 of your years of nonoperation in the past? 18 19 GRUMBIR: Between years -- the 20 lifetime capacity factor up until 2002. 21 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Your traveling water 22 screen is mainly a fish removal screen, rather than a 23 weed removal screen? 24 MR. GRUMBIR: That was the starting event 25 that got us to put that in, that's correct.

we reorganized our engineering department so that

1 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Did the fish go to 2 market? VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Make them into cat 3 4 food? 5 MR. GRUMBIR: Apparently not. I think we flooded the market when that happened. 6 7 I also want to take a few minutes and talk about implementation activities. There's been some 8 9 question or concern with other applicants over are we just going to wait until the period of extended 10 operation and implement and that's clearly a concern 11 12 that we also had, so when we started working on the project, we made -- we anticipated spending a fair or 13 14 some amount of time on the tail end to go in and make 15 sure that we have all the programs, as many of the programs updated as we possibly could. 16 And this represents out of the 46 total 17 programs that were credited, 18 did not require any 18 19 enhancements; 16 required some enhancements; and 12 new programs. Our internal goal is much more 20 21 aggressive than our official commitment and that's to 22 have most of the programs completed by 2005. 23 that are tied with industry activities such as the MRP 24 or where we're looking for some operating experience

through the industry, those are activities that we're

1	going to defer a little bit into the next few years.
2	And rather than wait until 2014, our internal goal is
3	to have all these programs completely in place by 2009
4	which will give sufficient time for a little bit of
5	internal operating experience prior to the region
6	coming in and doing the inspection.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: May I ask the Staff, a
8	lot depends on the quality of these AMPs. Are you
9	going to review them by 2009 and give some kind of
10	feedback to the licensee as to how satisfactory they
11	are?
12	MS. LOUGHEED: My name is Patrician
13	Lougheed. I'm from the region.
14	We are our current program does not
15	require us to review them by 2009. It basically says
16	within a year of the period of extended operation. So
17	we'd be more looking probably early 2011 is when we
18	would be coming out
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But they will be
20	reviewed thoroughly before the period of extended
21	operations?
22	MS. LOUGHEED: That is our plan, yes.
23	That is required by our inspection procedure.
24	Additionally, because we have the
25	residents on site, programs that are put in place,

they would be monitored, not officially for license renewal, but by the residents.

MR. GRUMBIR: The flow in from here, any of these items where we do have commitments, clearly for these implementation activities, we track them in our commitment management system which is the same system that's utilized for any other licensee-type commitments. It's consistent with the NEI quidance that, the project's and then over and above implementation, in order to ensure that there's adequate turnover from the project into the line organization, we've taken some measures in that regard to ensure that that's smooth, such as the assignment of a license renewal program owner that will be within the engineering programs.

We've provided training along the way to the various program owners so that they could understand license renewal and provide us with input as we were going through developing either the application, the supporting material and then also during the inspections and audits.

We're also going to ensure that any of the activities that are performed by the site related to a license renewal commitment implementation are reviewed by that program owner. And then we're going

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 in and annotating, putting notes in procedures that say this procedure or this step in the procedure is an 2 3 important attribute that was considered during the 4 license renewal effort. 5 And in closing, I just want to say that the process provided us with a systematic opportunity 6 7 to refine our processes and programs, so that we make sure that we're covering the aging effects. 8 9 indicated, our internal goal for implementation is to 10 be much more aggressive than the commitment for 2014 and 2017. 11 adequately tracking 12 And those we're commitments in our commitment management system. 13 14 I believe that's all necessary in order for us to 15 demonstrate that we're committed to safely operating 16 the facility. 17 With that, any questions? MEMBER DENNING: Could you explain a 18 19 little bit more about the state of the PRA results 20 that led you to -- or at least were part of the 21 motivation to put in the other diesel generators? 22 MR. GRUMBIR: I can start and then I can 23 get Joel Gebbre to filter. 24 Part of the reasons we were looking at the 25 supplemental diesels was a number of items. The

1 severe accident mitigation alternatives that were 2 performed for license renewal identified that that was some cost beneficial 3 area where there was 4 modifications that could be made. And then in the 5 other arena we were looking at increasing our diesel, our main diesel reliability and part of that included 6 7 the ability to go in and conduct on-line maintenance 8 activities. I'll let Joel continue from there. 9 I'm Joel Gebbre from Indiana 10 MR. GEBBRE: Michigan Power. That's correct. The primary 11 12 motivation was to extend our diesel allowed outage time from 72 hours to 14 days and that does allow us 13 14 to do a significant amount of maintenance, on-line 15 maintenance which also allows us to reduce our outage risk when we take a diesel out of service during the 16 17 fueling outages. MEMBER DENNING: And with regards to 18 19 severe accident mitigation strategies, was that mostly 20 related to powering of the igniters in the station 21 blackout situation? 22 MR. GEBBRE: That was one of the items. 23 The other was the cooling supply to the reactor 24 coolant pump seals.

MEMBER BONACA:

25

Neither is the fans,

right?
MR. GRUMBIR: I'm not sure about the fans,
but the fans, but the igniters, definitely.
MR. GEBBRE: The igniters. The fans were
not included.
MEMBER BONACA: I don't understand how you
size this diesel, what was the criteria? I mean we
haven't heard yet the capacity of the diesels.
MR. GEBBRE: The diesels were sized so
that we could supply reactor coolant pump seal cooling
in the event of a station blackout scenario.
MEMBER BONACA: All right. Thank you.
MR. GRUMBIR: Any other questions? I'll
turn it back over to P.T.
DR. KUO: Thank you. Jonathan Rowley is
going to make the staff presentation.
MR. ROWLEY: Good morning. My name is
Jonathan Rowley. I'm the project manager, safety
project manager for the Donald C. Cook license renewal
application. I, along with other NRC staff, will
present the safety review findings and evaluations
documented in the Safety Evaluation Report.
The SER With Open Eyes was issued on

review of the D.C. Cook LRA through early November

At that time, there were two unresolved issues 1 2004. 2 and two issues that required confirmation. 3 Prior to the February ACR subcommittee 4 meeting, resolution of the four items had been reached 5 and resolution was discussed during that meeting. The following SER was issued May 29, 2005 6 7 documenting the resolution of the four items and the final position of the Staff for all items related to 8 9 the license renewal application. To provide a quick overview of the Staff 10 review, I'd like to begin with Section 2, Structures 11 12 and Components Subject to an AMR. System structures and components within a 13 14 scope of license renewal are subject to AMR have been 15 identified. The five listed components were brought 16 into scope as a result of the view of systems and 17 components subject to an AMR. 18 Next, please. 19 MEMBER BONACA: Just a question regarding 20 So first of all, you go through a process by this. 21 which you review these scoping and screening process? 22 MR. ROWLEY: Correct. 23 MEMBER BONACA: And then you make a 24 judgment that says yes, it's okay or no, it's not 25 okay.

1	Now as part of the judgment, if you
2	support the judgment, you then go in and see system by
3	system what is the result of that and whether
4	something has been missed and you find some open
5	items. Some components you should believe will be
6	missed, okay? So how do you go from that step to
7	concluding that all components now that are in scope
8	have been brought in scope?
9	MR. ROWLEY: Rau Hernandez, could you?
10	MR. HERNANDEZ: Hi, my name is Raul
11	Hernandez from Plus Systems. We went through every
12	section and we make sure that all the systems were
13	thoroughly reviewed. And we did an in-depth review
14	and we know that everything is within scope.
15	MEMBER BONACA: So I mean you make a
16	judgment that this is more of a minor oversight or
17	some disagreement on how the process should be applied
18	rather than being a problem with the scoping
19	MR. HERNANDEZ: It wasn't systematic.
20	Most of them were simply differently defining the
21	system not a system, but a small oversight.
22	MEMBER BONACA: That's what we would like
23	to hear.
24	MR. HERNANDEZ: It wasn't a systematic
25	problem. It was minor oversights.

1 MEMBER BONACA: Because you want to 2 conclude that the components have been identified? 3 MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. 4 MEMBER BONACA: Okay. 5 MEMBER DENNING: For example, here, like second bullet on emergency diesel generator 6 7 exhaust silencers. Is that on some standard list or did you look at that and say exhaust silencers have 8 9 some safety significance? MR. MARKS: Hi, I'm Cliff Marks, I'm 10 assisting ISL and I was performing a review in support 11 12 of the systems branch, particularly on the auxiliary systems and that was one of them. 13 14 Some of the background that I had was in 15 preparation with viewing other plants of the same 16 vintage and type for license renewal 17 preparation of license renewal in other activities. And using experience like that, probing questions were 18 19 asked in all the areas that you see up there, 20 including the exhaust silencers. And one of the 21 questions was could a failure of the exhaust silencers 22 affected the intended function of the diesels and 23 because of that line of questioning and probing we all agreed that that was one of them. That's the kind of 24

questioning we performed.

1	MEMBER BONACA: Okay, well, this is a good
2	example. So you identified that you need the silencer
3	in order to have diesel operating for an extended
4	period of time. You must have concluded that?
5	MR. MARKS: We need the silencer to
6	perform its intended function which was to transfer
7	the flow of exhaust gas unimpeded to the atmosphere.
8	MEMBER BONACA: And so why was it missed?
9	MR. MARKS: We didn't miss it.
10	MEMBER BONACA: No, no, no
11	(Laughter.)
12	MEMBER BONACA: Why was it missed by the
13	licensee. It's just an oversight or did they disagree
14	with your assessment?
15	MR. MARKS: The line of questioning was
16	that it should be that it does perform the intended
17	function and that we question that they agreed to it,
18	but that's the kind of in-depth probing questions
19	that we went through, each of the systems.
20	MEMBER DENNING: Could we just following
21	that one bit further and ask does the utility actually
22	agree that that was an oversight or is it just that it
23	was easier to give in?
24	(Laughter.)
25	MR. KALINOWSKI: My name is Bob
	I and the second

Kalinowski, tech lead for that renewal project. We
when we reviewed that, we did not totally agree. We
thought that if it would fail, it would fail open. In
other words, the nonsafety-related impact of the
safety function of these exhausts or silencers would
be that it could close off and go ahead and choke out
the exhaust. Items usually age. They go ahead and
fail or they'll go ahead and deteriorate which would
actually create an exhaust path. But when we looked
at it, we didn't feel that we had a strong enough
argument to go ahead an pursue that, so we went along
with the staff and agreed that that was the right
thing to do is to put the exhaust silencers in that
scope.
CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's funny that you just
have silencers. I would think the whole exhaust
piping system fulfills this function of getting rid of
the gases.
MR. HERNANDEZ: The rest of the piping was
within scope.
CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's strange that the
silencer wasn't then, wasn't it? Well, this isn't
really an important issue.
MR. HERNANDEZ: No, it's not.
CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's pursuing your way

1 of thinking about it, the operation. 2 MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. Because the conclusion is 3 MEMBER BONACA: 4 being made with the SER that all components in scope 5 have been identified. Now to make the conclusion really you have to agree with the approach chosen and 6 7 the process and also the application of it, looked to 8 see if it's consistent and acceptable. Okay. 9 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you. 10 MR. ROWLEY: Two open items were contained 11 in Sections 3, age and management review results. 12 first open item occurred in viewing the auxiliary system, then with the use of the system walkdown 13 14 program to manage aging effects of internal surfaces 15 of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) component types. The Staff's concern was that the visual 16 17 inspections performed by the system walkdown program or (a)(2) component, external surfaces, were not 18 19 representative of aging effects on the internal 20 The Applicant had not provided sufficient surfaces. 21 information to demonstrate the aging effects on an 22 internal surface would be effectively managed at the time to meet the ACRS rules for items of issuance 23 24 deadline, thus the open item.

Prior to the subcommittee meeting,

1 Applicant provided information to demonstrate that in 2 addition to system walkdown, aging effects on internal 3 surfaces would be effectively managed by a combination 4 of the four additional items listed. 5 MEMBER BONACA: And I agree with this I'm still puzzled on how system 6 issue resolution. 7 walkdown contributes to this at all, since you're 8 talking about internal surfaces, you're not going to 9 walkdown the system and look at it. You can't. 10 Ι agree that these four additional programs identified are adequate to manage aging of 11 12 internal surfaces. 13 MR. ROWLEY: Renee? 14 MS. LI: This is Renee Li. And as you see 15 from the slides, our main concern is that system walkdown program alone cannot, is not adequate to 16 detect the internal surface aging effects. 17 But the point I'm making 18 MEMBER BONACA: 19 is that the walkdown to me doesn't have anything to do 20 with managing the aging effects of internal surfaces. 21 I just don't understand how it has anything to do with 22 it. 23 It's nice, just do it. You do it for 24 other reasons, to look at maybe aging of external 25 surfaces.

1 MS. LI: Right, and that's why we asked 2 the REI and in response to our REI, it's okay. 3 going to have additional AMP and those are the ones 4 that the staff, except for managing the internal aging 5 effects. 6 MEMBER BONACA: Yes. I agree and I have 7 no issue with this except I'm still puzzled by how system walkdown is still a contributor to this issue 8 9 resolution, to the --10 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: It's defense-in-If you spot the water on the floor during the 11 depth. 12 system walkdown, you've --(Laughter.) 13 14 DR. KUO: How it was missed, that's 15 basically what we're talking about. MEMBER BONACA: We're looking at actual 16 17 leakage. That's really a stretch. All right, let's 18 go ahead. 19 MR. ROWLEY: The second open item dealt 20 with the flow-acceleration corrosion program. The 21 flow-acceleration corrosion program was stated as 22 consistent with GALL in the license 23 In November 2003, Region 3 AMP application. 24 inspection revealed that it was consistent, but with

one exception. The monitoring and turning element of

1 CALL requires an examination of the detected wall 2 thickness degradation is less than the 3 predicted, but GALL relates to the minimum allowable 4 wall thickness. 5 Cook's FAC program was based on a measure of predicted wall thickness reaching a threshold 6 7 criteria. Sampling expansion was increased when detected or predicted where results in wall thickness 8 9 of less than or equal to 60 percent of nominal wall 10 thickness. The Applicant was requested to indicate 11 12 that the 60 percent nominal wall thickness criteria is an exception to GALL and provide justification to 13 14 ensure that the nominal wall -- the minimum allowable 15 wall thickness is maintained in a period of extended 16 operation. Staff found 17 The exception and justification in Applicant's response to the overall 18 19 items acceptable and thus the issue was resolved. 20 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Can you explain to 21 me how that was resolved again? It indicates that 22 your predictions are off. Now do you go back and 23 somehow check at every location? 24 You make some maximum change 25 prediction and you're still okay?

1 MR. ROWLEY: Greg? 2 MR. CRANSTON: Hi, this is Greg Cranston. 3 I was the audit team leader. 4 What our concern was or what their concern 5 was in conjunction with using predictive values is you could have a very small difference between what you 6 7 predicted and what actually happened and they would have to increase their sample size and it wasn't 8 9 anywhere near close to being at that nominal wall. They did take the information and trended 10 11 it forward as far as finding out what they actually 12 are comparing it to, how close they're a nominal wall. And if the trend shows that they might approach that 13 14 particular threshold before the next inspection, then 15 they will increase the sample size in the vicinity, 16 determine what the cause is and do that type of 17 investigation. So that was really what the change was. 18 19 The concern was if you took the words literally, you 20 could be well above nominal wall, but just because your prediction was slightly off, you have to increase 21 22 your sample size and do a lot of extra work that 23 wasn't going to gain you any information. 24 So that's basically what the exception was 25 that we accepted.

1	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Are you going to
2	change GALL?
3	MR. CRANSTON: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You could even have a
5	new pipe which had a wall thickness less than
6	predicted?
7	MR. CRANSTON: Yes.
8	(Laughter.)
9	MR. ROWLEY: While verifying the adequacy
10	of the AMPs in preparation of the final SER, Staff
11	identified additional information that was needed to
12	meet GALL recommendations for one of the AMPs. Cook
13	service water system reliability program did not
14	include a hardness test measurement when checking for
15	selective leaking.
16	The Applicant committed to enhance the
17	program to include hardness testing or an equivalent
18	physical test.
19	Concern has recently been raised about
20	aging management of various components. Cook's buried
21	pipe and inspection program is a new program that is
22	credited for managing the loss of material for various
23	carbon steel piping intent.
24	In recent years, most of the excavations
25	have been conducted of underground piping including

carbon steel, fire protection water and station drain 1 2 water piping. More excavations are expected prior to 3 4 entering the period of extended operation and the 5 license has committed to enhance the various programs to require an inspection of in-scope varied piping 6 7 within 10 years of entering a period of extended operations, unless an opportunistic inspection has 8 9 occurred within that first 10-year period. 10 MEMBER BONACA: Could you tell us a little bit about the multiple excavations, February 2001 and 11 12 2003 and what those found? 13 MR. ROWLEY: Yes. 14 MEMBER BONACA: What prompted them and 15 what was found? This is Patricia Lougheed 16 MS. LOUGHEED: 17 again. We looked at that during the inspection, specifically. As far as I -- my memory of what we 18 19 looked at, I believe that all the inspections were 20 caused by valves that were not operating properly. 21 Only one case was there any sort of leakage involved. 22 It was not the piping itself, it was more valve 23 problems that caused the utility to go in and take a 24 look at -- replace the valves and as they did that, 25 they looked at the buried piping that was associated

	40
1	with it.
2	MR. KALINOWSKI: This is Bob Kalinowski
3	again. She is correct. It was usually on account or
4	a valve packing leak and not account of any sort of a
5	pipe leak, so we'd go in, pull that out and replace
6	the packing for the valve, replace. There was no
7	outside deterioration on the valve or the pipe.
8	MR. ROWLEY: The Applicant has
9	demonstrated the below-grade soil and water
10	environment is not aggressive. This table contains
11	the pH, chloride and sulfate values for wells in the
12	years 1976 and 2000. The values are far below the
13	limits.
14	Section 4 of the SER addresses the Time-
15	Limited Aging Analyses, TLAA. One of the fatigue
16	parameters evaluated upper shelf energy for the
17	limiting beltline material. The Staff confirmed that
18	Applicant's upper shelf energy values calculated at 48
19	with respect to full power years. Staff's
20	calculations are given in the table for you.
21	And Cook's values were 57 and 66,
22	respectively.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This sulfate. You just
24	have two samples, six years apart, no 26 years apart.

Does sulfate fluctuate significantly from

1	year to year?
2	MR. ROWLEY: I'd have to ask Thomas Cheng
3	to address that question.
4	MR. CHENG: This is Tom Cheng with EMEB.
5	Could you please repeat your question because I sat in
6	the back and I can't hear.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, as you see, there
8	are two samples here which are 26 years apart and it
9	seems to me that sulfates might fluctuate and
10	certainly there's a difference in these values, from
11	year to year. So where do the sulfates come from?
12	They come from sulfur dioxide from coal burning or
13	something or from where do they come from?
14	MR. CHENG: Where it comes from I'm not
15	too sure.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Does it fluctuate from
17	year to year and what's your experience with sulfates?
18	MR. CHENG: I just said where it comes
19	from, I personally I really don't know.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are two samples, 26
21	years apart sufficient in view of the likely
22	fluctuations from year to year?
23	MR. CHENG: There are four on-site wells,
24	based on the discharge permit requirement. They can
25	monitor the water quality quarterly, every three
J	I and the second

1	months.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Does that sulfate
3	concentration fluctuate significantly?
4	MR. CHENG: No, based on your monitoring
5	results. It didn't show any but this is the only
6	one
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Any fluctuation at all?
8	Absolutely constant?
9	MR. CHENG: It's not absolutely, they
10	fluctuate.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it's not a
12	significant fluctuation?
13	MR. CHENG: Yes.
14	MR. KALINOWSKI: This is Bob Kalinowski
15	again. Also, we do take more samples. Those are not
16	the only two taken. I believe we do sample that water
17	every year for EPA requirements.
18	MR. ROWLEY: Another fatigue parameter
19	evaluated was the rapid temperature pressurized
20	thermal shock. Staff confirmed the Applicant's
21	pressurized thermal shock values calculated for EFPY.
22	Staff's calculations are given in the table and both
23	the Staff and Cook's numbers were identical.
24	Next.
25	The two components or items were found in

43 Section 4. Updated final safety analysis report to include commitments to evaluate component fatigue analysis. The Applicant provided the updated SER supplement discussion, performed additional actions to address fatigue. That resolved those two issues. In conclusion, actions have been taken and identified or will be taken so that there

is reasonable assurance that activities will continue to be productive in a renewal term in accordance with the current licensing basis. The Applicant has met the requirements of license renewals required by 10 CFR 54.29(a).

Are there any questions?

MEMBER BONACA: Well, part of the inspection reports had documented that walkdowns that were supposed to be part of the system walkdown program were not conducted quarterly as stated. Also, there were some issues to do with the inspections.

> MR. ROWLEY: Yes.

BONACA: And they had been MEMBER performed. What's the conclusion of the Staff from I mean these programs for license this perspective? developed for renewal need to be those implemented properly. And do you still feel comfortable with the implementation of these programs?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 MS. LOUGHEED: I feel that -- first of 2 all, not all of the aging management programs have 3 been put in place. Okay, so I can't speak -- if they 4 meet their commitments and we have no reason to 5 believe that they wouldn't, then we are comfortable 6 with. 7 MEMBER BONACA: Not all of them are in 8 place, only two are in place. MS. LOUGHEED: Right, and we will look at 9 10 them. There are actions which were not performed. 11 so the question is when you do the final And 12 inspections prior to entering the period of extended operation, are you looking for these kinds of insights 13 14 whether the licensee is following all the on 15 commitments which are new, in part, they're new. MS. LOUGHEED: That is one of the things 16 17 that we are planning in terms of doing these actual inspections right before license renewal. 18 19 I would like to say going back on the 20 missed walkdown and the missed surveillance, one of the things that we did look at in terms of how 21 22 significant these issues were, we found that the 23 number of surveillance that have been missed have gone 24 down dramatically over the last few years, especially

more utilities transfer over to

as

more

and

computerized systems.

Back when this one surveillance was missed, it was being tracked manually. It was a 5-year surveillance. Now we're not seeing that problem any more.

In regard to the system walkdowns, we overall had a concern with the adequacy of the system walkdown program and as a result of that concern the Applicant made a number of additional commitments to enhance the program.

It is an on-going program and the resident inspectors follow that up on a routine basis. While I can't, of course, promise that it will never be missed, I don't believe that it would be routinely missed.

DR. KUO: If I may also say just that the regional inspectors will perform the inspections before the plant enters into the periods of operation according to the inspection procedure, 71003. And a list of the commitments that is contained in the FSAR supplement will be attached to this inspection procedure so that -- at that time, inspectors will be able to see what are the commitments that are made by the Applicant and followed, basically perform the inspection according to the commitment list.

MEMBER BONACA: This Committee has expressed a number of times concerns -- maybe not concerns, but raised questions regarding what we have called in the past by way of commitments and the ability of the regions to carry out these inspections. In part, we're asking these questions because we don't have a full appreciation of how many people are going to be there, what effort is going to be done, the process by which you're going to do that.

I think it would be good if you gave us a sense, as we approach the first plant entering into license renewal. Could you give us a sense of what the effort would consist of, what kind of resources are you going to use, what kind of people? I think that would put to rest a number of questions that we keep raising regarding commitments.

MS. LOUGHEED: And to be honest, sir, I'm not sure that we've thought quite that far ahead. I believe that the first plant that comes due is Ginna in Region 1. That's followed by Dresden and Quad Cities which are in my region, Region 3. I know it is one of my tasks in the upcoming year to start planning how we will accomplish those inspections and what activities will be needed to be done and how many people will be needed and what types of people will be

1	needed.
2	MEMBER BONACA: It seems to me one thing
3	you'll have to do is verify that whatever program they
4	develop is consistent with the commitments they made
5	to you.
6	MS. LOUGHEED: Absolutely.
7	MEMBER BONACA: The SER is descriptive of
8	the FSAR update.
9	MS. LOUGHEED: We anticipate that this
10	could be a very difficult inspection, yes.
11	And as I said, that's one of my tasks is
12	to make sure that it's developed, at least for our
13	region, because we have a number of plants coming up
14	in 2009, 2010 to make sure that the commitments are
15	reviewed and that they are adequately implemented.
16	And I wish I could tell you that we'd
17	already done it, but not yet.
18	MR. ROWLEY: Questions?
19	DR. KUO: If there's no further questions,
20	Dr. Wallis, this concludes the Staff's presentation.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you very much.
22	MEMBER DENNING: I have a question that's
23	really more for the Applicant than for the Staff and
24	the first of those questions is instrumentation and
25	control system upgrades that might be expected over

1 the near term and then into the period of extended 2 operation, I see that there is a digital turbine 3 control system. 4 What else is going to happen in the future 5 as you look forward on the I & C systems? MR. FADEL: Hi, I'm Dan Fadel, engineering 6 7 vice president for American Electric Power. 8 What our plans are, we do have a long-9 range plan taking us out through the end of the 10 extended license period and in that long-range plan, right now, a lot of things are in it that we are still 11 12 Besides digital speculating on to some extent. upgrades, we are looking at potential power uprates. 13 14 We're also looking at long-term effects of 15 degradation, so we'll be watching primarily systems for the balance of plant. Those are the areas 16 17 where we expect to see the most need. Also, in control room upgrades and so on and so there is a 18 19 comprehensive plan that again takes us out through the 20 end of the extended life. 21 MEMBER DENNING: I have a similar question 22 about the PRA and I'm not sure who is there that would 23 feel comfortable in responding to me, but starting 24 off, I wanted to just get a feeling for the core

damage frequency and the LERF, in particular, but I

1	was also wondering just what's going to happen to that
2	PRA? What is its status? Do you have a fire PRA?
3	Will you have a fire PRA? I mean, we're in a period
4	of expanded use of PRA in the regulatory spaces.
5	MR. FADEL: I'll let Joel answer.
6	MR. GEBBRE: Joel Gebbre, Indiana Michigar
7	Power.
8	Our current core damage frequency for our
9	PRA is $4.28e^{-5}$. In our large early release frequency,
10	it's $6.89e^{-6}$. As far as our fire PRA goes, we did an
11	analysis in accordance with the IEEE guidance in 1995.
12	It was estimated to be 3.76e $^{-6}$. Right now, we are
13	doing some analysis for our diesel AOU. That's in
14	progress right now, as far as the fire PRA goes. We
15	also anticipate doing a full fire PRA in the future.
16	MEMBER DENNING: Thanks.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Now your license
18	renewal environmental impact statement says it's 5
19	times 10^{-5} for the CDF internal events. Is the 4.2 an
20	update?
21	MR. GEBBRE: I'm sorry, could you repeat
22	the question, please?
23	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: The license renewal
24	impact statement gives a CDF of 5 times 10^{-5} for
25	internal events And you said it was 4 28

1 MR. GEBBRE: Right, and we are 2 continuously updating that model. In fact, our latest update was in April of this year, so it's likely been 3 4 updated since then. 5 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Does it improve in model changes or because something real has changed? 6 7 MR. GEBBRE: There are both. There are 8 model changes. We're going down, top down logic 9 remodeling and then also we update equipment in the 10 incorporate design changes that efficiency and safety. That also improves our core 11 12 damage frequency. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Do you consistently try 13 14 to do this? Do you try to upgrade your plants so that 15 the CDF is lower? What about sources of -- biggest contributors and see what you can do to lower them? 16 17 MR. GEBBRE: Yes, and in fact, the supplemental diesels that we're talking about, so we 18 19 can extend our diesel allowed outage time, that was 20 because our diesels are our second largest contributor 21 to core damage frequency at the station. And as Dan 22 Fadel mentioned, our long-term plan, we are looking at 23 long-term upgrades to a lot of those systems that are 24 major contributors to our core damage frequency. 25 MEMBER BONACA: So the additional diesels

1 must have made a significant difference? 2 GEBBRE: Yes, they offset the MR. additional 3 time that we're allowed to take the 4 emergency generator diesel generators out of service. 5 MEMBER POWERS: Could I just ask? you know that that was the significant change? 6 7 you quoted a point value to me. I presume there's 8 some uncertainty to it and you compared it to another 9 point value with some uncertainty? I mean maybe the two were the same numbers within the uncertainty? 10 MR. GEBBRE: Right, we basically looked at 11 12 our base core damage frequency with the existing 72hour allowed outage time for the emergency diesel 13 14 generators and then we'd done the analysis with the 15 supplemental diesels in the 14-day allowed outage time to show there is no corresponding increase in core 16 17 damage frequency. 18 So it didn't change MEMBER POWERS: 19 anything at all? 20 The numbers have changed MR. GEBBRE: 21 slightly. I do not have the latest numbers with me, 22 but basically in the submittal for the license renewal 23 request, we've showed basically negligible impact on 24 core damage frequency or large early release frequency 25 as a result of this increase to the allowed outage

1	time and in addition to the supplemental diesel
2	generators.
3	MEMBER POWERS: So it had no impact at
4	all?
5	MR. GEBBRE: For the most part.
6	MEMBER POWERS: It allowed you to take
7	longer outage times?
8	MR. GEBBRE: That's correct.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Anything else?
10	MEMBER BONACA: Any additional questions
11	from Members, from the public?
12	None. I mean we are well ahead of time
13	and if there are no further questions, I want to thank
14	the Staff and the license for the their presentations
15	and I'll turn the meeting back to you.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you. I think we
17	have set a record in the shortest time that it takes
18	to review a final NCR license renewal.
19	I'd like to say this was part of our
20	continuing efforts to improve our efficiency, but I'm
21	not sure that we can get credit. The Staff and the
22	license get the credit.
23	We're not allowed to start the rest of the
24	meeting early, so we're going to have to take a break
25	until 10:15. We can then make use of that time to

1 prepare for other things we're going to do in the next 2 few days. So we will take a break until 10:15. 3 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 4 the record at 9:29 a.m. and went back on the record at 5 10:14 a.m.) CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Come back into session. 6 7 The next item on the agenda is the final safety 8 evaluation report on North Anna Early Site Permit 9 The wise and knowledgeable Dr. Powers Application. will conduct this part of our deliberations. 10 Well, the wise and 11 MEMBER POWERS: 12 knowledgeable Dr. Powers may be dim and stupid today because of a late arrival into Washington, a very late 13 14 arrival into Washington last night. 15 We're going to talk about early site permits, and particularly for North Anna. 16 committee has had a chance to hear about this in the 17 The subcommittee has talked about it. 18 19 now going from a preliminary stage to a final stage, 20 so we're approaching finalizing this. We're going to 21 hear both from the applicant and the staff on this 22 We have written an interim letter specifically 23 on the SER, though I think some of our comments may 24 have filtered down to the application, or be pertinent

to the application itself. There were at the time of

our interim review a few outstanding items, open items to be resolved. And I'm sure that the applicant will tell us what the status of those are, and the resolution. To the extent that he is familiar with and can comment on our interim letter and its comments, I would appreciate that.

Well, with that, unless any of the members have comments they'd like to make at the beginning of this, our intention is to write a letter at the conclusion of these briefings. Seeing no comments, I'll turn it to Mr. Grecheck to present for Dominion.

Good morning. MR. GRECHECK: I'm Gene Grecheck, Vice President of Nuclear Support Services for Dominion, and it is our pleasure to be here for this second meeting with the ACRS on the North Anna ESP Application. We do have a number of people here to support me today, and I just want to point out a few of them. Marvin Smith over here at the table is the project manager for the ESP project, and has been working on the project since it commenced. And out in the audience we have two other members of our ESP team, Joe Hegner and Tony Banks who have been working on the process from the origination of the application all through the review. And also Steve Ralph from Bechtel is here who will also be able to support us if

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

we get into some extremely technical discussion.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

What we're going to do today is refresh your memory on some of the things we covered during the last meeting in March, just to remind you where the North Anna site is, and some of the site features, and then go through some of the resolution of the open items and where we stand today.

So the first slide, again, why did we go though this process. As you know, this is the first application to go through the process, and there's three applications that are running pretty much concurrently. The reason that we started this back in 2001 actually, when we started writing the application, where as you see up here it was to determine the suitability of the site, try to resolve any siting issues early, but most importantly to defer our technology decision until it became time to do that, justified by the business case. If you think back at how quickly things have been moving in the new nuclear era over the last several years, where the things we thought we knew about various new reactor and new technologies four years ago is designs, entirely different from what we currently think we know. So therefore, I think that part of the process has been successful. It has allowed us to engage with

1 the NRC to work through siting issues without having 2 to narrow down a selection of technology at this 3 point. 4 MEMBER POWERS: And that was -- I mean, 5 that's the way the regulation has been written. facilitate exactly that sort of thing. 6 And so it 7 works. 8 GRECHECK: So to that extent the 9 process has worked. Of course we're testing the 10 regulatory process. There had been no previous early site permit applications, so we needed to be able to 11 12 actually do this to understand how it worked, and of course to keep the nuclear option open as we were 13 14 trying to make a business case. 15 MEMBER POWERS: I keep looking at that 16 word "test" the regulatory process. And is there some message here? You didn't believe this was actually 17 18 going to work? 19 MR. GRECHECK: I think that the first time 20 you do anything there is certainly -- and there's 21 certainly some hesitation as to how the process is 22 But having said that, and having now going to work. 23 been through it to this point, I think we've all 24 learned something too. And I think both the staff and

the various applicants have acknowledged that for the

next series, if we were going to do it again there would be things we would do differently, and I'll talk about a few of those as we proceed through this application. So there is a certain amount of testing that's going on.

MEMBER POWERS: I'll remind you that we are thinking that sometime this fall we might get together and do a lessons learned on this. We certainly would invite you to participate in that, either in person, or in writing, or in any mechanism that you would like to note on the email, whichever way it is, because I think we'd like to capture some of these lessons learned. I mean, the idea is to have an efficient and effective process here.

MR. GRECHECK: And we would be very interested in participating in that. All right. The North Anna power station site, or the ESP site, again, was originally designed as a 4-unit site. Two units were built. Two units had construction permits issued during the 1970s. Construction had actually commenced on Units 3 and 4, and then was canceled. And in the years after that cancellation, the construction work that had taken place was demolished.

The next is a picture of the site. On the right-hand side you see Units 1 and 2. Those are the

1	operating Westinghouse 3-loop PWRs. Immediately to
2	the left of the operating units you see a hole in the
3	ground. That hole in the ground represented the area
4	where the Unit 3 and 4 containment structures were
5	actually under construction at one time. And that is
6	the beginning of the ESP site. But if you look at the
7	diagrams on the next several slides, you can see that
8	the ESP site is significantly larger than just that
9	area. It extends significantly off to the left.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Would you point to
11	it?
12	MR. GRECHECK: Right in here is the Unit
13	3 and 4 containment area. But the ESP site runs way
14	out to here. And you'll see that on the next diagram.
15	But it runs significantly off to the side.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Big enough for 12 modules.
18	MR. GRECHECK: Yes.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Modules, George.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I know.
21	MEMBER POWERS: Little toy reactors.
22	MR. GRECHECK: Right. Included in the
23	plant parameter envelope are the PVMR and the General
24	Atomics GTMHR. So yes, there could be many modules,
25	actually up to 16 I think. Yes, up to 16 PVMR

modules.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

All right. Then the next slide that's out of the application shows a 50-mile radius around the The lake is right in the middle. That's where the plant is. You can see some of the major geographical areas. See that Richmond is about 45 miles off to the southeast. See Charlottesville maybe 40 miles or so to the west. And coming up this way toward the Washington area you can see that Manassas is just outside the 50-mile radius of the plant. area is essentially quite rural. Since the lake was built it has become somewhat of a vacation or second home area, but it is still predominantly rural. major population centers, and no industry to speak of.

Next is a picture of the site itself. It shows the site boundary. This would be the plant boundary, or the exclusion zone, with a 5,000-mile radius around the plant. And in that cross-hatched area, this cross-hatched area right here represents the ESP site which was part of the application.

Just to bring you up to speed on the overall schedule of how we got here. You can see we submitted the application back in September of 2003. We've made four revisions to the application as the review went forward. The last of those was back in

May. That was the final revision that took into account all of the open items that we discussed during the meeting with you back in March. And back in June a few weeks ago the NRC staff did issue the final safety evaluation report.

All right. If we go to the next slide, you can see where we've come since the last time we met with you. The draft SER that the staff issued in December had a number of permit conditions, had a number of proposed action items that would be carried over into the COL phase. And then 28 open items that represented issues that needed to we come to resolution with. At the time as I recall when I sat here at that time, I was indicating that we were going to submit our response to all but one of those items the next day, I believe it was we were indicating, There was one seismic-related item which we did. which took a couple of more weeks to submit, but all of that did come in on time.

So if you look on the right-hand side, this is where the final SER stands. There are eight proposed permit conditions which the staff will discuss with you. I will not go through those in detail with you. There are 30 items which have been deferred into COL space. And these are primarily

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

items which cannot be addressed now because they depend on design detail, and therefore they are simply flagged that at the time we do come in with a COL those will be items that will have to be discussed then. And then you can see that all of the items have been satisfactorily closed.

If you had a chance to read the final safety evaluation report, I'm sure you've read the staff's evaluation of each of these items. And I was not proposing to go through those in detail here, although if you have any questions about them we can. The vast majority of them, everything on this slide were items that we characterized simply as the staff requiring additional information. There was no particular dispute or open issue. It was simply that additional information was required. So for each of these we provided that information in that letter that was submitted the day after we met with you, and that -- the staff was able to complete their review.

There were a few which I'll bring out that were a little bit different and represented some discussion. The first of those had to do with the exclusion area. And what makes this one interesting is the present environment of how power companies have evolved since perhaps the first generation of plants

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

were built. We have generation deregulation in
Virginia. The existing plants are owned by a
subsidiary of Dominion called Virginia Electric &
Power Company, or Virginia Power. That is still
technically within the regulated portion of the
utility business. The entity of the company that is
doing the development of any potential new reactors is
on the deregulated side of the company. Those are
both subsidiaries of Dominion Resources, but they are
separate legal entities, and therefore in a purely
legal sense Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC, which is
the applicant for this site, does not currently have
any property rights over this site. Now, clearly we
will be able to deal with that at the appropriate
time, but at the time of this application, DNNA as an
entity does not have those controls. So clearly as a
legal matter before DNNA would be authorized under an
ESP to do any limited LWA work at the site, we would
not to have legal authority to do that. We would need
to have legal authority to perform site redress and
such things. And certainly those things will happen
prior to any of that work happening.

There was another question during the open items to that talked about minimum distances. If you recall we talked about that during the meeting, and

that was was it necessary in ESP space to put into
effect any kind of limitations as to how close to the
operating units could you get as part of the
construction process. And what led to that is that
the circulating water tunnels that were built as part
of the Unit 3 and 4 construction at the moment at
least we are still hoping to be able to use those
tunnels as part of any future construction here.
Those tunnels should be in good shape. They should
certainly be capable of handling the flow rates that
we would be expecting from new units. So as part of
the site investigation that would go into preparation
to submit a COL we are going to be doing some
investigation of those tunnels. If we have to do
refurbishment, or repair of those tunnels, those
tunnels do run through the Unit 1 and 2 sites. So
there was some question about what kind of limitations
need to be put in place. We have agreed with the
staff that there are sufficient processes in place for
the operating plants to be able to control any such
thing. So before we can make modifications to the
Unit 1 and 2 site, then clearly under the licensing
processes that govern operating reactors, whether it's
10 C.F.R. 50.59 or any review processes there. We
still need to be in accordance with the operating

licenses, and we will be. So it's not necessary to put ESP restrictions over activities that are not going to be taking place on the ESP site, but would be taking place on the operating site.

There was some question about what the minimum lake water temperature would be, and that has been resolved by defining the site characteristics. So that site characteristic will move forward with the application as one of the items that needs to be considered as part of the design process. also question about the absorption/retention coefficient of the soil. And that had to do with whether that needed to be specifically measured by tests at the site, or could be done through an empirical process. And again, we were not in a position to be able to do actual testing since we are not yet -- have not defined a precise location at this -- in this ESP boundary as to where these units would So it would be difficult to do specific be built. testing for specific soil. So that has been resolved by a proposed ESP license condition that would say that any plant built here needs to be able to prevent spillage of liquid radioactive material.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You mean the soil varies so much over this site that you can't just take a few

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

samples?

MR. GRECHECK: It -- You have to test the specific soil in the specific location. There's not a tremendous variation, but there is difference between weathered rock, and soil, and exactly what is in each location, and it would have to be verified. So rather than, again, trying to get into some extensive hypothetical perspective, we just agreed to a design condition on any future use.

The next one I brought up simply as an example of the kinds of things that were brought up during the staff's review that are important, but again cannot be determined at an ESP stage. And that had to do with the design of the ultimate heat sink. This is a design-related issue, and has to be clearly dealt with at COL time, but cannot be dealt with at this point. So, again, it was just deferred as a COL action item. And there was, again, some seismic issues in terms of --

MEMBER POWERS: That's not necessarily generically true. It just happens to be true for the way you want to do things.

MR. GRECHECK: It is. The kind of thing
-- generically the issue is what is the level of
design detail that you have at this phase. And in

some cases you can -- if it's site-related you can define that somewhat specifically. But if you're talking about what a structure's going to look like, or what a particular -- in this case it was uplift, and uplift again is going to depend on location, and without having the location specifically specified it's very difficult to do those kinds of analyses.

MEMBER POWERS: Yes. Those pieces that get near the boundary, the ones that are going to have to be decided on an individual applicant's case. It's one of those things it would be very hard to write something down firm and fast. But you instantly recognize them when you see them, I think. I mean, I don't know how you write a review process that specifies them, but I sure know them when I see them. And so it's an agreement, you've reach an agreement, great.

MR. GRECHECK: And finally in emergency facilities we had a lot of discussion during the last meeting. As a matter of fact, you mentioned that during the -- or you mentioned that in your letter to the NRC. I think this is clearly one of the areas where some lessons have been learned, because we think, and I think the staff agrees that we got into some unintended review processes here. But in this

case we actually had to withdraw part of the application because it had to do with major features, and this major feature specifically was the design and capability of the emergency facilities. And again, it's very difficult to specify what the LUF or the TSC is going to look like when you don't know yet what the plant is. So we withdrew that portion, and basically just said we're not asking for approval for that piece of the major features.

MEMBER POWERS: And the staff has indicated that they, (a), think that maybe they need to rework their review guidance. Because, I mean the problem is that major feature is not defined. And at least when you look through -- you look at the regulation itself, I think the authors of the regulation were looking at a very high-level kind of thing, and you have a tendency to go to too low a level here it seems to me. I think that's what gets us in trouble.

MR. GRECHECK: Our expectation certainly when we entered into this process that since we were dealing with a proposed site that would be clearly covered under the features of the existing emergency plan for two operating units, an emergency plan that has been in place now for many, many years, that it

should not have been a very complex process to conclude that that plan would be adequate for additional units. And I think ultimately that proved to be the case. But the process of getting there was probably more difficult than it needed to be.

Some accomplishments of this whole process is that we've established some boundaries for any future COL applications here. For example, we have defined a number of site characteristics. site characteristics have been agreed to, these were characteristics we proposed. The staff has reviewed The staff has agreed with those. means that these become inputs into any future design, or an application for a plant to be located here. anything that was going to be proposed here will have take into account the agreed-upon site to characteristics.

Those characteristics have been defined as things like what is the low population zone, and what is the exclusion area boundary. There are some definitions of what the relevant site meteorologic items are, and then of course the hydrology, and geology, and seismology, to the extent that they affect design decisions, have been defined now as fixed characteristics.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MEMBER POWERS: I went through a couple of I mean, I think these are important points. You define these characteristics, and they become boundary conditions for the subsequent design of a plant if somebody decides they should build a plant And these characteristics get fixed by this So when you go through, and you look, and you define these site boundaries, and you define the population, you also look into the future and say is there any reason to think that this is going to change very radically. And you actually put some numbers in and some projections. And some of them even actually move down, which it's always remarkable when that happens. But I mean, you do look at the applicability of your population data.

MR. GRECHECK: We do.

MEMBER POWERS: Now we come to the site meteorology. And what you do there, as I think I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you look at the historical meteorology, and you define some limiting conditions, and you do that fairly conservatively. I mean, you find 100-year values and say they're 50-year values, and things like that. And you say, okay, what I've seen in meteorology in the past is what I'm going to see in the future. Why is

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

that a legitimate thing to do? When I look at your population you don't do that in the population area, but you do do that in the meteorology area.

I think the major reason is MR. GRECHECK: that there is a certain methodology to predicting population changes. You know, you have some ability, and of course it's not exact, but there is some ability to project economic trends, and development is occurring, and what kind of development is occurring, whether it is high-intensity or lowintensity, what that's going to look like. And then within some accepted boundaries you could make some Even though I think there is certainly projections. a lot of discussion, and a lot of work going on about climate change items, there is at this point certainly at a locational basis perhaps you can draw some conclusions overall for global climate or something, but at a locational basis, the methodology for making some kind of prediction about what's going to be occurring at a particular site is relatively limited.

So what you do is you say I'm looking at extremes. The extremes are defined in the current regulations and reg guides as looking at these 100-year recurrences and things, and you say that these are so unusual anyway, this does not represent typical

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

climate conditions. This represents extremes. And
these extremes probably, to the limit of our ability
to predict, probably bound whatever is going to
happen. But then on top of that you have to look at
the specific site, and recognize that the North Anna
site is not in any stretch of the imagination at any
meteorological extreme as far as what you would
expect, say, in the United States. It does not
represent particularly high wind speeds. It does not
represent particularly cold weather, or hot weather,
or heavy rain, or drought conditions, or any of the
various extremes that you would define around the
typical design. And recognizing that any plant that
you would build here would be built or designed by its
manufacturer to be able to be built at just about any
location within the country. They are going to be
building it to a set of conditions that are clearly
much more extreme than anything we're going to see
here. So we do our best historical reviews to be able
to identify what those conditions are. We recognize
that even with those 100-year returns we're talking
about limits that are clearly bounded by other sites
in the U.S., and then we say that from a design
standpoint that's really not going to be an issue.
Now, I'll agree with the staff. I know

б

that in their letter that they wrote back in response your previous question, they're saying whatever does happen should happen over a lengthy period of time. So if the trends indicate that something needs to change, there's going to be plenty of time to be able to change those. But I think that right now from an overall assurance of standpoint, the issue would be mostly that anything that gets built here is going to be designed to meteorological conditions that far exceed anything we would expect to see at the site.

MEMBER SIEBER: I think it's fair to say, too, that when the plant is built and licensed to operate, you will have tech specs, and restrictions on water temperature and so forth that will be do-not-exceed, and in the event that Lake Anna temperatures rise above that, then you may not be able to go to full power.

MR. GRECHECK: To the extent that we'd be using the lake for safety-related cooling. Right now our expectation is that we would not be, but yes, in principle you're correct.

MEMBER POWERS: I actually like your answer. I mean, I don't know that you could give any other answer. I did -- I'll share with you my

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

experience. I received the staff's response, and
didn't particularly care for it, so I went looking.
And I went to the Journal of Climate bulletin in the
American Meteorological Society, and I just pulled out
random issues. And what I found was in the most
recent issue of the Journal of Climate were three
articles on long-range weather forecasting in local
areas, local areas being defined fairly big areas, but
the Eastern Seaboard of the United States is certainly
not one of them. And there are in fact cycles of
climate, driven by what's called the El Nino southern
oscillation. Occurs over years. And a cycle of
shorter duration. And at least some authors think
that these cycles are now coinciding with each other,
so we're getting peaks in both, and so they actually
predict with probably no more accuracy than your
population predictors, you know, some increase. And
what they disagree with is, for instance, in the area
of hurricanes, you know some say that, okay, we're
going to have more hurricanes, but they're going to be
milder ones. And other ones say we're going to have
more hurricanes and they're going to be worse ones.
It's interesting stuff.
There is my point being that there is

probably as much technology for predicting long-range

forecasting as there is for your population stuff, and we just don't do it. And in your case I would have given the answer that you gave, and it's justifiable, don't get me wrong. I'm not faulting you the least bit in what you've said here. It just surprises me that we do that in the face of a fairly formidable, that impressed me, literature base that says things are changing.

And I agree with Mr. Sieber that, yes, I'm not sure that this has a big safety impact, because we'll put the tech specs on that'll control things, and we'll be in good shape here. But we are in the business of characterizing the site, and we ought to try and do as good a job as we can. I am reminded, one of the things that I very much learned on this committee, when Professor Wallis came onto it he took the view that it's the academic community that in some sense reflects the public interest in these highly detailed discussions. That academic community is going to be looking at this literature that we find in the technical journals on climatology, and when they don't see it showing up in our thinking here, I'm not sure what kind of impact we're having. It's just an interesting concern right now. For the purposes of our discussion, it's an interesting concern.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

have more to say to the staff on the subject.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. GRECHECK: Okay. Moving on to the next slide. Similar to site characteristics, we've also defined plant parameter values. And again, to refresh those of you that don't remember how this happened, although we got into a small bit of that discussion. We picked eight different designs at the beginning of this process that was just about anything that anybody was proposing back at the time that we started writing the application, did an extensive listing of plant parameters from all of those various designs, and then attempted to create a bounding envelope that would encompass all of them. a comment on a later slide that I think that's another one of those lessons learned is that we didn't really know what was important and what wasn't when we were dealing with literally hundreds of these design And I do think we do understand that process issues. a little bit better now. But having said that, we've gone through the review process, and various plant parameter envelope values have been chosen as being relevant by the staff as part of their review, and those are being defined in the ESP as being bounding. So at COL stage it'll be necessary to demonstrate that

whatever technology is actually proposed for this site

fits within those boundaries or would be subject to further review.

And finally, we do want to take the opportunity to commend the staff for the work that they did on selection of permit conditions. mention when I was here last time that we felt that the proposed permit conditions back in March represented a wide variety of bases for them, and it was difficult in some cases to understand exactly what I think the staff has done a very that basis was. commendable job of trying to rationalize exactly which ones were conditions, and which ones were action items, and which ones were resolved as open items. And I think primarily the conclusion that if an existing regulation or an existing process already takes into account a review that is necessary, it's not necessary to specify that again in a license condition. So again, I know the staff is prepared to talk to you about the license conditions, but we have no issues with them.

So overall it's been -- getting back to that testing question, it's been a very interesting process. There was a lot of hard work on our part with a lot of late nights at times trying to come up with the necessary evaluations to meet the staff's

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

review. I think the communication between the staff and the applicant was very good. I think it does represent probably a continuation of the work that the staff has done that started with license renewal, perhaps, but has carried over into this idea that a dynamic, continuing discussion is very valuable. And of course it is open to the public, and subject to public observation and comment, but yet it is a recurring, ongoing discussion rather than a number of discrete opportunities.

The emergency planning major features option is still of questionable value, and I think we will clearly talk about that in any lessons learned item. But I think if for no other purpose, it was a good warm-up for my emergency planning staff. They now have an idea of what kinds of things they're going to have to deal with, and I know that they're already starting to think, as Marvin's organization is going to them and saying, okay, we're going to start working on this COL application, they have a better idea of what that means, I think. So from that perspective I think it was good.

MEMBER POWERS: To put the best spin on it you possibly can.

MR. GRECHECK: The plant parameter

envelope approach worked. And I think this is
probably one of the most important items, is that if
ESP is valuable, it is valuable for a company that is
not yet sure of what they want to pursue, because if
someone is pretty sure of the technology, there's
probably and I can't speak for all cases but
there's probably limited value to go through this.
You might as well go directly into a COL application,
if you think you know what you're going to do. But if
you don't, and you're trying to get through a site
review while you're trying to determine what's the
best technology, then you cannot allow yourself to get
so locked in to a particular design that it becomes
exclusionary to anything else while you're still
trying to make that determination. I know there was
a lot of trepidation both on our part, and on the
staff's part when this PPE concept was first proposed.
But I think all in all it has worked. But if we were
going to do that, again, we would certainly identify
considerably fewer parameters, because it turns out
many of them are either duplicative, or tend to not
really be necessary for the process.
MEMBER POWERS: We certainly live in a

MEMBER POWERS: We certainly live in a just-in-time world when it comes to capital expenditures.

б

MR. GRECHECK: Exactly.

MEMBER POWERS: And so it's good that this worked, and I liked your comment that if you know the technology you're going to use, skip this and go to COL. That's an interesting comment.

MR. GRECHECK: And as I said, I think there's lessons learned, and as I indicated before, we'll be eager to participate in any review of that.

The final slide, I just wanted to throw something up here just to say that as interesting as this process has been, it is a relatively minor piece of what happens next. The COL process is significantly more complex. As it was envisioned by the original regulations, I can remember a lot of people talking about, well, you'll have this ESP on the shelf, and you'll have this certified design on the shelf, and you just bring these two together, and everything is going to be just --

MEMBER POWERS: Hours later you get -
MR. GRECHECK: Everything's going to be

real easy. But if you just look at this, there's a

whole number of blocks in here of inputs into the

process for a COL that will go into the various

chapters. And we are looking forward to that process,

but it will be substantially more complex than the ESP

1 process, and I think that it is important to learn and 2 apply the lessons that we've learned through this process in order to make that next one work. 3 4 have opportunities to talk about that in the future, 5 I'm sure, but it will be more complex than what we've seen here. 6 7 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is the FSAR and the 8 chapters will be similar to the FSARs of the past? 9 Similar? Roughly similar. MR. GRECHECK: 10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The PPEs and all that. 11 12 MR. GRECHECK: They will be different in they're -- if you looked at how the ESP 13 14 application was written in its electronic form, it was 15 heavily hyperlinked, and heavily cross-referenced to source documents. The new FSAR will be even more so 16 17 because it will be incorporating by reference material from the ESP, or from the design certification, and it 18 19 will not in many cases repeat that because those 20 features have already been reviewed and approved. 21 there's going to be a lot of inter-linking between all 22 of those applications. And in my opinion, it's going 23 to be very difficult to read in a hard copy form. 24 You're going to probably need to do it electronically.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the work that the

1	staff is doing on risk-informing the licensing process
2	would not affect any of this?
3	MEMBER POWERS: Well, it depends on how
4	far the staff gets.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And it depends on how
6	long it will take them to go to poll with this COL,
7	right?
8	MEMBER POWERS: I mean, in principle we
9	could have a whole revolution in the way we do plants
10	between now and then.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I doubt it, though.
12	I doubt it. Probably what they're doing refers to Gen
13	IV reactors. Because otherwise they would have
14	accelerated the process.
15	MR. GRECHECK: I'll say from our
16	perspective, the NEI has proposed a framework for a
17	COL application to the staff. I think the staff is
18	reviewing that now. Our expectation is that that
19	framework or some reasonable facsimile of it will
20	represent the basis for at least the first
21	applications that we'll be seeing.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So if some of the
23	thinking that has gone into this new licensing process
24	is to be part of this, then this is the place to do
25	it, in the review of the NEI document. That's a good

1 point. 2 MR. GRECHECK: All right. Well, that 3 concludes our portion of the presentation. 4 MEMBER POWERS: Let me ask you one 5 Do you think that having been through this, that we now have a decent template that people can 6 7 follow if other people wanted to do things? 8 MR. GRECHECK: Yes. I think --9 POWERS: With the possible MEMBER 10 exception of the major features issue on the emergency 11 planning. 12 If you go back and remember MR. GRECHECK: the history, all three companies that are currently 13 14 having active ESP applications are all doing that in 15 partnership with the Department of Energy. And it was done with the idea of doing exactly that, that we 16 17 would blaze the way through this process, try to figure out exactly what needed to be done or not. 18 19 one of the outputs of all that will be exactly this 20 more clearly defined process, with a more clearly defined table of contents, and a content guide, and a 21 22 review guide for the staff. And I think we've made a 23 lot of progress. 24 VICE CHAIR SHACK: Your PPE should be a

fairly generic sort of thing.

25

I mean, you guys

covered the waterfront.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. GRECHECK: There have been a few changes to the technology offerings since then, but yes, to the extent that it defined a very broad technological envelope, yes. I think it was -- it still has value going forward.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You made a statement at the beginning that I find intriguing. You said we know more about the reactor types than we knew three years ago. And you smiled when you said that. What is it that we know that warrants a smile?

MR. GRECHECK: Because now we're getting commercial feasibility, into issues, and practicality, and things of that sort. I can distinctly remember that in 2001, various gas reactor vendors were actively stating that they could be licensed in time for the next plants to be built. I think we generally now accept that that's not the But four years ago that was clearly, I mean the vendors clearly believed that they would be able to move through the NRC licensing process in time to support NP 2010.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But we know now that this cannot be done because of what? Because we would have to change the system significantly?

1	MR. GRECHECK: I think there is a variety
2	of things. I think there are probably a better
3	understanding of the technical differences between
4	what has been previously licensed, and what would have
5	to be, and therefore that just means more work and
6	more time.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you.
8	MEMBER POWERS: Any other questions?
9	Thank you a lot, Gene. I appreciate your
10	presentation. Appreciate your participation, and the
11	effort. Very interesting, and I do hope that you can
12	help us on the lessons learned on this process.
13	Our next presentation is from the staff.
14	And I guess Ms. Sosa, you're going to?
15	MS. DUDES: Good morning. While they're
16	setting up, could I just do an intro?
17	MEMBER POWERS: I don't know. Have you
18	been good?
19	MS. DUDES: I don't know. I try to think
20	of new things to tell you.
21	MEMBER POWERS: Go ahead.
22	MS. DUDES: And also in the interest of
23	time as they're getting the slides ready.
24	MEMBER POWERS: You do have to identify
25	yourself for the record.

1	MS. DUDES: My name is Laura Dudes. I'm
2	the Section Chief from New Reactors. I just wanted to
3	remind everybody that today is the presentation for
4	the final safety evaluation report. This document in
5	conjunction with the environmental impact statement
6	will serve as the basis for the ASLB's review during
7	the mandatory hearing. Of note, I was happy to hear
8	Gene mention that he realizes, as I have Dave sitting
9	next to me, that with the plant parameter envelopes,
10	and our design certifications, which have COL action
11	items, it's the first time I've heard someone from
12	industry say, yes, we realize that going to COL is not
13	an easy marriage of an early site permit and a design
14	certification, and there is work to be done. So as
15	we're looking at these documents, we're looking at the
16	plant parameter envelopes, yes it was successful. I
17	think it was successful also in large part to the work
18	that the staff did in defining the permit conditions,
19	the COL action items. I know Goutam Bagchi, I think
20	he's here, was instrumental, along with Ms. Sosa and
21	Brad Harvey, in really working out those definitions
22	and establishing a good basis to take this ESP forward
23	so that when we have to use this, or if we do have to
24	use this document as a basis in COL, we have some
25	clear definitions, and some clear directions. So I

think they did a really outstanding job in doing that.

I think there was a slide in the beginning that talked about not having a technology when you went into ESP. That was not necessarily the original In fact, I think if vision of Subpart A of Part 52. you talk to some of the authors of this regulation, they will tell you that they thought a technology would be ready and referenced, and that it was a step. But the staff actually was able to accommodate the concept of the plant parameter envelope, and I think they did so very well. It created more challenges. It created more challenges as this was our first time through Part 52 on an early site permit, and we had to come to safety conclusions because as I said, once we finalize this early site permit, many of these issues will be considered final as we go to COL. the staff did a good job trying to come to safety conclusions on site suitability within the plant parameter envelope.

So I don't want to belabor that, but I did want to say that was a -- commend the staff for their work, and remind everyone that the final safety evaluation report is a supporting document. Not unlike when we do a design certification, and the applicant's design control document is the basis for

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 that design certification, in early site permits, the 2 final safety evaluation report 3 environmental impact statement will become the basis 4 for our safety conclusions. With that, Belkys? 5 you. MS. SOSA: Good morning. Belkys Sosa, New 6 7 Reactors. I'm the PM for the ESP North Anna review. The purpose of today's meeting is to provide the ACRS 8 with an overview of the conclusions reached by the 9 10 staff in the North Anna early site permit safety review. We'd also like to discuss the permit 11 conditions recommended by the staff, and the combined 12 action items, well 13 as as the bounding Success today would be 14 parameters listed in the FSAR. that the ACRS gains an understanding of the conditions 15 and limitations recommended by the staff for inclusion 16 17 in any ESP that might be issued in connection with this application, as well as to gain an understanding 18 19 for the COL action items identified in the SER. 20 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So this implies that 21 the staff believes that it's hard for the ACRS to gain 22 understanding? 23 MS. SOSA: I would measure success if No. 24 when I leave here today you understand what this is. 25

MEMBER POWERS:

They're really hostile

1	toward us. I mean, they write us responses to our
2	letters that are hostile.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is the first
4	time I see, you know
5	MS. SOSA: I thought it was a good letter.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: the measure of
7	success is us understanding.
8	MEMBER POWERS: They may have a sound
9	reason. We'll explore that a little bit.
10	MEMBER DENNING: Shouldn't it be a
11	positive letter from us? Isn't that success?
12	MS. SOSA: Yes.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Success would be a
14	positive letter, actually, but yes. But that's okay.
15	MS. SOSA: Yes, that would be the actual
16	
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But the assumption is
18	that if we understand, the letter will be positive.
19	MS. SOSA: Yes.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Very good.
21	MS. SOSA: Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How will you determine
23	that we understand?
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: By the letter. The
25	letter is the measure of success. If the letter is
ļ	

1	negative, we just didn't understand.
2	(Laughter)
3	MEMBER POWERS: They should be prepared
4	for a failure to understand, then.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anyway, I think we've
6	exhausted the humor of this.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is a favorite
8	teenage excuse that, Dad, you just don't understand.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: She never said that.
10	I think we're ready.
11	MS. SOSA: Dad, I hope you understand.
12	Hopefully I'll spend about 25 minutes trying to
13	achieve success here today. I'll briefly discuss the
14	conclusions in the report, as well as just the key
15	review areas where we had to resolve open areas,
16	present affirmative conditions, and the bounding
17	parameters.
18	MEMBER POWERS: I will comment that I
19	think we do need to understand how you rationalized
20	your permit conditions. To the extent that you can go
21	through that carefully for the poor, benighted ACRS
22	with its limited capacity for understanding, that
23	would be helpful.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We'll never let you
25	forget that.
	1

MS. SOSA: Thank you. The final SER document, the staff's technical review of site safety analysis report, and emergency planning information that was provided by the applicant in conjunction with its application. The review conducted by the staff confirmed that the application complied with the requirements of Part 52 which is intended to address the site-related issues, as well as Part 100, the The staff determined the Reactor Site Criteria. applicant's exclusion area is acceptable and meets the requirements of Part 100 subject to the limitations conditions identified in the and SER. Permit. Condition 1, which I will describe in more detail later, provides reasonable assurance that the ESP provides for control of the exclusion area.

The staff independently verified the adequacy of the applicant's dose consequence calculations from normal operations, and concluded that the proposed site is acceptable for constructing a plant falling within the PPE with respect to radiological effluent release dose consequences from normal operations.

The staff reviewed the applicant's aircraft hazard analysis, and independently verified the assessment of aircraft hazards at the site. The

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 staff concludes with respect to aircraft hazards that 2 the proposed site is acceptable for constructing a 3 plant falling within the applicant's PPE. 4 In the area of industrial security, the 5 staff concluded that the physical characteristics of the site would allow a COL or construction permit 6 7 applicant to develop adequate security plans 8 measures for reactors that might be constructed and 9 operated at the site. 10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I quess I'm constantly confused by this. I think I mentioned it 11 12 last time, too, in the seismic area. Shouldn't we expect the first bullet to be true since there are 13 14 units already there? I mean, how could you conclude 15 something different? 16 MS. SOSA: That's a good question. Still, 17 regulations require us to make sure that they comply for additional units. 18 19 MR. SCOTT: Can I interject something, 20 One possibility would be if you had a site George? 21 that had a limited area, and your new reactor was 22 going to be close to the edge of the site where you 23 didn't have stand-off distance, for example, for

unlikely, but it's possible, and the staff clearly has

security purposes. So there are -- certainly it's

24

1	to evaluate it because the rules have that as a
2	criterion.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The rules say so. I
4	mean, I'm not questioning why the staff did it. It's
5	just that I find it a little surprising.
6	MS. SOSA: It's an easier review.
7	MEMBER POWERS: Well, you also can
8	conceive of the situation where a major international
9	airport is planned for 20 years down the road, post
10	retirement of the current reactors. I mean, these are
11	not inconceivable things. They do happen.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you are looking
13	also into the future here?
14	MEMBER POWERS: Sixty years.
15	MS. SOSA: Well, what we did in our review
16	is take a look at what existing permits allowed for
17	some facilities to be built there, and the assessment
18	was based on that. So certainly nothing is there now
19	that would be a hazard.
20	MEMBER POWERS: But I'll remind you that
21	you also contacted the FAA
22	MS. SOSA: Yes.
23	MEMBER POWERS: or at least you told me
24	you did, and several other things, regional planning
25	authorities, and whatnot, and found no plans for this
ļ	

1	major international airport with large Airbuses flying
2	in.
3	MS. SOSA: That's correct.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Or out. Especially
5	the new one.
6	MEMBER POWERS: We only worry about the
7	ones flying in.
8	MS. SOSA: With their evacuation time
9	estimates, the applicant has shown that no physical
10	characteristics unique to the site
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: One last point.
12	MS. SOSA: Yes.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The spirit of all
14	this regulation 52 is that you are doing a review of
15	the site independently of the fact that there are
16	already units there?
17	MS. SOSA: No, the units that are there
18	are also considered.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, in the terms of
20	interaction. But the fact that you have already
21	licensed those other two units, does that affect Part
22	52 at all?
23	MS. SOSA: No.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's very
25	interesting. If not, why not? Well, this is not the

case.

1

2	MS. DUDES: We can use existing
3	applicants can reference existing information. But
4	again, this is a separate federal action, and so we
5	are doing an independent review. To the extent that
6	one site could impact another, or that information is
7	the same and an applicant wants to reference that
8	similar information, that will facilitate the process,
9	and the review may be shorter, it may be easier for
10	the applicant to prepare because they have reference
11	materials. But we need to review this as a separate
12	action, and look at impact both of sites that are
13	there, because those are other and maybe the impact
14	of the new unit.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The only issue may be
16	that if the technology has advanced since the last
17	time we approved the existing units, you reach
18	different conclusions now, what do you do? I guess
19	Part 52 doesn't say anything about that. It just
20	focuses on the new reactor.
21	MS. DUDES: Right.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If there's a conflict
23	in the conclusions, somebody else has to decide.

They have a licensing basis through a

MS. DUDES:

licensed.

24

25

Well, the existing sites are

1	certain set of regulations, and then the new reactors
2	will be licensed to the regulations as well.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But there may be a
4	public relations issue there.
5	MEMBER POWERS: Well, I'll remind you,
6	George, that for instance, the methodology available
7	for doing the seismic hazard analysis has changed
8	since the original site plants were put in. And the
9	applicant is expected to specifically address that
10	issue, plus any revisions that should have been made
11	that haven't been made.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, I understand
13	that.
14	MEMBER POWERS: So there's quite a little
15	bit
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: There has to be.
1 -	indicate in obtaining fraction and to be.
17	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a
18	
	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a
18	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the
18 19	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the existing units.
18 19 20	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the existing units. MS. DUDES: Yes.
18 19 20 21	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the existing units. MS. DUDES: Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: I view these as two
18 19 20 21 22	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the existing units. MS. DUDES: Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: I view these as two independent actions. The existing plant is licensed
18 19 20 21 22 23	Somebody else will decide, though, if there is a conflict in the requirements, what to do about the existing units. MS. DUDES: Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: I view these as two independent actions. The existing plant is licensed under one set of rules, and the new plants, proposed

1 that. But don't you see that you may have a problem 2 with the public at some point if the requirements are 3 different? 4 MEMBER KRESS: Well, you may have a --5 MEMBER SIEBER: Maybe, but who knows. If I may, if there's any issues 6 MS. SOSA: 7 of safety concerns, then obviously the staff will work 8 with the existing units group to make sure that that 9 is factored. 10 MEMBER POWERS: And so you have indicated you've done on the seismic analysis? 11 That is right. 12 MS. SOSA: Yes. MEMBER KRESS: Let's pursue this just a 13 14 little more. One of the things we tend to look at is 15 the LRF when we think about the new plants. LRF is a surrogate for the prompt fatality QHO. Did we look to 16 see if the prompt fatality QHO is met at this site 17 before we decided it was suitable? In the sense that 18 19 you have already two units there. And you're going to 20 have an unknown number more units. And in my view, 21 LRF is you add up the LRFs for the various things. 22 Did we look to see if the QHO is met there? 23 it's not a requirement, which you know, is sort of a 24 strange thing, but did you even look at it?

it might color your view of things.

1 MS. SOSA: I will have to ask for 2 assistance from the staff. MS. DUDES: Well, in general, in the early 3 4 site permit review that we did we did not consider 5 integrated risk from the existing units with the ESP. I think we looked at the new application. And it is 6 7 a policy issue that the staff is working on 8 conjunction with Research. In fact, I believe there was some discussion with the committee on this, and 9 integrated risk, and how we would address that. 10 MEMBER KRESS: -- technology neutral 11 12 framework. DUDES: Right. Yes. But the 13 MS. 14 decisions that come out of that policy on integrated 15 risk could then be applied to ESPs. If there is a 16 decision that says you will consider integrated risk. 17 MEMBER KRESS: Will you go back and revisit this? 18 19 MS. DUDES: Well, we may not revisit this 20 early site permit, but again, this is establishing a 21 site suitability, and if there's a policy that comes 22 up, we would address it at COL, or change our next 23 early site permit reviews. But the staff is 24 considering how to look at integrated risk. And I 25 think right now we're just looking at LRF independent

1	of the existing sites.
2	MEMBER KRESS: I would question the
3	quality of that judgment, but you know, I would have
4	looked at it anyway, whether there's a policy or not.
5	Because it's a safety issue, I think.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: But once you look at it,
7	even if it's adverse, there isn't anything you can do
8	about it because of the rules.
9	MEMBER KRESS: Well, you could not approve
10	the early site.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: I don't think you can do
12	that.
13	MEMBER KRESS: I think the staff has the
14	ability to use judgment on things like that. Whether
15	it's written into some rule or not, they can question.
16	MR. MATTHEWS: Mr. Kress, let me speak to
17	that just for a moment. The regulations have a unique
18	quality that they apply to the licensee as broadly as
19	they apply to the applicant. So, therefore, when the
20	applicant meets regulations, we're obligated to grant
21	the license.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
23	MR. MATTHEWS: So no, there is an
24	expectation that we follow the regulations as well as
25	the applicant, and if we choose to address an

1	additional requirement then we have to get the
2	regulation changed.
3	MEMBER KRESS: Yes, but
4	MR. MATTHEWS: We don't have that much
5	discretion.
6	MEMBER KRESS: Yes, you do have the
7	discretion.
8	MR. MATTHEWS: Excuse me, this is Dave
9	Matthews, Director of Regulatory Improvement.
LO	MEMBER KRESS: You do have the discretion
L1	to bring in the question of whether or not adequate
L2	protection is actually there, whether they meet the
L3	rules or not. You can always question it.
L4	MR. MATTHEWS: There is always a factor of
L5	judgment involved in a reasonable assurance finding.
L6	I would agree with that.
L7	MEMBER KRESS: I'm saying that would be
L8	the avenue that one might pursue.
L9	MR. MATTHEWS: We would view the exercise
20	of the staff's judgment to that degree that would
21	reflect that much flexibility in the determination of
22	reasonable assurance or adequate protection would
23	raise a policy issue, and it would have to be
24	presented to the Commission for resolution ultimately.
25	Now, the Commission could do that, but the staff

1	itself couldn't.
2	MEMBER KRESS: Of course. But you know,
3	I think it's within the staff's purview to do that, to
4	raise those kind of issues.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Presumably when they
6	meet the regulations, there is reasonable assurance.
7	MEMBER KRESS: No. Unless some special
8	conditions happen to come forward.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But this is broader
10	than just this site, right?
11	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. This may not have
12	anything to do with this site at all.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But this is where the
14	risk-informed licensing process of the staff is
15	developed and comes to the picture.
16	MEMBER KRESS: Yes.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is what we've
18	been struggling with as a committee, trying to decide
19	what is the best way to proceed.
20	MEMBER KRESS: Right.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, the issue here is
22	that this ESP has to be approved based on the rules
23	that are in place right now. And if you want to
24	consider some additional phenomenon that is not
25	considered in the rules, I think that the staff is

1	outside its purview in so doing. And once they
2	approve this ESP, and at some later time they change
3	the policy, this ESP still sticks. That's regulatory
4	stability. That was a primary goal of what this
5	agency does.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think Jack you're
7	right. I think what Tom and I are trying to do is
8	make sure the staff gains an understanding of where
9	we're standing.
10	MEMBER KRESS: Well, I don't think he's
11	exactly right. I think the staff can always raise the
12	question of whether you have reasonable assurance of
13	adequate protection, whether or not you meet the
14	regulations or not. Based on special circumstances
15	exist. And they can always do that.
16	VICE CHAIR SHACK: Well, I mean, they
17	actually had a policy that you could ask for that risk
18	information even if it wasn't risk-informed if there
19	was a circumstance.
20	MEMBER KRESS: That's correct.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
22	MEMBER KRESS: If there was a
23	circumstance. Then I've asked in the past what are
24	you going to do with that information. And the answer
	1

has always been, well, it may raise the question of

1	whether we have reasonable assurance of adequate
2	protection. That's always the answer.
3	MEMBER BONACA: Logically, I mean, the ESP
4	goes through a process in which you are questioning,
5	or you're considering everything, there is around the
6	plant, including, you know, possible new airports, or
7	minor airports, or anything that happens in the lake
8	or whatever. You cannot ask questions about the
9	nuclear power plant sitting there? I mean.
10	MEMBER KRESS: Sure you can. That's the
11	point.
12	MEMBER BONACA: It's a facility that
13	exists.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: I would suggest that if we
15	have a concern about integrated risk from any given
16	site, that we address that as ACRS as a policy
17	question by the Commissioners, which we intend to do.
18	But to mix it up with this particular licensing action
19	I think is
20	MEMBER KRESS: Well, you may be making a
21	mistake if we permit give an early site permit and
22	then all of a sudden we realize we shouldn't have.
23	You know, I'm not questioning this particular site,
24	but you know, it's a general issue.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Well.

1	MEMBER POWERS: I'm just dying to ask, Dr.
2	Kress, how in the world they would ever get LRF
3	information?
4	MEMBER KRESS: Pardon?
5	MEMBER POWERS: How would they get LRF
6	information? They can't even calculate
7	MEMBER KRESS: I would forget LRF and go
8	to Level 3.
9	MEMBER POWERS: They can't even calculate
10	CDF with the existing PRA technology.
11	MEMBER KRESS: I understand that. That's
12	another question.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: You've got a bigger
14	problem.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The other question is
16	whether this issue is one of adequate protection.
17	You're talking about goals here. They are not
18	adequate protection issue. So you know, you're right
19	I think, that if the staff feels that it is an
20	adequate protection issue they can raise it, but first
21	they have to feel it. They have to judge that it's
22	and I don't think the issue of LRF is adequate
23	protection. It's just a policy issue.
24	MEMBER KRESS: Well, I asked in the past
25	if they calculated LRF as part of the non-risk

1	informed application, and they got values they didn't
2	like, what would that mean, and what would they do
3	with it. And the answer was, well, it would raise the
4	question of adequate protection in their mind. So I
5	don't know if that's the right answer or not, but
6	that's the answer I got.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: From a site standpoint you
8	still have to meet Part 100. And once you meet it,
9	under today's rules that's adequate protection.
10	MEMBER POWERS: I'm sure we're getting a
11	preview of a debate that will go on at some length in
12	the future, so maybe we can let Ms. Sosa continue her
13	presentation.
14	MEMBER KRESS: But I'm a little surprised
15	the staff didn't actually look at that. It didn't
16	show up in the SER anywhere.
17	MEMBER POWERS: Considering the amount of
18	work the staff had to do, I think anything that wasn't
19	actually required I would be surprised if they did.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: And in fact, just looking
21	at what the rules require happens when the staff does
22	their job, in my opinion.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, I'm eager to find
24	out what major feature H is.
25	VICE CHAIR SHACK: It is interesting,
I	I and the second

1 though, as Tom points out, that you do compute the 2 average individual fatality risk for the new reactor, 3 but nowhere can you find the information for the old 4 reactor. 5 MEMBER SIEBER: Unless you generate it. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And this is the 6 7 conflict I was talking about. With the new rules, we 8 may --VICE CHAIR SHACK: Well, this is not the 9 This is with the Part 52, the current rule 10 new rules. when you do the generic impact statement. 11 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, that's what I'm New in the sense that they did not exist when 13 the old units were licensed. A new approach to 14 15 things. MEMBER POWERS: Please continue. 16 17 MS. SOSA: Okay. With the evacuation time estimates, the applicant has shown that no physical 18 19 characteristics unique to the proposed ESP site could 20 pose a significant impediment to the development of 21 emergency plans. The staff concluded that the 22 proposed major features for the emergency plan are 23 acceptable and meet the NRC requirements, with the 24 exception of major feature H, that's the emergency

facilities and equipment. This includes technical

support center and the operational support center. Based on the applicant's request, major feature H was not evaluated, and the staff reached no conclusion regarding the acceptability of major feature H.

MEMBER POWERS: In a communication to us from the EDO -- to the ACRS from the EDO, he indicated that the staff might try to revise some of its review guidance in connection with these. Can you tell us more about that?

MS. SOSA: The staff is currently looking at updating the review guidance for lessons learned, and this is one of the areas. I'd like to request the assistance of Bruce Musico at this time for him to expand a little bit on what they're thinking in the area of emergency planning. Dan Barss, I'm sorry.

MR. BARSS: I'm Dan Barss, Senior

Emergency Preparedness Specialist and Team Leader for
the Licensing Team, responsible for the emergency
planning reviews. And we, as was mentioned earlier,
have a lot of lessons learned through this process.

And the major feature H particularly, which was
already talked about, addressed the facilities, and
it's kind of hard to tell when you're doing the plant
parameter envelope what those facilities are. So they
really couldn't be addressed.

As far as other lessons learned, we're still working on those. There's a rulemaking in process, and we're not sure where that's going to end up yet. We've got some ideas, and we've drafted them, but they're still in the review process, so I don't know if it's appropriate to discuss them in too much detail here, but we are reviewing them.

MR. MATTHEWS: This is David Matthews, Director of Regulatory Improvement. The rulemaking to which Mr. Barss is referring is an ongoing rulemaking with regard to refinement of Part 52. It's not a substantive change to Part 52 in the view of the staff, but it is an opportunity to reflect upon the process as we've undertaken it through successive design certification reviews, and now these ESP reviews, to introduce some clarifications that we think are necessary. And this major features aspect of that rule might suffer some changes, and I think that's what the EDO was referring to, in addition to the parallel changes we'd make to the review standard with regard to ESPs.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are we ready to move to the next slide? We've spent a long time on this one.

MEMBER POWERS: Well, I am still a little perplexed. I have a communication here from the EDO

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	that goes on at some length. Our comment to him was
2	we thought that the examination of some of these major
3	features and whatnot called for in the review guidance
4	was perhaps more extensive than it needed to be. And
5	in his response to us from that comment, the EDO goes
6	on at some length, basically saying no it isn't, and
7	then concludes but we're going to fix it so that it
8	isn't. So I'm trying to understand where we are on
9	this. Our rulemaking exercise doesn't seem to be
10	called for here. I mean, this is the staff's review
11	guidance that they have.
12	MS. SOSA: Dan Barss.
13	MR. BARSS: Dan Barss again. I think
14	I'm trying to remember the response.
15	MEMBER POWERS: It goes on for a couple of
16	pages.
17	MR. BARSS: Yes.
18	MEMBER POWERS: And it basically says
19	don't tell us how to do our job.
20	MR. BARSS: Well, one thing we learned.
21	We wrote back in 1996, the staff wrote the guidance
22	that's referred to as Sub-2. And that was in response
23	to a SECY where they asked us to do that. And we said
24	we would use that, or the guidance was written as
25	draft. We came to the conclusion we could use it. We

put it in RS002, and now that we've used it, we've found that there's a lot of detail in Sub-2 that doesn't need to be there. It did ask us to look at things that were below the depth of what really needed to be looked at at this point. So that's some of the lessons learned, and those are the things we need to go through, that review guidance, and I guess fix it, or modify it to be more appropriate to the process. I believe the applicant mentioned that too, that the level of detailed review was to them a surprise, and we've now learned that there were some things that we looked a little too far in it. Maybe we didn't need to at this stage of the game.

MEMBER POWERS: Well, our comment concerning the draft SER was to the effect that there's stuff more detailed than you need to be. The response seems to be, no that needs to be there, but we're going to change it. I remain perplexed on what the staff intends to do. It's just a peculiar comment. Please continue.

MS. SOSA: Okay. Slide 6. The applicant provided an acceptable description of current and projected population densities in and around the site, and properly specified a low population zone, LPZ, and the population center distance. The staff review

1 verified the radiological consequences of bounding 2 design basis accidents at the exclusion area boundary 3 and the outer boundary of the LPZ. 4 Meet the requirements of 52.17. The staff 5 concludes that the applicant's proposed site 6 characteristics related to climatology the 7 methodologies used to determine the severity of the 8 weather phenomena reflected in the site 9 characteristics are acceptable, and contain margins 10 sufficient for the limited accuracy quantity and timing in which the data have 11 period of been accumulated. 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Does the applicant 13 14 propose site characteristics? 15 MS. SOSA: Yes. 16 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh. Propose is the 17 right word? Anyway, keep going. Well, they submitted site 18 SOSA: MS. 19 characteristics associated with their site. 20 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They assess, perhaps. They are proposing to I suppose 21 MS. SOSA: 22 23 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Suppose we learn more 24 about weather prediction in the future. This could be 25 factored into a COL, couldn't it?

	111
1	MS. SOSA: Yes.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: To sort of fix forever
3	your evaluation of weather at the site.
4	MS. SOSA: If at any time any of these
5	site characteristics are exceeded
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We might learn more in
7	the future about the weather. There might be trends
8	of the type that Dr. Powers talked about.
9	MS. SOSA: Yes. That's true.
10	MEMBER POWERS: Let me understand
11	something. Ms. Dudes indicated to us that this final
12	safety evaluation report, the environmental impact
13	statement and presumably the applicant's application
14	itself, or the documentary bases for which you will go
15	into a required public hearing?
16	MS. SOSA: Yes.
17	MR. MATTHEWS: The phrase is mandatory.
18	MEMBER POWERS: It's a mandatory hearing
19	required by the regulation itself.
20	MR. MATTHEWS: Correct.
21	MEMBER POWERS: And at that hearing the
22	public can comment on what they think about this,
23	right?
24	MR. MATTHEWS: There is a and OGC will
25	correct me if I get this wrong, but the mandatory

hearing has an opportunity for intervention and the
presentation of contentions to be considered by the
Board, which is members of the public, of course, who
can bring those forward. But they also have an
obligation under the mandatory hearing as a Board to
review these documents, and raise issues, I guess the
phrase is sua sponte, on their own volition. So it
isn't confined just to members of the public comments.
It also has the opportunity of the Board arriving at
their own decision irrespective of whether there's any
admitted contentions.
MEMBER POWERS: And if contentions or
comments are raised, the staff responds to those?
MR. MATTHEWS: At that point the staff
would represent that their position is as shown in the
SER, and if it's insufficient in the Board's view, we
would be asked to provide additional testimony.
MEMBER POWERS: And one presumes that the
public could be more familiar than I with climatology
research that's going on nowadays. Is staff in a
position to respond to comments on climatology
research?
MR. MATTHEWS: Absolutely. We'd be in a
position to respond within the confines of the NRC's

responsibility in those areas, and the degree to which

it affected or was germane to the staff's finding.

MEMBER POWERS: In the staff response to an ACRS comment concerning climate and weather, it says current regulatory controls are adequate when measured -- it's unnecessary to mitigate adverse aspects of natural phenomenon in safe operation of a facility. Why did they think they were adequate? I mean, it doesn't say why, it just says that they are adequate.

MR. MATTHEWS: My recollection of that response in the SER was that the regulatory controls that are imposed are process-related, and in addition, at the time of the staff's review, it's guided by the review guidelines, and the reg guide associated with those site characteristics. And it fell within the quidelines that the staff had previously established and vetted through the normal public participation processes and the CRGR as appropriate quidelines for determining acceptability under the requirements that are broadly stated in the regulations. So, you know, the staff's finding with regard to our representation as adequate should be viewed in the light of adequate as defined by the regulations and the guidelines that have been outlined for implementation.

MEMBER POWERS: Well, that seems to be the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

question that comes up, because in its review quidelines, the staff says that it was going to assess applicability of past data to the performance. And the ACRS questioned whether they'd actually done that or not. Now, the staff I think makes an excellent point when it says since changes in climate are gradual, operating plant licensees should have adequate time to take action to mitigate the effects of such changes. And I think that was the point the licensee -- or the applicant in this case made as well. But it still is perplexing that attention is not given in explicit form to this applicability.

MR. MATTHEWS: Let me speak to several issues that are interrelated that I think, well I hope will respond to the concern as it's been expressed. We tried to capture this in the EDO's comments.

First of all, there's some process-related issues here. One is that the licensee we will assert, and the licensee will agree I'm sure, that they have an obligation, a continuing obligation to maintain their licensing and design bases. That licensing basis is expressed in many forms, but one basic form is the application that they present to us, and subsequent documents generated by them representing to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	us what they view to be the state of the world in this
2	instance climatology, its historical history, and
3	their expectations with regard to its changes.
4	Irrespective of the representation made at this time,
5	they have a continuing obligation to ensure that the
6	conditions surrounding their plant, and the
7	circumstances of their design stay within those
8	representations, which is basically they've got to
9	basically agree they've got to continually monitor
10	whether or not they're within their licensing basis.
11	And I will say design basis as well, but you can get
12	into an extensive discussion on the distinctions
13	between licensing and design basis, but I know you
14	don't want to do that at this point.
15	MEMBER POWERS: I'm going to accuse you of
16	taking the refuge of the scoundrel, and putting the
17	load on him.
18	MR. MATTHEWS: There is a portion
19	MEMBER POWERS: You're reviewing this
20	document, and the question is have you done an
21	adequate review.
22	MR. MATTHEWS: Well, you could question
23	the degree to which the staff had sufficient
24	information upon which to base their finding within

the confines of the guidelines that they used, namely

the Standard Review Plan, and the associated reg And we're of the view that the information we quides. requested of the applicant, and as was presented to us was sufficient to convince the individual staff member responsible and his management that sufficient representation of data was presented to allow them to reach they're-compliant-with-the-regulations finding. And so we've made that finding based on their representations.

Now, given that climatology in the future is speculative for sure, even though we don't expect there to be wide variation, you know, the so-called -and I guess you could put the burden on the scoundrel, but the so-called process-related response to those uncertainties, and what we're talking about is changes in margin really, is that they have an obligation to sustain their licensing basis under all circumstances. And if circumstances change, a good example of course is when we have, for example, population changes. I'll bring up a case in point. A few years ago a huge NASCAR racetrack was built outside the Turkey Point Which it turned out, my recollection is plant. Okav? on any given Sunday there was 250,000 people in the vicinity which hadn't been there at the time of Okay? And I'm just giving this, maybe licensing.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 it's not completely on point, but it's an example of 2 a changed circumstances of which --Two hundred thousand 3 MEMBER POWERS: 4 people looking for a train crash. 5 MR. MATTHEWS: That's right. Waiting patiently for a train crash. 6 7 MEMBER POWERS: A nuclear accident would 8 be really exciting for these guys. 9 So consequently, they were MR. MATTHEWS: 10 under an obligation to revise their evacuation time estimate, and represent it, and bring it to us. 11 But it really is the last 12 MEMBER POWERS: refuge of the scoundrel. Because you can say that 13 14 about anything. 15 MR. MATTHEWS: I know. But it is, I must 16 say Dr. Powers, it is a substantial underpinning of 17 the regulatory process. The license is granted under the conditions that the applicant is responsible for 18 19 its maintenance. It's not our job. Now we of course 20 provide additional insurance through the life of the 21 plant by our oversight, and our inspection, and our 22 examination, and our audits, but we can't be expected 23 to identify every changed circumstance that might 24 affect operations and safety of operations.

consequently, we put a strong obligation on the part

1 of the license to monitor these issues. 2 MEMBER POWERS: And I think there's no 3 argument there. The question we're dealing with here 4 is the adequacy of the review. 5 MR. MATTHEWS: I understand. MEMBER POWERS: And your own guidance to 6 7 yourself on how you're going to do it. And you included the phrase "we'll check on the applicability 8 of the data." And I don't think you've done it in 9 this case. Okay? I'm not -- I don't fault you very 10 11 Because I don't know how you could do very much 12 more of this other than to recognize the issue exists. MR. MATTHEWS: I will represent to you a 13 14 possible logical conundrum that the staff is faced 15 with in these situations, if I might. 16 MEMBER POWERS: Sure. I bet I can reproduce the conundrum. I think I understand it. 17 MR. MATTHEWS: Realize that we're in an 18 19 area that's fraught with high uncertainty. Okay? I would argue that if the applicant came in, based on 20 21 uncertainty that exists, and argued for the 22 reduction in margin, the staff would be disinclined to 23 approve a reduction in margin based on the licensee 24 making a representation of high uncertainty. 25 That's an interesting MEMBER POWERS:

point. Yes, weather's going to get better --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. MATTHEWS: Right. So when I turn that coin around, I would argue that the staff is limited to increase the level of safety margin based on a similar level of uncertainty. So it's kind of like the double-edged sword issue.

MEMBER POWERS: I kind of wish you'd brought up some of these points in your response to it.

MR. MATTHEWS: Okay. And I want to make one final point, and please take this in the spirit in which it's intended relative to the staff's relative responsibilities in areas such as meteorology. It really isn't appropriate for the NRC staff to speak with finality on the magnitude or extent of, let's say, global warming, given that we have partners in town that view that as their responsibility such as the National Weather Service, and NOAA, and EPA. so for us to substitute our judgment in that regard as a means of, quote, "leveraging an applicant into additional margin" we do that with some trepidation given our partnerships. And we didn't believe that the issue as represented by this site, and this applicant, rose to the level of raising a concern, either site specifically or nationally that would cause us to reach out to those partners to get their views on it. It just didn't rise to that level of concern. And again, part of my saying that is based upon my process answer, which is there's an obligation for both of us, the applicant and us, to monitor changed circumstances. And we have plenty of regulatory authority to reenter these discussions at such time as the level of concern rises to the point that we need to engage. And that really was the substance of the staff's response, Dr. Powers.

MEMBER POWERS: It would have been interesting to have it more explicitly stated. I agree with you -- in some sense your sister agencies actually feel a partnership with you. I mean, they say so explicitly on their website. I checked. And are willing to provide that information. You felt it was not necessary. That's interesting. I kind of wish you had. But maybe it's a judgment issue. Please continue.

MS. SOSA: Slide 7. The applicant determined that the -- I'm sorry, the staff determined that the applicant made conservative assessments of post-accident atmospheric dispersion conditions using appropriate meteorological data and diffusion models. The staff concludes that the short-term atmospheric

dispersion estimates are acceptable and meet requirements of Part 100. The staff will address atmospheric dispersion estimates used to evaluate radiological doses for the control room in its review of any COL or construction permit application that references this ESP. The staff concludes that the applicant's characterization of long-term atmospheric transport and diffusion conditions is appropriate for use in demonstrating compliance with dose requirements in Appendix I to Part 50. Any COL or construction applicant must confirm that the parameters provided at the ESP stage bound the actual values provided at the or construction permit stage, and that the calculation methodologies used for the confirmation is consistent with that employed at the ESP stage.

Slide 8. Staff concludes that the applicant's proposed site characteristics related to hydrology are acceptable, with the noted conditions involving water budget issues. I will discuss later in the presentation during the proposed permit conditions this question.

The staff concludes that the proposed ESP site is acceptable from a geology and seismology standpoint, and meets the requirement of 10 C.F.R. 100.23. Finally, staff concluded that the applicant

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

provided appropriate quality assurance measures equivalent to those required by Part 50, Appendix B.

Key review areas. The staff review included all the different areas listed here. The bolded text refers to the areas that contained open items at the time we last briefed the ACRS. There were a total of 28 open items in the draft SER, one in the exclusion area authority and control, four in meteorology, eleven in hydrology, two in seismology and geology, and ten in emergency planning. All of those issues have been resolved in the final SER. In their presentation, the applicant discussed some of the major ones, so I won't go into that discussion again here.

Permit conditions. There are a total of eight proposed permit conditions in the final SER, from the original 18 in the draft SER. The staff, as the applicant discussed, had a challenge here of trying to integrate, or be consistent in their approach to defining permit conditions. So the staff came up with the criteria for defining permit And they're included under three conditions. One, the staff's evaluation in the SER circumstances. rested on an assumption that is not currently and which is practical to support only supported,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

	arter issuance of the ESP. For example, the sub-
	surface conditions discovered in an excavation of the
	site for the foundation. Second, the site physical
	attribute exists that is not acceptable for the design
	of system structures and components important to
	safety. An example of that would be a condition that
	may call for action to correct a deficiency, like
	cracked or weathered rock that is not acceptable for
	burying foundations, that you would have to be treated
	with concrete, for example. Number 3. The staff's
	evaluation requires a future act. And an example of
	that would be approval by the state regulatory board.
	And finally, should an ESP be issued for the North
	Anna site, the staff believes that the ESP holder
	should be constrained by these conditions.
	VICE CHAIR SHACK: Now, when you went from
	18 to eight, the other 10 became COL action items,
	basically?
	MS. SOSA: For the most part, yes.
	VICE CHAIR SHACK: And you balanced them
	between the permit conditions and the COL action items
	on these three circumstances?
	MS. SOSA: That's correct. We applied the
	VICE CHAIR SHACK: The additional work
- 1	

б

that was needed.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. SOSA: Right. A lot of the ones I recall had to do with design interface site issues. So, not enough information was available so it really fell under the COL action item category.

Here are the proposed permit conditions for the ESP site. The first permit condition, the staff proposes to include a condition in any ESP that might be issued in connection with this application to the exclusion area control. Before construction begins under the construction permit or the COL referencing this ESP, the applicant must obtain and execute agreements providing for shared control of the North Anna ESP exclusion area, including the state approvals.

Permit condition two requires the ESP holder to obtain the right to implement the site redress plan before undertaking limited work activities. Permit condition three. An applicant referencing this ESP is required to use a dry cooling tower system during normal operation for Unit 4. And again, this is the one having to do with the water budget issues for Lake Anna.

Permit condition four requires the new unit's radwaste systems be designed with features to

1	preclude any and all accidental releases of
2	radionuclides into any potential liquid pathways.
3	Again, in order to meet Part 100 requirements, you
4	heard about the absorption/retention coefficients, and
5	the applicant not being able to take measurements at
6	this time. Really didn't make a lot of sense since
7	they didn't have the exact location.
8	MEMBER POWERS: How do you require someone
9	to preclude all possible accident releases? I mean,
LO	surely I can define an accident that cannot be
L1	precluded.
L2	MS. SOSA: Okay. These are the radwaste
L3	systems. So designs can include liners to prevent any
L4	accidental releases.
L5	MEMBER POWERS: But I can still define an
L6	accident that the liner doesn't work. I mean, it's
L7	language that is colloquial, and not very precise.
L8	Don't you need something more precise there? I mean,
L9	all accidents.
20	MS. SOSA: The issue here was in order for
21	us to determine that the Kd value being zero, in order
22	not to have anything get into the groundwater, that
23	was the only language that we could come up with in
24	order for us to make our Part 100 finding.
25	MR. MATTHEWS: I could maybe add something

that might clarify this. Again, it has to do with
circumscribing the extent of the staff's review, and
it's within the four corners of the regulation in that
it focuses on design basis accidents. So
consequently, when we make that kind of statement,
it's within the confines of that class of accidents
which it has been agreed upon represent the design
basis accidents which have to be addressed. And they
include radwaste accidents. So that could be a caveat
on each of those kind of statements. I agree with
you. When we make that kind of broad statement you
could infer that we've gone way beyond the limits of
those accidents, and we haven't. We've stayed within
the regulatory strictures.
MEMBER POWERS: The way you've written it.
MR. MATTHEWS: I understand.
MEMBER POWERS: It doesn't I mean it
MR. MATTHEWS: All of these kind of
statements could be preceded "Within the confines of
the staff's review of the applicant's response to
current regulatory requirements."
MEMBER DENNING: Did regulatory
requirements specifically use terms like "include any
and all accidental releases"? I mean, those are the
things that are so objectionable.

1 MR. MATTHEWS: They do, but yet they're 2 within the confines of the definition of accidents. 3 MEMBER DENNING: So you're saying that it 4 kind of is required that you have that -- that you 5 qualify it a little bit by using the term that 6 qualified it as to what you meant? 7 MR. MATTHEWS: We could. MS. SOSA: Next slide. Permit condition 8 9 five requires the ESP holder, and/or an applicant 10 referencing this ESP, to replace fractured weathered rock at the foundation level with lean 11 12 concrete before construction. MEMBER SIEBER: Why did you specifically 13 14 talk about lean concrete? As opposed to other methods 15 of remediation, like Frankie piles, or selected fill, 16 that kind of thing. 17 MS. SOSA: This was actually suggested by the applicant in their own application. So the staff 18 19 basically is paraphrasing that. It's a common method. 20 MEMBER SIEBER: It's a common method, but 21 it's restrictive, and expensive, and there are other 22 ways to do it that are more efficient. 23 MEMBER POWERS: And 20 years from now 24 another guy is going to come along and say, okay, I'm 25 ready to make use of this application, and I want to

1	do that. You've just created work for yourself.
2	MS. SOSA: Again, I think the applicant
3	can demonstrate that whatever alternative method they
4	have meets this intent, and that would be all that's
5	required. I mean, they wouldn't have to we
6	wouldn't have to reevaluate.
7	MEMBER POWERS: He's going to have to come
8	back to you and say I can't meet this condition.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, it's just another
LO	little trip around the block.
L1	MS. SOSA: Okay. Permit condition six.
L2	The ESP holder and applicant referenced in this ESP is
L3	prohibited from using engineering fill with high
L4	compressibility and low maximum density, such as
L5	saprolite.
L6	Permit condition seven. The ESP holder
L7	and applicant referenced in this ESP must perform
L8	geologic mapping of future excavations for safety-
L9	related facilities. And finally, permit condition
20	eight requires the ESP holder and applicant referenced
21	in this ESP to improve Zone II saprolitic soils to
22	reduce any liquefaction potential if safety-related
23	structures are to be found.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Somewhere in the ESP
25	application it says that this is a hard rock site, but

2 Is it or isn't it? 3 MS. SOSA: I'd like to ask the assistance 4 of Dr. Munson to respond, please. 5 MR. MUNSON: This is Cliff Munson. I'm in Division of Engineering in NRR. All the 6 7 saprolite, all the soil will be cleared away for the 8 major Category I structures. This last item, Number 9 8, is referring to -- I don't know specifically what structures, but they wouldn't be major structures. 10 would be a tank or some other item that would be 11 12 placed on the soil itself. So they would have to improve the soil in order to avoid liquefaction 13 14 problems. 15 MS. SOSA: Next slide. COL action items. There are 30 COL action items in the final SER from 16 the 19 in the draft SER. COL action items are 17 included to ensure that significant issues are tracked 18 19 and considered during the COL stage. They identify or 20 highlight work that's needed at the COL stage. 21 Again, this is similar to the concept that 22 was established in design certification. However, 23 regulatory control is provided by listing them in the 24 actual permit, which is, unlike the design 25 certification, they list it in the actual rule.

these conditions speak like it's not a hard rock site.

1 list of COL action items that you see in the FSAR is 2 by no means all-inclusive. So these are things that 3 the reviewers felt were important to track for the COL 4 review. 5 The plant parameter envelope identified postulated values of design parameters that provide 6 7 detail to support the staff's review of 8 application. A controlling PPE or the bounding 9 parameter value is one that necessarily depends on the site characteristics. The staff review the design 10 selected and the COL or construction applicant to 11 12 ensure the design fits within the bounding parameters values identified in the ESP. Otherwise, the COL or 13 14 construction applicant will need to demonstrate that the design, given the site characteristics in the ESP 15 16 complies with the regulations. 17 There are four bounding parameters identified by the staff in the North Anna ESP site: 18 19 the maximum cooling water flow rate for Unit 3, the 20 maximum cooling water temperature rise, and 21 maximum inlet temperature, and the minimum site grade. 22 They're all listed as bounding parameters. 23 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Five degree water coming 24 out of a lake? The fish must be very unhappy.

MS. SOSA:

This is, again, a bounding

1	parameter. Their design must meet these conditions,
2	and they have to demonstrate that at the COL stage.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's a hot bath. I
4	mean, are you serious?
5	MEMBER POWERS: This is what you call a
6	robust design. It can take just about anything you
7	deliver.
8	MEMBER DENNING: Why does it specify Unit
9	3?
10	MS. SOSA: Unit 3 is the one
11	MEMBER DENNING: Instead of any other
12	additional unit?
13	MS. SOSA: Unit 3 will be the one using
14	lake water. Unit 4 is the dry.
15	MEMBER DENNING: Oh, I see.
16	MS. SOSA: The major milestones for this
17	project included receiving the application in
18	September of 2003. We accepted the application
19	October of 2003. The notice for the mandatory hearing
20	was published in December of '03. The draft SER was
21	issued December of '04. Open items resolution went on
22	from January to May of '05. We held the ACRS meeting
23	on the draft March of '05. We received your interim
24	letter March 11. The Revision 4 of the application
25	was received May 16. We responded to the ACRS interim

1	letter June 3 of '05. The final SER was issued June
2	16 of '05.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: What's a green ticket
4	response?
5	MS. SOSA: That's the response to your
6	interim letter.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Oh, okay.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why is it green?
9	MS. SOSA: That's NRR's terminology.
10	Sorry.
11	MEMBER POWERS: And they sent us this red
12	flag based on a green ticket.
13	MS. SOSA: We have all kinds of colors.
14	We have yellow tickets, green tickets.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What does it mean?
16	MEMBER POWERS: It doesn't mean anything,
17	George. Forget about it.
18	(Laughter)
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Somebody decides it's
20	yellow versus green.
21	MEMBER POWERS: No, you take it in, they
22	punch it, and that's it.
23	MR. MATTHEWS: Let me clarify. Don't
24	bother. Please continue. It can be satisfied in
25	nrivate with a true indoctrination. Please continue

1	MEMBER POWERS: Or maybe not.
2	MS. SOSA: Again, we expect your response,
3	hopefully, if we're successful today, July 25 of '05.
4	If you would like to color it, I'll take it anyway.
5	MEMBER POWERS: Can we slip that due date?
6	MS. SOSA: Can we discuss the due date?
7	MEMBER POWERS: Can we slip it a little
8	bit?
9	MS. SOSA: Well, we need about a month to
10	develop the new reg. And the published milestone for
11	that is August 29.
12	MEMBER POWERS: Oh, that's fine. Don't
13	worry.
14	MS. DUDES: Belkys, the short answer is
15	please no.
16	MEMBER POWERS: You may not like our
17	response.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I can't imagine us
19	taking so long to finish a letter.
20	MEMBER POWERS: You haven't seen the
21	letter, have you?
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, either we finish
23	it by something like the twelfth, or we don't finish
24	it till August.
25	MEMBER KRESS: No, September.

1 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: September, okay, you're 2 right. MEMBER KRESS: Unless we want to depart 3 4 from our usual way. 5 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We'd have to alter the bylaws to do that. 6 7 MEMBER POWERS: Please continue. This discussion is going nowhere. 8 9 MS. SOSA: In summary, the staff issued a first of a kind final SER for the North Anna ESP 10 application as scheduled June 16, 2005. The North 11 12 Anna site characteristics with the limitations and conditions proposed by the staff comply with Part 100 13 14 requirements. Reactors having characteristics that 15 fall within the parameters identified in the ESP and which meet the terms and conditions proposed in the 16 17 final SER can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. 18 19 The staff's review concludes that issuance of the 20 North Anna ESP will not be inimical to the common 21 defense and security, or to the health and safety of 22 the public. And because of the first of a kind nature 23 24 of this action, the staff had to work through some of 25 issues identified during the review,

involving the interface between the design and the site issues. In general, the nature of the PPE packs a lot of detailed design information. And that was challenging. The staff is, again, identifying lessons learned for possible input to future rulemakings and revisions to guidance. And we believe the staff has done an outstanding job in preparing this SER. And we appreciate your committee's efforts to support issuance of the new reg.

MEMBER POWERS: Not so congratulatory at

MEMBER POWERS: Not so congratulatory at all here, are you?

MS. SOSA: I'm referring to the technical staff. Eternally grateful. That concludes my presentation. I'll be happy to address any questions.

MEMBER POWERS: Any questions for the speaker? Well, let me comment again that I do congratulate the staff on one of the most readable SERs that's ever come across. You write excellent SERs, lousy responses to ACRS comments, but wonderful SERs. I had really no trouble understanding what the staff had done in its review, where they had just reviewed, where they'd done independent work, and in most cases, not all, but most cases I could understand the bases for the conclusions that the staff had come to. That doesn't include weather, but there's an area

1	there. And I am quite pleased with your work to
2	define criteria for site permit conditions. I think
3	that's an excellent step, and one that I think the
4	Commission has to understand that you've taken here,
5	that I think you deserve some congratulations for
6	that. And that's the only comments I have. So seeing
7	no other questions?
8	VICE CHAIR SHACK: I'd like to see their
9	backup slide.
10	MS. SOSA: How do you know we have backup
11	slides? Did Raj show you?
12	MEMBER POWERS: That'll teach you.
13	MS. SOSA: I can put up there the long-
14	term climate response.
15	MEMBER POWERS: Please. Please show
16	VICE CHAIR SHACK: Dr. Powers? I'd like
17	to make a couple of concluding remarks.
18	MEMBER POWERS: We've got to show Dr.
19	Shack his backup slide or I'll never hear the end of
20	it.
21	VICE CHAIR SHACK: I was hoping my
22	concluding remarks might prevent that, but if we need
23	to.
24	MEMBER POWERS: I have to live with him.
25	You guys get to leave, I have to stay here.

1	VICE CHAIR SHACK: Okay.
2	MEMBER POWERS: Show him the backup
3	slides.
4	MS. SOSA: There you go. This is
5	essentially the same issue that we've been discussing.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: We didn't agree to the
7	Kyoto Protocol.
8	MS. SOSA: Here's our definition for site
9	characteristics.
10	MR. MATTHEWS: And that's sufficient to
11	discuss backup slides.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is there something you
13	don't want us to see here?
14	MS. SOSA: No. The rest is simply a list
15	of the COL action items, which I didn't think we were
16	going to have enough time to go through.
17	MR. MATTHEWS: I'd just like to say, and
18	I want to resonate with a couple of your comments, in
19	particular the one with regard to the readability of
20	this SER. I had Belkys put together one that had
21	"Brag Book" on the front of it.
22	MEMBER POWERS: I would love to see that,
23	by the way.
24	MR. MATTHEWS: In my meetings with my
25	staff, my management Commission staff, I use this as

an example of one of the first major steps forward
with regard to vetting, as I'll call it, proving the
COL process. We've had several successful design
certifications, as you know. They were occasioned by
rulemakings, and a very public, lengthy process, so I
need not belabor that. But with regard to this being
one of the first steps out of the box under this new
Part 52 process beyond those design certifications, I
commended it to my colleagues, even those whose staffs
were participants and contributors, that as an
integrated whole it presented a very good discussion
of how this is all supposed to work. And that's what
I found in the executive summary and the introductory
portions to be one of its great benefits. Before you
jump into these individual issues, you were able to
understand how this was expected to work, and it does
a good job of demonstrating a point that I think has
been lost in the popular media discussions with
Congress relative to what we see as the challenges
with regard to the integration of the ESP design
certifications and COL process. I believe that
there's a misperception that it was expected to have,
basically if you think of it in terms of years, three
finely meshed years that would generate a combined
license at the end. And I've been one who in my

public remarks and some of my writings have tried to bring some realism into those discussions, and indicate that there are regulatory gaps, and missing teeth in those gears. And this document I think demonstrates that clearly, particularly in regard to this issue of the applicability of the plant parameter envelope, and these what I call permit conditions and COL action items. It begins to demonstrate in a very clear way that there are some hurdles to be overcome.

Early in the discussion we had a comment made about the word "test", and we keep hearing that this was a test of the Part 52 process. That's a common word that's been used as to -- I think DOE has perpetuated it. NEI certainly has perpetuated that we're in a testing phase. The staff takes some exception to that definition of the word.

MEMBER POWERS: As well they should.

MR. MATTHEWS: In my view, the testing portion only comes with regard to looking at the degree of finality of certain of the technical issues that the staff reviews, based on the limitations or extensiveness of the applicant's representations as they are able to bring them forward given their commercial decisions at this time. So I think it is a test of the degree of finality, and to some degree

the degree of clarity with regard to the regulatory
requirements. I think that major features discussion
we had is an example of an area where we need to look
at the clarity with which we've expressed our
expectations with regard to a major features
discussion. I'll comment on that point that I think
the major features discussion lacks some definition
that it needs in the regulations. However, I think
the staff will agree that the Supplement 2 to NUREG-
0654 has excessive level of detail in terms of its
expectations. Somehow, what I was trying to say is we
need to meet in the middle on that one. And that's
why I think the EDO is committed that we'll look at
Supplement 2, and to the degree that we can change it
within the confines of the regulation, we'll change
it. And reduce some of that detail that's expected of
the applicants. However, on the other end, we think
that Part 52 might need to be changed to provide some
more specificity about what we mean by major features.
So I don't believe that we're involved in
a test by virtue of these initial ESP applications.

a test by virtue of these initial ESP applications.

I believe that the process itself has been examined extensively through the course of several rule changes over the past 10 years through a public rulemaking process. And I believe the process is sound. What

б

we're testing is its application, and the degree to which we can achieve some finality to the benefit of both the staff and the applicant on some of these issues. And anyway, that's what I wanted to say in conclusion. We appreciate your comments, all of them, and we look forward to continued interaction because we're going to be back here again on two more ESPs in the immediate future, and then we have several more that have been offered as possibilities by future applicants. So we're going to be busy, as will you. Thank you.

What we had hoped to do is MEMBER POWERS: that at some time between the near end of the Round of Three, and the beginning of the Round of N is to get a chance to get together and discuss lessons learned, possible streamlining of the process, refinements of the process, and things like that, more in a collegial discussion and less formality. because I think anything's flawed, in fact I think the process really is -- I've characterized it as grading graduate students. We're going to A to A sort of thing, and correcting any major not any deficiencies.

MR. MATTHEWS: We're not in the pass/fail situation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 MEMBER POWERS: Well, you're passing very 2 well, and it looks like it works well, and it looks 3 like it was exercised well, except of course in your 4 responding to ACRS letters, and we'll go through that 5 in some detail. (Laughter) 6 7 MR. MATTHEWS: We have a lessons learned 8 that will be under way, and we'd love -- we'd welcome 9 the opportunity to have that kind of collegial discussion with you, because I think it would be a 10 11 benefit. 12 MEMBER POWERS: Yes, I think it would be worthwhile, worth our investment of a little time on 13 14 this. 15 MR. MATTHEWS: On more than one occasion, 16 as somebody who also oversees the license renewal 17 process, that interaction with Dr. Bonaca and many of the members has been useful through that process which 18 19 we see as one of continuous improvement as well. 20 we'd like to start down the same road. 21 MEMBER POWERS: Yes. I think we can. Let's see. 22 I thank you for your presentation. 23 instructed to ask if anyone from the audience or 24 public cares to comment? Seeing no one anxious to do

that I will turn it back to you, Mr. Chairman.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We seem to be having
2	thank you very much. We seem to be having
3	extraordinarily long breaks today, and we have a break
4	from now until 1:45 for lunch? I would be very happy
5	to meet for fewer days and have shorter breaks, but
6	that's all right. We will take a break until 1:45
7	since that's what the agenda forces us to do.
8	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
9	the record at 12:07 p.m. and went back on the record
10	at 1:45 p.m.)
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Please come back into
12	session. Welcome to the afternoon. The first item on
13	the agenda is the draft final regulatory guide having
14	to do with guidelines for lightning protection for
15	nuclear power plants. My colleague on my right, Jack
16	Sieber, is going to come onto this session and lead us
17	through it.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thank you, Mr.
19	Chairman.
20	4) DRAFT FINAL REGULATORY GUIDE, DG-1137,
21	"GUIDELINES FOR LIGHTNING PROTECTION FOR
22	NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS"
23	4.1) REMARKS BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
24	MEMBER SIEBER: I'm sure everyone knows
25	that lightning has been around for a long, long time
	·

	144
1	and
2	MEMBER POWERS: Gee, when did it start?
3	MEMBER SIEBER: I actually looked that up,
4	and I will in private session tell you. It is more
5	than 100 years ago.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Lightning started 100
7	years ago?
8	MEMBER SIEBER: More than.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Oh, more than? I see.
10	MEMBER POWERS: Does this mean it's fairly
11	dated information that you have?
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Actually, what we will
13	hear this afternoon is the latest information on
14	lightning protection represented as a draft regulatory
15	guide, DG-1137. And I would point out that there has
16	been professional interest in lightning protection for
17	over 100 years. The first standard that came out was
18	issued by the National Fire Protection Association, I
19	think 103 or 104 years ago.
20	On the other hand, it was designed for
21	commercial buildings, rather than citizen factories
22	and so forth. And even the earliest versions had
23	disclaimers written into them that say, "This standard
24	does not apply to electric generating and distribution

25

facilities."

1 And so from the standpoint of adopting or 2 applying what I think is a really good standard, which 3 is the NFPA standard, the staff can't do that because 4 of the disclaimer. industry itself has its own 5 Now, the organizations: And IEEE has developed over the 6 IEEE. 7 years standards for lightning protection and grounding schemes and so forth that apply specifically to power 8 plants of all types, including nuclear substations, 9 transmission lines, and so forth. 10 And as far as lightning protection is 11 12 concerned, there are a number of standards, mainly four, which, in turn, reference another full set of 13 14 standards that basically address various aspects of 15 lightning protection. The draft regulatory guide endorses with 16 one exception the four IEEE standards. 17 I think the staff did a good job along with its contractors from 18 19 Oak Ridge, did a good job in putting this together. 20 This draft regulatory guide has already 21 been through the public comment period. And the 22 public comments have been incorporated. And so what 23 I would like to do is introduce to you Christina 24 Antonescu, who will make today's presentation along

from

0ak

colleagues

with

her

25

National

Ridge

Laboratory.

Christina? Would you like to go first?

MR. KEMPER: Yes, if you don't mind. My

name is Bill Kemper. I'm the Section Chief for the

Instrumentation and Control Section in the Office of

Research. I just wanted to make a couple of comments

before we begin the presentation.

MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.

MR. KEMPER: This reg guide is the result of several years worth of work. It actually started in the year 2000, a fairly complex issue. But I appreciate your comments about that reg guide. We share that view, I think. It's a good product.

We worked collaboratively with NRR, specifically EEIB, and Oak Ridge National Lab to develop this document, which describes acceptable means for minimizing the consequences of lightning strikes safety-related equipment at nuclear power plants.

This guidance really is based on a considerable amount of industry experience relating to lightning effects on nuclear power plants. And it's intended to complement regulatory guide 1.180, which is the guideline for evaluating electromagnetic radiofrequency interference in safety-related

1 instrumentation and controls, providing a 2 that the electrical really, to ensure surge environment in a nuclear power plant is consistent 3 4 with the assumptions of that standard. 5 So, with that, I'll turn it over to Christina. And thank you very much. 6 7 MS. ANTONESCU: Thanks, Bill. Thanks, 8 John. 9 BRIEFING BY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH 10 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NRC STAFF MS. ANTONESCU: As Bill mentioned, I'm 11 12 Christina Antonescu. I work on the I&C of the Engineering Research Application Branch within the 13 14 Office of Research. I am a program manager at the 15 NRC. And I have an electrical engineering degree. have been a staff member in the I&C Section of the 16 Office of Research for almost 15 years. 17 I'm joined today by two of my contractors 18 19 involvement in the development of 20 technical basis for this draft guide. Roger Kisner, 21 on my left, is a researcher and a program manager at 22 Oak Ridge National Lab. He has a Master's in nuclear 23 engineering, over 30 years' experience with electrical 24 and electronic systems as well as measurement

technologies. Mr. Kisner is also a registered

1 electrical engineer. 2 Dr. Richard Wood, on my right, is also a 3 researcher and program manager at Oak Ridge National 4 Lab. He has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering and over 5 26 years' experience with digital I&C technology. The purpose of the briefing is to discuss 6 7 DG-1137, the draft guide on lightning. We'll discuss the background and approach and the need for guidance 8 9 on lightning protection. I will also give you an overview of the draft guide and our responses to the 10 public comments. 11 12 We are here to request concurrence, of course, from ACRS to issue this draft guide. Now let 13 14 me start by also giving you information about the 15 guide itself. The focus of the reg guide is on new 16 Its purpose is to define a road map of the lightning 17 good practices that ensure adequate 18 protection to make certain those practices 19 available for new plant construction. 20 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Why the emphasis on 21 the new plants? It's a reg guide. 22 mandatory. 23 MS. ANTONESCU: No, it's not. 24 presentation, I'll answer this question. You'll see.

Why we generate this guidance, DG-1137

1 provides needed guidance as for new plant license 2 applicants. This guide responds to NRR user need 3 request 2002-017. Consensus lightning protection 4 practices have evolved since NFPA-78, as John has 5 mentioned. NFPA-78 is referenced in the standard review plan, chapter 7, along with IEEE 665, as part 6 7 of the electromagnetic compatibility systems. 8 has been no regulatory guidance on lightning 9 So clearly this would be useful at this protection. 10 point. Finally, we feel comprehensive guidance 11 12 assure adequacy and consistency of lightning protection approaches employed for new plants. 13 14 So the development of the technical basis 15 involved systematic approach. First, lightning data 16 gathered from actual nuclear power experience. These data were collected from LERs, NRC 17 inspection reports, and industry reports, such as from 18 19 EPRI. 20 Second, the accepted practices of industry 21 were evaluated: IEEE; NFPA, the National Fire 22 Protection Association; and UL, the Underwriter Lab. 23 And, third, we had planned to perform 24 confirmatory research, including the failure modes and

effects analysis. But those tasks were struck early

1 in the program because the first two components of the approach were adequate and sufficient for establishing 2 3 the technical basis. 4 So NUREG/CR-6866 documents these findings 5 from exploring the first two components, recommendation for establishing the guidance. 6 7 Experiences related to lightning events were gathered over a 24-year period. A total of 240 8 9 events were uncovered. Chris Rourk of the NRC conducted a study covering the period between 1980 and 10 1991. His study uncovered 174 events. Recently Oak 11 12 Ridge conducted their own study of the period between 1992 and 2003 and uncovered 66 events. 13 14 We carefully examined all these reported And these are some of the findings. 15 events. significant impact on plant is from local lightning 16 strikes versus the propagated through transmission 17 18 lines. lightning-inducted 19 And electrical 20 transients from transmission lines do not typically 21 propagate directly on the plants. About 32 percent of 22 the 240 lightning-related events resulted in a reactor 23 trip. 24 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How do they do that if 25 they don't propagate into the plant?

1	DR. WOOD: The direct strikes.
2	MS. ANTONESCU: These were direct strikes
3	at the plant.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Direct strikes not
5	involving transmission lines?
6	MS. ANTONESCU: No. They were not
7	propagated for the transmission lines.
8	MEMBER DENNING: And what sense, then,
9	that leads to the trip? What actually leads to the
10	trip itself? How is the trip initiated?
11	DR. WOOD: There are a variety of
12	equipment failures and things like that. A little
13	later in the presentation, it will talk about some
14	specific
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It depends on where the
16	plant is hit.
17	DR. WOOD: Right.
18	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes, it depends on where
19	the plant is hit.
20	DR. WOOD: So the specific mechanism that
21	leads to the trip varies depending on what the strike
22	is.
23	MEMBER DENNING: Typically is it an
24	electrical surge, then, that leads to it? I mean, do
25	we really take out that many I can't believe that

1	lightning strikes result in that many
2	MR. KISNER: It's not that the equipment
3	there are cases of equipment damage. But it's more
4	a case of spurious signals.
5	MEMBER DENNING: But surge is the
6	mechanism.
7	MR. KISNER: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it has to come in
9	some conducting path, doesn't it?
10	DR. WOOD: Through these service entrants,
11	the power distribution into the plant.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Which is not what you
13	call a transmission line and it's between the switch
14	here on the plant somewhere?
15	DR. WOOD: Right.
16	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes. I'll talk about the
17	specifics later on.
18	MR. KISNER: Lightning has anywhere the
19	transmission line. It can hit a remote substation 75
20	miles away, knock the power out. So you have a loss
21	of power. But the transient doesn't make it in.
22	You can have a strike on a transmission
23	line at or around the transformer yard at the plant.
24	You can have a strike inside of the yard. Now it's
25	propagating its way in.

1	There have been cases of strikes to piping
2	and vents and components as a part of the building
3	which were not properly grounded and so on. Those
4	transients made it into the plant onto signal lines,
5	onto power lines. It's a very wide variety of
6	experiences.
7	DR. WOOD: We'll talk in a little more
8	detail about that.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But if you look at
LO	the first two bullets, there is a period of 11 years
L1	in the first one and 11 years in the second. Yet, the
L2	number of events is less than half.
L3	DR. WOOD: She'll get to that.
L4	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes. I will get to this
L5	particular point.
L6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
L7	MS. ANTONESCU: So 27 percent of the 240
L8	lightning-related events result in loss of off-site
L9	power, and 60 percent of the 240 events result in
20	equipment malfunction. These results show lightning
21	occurrences impact plant availability, but, more
22	importantly, these results confirm that lightning
23	strikes can challenge safety system in nuclear power
24	plants.
25	MEMBER POWERS: One would presume that the

1 industry would be concerned about these things. 2 know what they're doing about this? 3 MS. ANTONESCU: Yes. 4 MEMBER POWERS: I mean, it strikes me as 5 unusual to have a lightning strike actually cause a I mean, it seems like an undesirable 6 reactive trip. 7 thing. Right. The industry has been 8 DR. WOOD: concerned about it and has been actively engaged in 9 bodies, 10 the standards committees improving practices, and upgrading their plant facilities. 11 And 12 that relates to why the focus of this guide is on new plants, rather than existing plants because 13 14 industry is already working and improving their 15 performance. I understand. 16 MEMBER POWERS: 17 MS. ANTONESCU: As you can see, the trend towards a lesser number of events is filed between 18 19 1992 and 2003. I will talk about it in more and more 20 detail in the next couple of viewgraphs, but we feel 21 that this is due to plants took a more proactive 22 approach to maintain and improve their lightning 23 protection systems. So we have less events of 24 lightning during that period of time.

Next slide actually shows the data, a

1 recent trend toward reduction, as Ι said, in 2 lightning-related events. The number of events from 3 1980 into 2003 shows a peak in the rate of occurrences 4 during the mid 1980s and a decline in the next decade 5 with a couple of outliers in 2003 and 1991. There are no definitive causative effects 6 7 that can clearly explain why this trend exists. However, one reasonable explanation is that it appears 8 that utilities have made a concerted effort to 9 maintain and upgrade lightning protection systems and 10 11 after the lightning incidents. 12 We did have an EPRI and SCC 41 study that looked at four plants and two with significantly 13 14 higher levels of lightning protection. So we learned 15 that plants took a more proactive approach maintaining lightning protection systems. 16 MEMBER POWERS: I know that at our 17 regions, where lightning strikes are extremely common, 18 19 do we have sort of what I would call a lightning 20 frequency map for our various plants? 21 MR. KISNER: We actually have that as a 22 back-up slide. We didn't include that in the main 23 lineup. 24 MEMBER POWERS: When you get a chance. 25 What I did was actually MR. KISNER: Yes.

1	overlaid the plant locations, the map of those, with
2	what they call a keratonic map, and put the two
3	together so we can see what plants
4	MEMBER POWERS: Most interesting.
5	MR. KISNER: The end result of looking at
6	that map is to finally say, "Well, a few plants are
7	going to be hit hard, like in the Florida region and
8	some other regions. Other places, there is no zero."
9	MEMBER POWERS: Yes.
10	MR. KISNER: There is a place where
11	lightning never
12	MEMBER POWERS: Yes. It's like tornadoes.
13	There's no zero.
14	MR. KISNER: There's no zero. So,
15	therefore, you're really obligated to make plants in
16	all locations live up to all the standards that apply.
17	MEMBER POWERS: Okay. Well, most
18	interesting.
19	MS. ANTONESCU: So this chart, the next
20	slide, shows a breakdown of the LER data by event
21	categories, the reactor trip and loss of off-site
22	power, the dominant events as extracted from the LER
23	database over the 24-year period.
24	From this chart, we can see a decline in
25	the number of events during the second period. So
l	

1 this could again indicate that plants have been 2 improving their lightning protection systems through maintenance and upgrade. 3 4 So, in conclusion, based on all of the 5 data, it seems clear that consensus practices are becoming more mature. And we believe efforts to 6 7 ensure lightning protection are improving. Thus, NRC 8 needs to evaluate those practices for endorsement as 9 part of this project. 10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. improving. Are we good enough? Was the previous 11 situation bad enough? I mean, so okay. 12 We're looking at an event, and the trend is downward. 13 That's good. Why should we worry about it? Has any PRA shown that 14 15 lightning is a dominant contributor or even mid-level contributor? 16 MR. KISNER: So far lightning shows that 17 it trips plants. 18 19 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 20 MR. KISNER: No incident has occurred that we saw where lightning caused a safety system or 21 22 protection system to become nonfunctional. 23 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right. 24 MR. KISNER: So, therefore, its pathway, 25 its connection in PRA is one of excessive trips.

2 DR. WOOD: There was a study by Brookhaven, -- one of Christina's programs sponsored 3 4 that -- where they looked at digital system failures. 5 And it identified EMI. And in that category of EMI was also included surge induced by lightning as one of 6 7 the significant environmental stress contributors to I&C system misoperation or failure. But there's not 8 9 been a probablistic assessment and also an assessment of the cost benefits of --10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So all of this is 11 12 done in the name of defense-in-depth, then? DR. WOOD: 13 Yes. 14 MEMBER DENNING: Well, I think they've got 15 to be a little bit careful here, George, because we are now moving towards digital control systems. 16 there's clearly the potential for common cause failure 17 of safety-related systems here. 18 19 Whether the evidence shows 20 happened or not, clearly it's an area that requires 21 looking at. Whether there's been adequate looking at 22 it so far I don't know, but I would be hesitant to 23 jump to the conclusion that this is just a matter of 24 trip without the potential for the common cause 25 failure of other systems because that's the concern.

1

that's where it's at.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, systems we
2	don't have. We don't control anything with digital.
3	MEMBER DENNING: Well, we are starting to
4	We actually do, George. And it's going to happen. I
5	mean, that's what's going to be. I mean, I don't
6	think there's any question it's going to be that way.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No. I know.
8	MEMBER DENNING: And it's more than just
9	I mean, there are digital systems now that are
10	important.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, the digital systems
12	aren't the only thing, you know. There are all kinds
13	of relays and actuating devices that may be even
14	electromechanicals that can be affected by lightning.
15	So this is not a new deal. In fact, you
16	know, all of your motor protection and transformer
17	protection and breaker schemes rely on the
18	establishment of a good common ground for the plant in
19	order to be able to detect things like differentials.
20	And so it goes well beyond digital I&C.
21	The bigger question is section D of the
22	draft guide makes it apply to new plants only, even
23	though we know that some older plants are going to be
24	backfitted with digital I&C.
25	Now, I sort of pondered that in the

1 process of reviewing all of this. And I note the fact 2 that we did do a radiofrequency interference and surge protection set of guides. And this is a companion 3 4 guide to those guides. 5 Those guides specify what the devices ought to be able to tolerate and reject. 6 This quide 7 limits the strength of the RFI and the surge that it 8 would impose on those systems. 9 So to me there is not necessarily an And at least the backfit rule would 10 inconsistency. prevent us from making this applicable to existing 11 12 plants. On the other hand, I think it's a mistake 13 14 to say that it's just digital I&C that is causing this I presume the staff agrees with that. 15 change. 16 MS. ANTONESCU: Yes, we do. 17 MR. KEMPER: Yes. In fact, from my experience in working with power plants, most reactor 18 19 trips are a result of secondary effects, like low 20 rejections, loss of feed pumps, loss of condensate 21 system. You're right. It's a big rotating machinery 22 is what typically gets you. It's not so much the 23 digital I&C. MEMBER SIEBER: Well, having worked in 24 25 power plants, digital I&C can get you, too.

1 MR. KEMPER: Absolutely, absolutely, yes. 2 MEMBER SIEBER: And usually when it does, it gets you bad. But there are all kinds of 3 4 opportunities for the plant to trip. 5 MS. ANTONESCU: So this viewgraph summarizes the risks from the 6 seen operating 7 experience. Review of operating experience shows that 8 lightning can cause a risk to a nuclear power plant 9 facility. As you recall from the previous viewgraph, 10 11 lightning contributes to a significant number of loss 12 of off-site power events. And lightning can result in loss of fire protection and may initiate a fire. 13 14 lightning can cause a reactor trip as accompanied by 15 random systems and component misoperation and failure. So we do have more information about it in 16 17 the NUREG/CR that Oak Ridge put together. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But they don't really 18 19 write them in the current codes through a certain 20 It's just that you don't quite know what is path. 21 going to fail because you haven't analyzed it yet. 22 The process by itself isn't random, the cause and 23 effect. And there is a traceable cause. Well, this is not a minor 24 MEMBER DENNING: 25 I mean, the way I interpreted that statement, Graham.

1	third bullet was they were saying lightning causes a
2	reactor trip. Now, in conjunction, you might have
3	random system failures and stuff like that. I think
4	the real question is, do you have causal failures as
5	well, that the lightning causes not only the
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, they cause all
7	failures, don't they?
8	MEMBER DENNING: I don't know what they
9	mean.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Your random system
11	failures are actually the ones caused by the
12	lightning, aren't they?
13	MR. KISNER: No. Well, you can have
14	situations in which the lightning causes a transient
15	surge, the surge itself knocks out some
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's what you mean,
17	isn't it?
18	MR. KISNER: And then there's a cascade of
19	
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right.
21	MR. KISNER: And so the random failures
22	can be a part of the cascade, but the
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So they are cause and
24	effect?
25	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes, there is a first

1	consequence
2	MEMBER DENNING: That's very poor
3	terminology, then, to call that random.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You wouldn't call
5	them random. Random means independent. Random means
6	actually independent of the lightning. I mean,
7	something is out for maintenance. That has nothing to
8	do with lightning. And it is part of the cut set.
9	And then the lightning causes the other events.
10	DR. WOOD: Yes. I think you're right.
11	The word "random" should be struck.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Independent.
13	MR. KISNER: I don't believe we actually
14	used the word in our CR. And I don't think the reg
15	guide had anything close to that in it.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But still, though, I
17	mean, in spite of the comments you gentlemen made
18	earlier, you don't have an actual event that did all
19	this stuff, did you?
20	MS. ANTONESCU: We had an event, actually
21	
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That did all of this?
23	MS. ANTONESCU: At Yankee-Rowe, we had
24	DR. WOOD: Yes. In the NUREG, I think
25	there's a diagram showing a cascade of events from one

1	particular LER.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And what was the net
3	result?
4	MR. KISNER: The net result was the plant
5	was out for several days. And there was significant
6	damage to equipment. There were communication
7	failures. There were failures of doors to lock or
8	unlock, to lock people access.
9	Some things failed. It almost looked
10	random, but there was no random. It was causal
11	reports. And ultimately they got the plant back
12	operating after quite a few days. There were some
13	close calls.
14	In the end, the reactor tripped and shut
15	down properly within milliseconds of the first action.
16	MEMBER DENNING: I think George's question
17	really relates to, do you have any cases where you had
18	to trip and you also had degradation of safe shutdown
19	capability coincident? That is, did it happen that
20	that particular failure that occurred was in a safe
21	shutdown system that would have
22	MR. KISNER: We postulate such a thing
23	could possibly happen. I've never seen that happen,
24	looking for that but have not found it, which is good.
25	DR WOOD: Had we seen something like

1	that, then I don't think there would be any question
2	that the staff would probably have proposed this apply
3	to existing plants as well as a backfit.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: But they would have to
5	meet a higher burden to
6	DR. WOOD: That's true.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the reason why it
8	doesn't apply to existing plants is
9	MS. ANTONESCU: Well, because plants
10	already employ lightning protection.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But as a backfit
12	tool, you don't think it is going to pass the
13	backfitting, right?
14	DR. WOOD: We haven't done an assessment.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which confirms what
16	I have been saying all along, that it is not a
17	risk-significant contributor, but that is okay.
18	DR. WOOD: Right.
19	MEMBER DENNING: There is not sufficient
20	evidence to indicate it is a risk-significant
21	contributor, correct.
22	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes, there is not enough.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: I think it's also
24	important to at least from my own viewpoint the way
25	I look at this, taking surges or IFI into a digital

1	protection system is a lot different than taking them
2	and causing failures in digital control systems. You
3	know, a controller can go out. And the parameters zip
4	out. And the plant will still trip.
5	On the other hand, there is at least in
6	the United States only one plant that I know of that
7	potentially might put in a digital protection system.
8	All the rest are analog-type systems.
9	And so there is to my mind a built-in
10	sturdiness to non-digital systems in the protection
11	scheme that would tell me that it's okay not to apply
12	the sophistication of this reg guide to existing
13	plants.
14	To me, it is also probably a pretty sure
15	thing that new plants, new reactors with new concepts
16	will have digital protection systems.
17	DR. WOOD: There are a few plants that do
18	have digital protection systems.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but it's a very small
20	number.
21	DR. WOOD: A very small number.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Good.
24	MS. ANTONESCU: So this is the slide that
25	actually shows a lightning event that can initiate a

1	cascade of effects. Possible consequences of
2	lightning strike are shown in the diagram. The
3	entries in the diagram are representative and are not
4	intended to be exhaustive.
5	The primary facts, like damage to
6	electrical distribution system, damage to electric
7	motors, generation of spurious signals, can lead to
8	isolation of system circuit breaker
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: When you're say,
10	"failure of power supplies," what do you mean? Do you
11	mean station blackout?
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Breaker trip.
13	MS. ANTONESCU: Power.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Just breaker trips. You
15	may lose a bus someplace because of the lightning.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you still have the
17	
18	MR. KISNER: Well, in the one case of
19	Yankee-Rowe, they have lost some diesel because of the
20	lightning.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, it's possible.
22	MR. KISNER: I mean, they managed to get
23	things going back manually and, you know, after a
24	number of steps. So it's not inconceivable that you
25	could go completely

1	MEMBER DENNING: Dr. Apostolakis will now
2	take back his earlier comment. It's just
3	defense-in-depth.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is
5	defense-in-depth. I don't think it's
6	risk-significant, but the defense-in-depth is fine.
7	You know, we have to
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Damage to an electric
9	motor would certainly fry a computer. Electric motors
10	are major.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You know, in the old
12	days, when we did this, external events, for the first
13	time, it would be much more convincing if, instead of
14	these columns, you had two or three actual scenarios
15	of PRAs.
16	You don't have the certain frequency. And
17	then with adding the lightning strike, that frequency
18	went up some rough estimate because then it would be
19	much more convincing. And that is what we did with
20	fires in the old days.
21	You know, the scenarios exist in the
22	internal event PRA. You know, pick some because right
23	now it's really no. It's not. No. It is. I mean,
24	yes. Okay. I mean, that's why we have a PRA.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: I think they're just

1	trying to make the point that this is what happens.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand the
3	point, but what I'm saying, the point would be
4	stronger if you did that. I'm not disagreeing with
5	the point.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But in the future, the
7	worst event would presumably be a lightning strike
8	which disabled a large proportion of the digital
9	control and information system.
LO	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
L1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That would be presumably
L2	the worst thing that you could think of. So the
L3	operators didn't know what was happening or got false
L4	information or things started and stopped randomly and
L5	so on. Isn't that the thing that
L6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: At some point
L7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: people have worried
L8	about?
L9	MR. KISNER: And that actually happened
20	with the Yankee-Rowe?
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes. It was a long time
22	ago.
23	MR. KISNER: It was.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is that the plant
25	that is shut down now?

1	MR. KISNER: It is now shut down. It
2	won't happen there again.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It won't happen
4	again.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: That wasn't digital
6	systems either.
7	MR. KISNER: No, no. That was analog
8	systems.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. It was totally
10	analog. And so it's not related. I think it's also
11	a mistake to say that if a lightning strike can fry a
12	motor, it will surely fry a computer. It depends on
13	the standards that each is built to and whatever
14	inherent weaknesses in the insulation systems each
15	has.
16	I could picture a lightning strike coming
17	in on a 6 kV or 4 kV bus that might fry a motor or
18	trip a circuit breaker that a computer could ride
19	through if it had the proper power supply. So let's
20	not jump to that assumption. I don't think
21	DR. WOOD: It's got to get through the
22	different protective measures.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
24	MR. KISNER: Which gets back to the point
25	we mentioned and you mentioned earlier, as you said.

1	setting the environment. As you said, if you set the
2	surge environment correctly, then the other work of
3	the EMI can take place and be properly applied.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right. Right.
5	MR. KISNER: So we want to make sure we're
6	fitting that environment. Now, how do you fit that
7	environment? Well, you follow certain rules. You
8	design circuits and route them a certain way. And
9	that's what this is about.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: All right. Okay. Moving
11	on.
12	MS. ANTONESCU: Moving on. So the results
13	are that the primary facts can result in isolation of
14	systems. And that, in turn, can lead to major actions
15	in the plant like back to trend connections.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: As opposed to the
17	description, do you have any analysis of it in a
18	quantitative form?
19	MS. ANTONESCU: No, we don't have.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's what I asked.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes. Well, I'm sorry.
22	I'm asking it again in a different way perhaps.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: With a different
24	accent.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The description is very

1	nice, but unless you put some numbers on it, I'm not
2	quite sure what it means.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's what we did
4	with fires.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You said, how does it
6	affect the PRA and the
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You take a sequence.
8	And you say, "Look, this is the frequency you guys are
9	getting now. If I postulate a certain lightning
10	event, here is how these things would change." You
11	don't have to be very precise, but if you show that
12	there is a significant change
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Was it a 10 ⁻¹⁸ event in
14	the CDF or
15	MEMBER SIEBER: No, it was not.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: With all of this
17	discussion between Jack and Rich, I'm wondering now.
18	Is there a single event that can disable all of the
19	digital I&C in the plant? I don't know. I mean, we
20	might as well speculate.
21	MR. FLACK: George, this is John Flack
22	with ACRS.
23	I believe this may have been a generic
24	issue at some point. And if it was, it would have
25	been resolved that way. And if it was resolved that
Į	I control of the cont

1	way, it was probably prior to their thinking about
2	I&C, which means, then, that if you introduce I&C now,
3	you may want to revisit that generic issue. But it
4	may have been a generic issue, which would then have
5	to be quantified and so on.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anyway, it was an
7	innocent comment that created a surprising amount of
8	reaction.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Often they're the best.
10	Often they're the best.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's more convincing
12	to put a sequence up there and show these things,
13	rather than saying what you're saying now. If I were
14	you, I'd move on.
15	MS. ANTONESCU: Okay. Thank you.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, what is a
17	comment which is not innocent?
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Sorry?
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can you give me an
20	example of a comment which is not innocent?
21	MEMBER POWERS: Most of my comments.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The ones you make.
23	MEMBER POWERS: The ones you make, Graham,
24	are not innocent. I see people nodding in the back in
25	the audience.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The ones we make over
2	here are very
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Actually, there hasn't
4	been an innocent comment in this room for a long time.
5	MS. ANTONESCU: So the next slide shows
6	the need for guidance technically does exist for
7	guidance on the lightning protection. New
8	technologies being used in plants, new plants will
9	employ such technology to a greater extent.
10	So nuclear power plants see widespread of
11	the digital and low-voltage analog electronic systems.
12	Electric and electronic components can fail due to
13	transients and current electronic devices are more
14	vulnerable than
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What you mean is
16	additional considerations for the need of guidance.
17	Is that what the title should be?
18	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes, yes.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Again, I mean, we've
20	beaten this to death, but it seems to me you are going
21	out of you way to convince us that this is a
22	worthwhile project. That's fine. Go on. That's
23	fine. That's fine.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, if you look at it
25	not from the standpoint of accident prevention or

1 minimizing consequences, this is really an electrical 2 engineer's design process. 3 MS. ANTONESCU: Right. 4 MEMBER SIEBER: And if it weren't a 5 nuclear power plant, you would go through these steps of setting specifications, both as to the capability 6 7 of the devices and the surges in RFIs that are imposed 8 on those devices and limiting those if you were 9 designing an electric car or a refrigerator. And so 10 this is just part of the design process. MS. ANTONESCU: So additionally lightning 11 research at new plants must be consistent with that 12 measured at existing plants. The reason is to make 13 14 sure that the existing electromagnetic guidance is 15 adequate for the new plant. So current EMC guidance is in the reg guide, 1.180, as you said before. 16 17 MEMBER SIEBER: Right. So the test levels are 18 MS. ANTONESCU: expected 19 based electromagnetic and surge on 20 through extensive environment established plant 21 measurements. 22 In conclusion, lightning protection 23 needed to address new and potentially more vulnerable 24 technology and to ensure that the EMC guidance remains 25 adequate.

1	This slide, the next slide, shows
2	lightning-related activities over the last 20 years at
3	NRC and several other organizations. Standards
4	activities in lightning protection intensified in the
5	1990s, there is lots of information of this slide, I
6	know. And the colors are representative of work by
7	different organizations.
8	So standards studies, guidance development
9	all contributing to the development of this guide.
10	And there are a couple of them. I'm not going to go
11	through all of them, but the NRC lightning-related
12	activity dated back to a reg guide, draft reg guide,
13	in 1979.
14	There was also an information notice in
15	1985 and an engineering evaluation report. Then we
16	had an inspection report from Yankee-Rowe that
17	describes in great detail the series of events at a
18	nuclear power plant.
19	And in 1991, we had a petition for
20	rulemaking that was originated by Richard Grille,
21	former NRC staffer. And he was petitioning the NRC to
22	address concerns related to lightning.
23	And then in 1992, the NRC staff issued a
24	report authored by Chris Rourk. And then in 1996,

there were two unpublished NRC reports written on

lightning. One was on the technical basis, and the other one was on some analysis for preparation of a reg guide. Afterwards, around 2002, we got a user need from NRR followed by our work in 2005 on developing a reg guide.

In 1981 also, there was an EPRI/NSAC 41 report, which found wide differences in protection

report, which found wide differences in protection between nuclear power plants. In 2001, the UL 96A covers insulation practices, including air terminals, down conductors, and grounding systems.

And now we come to the four primary IEEE standards that form the basis of lightning protection.

Those are the ones that we're actually endorsing and we'll discuss later.

Current industrial guidance on lightning protection comes from NFPA-780 and UL 96A, as John has mentioned. Basically, neither of these were intended to be applied to power plants.

The NFPA-780 provides facility protection guidance and philosophy. Virtually all lightning protection standards referenced it. However, it excludes electric generation facilities, the same with UL 96A. It provides facility protection, insulation practice, but, however, it excludes electrical generating distribution and transmission systems. So

1	in both cases, the principal focus is on fire
2	prevention and personnel protection, no impact on
3	electrical systems.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, it does
5	talk about lightning protection systems. And it has
6	good maintenance and training
7	MS. ANTONESCU: Right.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: sections in there,
9	which IEEE doesn't have.
10	MS. ANTONESCU: Exactly. That's why we
11	are trying to adopt some of these practices.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: And it's sort of
13	unfortunate. I guess all you can do is recommend to
14	the industry that they read them and perhaps on their
15	own adopt some of these practices.
16	MR. KISNER: Well, in our endorsing of at
17	least one or two of these IEEE standards, they, in
18	turn, call out 780.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, yes. But it's sort
20	of a roundabout kind of a way. You know, you've got
21	to go through this long chain to get to it.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's standard for
23	IEEE standards.
24	MEMBER POWERS: Yes.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They gite each other

	1,7
1	like crazy.
2	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.
3	MEMBER POWERS: They do, in an effort to
4	make them incomprehensible in mortal men.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Eventually you end up
6	where you started.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
8	MS. ANTONESCU: So given the information
9	we discussed, I want to give a more detailed
10	description of DG-1137. What is DG-1137? It
11	describes acceptable practices for design and
12	qualifications related to requirements of 10 CFR.
13	So it does describe acceptable practices
14	that contribute to fulfilling the relevant regulation
15	and safety criteria, specifically GDC 2 for protection
16	against natural phenomena and GDC 3, protection
17	against fire; and then GDC 17, electrical power system
18	requirements.
19	The purpose of the guide is DG-1137
20	provides guidance on lightning protection that is
21	acceptable to NRC staff. The purpose is to minimize
22	challenges to operability of safety-related systems
23	due to lightning-induced transients and to minimize
24	spurious operation of safety-related systems due to

lightning-induced transients.

1	What it does is it supplies guidance on
2	design and installation practices for lightning
3	protection systems. It recommends general defense
4	against lightning strikes. It provides a reasonable
5	assurance that a lightning event will not challenge,
6	compromise, or cause spurious operation of
7	safety-related systems in nuclear power plants.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Actually, it doesn't
9	provide any guidance at all, does it? It just
LO	endorses other people's standards.
L1	MEMBER SIEBER: That's guidance.
L2	MS. ANTONESCU: But that is guidance.
L3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it doesn't provide
L4	direct guidance in itself.
L5	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
L6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Indirectly by indirect
L7	action endorsing other standards?
L8	MS. ANTONESCU: By indirect endorsement of
L9	
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And you sort of assumed
21	that they're good enough, but you haven't analyzed
22	that they are good enough to provide
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Unless there's a
24	presidential directive that federal agencies should be
25	using
J	I

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Consensus standards.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: the maximum
3	possible.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right, I know,
5	but the guidance okay. There was nothing in the
6	guidance itself which provides some guidance generated
7	by the NRC. It's all referenced to something somebody
8	else did.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. The guidance to
10	MS. ANTONESCU: The guidance is the
11	endorsement of acceptable practices that industry is
12	using.
13	DR. WOOD: One way to look at it is it
14	provides guidance by giving a road map on which
15	standards to use.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right.
18	MS. ANTONESCU: So how is it useful? It
19	establishes the foundation for updating review
20	guidance on lining protection in nuclear power plants
21	and standard review plan. And, in addition, the guide
22	is complementary to reg guide 1.180.
23	So the scope of DG-1137, coverage is
24	plant-wide. It starts in the plants which are with
25	components related to plant power systems. It

1	includes power plant buildings an also electrical
2	distribution systems and safety-related systems within
3	a building and any other ancillary facilities.
4	What it does not cover is transmission
5	line high-voltage equipment which is outside the scope
6	because there are grid issues. And what is not
7	addressed is protection against secondary facts that
8	are ready at the EMI because that is covered in reg
9	guide 1.180.
10	DG-1137
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So wait a minute.
12	The stuff in there within the box of the dashed line
13	
14	MR. KISNER: It actually starts
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: that's what you
16	protect?
17	MR. KISNER: It starts at the switchyard.
18	MS. ANTONESCU: It starts at the
19	switchyard.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Including the
21	switchyard?
22	MS. ANTONESCU: Including
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So why isn't it in
24	the box?
25	MR. KISNER: Well, the box is only
I	1

1	referring to
2	MS. ANTONESCU: The building.
3	MR. KISNER: those things that are
4	within the building, protected in a sense by the
5	building but has nothing to do with
6	DR. WOOD: Yes. The dashed line isn't
7	intended to
8	MS. ANTONESCU: It's just showing the
9	building, the protected
10	MEMBER SIEBER: If you look at the typical
11	switchyard, there are a few components in there,
12	perhaps the main unit transformer or more likely the
13	main unit circuit breakers, in the bus feeds that
14	belong to the station. The rest of it is external
15	electrical transmission and distribution equipment,
16	which isn't covered.
17	MS. ANTONESCU: Right.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: And so there should really
19	be a little dashed thing into the switchyard to cover
20	those few pieces of equipment that belong to the
21	station.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, the thing
23	that's confusing, I mean, you said that the line
24	there, the box, does not indicate protection. It
25	gave "Drotected " So immediately your mind goes you

1	know, what's inside is protected.
2	What you're saying is that is
3	MS. ANTONESCU: We actually have a debate
4	about that.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's not a question
6	of blame. It's just better communication if you move
7	the line a little bit.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, the
9	switchyard and the transmission system is protected.
10	And the reason why it's protected is because it's in
11	the utility's best commercial interest to do so
12	MS. ANTONESCU: Right.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: and not because of some
14	nuclear safety reason.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But can the utility
16	do anything about the grid? I thought that now
17	they're supposed to keep a
18	MEMBER SIEBER: It depends on who owns
19	what section.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But somebody owns it,
21	right?
22	MR. KEMPER: That's correct, usually.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Ferrell Gray from
24	Southern California Edison said the other day that we
25	keep a distance between. We don't want to get

involved and be accused.

MEMBER SIEBER: The nuclear power plants keep their distance from the grid. And that was the case even before deregulation. The transmission and system operators ran their own ship. And the connection between the switchyard and the power plant consisted of just a few devices, enough to get the electricity out and get our auxiliary power back in.

But otherwise there are standards for transmission and distribution systems that have ground protection and have differential trips, pilot water trips, all kinds of things, that protect against the lines against lightning strikes and will isolate a section of transmission line from the plant to prevent a surge into the plant or at least minimize it. But that's not considered under the standards.

 $\label{eq:ms.match} \text{MS. ANTONESCU:} \quad \text{It's not under the} \\ \text{standards, yes.} \\$

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I didn't understand this figure because it seemed to me that what you want to do is you either want to direct the surge to ground or you want to somehow have a breaker which prevents it getting into the plant. There's nothing in this figure that indicates anything like that.

MR. KISNER: Right. This figure was just

1	showing what are the major
2	MEMBER SIEBER: What's affected.
3	MR. KISNER: kind of
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But the grounding system
5	isn't connected to anything. I don't know what it's
6	doing here.
7	MR. KISNER: No. It was merely
8	decorative.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But that's very
10	important. I mean, a lot of these standards deal with
11	how you ground things,
12	MR. KISNER: Later you'll see a slide in
13	
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: how you evaluate the
15	U.S. impedance in all of these things.
16	MR. KISNER: Exactly. And later you will
17	see a slide which under these major component areas
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That can be very
19	significant.
20	MR. KISNER: We show which of the
21	standards apply to them.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But doesn't this say
23	that anything that can be affected by a lightning
24	strike is protected? What do you leave out? Nothing.
25	I mean, you're under the building. You're protecting

1	everything.
2	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: In effect, yes.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It would help if you
5	would say, "Lightning comes in here. And this is how
6	you divert it" or something. Are you going to tell us
7	that?
8	MEMBER SIEBER: The standards tell you
9	that.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I believe already
11	they have regretted putting this up there.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
13	MR. KISNER: We should put an electric
14	schematic up there. I can see it right now.
15	MR. KEMPER: We should have provided an
16	electrical schematic. You're right.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: The standards do describe
18	delta- y and establish the ground. It describes
19	protection systems. If you get down to some digital
20	transmitter someplace, it will probably be grounded
21	for RFI interests, but it won't have lightning
22	protection built into it. That's already part of the
23	station distribution system.
24	MS. ANTONESCU: Right. So DG-1137
25	provides guidelines in specific areas relevant to

1	lightning protection. These elements are grounding
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, grounding involves
3	a lot of the conductors buried in the ground.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Isn't that? I mean, a
6	considerable amount of the conductors in the ground.
7	MS. ANTONESCU: What we
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Otherwise the impedance
9	is much too big otherwise.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you have a big map.
11	And everything is
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Big map, right.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Everything is connected to
14	that map.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You have a big map.
16	MS. ANTONESCU: What we
17	MR. KISNER: Not just nuclear power plants
18	but
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Every power plant.
20	MR. KISNER: plants, substations all
21	put a ground grid down.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right.
23	MR. KISNER: And then at periodic
24	intervals, a grounding rod is run into the ground.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right, right.

1	MR. KISNER: And an impedance is
2	established, low impedance is established, to meet
3	some minimum criteria for the entire structure.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is this within the scope
5	of license renewal you inspect these ground things?
6	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
7	MEMBER BONACA: I haven't seen it, no.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
9	MR. KISNER: Those are not generally
10	inspected.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, it's
12	sort of obvious if you have a bad ground, you get a
13	light in the control room at the control for the
14	breaker that says the ground is bad because you will
15	show a differential between the common station ground
16	and a specific device that is ground. And so that
17	becomes a normal part of the operator's process when
18	he sees ground lights.
19	If you get an unintentional ground on two
20	different devices, they are both going to trip. And
21	so establish
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, it's difficult to
23	get consistent grounds, though.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Well, if you take a
25	Simpson in a power plant and you put one probe here

1	and another probe
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: 50 feet away, you could
4	read as much as 5 volts difference.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right. I get
6	that. I mean, I have two water pipes coming in my
7	house. And they go in the ground and all over the
8	place. And I can measure quite a potential between
9	them that fluctuate around.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Anyway.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: That's just sort of the
13	way the world works.
14	MR. KEMPER: Many of the things we're
15	talking about here really involved the maintenance and
16	testing of the lightning protection system, which is
17	more in the scope of this documents.
18	MS. ANTONESCU: So other elements are air
19	terminals, which are lightning rods, the purpose of
20	them to intercept lightning; bonding, down conductors
21	conducting lightning occurring from top to bottom, so
22	connecting the air terminals to the overhead ground
23	wire to the subsystems; cables; distribution voltages;
24	surge protection devices; and maintenance and testing.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Since we're talking

1	about some of the details of how the grounding system
2	works, I notice you took exception to the conductivity
3	of concrete. And I know the number that was in the
4	standard was wrong at 30 ohms per centimeter.
5	Where did 30 k-ohms? I tried to check
6	that and couldn't find it in any of my references.
7	Where did you guys find it?
8	MR. KISNER: That's a good question.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: That seems pretty low to
10	me, too.
11	MR. KISNER: Three thousand seems low?
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Thirty thousand ohms.
13	MR. KISNER: Thirty k-ohms.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Thirty k.
15	MR. KISNER: Thirty k?
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
17	MR. KISNER: Yes. That number was one of
18	our colleagues had investigated that. And I'm afraid
19	I am not able to give you that number.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Well, I
21	MR. KISNER: He's on a cruise, and we
22	don't have
23	MEMBER SIEBER: I couldn't
24	MR. KISNER: We don't have a direct line,
25	unfortunately.
ļ	

	172
1	MEMBER POWERS: That's the most exotic
2	story I've ever heard.
3	MR. KISNER: Yes, I know.
4	(Laughter.)
5	MEMBER POWERS: You guys thought to make
6	this one up.
7	DR. WOOD: We'll be happy to go to the
8	Caribbean and find him.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Somehow I don't believe
10	that.
11	MEMBER POWERS: Our committee maybe ought
12	to go there.
13	DR. WOOD: Maybe so.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Do you think he will ever
15	come back?
16	DR. WOOD: I don't know.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Go where?
18	MEMBER SIEBER: He's on a cruise. I think
19	we should go and meet with him and discuss this. No.
20	I just wonder where the number came from because
21	MR. KISNER: It was 3,000, 3 k, not
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Three k? Okay.
23	MR. KISNER: Three k. Yes.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. But, in any event,
25	if you know, I would be interested in knowing where

1	DR. WOOD: We will get back with you on
2	that one.
3	MS. ANTONESCU: We'll get back to you.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: It's not crucial to our
5	discussion, but I wasn't able to find it.
6	MS. ANTONESCU: Sure.
7	MEMBER POWERS: Why would we not be very
8	sensitive to the role of the humidity?
9	MEMBER SIEBER: What, the concrete?
10	MEMBER POWERS: Yes. Is the
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, it's only important,
12	humidity is only important, on the surface. I think
13	what they're talking about is if you take a concrete
14	structure and it's grounded to the mat at one end and
15	you've got a fence post sticking out the other end,
16	how well will the fence attract lightning?
17	And what is the resistance to the current
18	flow after the fence gets fried? And it's important,
19	for example, that containment has lightning rods on
20	it. And if you didn't have those, containment would
21	become a conductor. And it's not clear to me exactly
22	what would happen, but it probably wouldn't be good.
23	MEMBER POWERS: Well, it's a conductor all
24	along and protection.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I would prefer to

1	have it hit the lightning rod and come down and the
2	lightning rod is a conductor, rather than going
3	through all the cracks and so forth in the concrete.
4	It just seems like a better deal to me.
5	But it becomes important when you're
6	trying to establish the extent to which a structure
7	like a fence around a plant will become charged at
8	50,000 volts or 500,000 volts or essentially stay at
9	ground, particularly if you have a guard.
10	MR. KISNER: Usually you don't want to be
11	going through the concrete thinking that it's a
12	conductor.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
14	MR. KISNER: You want to be going through
15	the
16	MEMBER SIEBER: You want a ground defense.
17	MR. KISNER: And you want to go from
18	points A to B in multiple paths
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
20	MR. KISNER: with a maximum pen radius,
21	with a minimum number of kinks
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
23	MR. KISNER: and points where the
24	voltage can be the vector can be concentrated
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
ı	· ·

1	MR. KISNER: and go straight into the
2	ground mat and then be sure that it itself is going
3	into the earth ground uniformly across the grounding,
4	
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
6	MR. KISNER: although if you could see
7	a picture of the voltages in 3-D
8	MEMBER SIEBER: It would be
9	MR. KISNER: with a strike on one end,
10	you would think, "Well, it's going to be all the
11	ground." Not so. You'll see a conduction across the
12	entire plane as the thing they call GPR, ground
13	potential rise, occurs. And you see that rise go up
14	and prorogate across the entire
15	MEMBER SIEBER: It actually will move,
16	that people move.
17	MR. KISNER: Yes. And the GPR is one of
18	the reasons that a lot of things can fail because what
19	you thought was ground and had every reason to believe
20	would be turns out to be at 3,000 volts or 10,000
21	volts for so many milliseconds or microseconds.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: That's why I became a
23	mechanical engineer.
24	MS. ANTONESCU: How should this guide be
25	used? It applies to new plants as a result, no

1	backfitting at existing plants is intended for use
2	in evaluating licensee submittals for design
3	certifications and combined licensees.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So let me understand
5	this now again. I think we mentioned it earlier.
6	Existing plants now are beginning to use digital I&C.
7	Are they expected to protect them against lightning?
8	DR. WOOD: Right.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And if they are, how
10	are they going to do it?
11	DR. WOOD: If you go to reg guide 1.180,
12	they're expected to ensure that the surge environment
13	and the EMI environment at their plant is consistent
14	with the characteristic environment that was used to
15	establish this.
16	MS. ANTONESCU: Already established for
17	the measurements that
18	DR. WOOD: So if that leads them to say,
19	"We need to make some changes to the lightning
20	protection system" at their plant, that's where this
21	last bullet comes in.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: In other words,
23	nothing stops them from using this guide?
24	DR. WOOD: That's right.
25	MS. ANTONESCU: Nothing stops them, no.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But, then, Dr.
2	Shack's comment earlier is perfectly valid. I mean,
3	all regulatory guides are optional.
4	DR. WOOD: Voluntarily, yes.
5	MS. ANTONESCU: Voluntarily, yes.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So what is the
7	difference here?
8	DR. WOOD: I guess it was a question of
9	whether or not it was going to be imposed on existing
10	plants requiring changes.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But regulatory guides
12	are not imposed.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Once you establish that as
14	an acceptable regulatory solution, there is an
15	implication that it is the minimum. And if you impose
16	it on plants
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Where applicable,
18	right?
19	MEMBER SIEBER: that were designed and
20	built to some other standard, that becomes a backfit.
21	And the burden on the staff to establish that this is
22	important is greater than if you apply it to a new
23	licensee who hasn't constructed any physical plant as
24	yet because that becomes, then, a part of the decision
25	process as to whether you are going to build the plant

1	or not. So it's a regulatory issue.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: When do you demand
3	that something goes through the backfit rule? When
4	you issue a new rule?
5	MEMBER SIEBER: If it requires you
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is something
7	mandatory.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: If a new rule
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: A requirement of some
10	sort.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: a requirement causes
12	you to make a physical change to the plant that
13	changes the design basis, that puts you in 1.109.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which is not, though,
15	tied to adequate protection. If it's an issue of
16	adequate protection, you don't do that.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right. Well, if
18	you need to reestablish adequate protection by
19	enhancing some regulation,
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's right. You
21	don't
22	MEMBER SIEBER: you have to show that.
23	And then 1.109 doesn't apply.
24	MEMBER POWERS: Just to be absolutely
25	clear, now 1.109 applies to all changes and

1	regulation. Some of them deal with adequate
2	protection. And staff is not allowed to make a
3	cost-benefit analysis.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. But, anyway,
6	I don't see why this can't be just a regulatory guide
7	like anything else. I don't see the benefit of the
8	first two bullets.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: There isn't any.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: There must be some
11	reason why you are proposing it, but it's not
12	everything to me.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: I think you have to do
14	this in order to make the standards that apply to
15	devices and the standards that apply to their power
16	supplies consistent with one another.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You have to do
18	"this." What do you mean by "this"?
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Impose this standard.
20	This standard
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you disagree with
22	the first two bullets? I mean, you wouldn't put them
23	there.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: The new standard for
25	digital I&C applies to new plants. This standard

1 applies to new plants. So that's consistent. And 2 that's also consistent with this --If I could offer a thought 3 MR. KEMPER: 4 The existing plants already have programs 5 whereby they show compliance with general design criteria 2, 3, and 17, which is appendix A of Part 50. 6 7 We all know that. So this is another way of doing that. 8 9 may be perfectly consistent with what many plants are 10 doing or it may have some deviation. So we're saying that we're not proposing that this should supplant 11 12 their existing compliance system. So that's really what this term and what 13 14 we're trying to indicate here is we're not trying to impose this is one acceptable way of meeting these 15 requirements, not necessarily the only way, though. 16 17 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why didn't you say that in so many words, that this is not intended to 18 19 supplant what you are already doing but it's a 20 regulatory quide? If you choose to use it, that's 21 fine. 22 MS. ANTONESCU: I think we said that in --23 MR. KEMPER: That's written, I think, in 24 the language of the reg guide. Isn't it, Christina? 25 I think the language of the reg DR. WOOD:

1	guide includes this, that the licensee can voluntarily
2	adopt this if there's a clear nexus between this
3	guidance and what they are doing to upgrade their
4	plant.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: There's that subtle
6	arm-twist, though, that although it's not mandatory,
7	when you come in with a new plant, it looks pretty
8	close to mandatory.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, they keep asking you
10	questions as to why you didn't adopt this guide and
11	that guide and that guide because the reg guide says
12	it applies to these situations and depends on whether
13	you want to build a plant or answer questions, you
14	know. And you've got a choice.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Does the first box there
16	say applies only to new plants or to new plants?
17	MEMBER SIEBER: That's what section D,
18	"Implementation," says.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it's of no use
20	whatsoever until someone wants to build a new plant?
21	MEMBER SIEBER: That's not true. Let me
22	give you an example.
23	MS. ANTONESCU: It's also for
24	considerations for upgrades on a voluntary basis.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The second bullet is,

1	in fact, wrong. Right? A regulatory guide will not
2	be considered as a candidate for backfitting. So it
3	doesn't make sense to say, "No backfitting is
4	intended" unless there's something again I'm not
5	seeing.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
7	MR. FLACK: It's to meet the GDCs. If
8	they meet the GDCs now, they don't have to meet this
9	reg guide. Meet the GDCs now.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The GDCs are so
11	high-level. Come on, John.
12	MR. FLACK: But that is where the
13	requirements are. That's where the regulation hits
14	the road in GDC.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: That's the regulation.
16	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But, I mean, he has
17	his current licensing basis. Unless you supply some
18	new requirement, I don't see that he would pick this
19	up. You're protesting too much here.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Exactly. You're
21	protesting too much.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Let me give you an
23	example, and this was before these guys came along.
24	I worked in a plant that had diesel generators that
25	had mechanical timers on them to load the loads onto

the bus that the diesel was supplying.

They could never get the time set right. So they decided to take out the analog timers and put in the digital timers. The digital timers met the basic RFI and surge protection standards.

And they worked for about 18 months until the first failure occurred. And, unfortunately, two failures occurred in one shift, which basically said both diesels were inoperable, which is a Level III violation and a civil penalty. Okay?

And the violation was based on the general design criteria and not on the regulatory process under which these devices were installed. And the fault was surges on the D.C. buses that were induced by relay closures. It wasn't lightning, but it was the same kinds of things. You get a lot of spikes when coils are energized and deenergized. And those spikes were enough to reset the CPUs on the timers.

So the overall rule is the general design criteria in this case. The guidance provides you with the methodology that if you apply, you can show that you meet the intent of the three GDCs that apply.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm reading the reg guide. The introduction unless I've missed something doesn't say anything about applying to new plants.

	204
1	MEMBER SIEBER: D, section D.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it should be an
3	introduction.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: It's always in section D.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You have to read the
6	whole thing before you find out it doesn't apply to
7	you?
8	MEMBER SIEBER: No. The first thing you
9	read is section D. I learned that in 1980.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Do you read it
11	backwards?
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Why don't you put right
14	at the first line
15	MEMBER SIEBER: The most important thing
16	is section D.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: in the introduction,
18	"This applies to new plants"?
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why is that so, Jack?
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Why?
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why is the most
22	important section section D?
23	MEMBER SIEBER: If it doesn't apply to
24	you, you can put it in your
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you have to read the

1	whole guide until you get to section D.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: No, no. If you know that
3	you start with D.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, this seems
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anyway, it seems to
6	me that the second bullet there was not correct. "No
7	backfitting is intended." That doesn't make sense in
8	the context of the regulatory guide.
9	MS. ANTONESCU: All right.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So if you have some
11	words to the same effect in the guide itself, change
12	them.
13	MS. ANTONESCU: All right.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is supposed to
15	be an acceptable method for doing business.
16	MS. ANTONESCU: Well, it is available.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Section D is the same in
18	every reg guide. That's the standard format.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you always read
20	section D first?
21	MEMBER SIEBER: I do.
22	MR. KEMPER: This language simply will
23	give the licensee the right to assure himself that the
24	regular inspection team is now not going to come and
25	look and inspect him for compliance with this

1	document. That's all.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But that's a
3	regulatory guide.
4	MR. KEMPER: That's right.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The word
6	"backfitting" doesn't belong. You can make that
7	clear. That's fine. Those words are fine. Oh, okay.
8	So good. So you're asking them to go read four
9	standards.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Four standards. And this
11	is the primary one.
12	MS. ANTONESCU: Now let me tell you about
13	that.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You are actually
15	pretty generous. It's only
16	MEMBER SIEBER: These are the primary
17	ones.
18	MS. ANTONESCU: It could have been a lot
19	more.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: These, in turn, reference
21	another dozen standards. These are really good
22	standards.
23	MS. ANTONESCU: So that's regulatory
24	position one, which endorses design installation
25	practices in four primary IEEE standards. IEEE 665

1	deals with grounding practices. Sixty-six covers
2	grounding and surge protection for medium voltage.
3	IEEE 1050 covers I&C grounding. And C62.23 covers the
4	surge protection.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So reaffirmed means
6	that somebody looked at it and gazing at it and the
7	revision, they decided that they didn't need
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
9	MS. ANTONESCU: Right. That's correct.
LO	MEMBER SIEBER: The standards committee
L1	will review them on a periodic basis.
L2	MS. ANTONESCU: Right. So these standards
L3	encompass all the areas that we believe are important.
L4	So we are endorsing them in their entirety.
L5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All of them?
L6	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.
L7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The next slide looks
L8	like the path of a lightning strike to me.
L9	MEMBER SIEBER: This one?
20	MS. ANTONESCU: This slide actually shows
21	the application of each standard to the plant areas
22	addressed by the guidance, the diagrams we saw before.
23	So the combination of these four standards
24	fully covered necessarily lightning practices. No one
25	IEEE covers all the lightning protections that are

1 necessary. And these four primary IEEE standards 2 refer to several other standards. You can see them because they call out 3 4 other standards. The applicable portions; that is, 5 the sections referenced by the primary standards of those standards, are included in the endorsement of 6 7 the four standards. So, as you can see, the endorsed standards 8 9 are shown in blue. And the yellow standards are referenced by the primary standards. 10 They're in yellow. 11 12 It reminds me of the MEMBER SIEBER: fellow in "Oh, what a tangled web we weave." 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 MS. ANTONESCU: The second regulatory position identifies relevant practices for inspection, 16 testing, and maintenance. The endorsed IEEE standards 17 do not address inspection, testing, and maintenance of 18 19 lightning protection systems, as John has mentioned. 20 So additional guidance is provided. 21 The quidance includes inspection 22 quidelines, testing/maintenance quidelines, 23 comprehensive records. And these guidelines are 24 derived from analysis of NFPA-780, again, as you 25 mentioned before. And they provide informative

1	guidance on inspection and testing and maintenance.
2	MEMBER DENNING: Do these differ from
3	current requirements for testing and maintenance of
4	for existing plants now, what do they use for this
5	kind of guidance?
6	MS. ANTONESCU: They have been using the
7	existing guidance in NFPA-78, which was now revised to
8	780. And we're now putting down
9	DR. WOOD: I guess the point is it's
10	consistent with what they would have.
11	MS. ANTONESCU: It's consistent. Yes,
12	it's consistent with existing
13	MEMBER DENNING: Okay.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: And then you compare that
15	with the
16	MS. ANTONESCU: So this basically
17	describes the technical content of the reg guide.
18	This guide was released for public comments in
19	February of this year. And I want to talk now about
20	the comments and our responses to them.
21	Resolution to the public comments, we have
22	two correspondence. Progress energy and TVA submitted
23	a total of five comments on DG-1137. Public comments
24	can be grouped into general categories. And we agree
25	with the technical comments and have incorporated

1	appropriate changes.
2	Changes for the first comment, wording was
3	added to include relevant non-safety-related equipment
4	in the scope. The second change, wording was added to
5	acknowledge that alternative methods may be acceptable
6	given sufficient technical justification.
7	And the third one was no change because
8	comments simply acknowledged the value of guidance on
9	such practices. So we actually resolved all of the
10	comments.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: In favor of the
12	commenters.
13	MS. ANTONESCU: In favor of the
14	commenters.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
16	MS. ANTONESCU: And, to sum up, we feel
17	that DG-1137 is ready for issuance. It provides
18	needed guidance to the applicant and reviewer to
19	support licensee-covered plants.
20	It is supported by well-documented
21	technical bases that embody the cumulative work of NRC
22	and industry. It addresses the few technical comments
23	from the public. And we are finally here seeking ACRS
24	concurrence to publish this effective guide.
25	And also we feel it supports the

1	Commission goals to promote safety by minimizing risk
2	of lightning in these events and enhances regulatory
3	effectiveness by giving guidance on acceptable
4	practices and reduces the potential of regulatory
5	burden by clearly identifying necessary practices.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: If any member has any
7	additional questions or comments that they would like
8	to make at this time concerning this subject, now is
9	a good time to do it.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So if you issued the
11	guide without any statements regarding its
12	applicability to future or existing plants, would that
13	give you heartburn?
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I didn't ask you.
16	Why? I mean, it's an optional way of doing business.
17	MS. ANTONESCU: I think my next step is
18	CRGR. So the question will be, is there any backfit?
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No. It's a
20	regulatory guide. The issue of backfit doesn't arise
21	at all. No. You're not imposing it on anybody that
22	is not
23	MS. ANTONESCU: I think the results
24	actually show that's the operating experience. We had

1 lightning events. We feel that backfit --2 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You can issue the guide and then say somewhere in there to avoid what 3 4 Bill said earlier that, you know -- well, first of 5 all, state the obvious. At least it's not mandatory and that you expect that the guidance in this would be 6 7 more appropriate or applicable to new plants and leave 8 it at that without saying --9 MS. ANTONESCU: We could say --10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: -- without referring to backfitting, which has no place here, and without 11 being so explicit that this applies to new plants. 12 Now, I think as a technical 13 DR. WOOD: 14 issue, this guidance is valid for anybody who wants to use it. It can provide value to all the plants. 15 The issue of backfitting and what wording is necessary in 16 17 there really is a regulatory issue. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me take another 18 19 point of view. There is an enlightened licensee out 20 there. They start putting digital I&C through an 21 existing facility. They use this guidance. And they 22 come to the NRC. And the reviewer says, "Oh, excuse 23 This applies to new plants. I can't accept what 24 you have done. 25 MEMBER DENNING: No, no.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What do you mean,
2	"No"? If it says
3	MEMBER DENNING: No, no. They clearly
4	have
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I just picked an
6	extreme to show you the
7	MEMBER SIEBER: We may have a differing
8	concept about what regulatory guides do and what they
9	mean. There is a standard format for regulatory
10	guide, section D, which is entitled "Implementation."
11	You have to put something in there, you know, because
12	every licensing manager, which there are probably 100
13	in the country, reads that first and does it apply to
14	me or not.
15	And, on the other hand, the implication of
16	a regulatory guide is this is one acceptable way you
17	can design and structure a plant to meet these
18	regulations, in this case three general design
19	criteria from appendix A. That doesn't preclude you
20	from adopting some alternative method, which should be
21	equal to this method. So then it becomes a backfit
22	just at that point.
23	You've got to do this or something just
24	like it. And so that's basically why it comes down
25	that

1	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: George's point is
2	the last two bullets tell you everything you need to
3	know.
4	MS. ANTONESCU: Right.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. There is a
6	sentence in section B, which now I will read first,
7	that says, "This guide only applies to new plants.
8	And no backfitting is intended to approved in
9	connection with this issuance."
10	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's way too strong
12	based on what this lady and gentlemen told us today.
13	I would say, "This guide is intended primarily for new
14	plants," period. Forget about backfitting.
15	Backfitting doesn't apply here at all.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: I think they're trying to
17	ease their way through CRGR.
18	MR. KEMPER: Yes. As part of producing a
19	reg guide, we have to address the backfit question as
20	part of the process. So we have to decide whether it
21	exists or not.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
23	MR. KEMPER: Now, in reg guide 197 we
24	presented you all a couple of weeks ago, we took a
25	stand. We said it's applicable to new plants, but on

1	a voluntary basis, existing plants can implement this.
2	You know, we use words like that. So we could
3	certainly do something like that, I think, and still
4	not have trouble with CRGR, I think.
5	MS. ANTONESCU: Or maybe we can say
6	something that the guide is available for further
7	consideration and further upgrades on a voluntary
8	basis but was not imposed
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You're stating the
10	obvious again.
11	MS. ANTONESCU: on existing plants.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: "This guide is
13	intended to be applied primarily to new plants,"
14	period, nothing else. CRGR are not children. You can
15	tell them that this is not backfitting. They know
16	that, even if you don't tell them.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, there's actually
18	some
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You don't have to put
20	it in the official documents.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: There's actually some
22	value in recommending it for use
23	MS. ANTONESCU: It's a cost-benefit
24	analysis.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, in situations where

1	a licensee may want to upgrade his plant and is
2	hunting for standards to make everything compatible,
3	as a good design engineer should do because design
4	engineers typically are not licensing engineers. And
5	they will not go through all these reg guides if it
6	says, "Doesn't apply to me."
7	So there is some value in that. And the
8	staff may want to consider it. I think it's a good
9	point.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The words "no
11	backfitting is intended to approved in connection with
12	this issuance" are simply wrong. Even if you want to,
13	you cannot approve anything of the kind. I would just
14	
15	MEMBER SIEBER: No. You can impose that
16	guide on the industry and say, "You have to do this,"
17	but then you have to show that imposition is required
18	to meet adequate protection.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Then it's not a
20	regulatory guide, is it? It's something else.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you can make it a
22	regulatory guide if you don't want to go through a
23	rulemaking.
24	MR. FLACK: George, if they raise the
25	generic issue of plants putting in new I&C and the

1	resolution of that generic issue passes the backfit
2	test, which requires them then to use this as a guide,
3	then if it passes the backfit test, then it becomes
4	the guide and the intent.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What would be wrong
6	with saying, "This guide is intended to be used
7	primarily for new plants," period? Isn't that the
8	same idea?
9	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.
10	MR. KEMPER: Well, we'll try that. That
11	sounds good.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you intend to make
14	this change?
15	MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, I'm going to
17	put it in the letter, in the main letter or in the
18	comments.
19	MR. KEMPER: I mean, we'll just confer
20	with our colleagues in NRR, make sure that they don't
21	have an issue with this.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Those words sound like
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You guys don't have
24	to agree here.
25	MR. KEMPER: Yes, they do. Yes.
l	

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It just puzzles me
2	that there's so much I mean, it's, again, another
3	innocent statement.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Are there any other
5	questions or comments from any of the members?
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, not from me.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: If not, is there any from
8	our
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I must say I learned
10	something today, though.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, yes. I learned that
12	25 years ago. I'm glad I could tell you.
13	One other thing I would like to say is I
14	really appreciate the cooperation of the staff in
15	supping me with the materials because, frankly, it
16	takes a long time to read all of this stuff. And I am
17	interested in it and wanted to understand it. And
18	there is a lot of material. It is not an easy
19	subject. So I owe you all a debt of gratitude. I
20	think you made a fine presentation.
21	Mr. Chairman, I
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Twenty-five minutes
23	early.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So once again I find
25	myself thank you very much. Thank you. Once again

1	I find myself in a position of offering this Committee
2	a long break. I'm really puzzled by today because
3	usually I'm in the other position of trying to hurry
4	things up. But we will take a break until 3:30.
5	And then, George, you're going to have
6	charge of the break until 3:30.
7	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
8	the record at 3:07 p.m. and went back on
9	the record at 3:32 p.m.)
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm now handing the
11	meeting over to George Apostolakis to lead us through
12	this
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: next session, next
15	topic.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The purpose of this
17	meeting this afternoon is to review and comment on the
18	Draft Final Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.152,
19	Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of
20	Nuclear Powerplants.
21	The existing Rev 1 of this of the
22	guidance of the Regulatory Guide endorses an IEEE
23	Standard 7-4.3.2-1993. The IEEE Standard has been
24	updated, and now it's IEEE Standard 7-4.3.2-2003, to
25	keep up with the state of the art. And as a result,

2 position regarding this new IEEE Guide. 3 The Draft Guide endorses the updated IEEE 4 Standard, but also it goes beyond the standard and 5 includes a regulatory position providing guidance regarding cyber security. And the Guide has been 6 7 subjected to public comment period, and there are several comments from the public where people disagree 8 9 with this particular part of the Guide. 10 And the staff came back and said, "No, we believe that it's important to have this, because we 11 12 can't wait for the industry or the technical societies to develop a position." So the staff is here to brief 13 14 us on these issues, and it is requesting a letter from 15 the Committee regarding this Guide. And without any further comments, I will 16 17 turn the microphone to you, Mr. Aggarwal. 18 MR. AGGARWAL: Thank you, George. 19 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you. 20 MR. AGGARWAL: Mr. Chairman, let me first 21 introduce my colleagues who are with me here today. 22 On my left is Mike Waterman from our division. 23 in NRR when this Guide went through for public 24 comment. Adam Wilson is an intern in our division, 25 and Matt Chiramal is representing NRR on the topic.

now we need this Rev 2 to express the regulatory

1	George, thank you very much for doing an
2	outstanding job. You really took most of the thunder
3	of my talk, but that's fine.
4	(Laughter.)
5	As George stated, the purpose is the staff
6	would like to briefly discuss the Reg. Guide 1.152,
7	and we are looking forward to obtaining the
8	Committee's concurrence on these regulatory positions,
9	as is stated in the Reg. Guide.
10	Again, as George pointed out, Revision 1
11	was issued in 1996, which endorses Standard 7-4.3.2-
12	1993.
13	Mr. Chairman, excuse me I just forgot
14	I would like to recognize Mark Cunningham, our
15	Deputy Division Director, who is also joining us.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I didn't know he was
17	still alive.
18	(Laughter.)
19	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, this is why I thought
20	I'd make it known that he is still here.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We haven't seen him
22	in, what, years now, right? You used to be a regular.
23	He's too high now for us.
24	(Laughter.)
25	MR. AGGARWAL: No, he's just regular

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: He's a senior 2 I'm sorry, Mr. Aggarwal. manager. 3 MR. AGGARWAL: That's fine. He's still 4 regular. 5 (Laughter.) As you know, this is in an arena which is 6 7 updating almost every day, and the IEEE has produced and kept up to date and issued the Rev in 2003, which 8 9 is endorsed by this Reg. Guide. And this Reg. Guide provides broad guidance on cyber security, which is 10 11 not addressed in the standard. 12 It is the opinion of the staff that it is critical establish a stronger 13 that we 14 framework for computer systems in our nation's nuclear 15 powerplant. And that is the reason that we are taking a lead to include this quidance for the first time in 16 our Regulatory Guide. 17 As pointed out, Draft Req. Guide 1130 was 18 19 December 2004 for public 20 Initially, we only received one comment letter by 21 February 11th. We decided to extend the comment 22 period, because we believed more the better because we 23 have a better and improved technical document. As a result, we received 20 comment letters. 24

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to point

1	out that in this particular case we have gone extra
2	mile, and that is we provided all the documents which
3	are before you dated May 31st to every commenter who
4	had made a comment. We have never done that before.
5	And the reason why we want the public to know well
6	in advance where we are going, what we are doing, if
7	anyone has a concern, and this is the time that they
8	can come and speak.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Excuse me. You say
10	you provided all the documents in addition to the
11	DG-1130. What are documents were there that you
12	provided?
13	MR. AGGARWAL: The public comments, as
14	well as the resolution of public comments. All of the
15	documents which you see in your letter
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
17	MR. AGGARWAL: they were put in
18	ADAMS
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, okay.
20	MR. AGGARWAL: publicly available area.
21	We went extra mile. We sent those documents directly
22	to each commenter.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you're saying
24	normally this is not done?
25	MR. AGGARWAL: We never do put it in
l	I and the state of

1	ADAMS at times, because when we submit a package to
2	ACRS, it is up to you when you want to release it.
3	Okay?
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh. So you don't
5	make them public.
6	MR. AGGARWAL: We don't make them public,
7	right. They only come to know when they are here in
8	this meeting.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, I see. I see.
10	I didn't know that.
11	MR. AGGARWAL: But this time we wanted to
12	make the public be aware that, hey, this is what we
13	are doing, because there were many articles in
14	newspapers and coverage there. So we didn't want to
15	hide the
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's fine.
17	MR. AGGARWAL: Mr. Chairman, also I'd like
18	to point out that we consulted for in development of
19	the Reg. Guide the Office of NFIR, Office of the Chief
20	Information Officer, General Counsel, and, of course,
21	our colleagues in NRR. And I might say that there are
22	no diverse views on this topic. The staff is united.
23	Mr. Chairman, also, I'd like to point out
24	that the outside and I understand there were some
25	discussions earlier in an earlier presentation with

regard to implementation policy. The policy of the agency is, at least last 10 years, 15 years, that all regulatory guides are the best technical documents the staff can produce, but they are voluntary.

In other words, if licensees may decide -choose to decide to do it or do whatever pleases him,
and there is absolutely no backfit in this Reg. Guide
or any Reg. Guide issued over the last 10 years, or
probably hereafter. Any plans which are already
certified, again, it is optional if they retain the
system and using this Reg. Guide, they can use it,
because all the staff is saying that if you do it this
way, this is acceptable to us. This is one method.

So this is the position of the agency, that any Reg. Guide, at least for 10 years in the electrical I&C area we have issued, there are ways we will definitely apply it to newer plants. But with regard to backfit, it is optional.

So essentially in the Reg. Guide we have three regulatory positions. Number one is essentially saying that we endorse the standard for meeting the Commission's requirement or regulations with respect to computer-based safety systems and to maintain high functional reliability.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to point

1	out to you that the staff vigorously participates in
2	the standard's activities, such as IEEE. Just like
3	our Regulatory Guides in many areas are outdated, the
4	standards are also outdated.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, let me get back to
6	this question of voluntary standard.
7	MR. AGGARWAL: Yes, sir.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I noticed that in the
9	bit that you contributed, not just the endorsement but
LO	all this the NRC part, most paragraphs begin with
L1	the statement, "The licensee should," and that seems
L2	to be more a specification of what should be done
L3	rather than something that's voluntary. And it
L4	says
L5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And in the standard
L6	"should" is different from "shall." The ACRS feels
L7	it's the same thing.
L8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I mean, the licensee
L9	should have a digital system security program. Do you
20	mean there's an alternative to that?
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It could be. In this
22	case, I guess
23	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: If you turn to
24	Section D, which, of course, I immediately did
25	(Laughter.)

-	MD ACCADUAL A FINAL A
1	MR. AGGARWAL: Exactly.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: I found out that
3	no backfitting was intended to implied with this
4	document.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: That's why it should.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is a very positive
8	sort of statement. Most of these are very positive
9	statements, almost like demands. I mean, you're
10	setting up the specifications in a way that it's
11	very specific, you know. They're saying the licensee
12	should do this, this, this, this, and this.
13	So it's getting a bit far from being
14	voluntary. It's rather hard to see how they would set
15	up an alternative set of specifications which would
16	meet the same objectives. I guess it's okay, but I'm
17	just
18	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, you know, whatever
19	the meaning of a word is, as long as people
20	understand. And we are doing this for 15 years at
21	least, and the implementation section makes it
22	clear
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know. I know. But
24	this this Regulatory Guide, the way it's written,
25	it's almost like a rule to me, the way it's written.

1	MEMBER DENNING: But the fact that it
2	doesn't say "shall"
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know, I know.
4	MEMBER DENNING: is very important.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know. I know.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: "Should" is advice.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: "Shall" means do it.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's just an aside.
10	It's
11	MR. AGGARWAL: A helpful hint.
12	(Laughter.)
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And then, the other
14	question I have in reading this was the licensee
15	should do all these things. Are they capable of doing
16	them all?
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I'm sorry?
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are they capable? I
19	mean, do they know how to ensure that there aren't
20	worms and Trojan horses and bombs, and all of that?
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is a broader
22	question that I was planning to raise with the staff.
23	I don't know where the appropriate time is, but there
24	doesn't seem to I mean, this is consistent with
25	other standards that were reviewed in the mid '90s

1 regarding I&C. It's not clear to me what the measure 2 of success is here. I mean, we're asking them to have this and 3 4 that, do this and that, but we are not really telling 5 people what method to use. So how would you know that somebody has implemented this successfully? 6 7 interesting that today the issue 8 somewhere in another context. 9 You know, the Regulatory Guide 1.200, which has to do with quality of PRA, it says, you 10 11 know, you should do common cause failure, you should 12 include this and that, but it doesn't tell you how. And, apparently, there are beginning to be some 13 14 problems now, because the licensees are saying, "Yes, we met all of these. We did all of these." 15 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But PRA can't be tested. 17 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But they are not doing --18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Those can't be tested. 20 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If you don't explain 21 to people what you expect them to do, then eventually 22 you will be unhappy with some of the things they 23 choose to do. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You almost have to have 24 25 some NRC hackers try to get into the plant.

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So this is the 2 standard practice in this field, I mean, to just tell people that they have to do certain things, but we are 3 4 not really telling them how to do it? 5 MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: How is the reviewer 6 7 going to satisfy himself or herself that this is done 8 satisfactorily? I mean, you've had experience now of 9 years of reviewing things. So you must know whether 10 there are any problems along these lines. MR. AGGARWAL: Matt, do you want to --11 12 My name is Matt Chiramal. MR. CHIRAMAL: I'm with the NRR. Basically, the IEEE 7-4.3.2 has a 13 14 lot οf reference documents, along with other standards, which tell you the detailed steps that are 15 taken during the life cycle of the product. 16 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. 17 But I remember we read all this stuff, and it said, you know, you 18 19 have to have reviews, you have to have this. 20 I have participated in reviews that were extremely 21 superficial, and now the reviews that were extremely 22 They were both reviews, though. technical. 23 can say, yes, we had -- we had the review. 24 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, look at the 25 experts in the field in Microsoft Windows, they have

1	this Windows they put out, and they're forever putting
2	out modifications that improve the design and the
3	MEMBER SIEBER: The security of the
4	system.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: security, and so
6	obviously it's not something which is done and this is
7	perfect from day one.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Actually
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: If Microsoft has all of
10	these problems, I would think these plants would have
11	them in spades.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: The easiest way to avoid
13	Trojan horses, viruses, worms, is to not connect to
14	the outside world. And I can't think of good reasons
15	why powerplant digital control systems or protection
16	computer should be connected to the outside world that
17	I will tell you that every licensee wants to do it,
18	because the plant manager wants to look at this data
19	at home.
20	The guy who maintains the computer wants
21	to be able to do that by remote control when he's on
22	vacation. And once you start that, you open yourself
23	up to invasion.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But there were some,
25	as you know comments to that effect

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And it seems that the
3	public the public, and probably the industry, did
4	want a one-way communication. So you are saying even
5	if you have one-way communication, you're still
6	vulnerable?
7	MEMBER SIEBER: You can't have one-way
8	communication.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's what they say.
10	I don't know whether
11	MEMBER SIEBER: You just can't do it.
12	It's got to be send a signal and get a reply. But
13	that's where the vulnerability is, in my view.
14	MR. CHIRAMAL: And those are some of the
15	details that look at the design to make sure that when
16	they get a handshake from the message, that's separate
17	from the safety system.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But, again, in your
19	reviews in the last 10, 15 years, have there been
20	cases where the reviewer was at a loss whether what
21	was done was satisfactory? Because the standards
22	don't really tell you how to do things.
23	MR. CHIRAMAL: When we look at the
24	documentation that, for example, the tests we look

at the test procedures and the test results, the ${\tt V\&V}$

1 documentation, the QA --2 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Maybe the tests are 3 the easier part, because they are concrete. They did 4 something. But the other parts, let's say, you know, 5 the life cycle of the software, make sure you review this, review that, and you have quality here, there, 6 7 and there. I don't know how one satisfies oneself 8 that this is done correctly. 9 You've wanted to say something for a while 10 now. MEMBER BONACA: Well, I think the industry 11 has a lot of working groups that they have formed. 12 Ιf I remember, one is called NewsMag or --13 14 MR. AGGARWAL: That's right. 15 MEMBER BONACA: And those working groups 16 are very active in looking for interpretation, in 17 fact, and agreeing on what it is and then living, you know, with certain standards. Now, they also belong 18 19 to some of these committees. 20 Now, I know that one way in which you get 21 beginning some assurances at the that the 22 interpretations were correct was to go to some vendors 23 that had interactions with this stuff, and had to 24 find, in fact, terms or what this means in terms of,

you know, qualifying a computer or piece of software.

1	And then, from that, there was establishment of
2	positions or interpretations, and I think that's
3	pretty much the way it's done.
4	There is almost like a side standard
5	organization that includes a member of the
6	powerplants, everybody actually.
7	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, let me concede that
8	this Reg. Guide is not perfect by any means. This is
9	the best we could do, and this is the first time we
10	are doing it. And we are taking a position that if
11	the industry develops some kind of more concrete
12	guidelines, we will again revise this Reg. Guide to
13	endorse if those requirements are appropriate.
14	But option not doing something, that's
15	not acceptable. We want to put some kind of pressure
16	on the industry as staff looks at this thing as a
17	critical factor. And we would like them to develop a
18	standard as fast as they can.
19	Now, it is true that we really don't have
20	a complete story in terms of success, what will be
21	acceptable.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me ask you this.
23	MR. AGGARWAL: Yes.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: On Section 2.2.2,
25	development activity, says oh, you don't have to

1 find it. The development process should ensure the 2 system does not contain undocumented code, malicious code, and other unwanted and undocumented functions or 3 4 applications. 5 MR. AGGARWAL: Great. Yes, it should. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But if I'm the 6 7 reviewer now and they come and tell me, "Yes, we did 8 a few things, and we are sure that it does not contain 9 those things, " how do I make sure -- how do I satisfy myself that what they have done is actually proper? 10 You see, that's where I get lost, because I'm not used 11 12 to this kind of fairly high-level guidance. And I'm willing to accept that maybe this 13 14 is the best we can do right now, but I'm just curious 15 in practice what happens, what actually happens. the reviewer come back to you, Matt, and say, "Well, 16 17 gee, help me." MR. CHIRAMAL: Well, what we do is we take 18 19 one of the requirements and trace it down to -- down 20 to implementation in the design, and see how -- the 21 V&V people did the same job as part of their package 22 deal that they're supposed to look at every -- every 23 requirement and see that the requirements are met at 24 every stage of the life of the -- every design stage

of the product.

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is that stated 2 I mean, how does the licensee know that you anywhere? 3 are going to do that? 4 MR. CHIRAMAL: It's in the SRP, Chapter 7. 5 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, the SRP does say that. 6 7 MR. CHIRAMAL: Yes. This is Mike Waterman. 8 MR. WATERMAN: I'm with Office of Research. 9 The guidance that you see in Regulatory Position 2 with regard to cyber security 10 11 was taken out of branch technical position HICB-14 of 12 the Standard Review Plan, Chapter 7, almost word for word if you will. So that's the guidance that 13 14 currently exists in the standard review plan. 15 And I agree with you, Dr. Apostolakis, that the real devil is in the details about how -- you 16 17 know, what are they supposed to do, and how do we assess that they actually did enough, and what is 18 19 And that's a lot of what the research plan 20 was intended to address. 21 I don't want to get off into the research 22 plan right now, but that was the -- that was what I 23 considered to be the shortcoming of our standard 24 review plan is it talks about what we're supposed to

look at, but it really doesn't get into how do we

1	actually look at it.
2	And so your comments about the Regulatory
3	Position 2, all of the things the licensee should do,
4	and why didn't we tell them how to do it, well,
5	actually regulatory space-wise we're not supposed to
6	be telling the licensee how to do things. That's
7	their job, to figure out how to do it. It's our job
8	to figure out how to assess that they actually did
9	enough.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But you can suggest
11	a method.
12	MR. WATERMAN: Well, we can suggest it,
13	but, you know, when the regulatory agency makes a
14	suggestion, most of the licensees pretty much consider
15	that de facto requirement and de facto approval if
16	they do it, you know, so we
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, anyway, that's
18	not
19	MR. WATERMAN: get away from
20	suggesting
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think the reason is
22	that the state of the art doesn't allow you to go into
23	more detail, and we have to live with this.
24	MR. WATERMAN: And the
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which is fine. I
ı	I and the second

1 mean, if that's the way it is right now, maybe 10 2 years from now it will be different. Let me get into a question 3 MR. WATERMAN: 4 of timing about how it came about that we could come 5 up with -- with cyber security guidelines while we're endorsing a standard that doesn't touch on cyber 6 7 security guidelines. In November of 2001, the Nuclear Power 8 9 Engineering Committee, which is part of the IEEE that oversees the creation of IEEE 7-4.3.603, and all of 10 11 the other nuclear power generating station IEEE 12 standards, had their meeting in San Diego. there, and at that time they asked us on the IEEE 13 14 7-4.3.2 working group -- I was a member of that group 15 to come up with some regulatory -- or not 16 regulatory but standards requirements for cyber 17 security. And at that time, we were pretty much done 18 with our draft standard, and we didn't think we could 19 20 actually take on that issue at that time. That was in 21 November of 2001. And so what NUPEC did was they 22 decided to create a committee that would develop some 23 cyber security guidelines.

> **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

anything from that committee, NUPEC. As a matter of

A couple years later we hadn't heard

24

1 fact, that committee was never actually formed, from 2 what I understand. It dropped between the cracks. 3 Meanwhile, we still had to do a draft guide, if you 4 will, endorsing the new standard. And it had been decided that if we're 5 going to address cyber security -- mind you, 2001 has 6 7 a lot of significant, right? This is a couple --November 2001 was a couple of months after 9/11. 8 9 That's why cyber security became such a good buzz word at that time. We hadn't really tackled it before 10 that. 11 12 We felt it was important that we have some document that would reflect, you know, what do you 13 14 need to do about cyber security? So which standard do 15 we endorse and put that into? Do we write a separate Req. Guide, or what? 16 17 Well, it seemed that a standard that talked about computers and safety systems at the 18 19 nuclear power generating stations would probably be a 20 good avenue, if you will, to introduce the idea of 21 cyber security. And that's how it came to be as a 22 regulatory position in this draft guide. 23 Matt and I worked on it together when I 24 was over in NRR, and I was tasked originally to come

up with some cyber security guidance. So the first

1	thing I thought about was, "Well, let's take a look at
2	what we did in IEEE 1012, the verification and
3	validation standard which addresses security." And
4	Matt said, "Why don't we take a look at our branch
5	technical position, HICB-14," went to there and there
6	was everything we needed laid out in, if you will, a
7	life cycle type format.
8	What do you think about cyber security
9	when you're talking about concepts? What do you do
10	about cyber security when you're laying out
11	requirements, design, implementation, etcetera? So
12	that's how it came to be.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We are preempting a
14	lot of the things that Satish is trying to tell us.
15	Let me first ask, when would you like us to give you
16	a few detailed comments on the guide? Is it now or
17	after you are done?
18	MR. AGGARWAL: You can do that anytime you
19	please.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let's do it after you
21	are done.
22	MR. AGGARWAL: Okay. The bottom line is
23	industry is not ready for a standard at this time, and
24	we believe that it will take about five years before
25	such a guidance is developed by the industry.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: For security.
2	MR. AGGARWAL: Right. And particularly on
3	the security area.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I noticed that the
5	I&C people do not use modern technology for their
6	slide projector. You still like manual change of
7	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, that won't happen
8	next time.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You don't trust
10	you don't trust technology, it looks to me like.
11	MR. AGGARWAL: We are still
12	(Laughter.)
13	MR. WATERMAN: Satish is not in I&C.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, okay. So now I
15	understand.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's a matter of
17	security, George. It's not accessible. Only the
18	person who has the
19	MR. AGGARWAL: Our type people are still
20	very conservative.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
22	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, as you are aware,
23	that subsequent to 9/11 the NRC had issued orders that
24	address in part current cyber threats at nuclear
25	powerplants. Other actions, including regulatory

improvements to address cyber security, staff is working. We are also aware that nuclear powerplants have implemented announcements. And we believe this regulatory position and the Guide is a step in the right direction.

Talking about the improvement, NRC is taking a number of actions, including working with NEI to implement cyber security program at nuclear powerplants. And we will revise the Reg. Guide when industry standards become available.

Again, they note that security guidance is, as it is presented in the Reg. Guide, is based on one life cycle approach, but, of course, other approaches are acceptable.

Another point I would like to point out, that security functions are part of the overall function performed by the safety systems. And when you talk about security, it applies both for hardware and software. And the staff would not like to see two-way communication between the safety computers and plant-wide area network -- is not acceptable.

And let me address the public comments which were received on the Reg. Guide. From my point of view, they fell in three categories. One category was that they were highly complementary, saying the

1	right thing, right time, and they wanted this now
2	guideline as requirements.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Now, if you wanted to
4	make them mandatory, you couldn't go Regulatory Guide
5	draft, right?
6	MR. AGGARWAL: No, we will have to go to
7	rulemaking, and then we have to meet the backfit rule
8	requirement.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. That's too
10	much.
11	MR. AGGARWAL: So that was the one
12	category of comment.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How big were these
14	categories? You've got two in one and 15 in another
15	or something.
16	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, out of 20 letters,
17	there were at least five letters which say that what
18	we are doing is a right thing. And it is about the
19	time not only they wanted to cover safety computer,
20	they wanted to cover all computer.
21	Now, remember, we are living in a world
22	where somebody sitting in Korea or Tokyo or anyplace,
23	he can simply send a comment, and some of those
24	comments came from foreign countries.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I noticed that. You

1	got comments from
2	MR. AGGARWAL: Right, exactly.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's very
4	interesting.
5	MR. AGGARWAL: So the world is one now,
6	and we try to
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are you required to
8	respond to all of these comments, or are you
9	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, this is
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: nice people?
11	MR. AGGARWAL: It is the agency policy
12	that anyone who submits a comment, that we will
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. But let me ask
14	you, you said five commenters were complimentary.
15	Were any of those guys industry people?
16	MR. AGGARWAL: They have some industry
17	background, yes.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But they are not
19	industry.
20	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, I will talk to you
21	about NEI in a second.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
23	MR. AGGARWAL: The adverse comments, the
24	second category, what they were really saying to us
25	was take the cyber security out of this Reg. Guide,

1 and everything hunkydory. The part of the standard --2 we had one or two very minor comments. We didn't have 3 any comments at all. 4 Ninety-nine percent of the comments 5 address the Position 2 on cyber security. the industry took a position -- they gave us a big 6 7 lecture saying that, hey, how fluid the whole situation is, let us do it when we do it and then you 8 9 can do it, and all that kind of story. 10 But then, they said, hey, by the way, if you decide to do it, falling out of the technical 11 12 comments -- so as a technical person, my approach was that I want to have each and every comment. 13 14 And it is my submission to you, Mr. 15 Chairman, that we have incorporated I can say almost 100 percent, but almost near to 100 percent, all the 16 technical comments which were made. It is a summation 17 of the staff that the quality of the Req. Guide has 18 19 improved with this input. 20 And often, you know, by getting public 21 comments is a good advantage. You get all the 22 experience at no cost, whether it's from China or 23 Korea, or wherever it is. So, yes, this is the agency 24 policy, that we will respond to each and every

comment, no matter where it is coming from.

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Good. I think that's 2 a good policy. 3 MR. AGGARWAL: The technical comments 4 which I briefly already addressed, that they were 5 essentially on the Regulatory Position 2 on the cyber security. And I already pointed out that we have an 6 7 improved document. 8 The Regulatory Position 3 is а 9 boilerplate. We simply say that other standards which are referenced in the IEEE Standard you can use if you 10 so desire, and they contain useful information. 11 12 if they are endorsed by a regulation by NRC, or in another Reg. Guide, of course, the Reg. Guide or the 13 14 regulation is applicable. 15 In the following two viewgraphs, I have some information which is simply telling you that the 16 IEEE Standard -- the current version as opposed to the 17 old version -- what significant changes were made 18 19 And this is a listing essentially, and I will 20 go very quickly. They have added software quality 21 They have provided guidance on COTS, offmetrics. 22 the-shelf computer system. They have added a 23 reference to V&V, 1012. They have another two IEEE standards --24

And the software project risk

and

1042.

828

1 management references are also added, which are listed 2 there. And a clause was added on fault detection and 3 self-diagnostics, identification clause -- namely, the 4 IEEE 60398 was added. 5 Annex C was updated, which is on the dedication of existing commercial computers. 6 7 Annex D was also revised. In the conclusion part, it is the position 8 of the staff that it is essential that we should be 9 providing some kind of guidance, and the Reg. Guide 10 11 should be issued as is. And as I pointed out, that we 12 have incorporated the public comments, and nobody has shown up from the public. I believe that is an 13 14 indication that there is no technical quarrel with 15 regard to the technical revisions. Given the state of 16 the art, this is the best we can do. Finally, we will -- staff requests that 17 the ACRS concur on the regulatory position. 18 19 This essentially concludes mУ 20 presentation, and I will be happy to answer 21 questions which Mr. Chairman or any other member may have. 22 23 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I have a few 24 questions. Well -- yes. First of all, in the new

stuff, do we have to have all of these motherhood

1	statements? The developer should configure and enable
2	the design security features correctly. I mean, yes.
3	The developer should ensure that a security design
4	configuration item transformations from the system
5	design specification are correct, accurate, and
6	complete. Well, sure.
7	I don't see the need for these statements.
8	They are sort of motherhood. Might as well at the end
9	add, "And we should all love each other very much."
LO	It's irrelevant.
L1	MR. AGGARWAL: I totally agree with you,
L2	they are motherhood, but this is one of the guidance
L3	that your mother telling you all the time, "Brush
L4	your teeth" every day, and sometimes twice.
L5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: My mother was right.
L6	MR. AGGARWAL: And she's right. And I
L7	think on that point of view we have to
L8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I didn't expect this
L9	answer, but maybe that's
20	(Laughter.)
21	Now, there is another one here that
22	puzzles me. On 2.3.1, page 6, system features, second
23	paragraph. Physical and logical access control should
24	be based on the results of risk analysis. Wow. What
25	results are these? Who produces them? Especially in

1 light of the fact that two pages before, in Annex F, 2 you make it very clear that the NRC does not endorse the concept of quantitative reliability goals as a 3 4 sole means. 5 The NRC's acceptance of the reliability of computer systems is based on deterministic criteria. 6 7 Quantitative reliability determination can be an addon but not the sole basis, which is fine. But this 8 9 sentence here confuses me. What results -- what kinds of risk analysis are these that will tell you what the 10 11 physiological access control should be? I don't 12 understand this sentence. I'm not really sure it's needed. 13 14 Does anybody do risk analysis that help 15 you in this context? And, if so, who are these people? I mean, what kind of analysis are they doing? 16 I mean, we have a whole project trying to understand, 17 you know, software and I&C failures and probabilities, 18 19 and all that. I mean, if these guys have done it, 20 might as well know about it. MR. CHIRAMAL: Actually, the risk analysis 21 22 is more of a qualitative type of risk, which says that 23 if you fail -- if the system fails, what's the 24 consequence of it?

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: As you know, in this

1	agency, when we say "risk analysis," what we really
2	mean is PRA. So if you mean something else, you'd
3	better be explicit.
4	MR. CHIRAMAL: Okay.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Change the words
6	"risk analysis" to, you know
7	MR. CHIRAMAL: Qualitative
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Failure modes and
9	effects analysis, or evaluating consequences. Then it
10	would be fine, because, you know
11	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Except there is an
12	IEEE Standard that says risk analysis.
13	MR. WATERMAN: Well, yes. I think in this
14	term here we're talking about susceptibility and
15	consequences.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. So why don't we
17	say that, then?
18	MR. WATERMAN: Person gaining access to
19	it, because at the time that we wrote this, NEI-0404
20	hadn't come out yet. So
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anyway, do you
22	disagree with me?
23	MR. WATERMAN: The risk analysis here is
24	qualitative risk analysis. What happens if you have
25	a system, and somebody gets into the system? How do

1	we protect that system? Eric Lee is here from NSIR,
2	and he can provide a much more clarifying discussion
3	on that.
4	MR. LEE: Eric Lee from NSIR. I think if
5	I do remember correctly about that particular
6	statement that you are making, the risk that you are
7	talking about there is security risk. And you are
8	trying to semi-qualitatively estimate the what the
9	I guess risk. You want to look at the what are
10	the consequences associated with that, and also look
11	at the what might be the susceptibility as he was
12	saying, to see what the you know, combine those two
13	to get risk.
14	And as I don't know if you are aware or
15	not, we have developed this risk I guess assessment
16	method, where you could use this to semi-qualitatively
17	estimate what the risk might be.
1 .	Coetimate what the risk might be.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively.
	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively. MR. LEE: Semi-qualitatively.
19 20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively. MR. LEE: Semi-qualitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you're not
19 20 21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively. MR. LEE: Semi-qualitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you're not MR. LEE: Quantitatively.
19 20 21 22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively. MR. LEE: Semi-qualitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you're not MR. LEE: Quantitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You're not going to
19 20 21 22 23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not quantitatively. MR. LEE: Semi-qualitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you're not MR. LEE: Quantitatively. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You're not going to give me a contribution to CDF, are you?

1	give me a contribution to CDF.
2	MR. LEE: No. No, no.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anyways, all I'm
4	saying is that this statement is ambiguous. All you
5	had to do is explain what you mean. What you mean is
6	fine with me.
7	MR. AGGARWAL: We will make appropriate
8	changes.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. I don't dispute
10	that there is something there that is helpful. It's
11	just that when you say "results of risk analysis," my
12	mind goes to, you know, risk analysis.
13	MR. AGGARWAL: Good point. We will make
14	a couple of changes.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Now, there is
16	oh, now I remember. The title, of course, is
17	"Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems." So
18	you are talking you are following the traditional
19	safety versus non-safety-related thing. Well, we have
20	all this 50.69 now that allows us to have a two-way
21	categorization.
22	Why don't you allow for this somewhere,
23	that if somebody I mean, there may be a safety
24	system that is of very low risk significance, in which
25	case it belongs to Category 3 in 50.69. And maybe

1 that should affect the criteria, too, shouldn't it? MR. CHIRAMAL: Well, for example, if you 2 3 -- if somebody wants to get a modem connection to 4 safety system equipment to track its failure or 5 something, this -- it will be under access control that that --6 7 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But what if that system is safety-significant -- safety-related, but of 8 9 low safety significance? You know, there is four 10 categories that the agency has approved. MR. CHIRAMAL: Right, right, right, right. 11 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Risk 1, 2, 3, 4. 12 13 MR. CHIRAMAL: Right. Then, maybe they 14 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 15 don't want to do that. And what you are doing right now is you are telling them, "You must do this, unless 16 17 you want to submit a request to go on the 50.69 and, you know, go through the whole works." But since 18 19 50.69 is a rule now, maybe some recognition of that 20 fact should be --21 CHIRAMAL: Well, the thing is, 22 internal communication within the safety system, 23 there's an internal bus, if it's -- a lot of digital 24 equipment in the design of the plant -- and there will

be internal communication buses of safety systems.

1	if you make one level to one access, it can affect
2	the rest of the safety system.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: There may be safety
4	systems that are not risk-significant.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: No. But he's
6	arguing that if a safety-significant a safety
7	system is on the same bus, even though that system
8	itself isn't significant, you've gained access to
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because it may
10	affect
11	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, really.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Your argument would
14	work if it was, in fact, in isolation.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are you sure, though,
16	that this is true for all safety-related systems? I
17	mean, in light of 50.69. Because 50.69 was really a
18	major rule. I mean, especially if you look at the
19	percentage of safety-related systems, the overwhelming
20	majority turned out to be of low risk significance.
21	So they are relaxing also some requirements, except
22	for these.
23	MR. CHIRAMAL: That's why Taiwan people
24	came to make a comment, because they have advanced
25	boiling water reactor, which has the communication bus

1	for the safety system, and that has potential
2	vulnerability because of connections to the outside
3	world.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are you saying, Matt,
5	that 50.69 has no place here? I'd like to understand
6	that better. I mean, I agree with your examples you
7	are giving me, but I'm giving you a more general
8	comment.
9	MR. CHIRAMAL: Yes. Well
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 50.69 is a major
11	rule.
12	MR. AGGARWAL: No, I realize but in the
13	electrical and I&C area, I cannot turn it all the way
14	down. When you talk about qualification, they still
15	take the position that all safety-related equipment
16	must be qualified.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand the
18	position. The question is whether it's a reasonable
19	position.
20	(Laughter.)
21	I mean, that's why the agency issued
22	50.69, Satish. I mean, it was I don't know how
23	much you known about that, but it was a
24	MR. AGGARWAL: I know, I know.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: an agonizing time

1	for some people, because safety-related systems and
2	structures and components are safety-related. You
3	shouldn't touch them. And yet, finally, the agency
4	did approve 50.69, and I'm wondering why you are not
5	making any reference to it.
6	MR. WATERMAN: Well, I think within the
7	area of security, 50.69 deals with accidents, things
8	that accidentally happen, accidentally fail, randomly
9	fail. In the area of security, you're not dealing
10	with accidentally happened. You're dealing with
11	intentionally happened.
12	Somebody goes in there, deliberately tries
13	to destroy your system. So if you say, "Well, we'll
14	risk-inform this part of the safety system isn't very
15	important," essentially aren't you saying that, "Well,
16	we'll provide somebody with an avenue to attack
17	everything else that's connected to it?"
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, I'm not
19	suggesting
20	MR. WATERMAN: Well, you can't do that on
21	a secure in security. You can do that fine when
22	you say, "Well, this is not risk-significant, because
23	a plant can weather an event," if you will.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But your first
25	MR. WATERMAN: Because that particular

1	system failed. Whereas, in security, what you have to
2	be concerned with is making sure that people do not
3	have avenues of attack that affect
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, that's your
5	second part of the Guide. The first part is not
6	security-related.
7	MR. AGGARWAL: Right, right. I understand
8	that you are addressing the first one.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
10	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, the basic problem is
11	that
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 50.69 has nothing to
13	do with security.
14	MR. CHIRAMAL: See, the thing is, in the
15	electrical and I&C there are two trains and four
16	channels. And each train supplies the train one of
17	all categories of safety systems. So if it's Category
18	1, 2, 3, or 4, since it's connected to 1, that will be
19	the one that will it's the one that's most
20	vulnerable to it.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I don't know. So
22	you're saying the concept of low risk significance
23	does not apply here? I don't know. Maybe the guys
24	from Utility can tell us.
25	MR. WATERMAN: The Reg. Guide is written

1	in general terms to apply to any system. It would be
2	impractical for us to single out risk-significant
3	versus non-risk-significant in the Reg. Guide, such
4	that, you know, it's up to the licensee to make a
5	decision what's risk-significant and not risk-
6	significant.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So what you are
8	telling them is that they should
9	MR. WATERMAN: We have to provide
LO	guidance.
L1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 50.69 would have
L2	to be a separate request from
L3	MR. AGGARWAL: Exactly. They are to make
L4	an application and ask for exception. And I might say
L5	this is not particularly for this Reg. Guide. That's
L6	what we are doing with every Reg. Guide.
L7	MEMBER BONACA: You still have the title
L8	to the safety systems. I mean, you are making a
L9	distinction between
20	MR. AGGARWAL: Yes.
21	MEMBER BONACA: that and others. And
22	I really wonder about, you know, given the fact that
23	so much of the software is interconnected, at least
24	within the plant, and the concern one concern also
25	was the one of access or but even if you have not

1 -- does it make sense to limit the applicability of 2 this Reg. Guide to just safety systems? 3 MR. WATERMAN: Well, that's all we 4 regulate is safety systems. 5 MEMBER BONACA: I understand. MR. WATERMAN: You know, that's why the 6 7 standard has words to that effect in the title of the standard also, is because that's the only thing we 8 9 actually regulate. MEMBER BONACA: I understand that. 10 saying that, however, you know, if you had a way of 11 12 affecting safety systems by tinkering somewhere, or making it possible with no safety systems, you would 13 14 want to have some firewall there or some protection 15 that assures that. Absolutely. Yes. 16 MR. WATERMAN: 17 matter of fact, NEI has proposed a process whereby you -- it looks sort of like a bull's-eye, where all of 18 19 your safety systems are on the innermost level of 20 security, very high secure and they only have one-way 21 communication out, which would be like blind transmit 22 if you will. 23 You just dump your data into a dual-port 24 RAM or something like that, and anybody who wants to

use it can access that data off of the RAM, but they

1 can't acknowledge or anything back to the safety 2 system. 3 MEMBER BONACA: So you do have --4 MR. WATERMAN: And then, the next level 5 out would be I think -- you know, anyway, that's one philosophy is you isolate everything with it, behind 6 7 very rigid barriers. And as things become less 8 important, you isolate them less and less, and you 9 control the path of your communications. 10 We're getting into a security area that I don't want to talk about, if you don't mind. 11 12 If I may, I could say that the MR. LEE: NRC has developed the cyber security self-assessment 13 14 method, and they're using that as a base. NEI has 15 developed cyber security program to address the safety and non-safety systems. 16 17 We are in the process of working with them to do that review and try to implement the cyber 18 19 security program into the nuclear powerplants. 20 that will address the systems that could adversely 21 impact safety, security, and the emergency 22 preparedness of the nuclear powerplant. But we are 23 right now working to implement that. 24 MEMBER BONACA: Okay. Yes, thank you. 25 MEMBER DENNING: Let me ask a question

about the implementation of this in terms of what did -- obviously, you feel some urgency, particularly in the cyber security area, to get this out, to make it available to the utilities. But, you know, we say that there's no backfitting intended. What's the assumption here as to when -- you know, who is really going to use?

I mean, you're not thinking about future plants, obviously. We had an earlier one that was already entered towards future plants, though, that could happen down the line. How is a utility that currently has computers in its safety systems, or is going to put additional computers in the safety systems, how is he -- how is he going to use this? Or is it likely he is going to use this? And are you going to use it in some sense for regulatory enforcement? How do you use it? I guess --

MR. AGGARWAL: My expectation is that he should be using it. With regard to the staff, we cannot go back and ask them, why you are not using? But, certainly, when they make some recommendation to us as to what they are doing, we can ask the question that -- do you meet the guidance provided in Reg. Guide 1.152?

So what I'm saying that I --

1 MEMBER DENNING: No, I don't. But --2 Okay. Then, so what --MR. AGGARWAL: 3 then, you know, we'll ask more questions. 4 MEMBER DENNING: What currently -- what 5 does he currently have to comply with with regards to cyber security? Is it -- is there already something 6 7 established that he has certain requirements based -that -- in his safety basis that he has certain 8 9 requirements he has to meet relative to cyber 10 security? Or is this all new, and it has all come in 11 12 after -- after the safety basis has already been established? And so it's a question of, do you 13 14 actually do a rulemaking and force changes, or do you 15 just hope -- you know, provide guidance and hope that 16 they will do the same thing? What's our current 17 safety --The current position 18 MR. AGGARWAL: Yes. 19 is that some of the information I have pointed out to 20 you earlier came out of the standard review plan, or 21 piece by piece to different licensees, and so on. 22 This is the first formal channel that the agency is telling the licensee that if you do this, this is an 23 24 acceptable method, and --25 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: What is the branch

1	technical position? Since you said it came from that.
2	What do you do with a branch technical position?
3	MR. AGGARWAL: That branch technical
4	position is for the staff, not for the industry, and
5	that does not receive public comment. This is the
6	first formal document which goes out to the public for
7	public comment. And when the Guide is issued, the
8	expectation of this staff is that industry will use
9	and our experience is that they essentially use it.
10	Not only that, my expectation is that when
11	the standard is revised again, most of this
12	information will be carried over, and more, in the
13	standard.
14	MEMBER DENNING: So you really don't have
15	much of a stick. You don't have much of a
16	regulatory
17	MR. AGGARWAL: No, not at all.
18	MEMBER DENNING: stick. But by putting
19	out this guidance
20	MR. AGGARWAL: That was taken away when
21	the backfit rule was published, you know, essentially.
22	In my 25 years, I don't recall that we have made any
23	case of adequate safety and potential requirement.
24	And if we do, we have to go to process of rulemaking.
25	Again, the bottom line is Regulatory
	I and the second

1	Guides are simply guidance. It is one acceptable
2	method to the staff, and in this particular case it is
3	voluntary.
4	MR. CHIRAMAL: Let me clarify that a
5	little bit. 50.54H
6	MR. AGGARWAL: 50.54H? Are you talking
7	about the 603 endorsement?
8	MR. CHIRAMAL: No, it says I think it's
9	50.54H. I'll doublecheck that requires that any
10	design after 1985 has to meet the requirements of SRP.
11	They don't need it as guidance, but if they don't meet
12	it, they've got to justify why they don't meet it. So
13	what's in the SRP is part of the it's like a Reg.
14	Guide.
15	MEMBER DENNING: As the SRP was at that
16	time.
17	MR. CHIRAMAL: Yes, at that time.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, I think we've
19	touched on this before. This SRP has this guidance
20	has the problem that lots of these guidances have,
21	that they say you should do all these things, but they
22	don't tell you how well you should do them. And the
23	reviewer doesn't have guidance about how they have to
24	be done.
25	Just like saying that your house has to
I	•

1	have a lock on its door. But it doesn't say anything
2	about how good the lock has to be, and how, you know,
3	difficult it should be to pick it, and should you have
4	two locks, and, you know, how many different
5	interlocked things should you have, and what kinds of
6	forces should it resist. That's not in here at all.
7	So you have to have a lock on your door,
8	but how do we know how good that lock has to be.
9	That's I think the difficulty with this whole
10	guidance.
11	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, at times, we have to
12	take a position when we can only tell of our wishes.
13	And in your example that those should be locked, and
14	if you cannot open it from outside, one would consider
15	that you have implemented that wish. I mean, we
16	cannot tell them that they should have infrared
17	indicators inside, or other protective devices.
18	But, you know, my point is, again, that
19	choice of not doing nothing as opposed to doing
20	something, we have taken that
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That has stopped.
22	MR. AGGARWAL: Exactly.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: When you the IEEE
24	Standard, Section 5.4, addresses equipment
25	qualification. At which point there are several

1	subsections to this. At which point does one do the
2	environmental qualification?
3	MR. AGGARWAL: It makes a reference to
4	3.23, right?
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
6	MR. AGGARWAL: And 3.23 is addressed by
7	Reg. Guide 1.89.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So it's a different
9	Regulatory Guide.
10	MR. AGGARWAL: And we, as a point of
11	information, will be coming soon with a revision to
12	that Reg. Guide. That Reg. Guide was written by me,
13	if you remember, in '83 timeframe. So it is 20-plus
14	years old, so we want to update that.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you don't feel
16	that there is a need to be explicit about the
17	MR. AGGARWAL: Not at this time, because
18	the qualification, as I indicated earlier, that if the
19	staff has some regulatory position in the Reg. Guide,
20	the qualification or the environmental
21	qualification, then that is applicable.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Are there any
23	other comments from the members or the staff? Oh,
24	this one where yes, I wanted to now that Mr.
25	Sieber is back, there is a statement here that on

1	Section 2.1, concepts phase, the last sentence says,
2	"Remote access to the safety system should not be
3	implemented. Computer-based safety systems may
4	transfer data to other systems through one-way
5	communication pathways."
6	Now, Jack, you told us that there isn't
7	such a thing, or there isn't one way. If it's one
8	way, then it's the other way, too. So I wonder
9	whether you agree with the statement. It is on page 5
10	of the Guide
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: under 2.1,
13	Section 2.1.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Let me find it.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can I give you this one
16	here?
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, that would be
18	helpful.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Concepts phase, the
20	last paragraph, which is really two lines. So whom do
21	I believe, you or them? It's on page 1.152-5.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Yes, I've got it.
23	I'm reading it.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, other people
25	are looking.
ļ	I and the second

1	MEMBER SIEBER: I suspect that what they
2	have here is adequate. You know, it satisfies the
3	basic concern. It's just that most protocols require
4	
5	MR. AGGARWAL: Exactly. Exactly.
6	MR. CHIRAMAL: Normally, when they
7	implement that design, they use a fiber optics
8	communication, and then the and then
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. But basically what
10	you're doing is just dumping data to some other
11	device, without the ability to come back in and send
12	along with it Trojan horses, viruses, worms.
13	MR. WATERMAN: And whatever uses it,
14	assumes the data is good. And if it's not good, well,
15	it
16	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Just trying to learn
18	here. You said there are reasons for doing it. But
19	if it's
20	MEMBER SIEBER: I'm not aware of any
21	protocol that's used in commercial systems that's one
22	way. Okay? It's usually a handshake kind of a deal.
23	You ask for something
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It is not worth the
25	paper that

1	MEMBER SIEBER: physically possible for
2	it to be one way, and it, in fact, can serve a
3	purpose. The question is: do you want to rely on it
4	for any any purpose?
5	MR. WATERMAN: For any purpose, yes.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, in the event of a
7	major accident at the plant, is there a response
8	center that's here? They would want to get access to
9	what's going on in the plant, presumably. Would they
10	not be able to because of this?
11	MR. WATERMAN: They would probably be
12	gaining access to post-accident monitoring
13	instrumentation, which generally is not out of your
14	safety-related system itself.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: And a lot of plants now
16	have one-way links to the plant data logging.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And one way would be
18	adequate in this situation?
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you'd get the data.
20	MR. WATERMAN: And you just have to trust
21	it was transmitted clean.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
23	MR. WATERMAN: You know, it's just one of
24	those things.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: And it will come in a

1	certain pre-prescribed protocol.
2	MR. AGGARWAL: Yes, exactly.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: You're going to get it in
4	a certain order, and that's
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You get the data, but
6	you can't do anything with it. You can't operate
7	anything.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: No, you can't, not if it's
9	one way.
10	MR. AGGARWAL: The other communications is
11	in part to be in that scenario, to talk to the plant.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: The question really comes
13	to, what do you do with things like the programmer's
14	console, you know, because there is maintenance that
15	you have to do, there is software adjustments that you
16	have to do. Do you put that in a room that's under
17	lock and key because it has to be two-way?
18	MR. AGGARWAL: Sure, right.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You may need some
20	customer service. I mean, if the thing isn't working,
21	you may want to get someone who actually installed it
22	from to give you some advice about it.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. And the vendors all
24	seem to want to do it remotely from their shop using
25	PC-Anywhere, or something like that. And I think that

1	that's a not a great idea. Some people go to the
2	extent of having an unlisted dial-up number, and use
3	a data modem, you know, an acoustic one, which I think
4	is also a mistake.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Any other comments?
6	DR. WOOD: Actually, I have a comment, if
7	I may.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Sure. I was actually
9	I meant members, but do the members have any
10	more comments? Okay. Now you can speak.
11	DR. WOOD: Okay. I'm Richard Wood, member
12	of the public who submitted a public comment. And I
13	wanted to ask for a clarification on the resolution of
14	that comment. It's
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which comment was
16	this? Can you tell us, sir?
17	DR. WOOD: Well, in the resolution of
18	public comments, I think it's Item Number 47.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Page 11.
20	DR. WOOD: In the response, it states that
21	computers are located in mild environments, and,
22	therefore, the traditional qualification processes
23	cannot be applied. And the clarification I wanted was
24	in the mid '80s and early '90s when Eagle 21 and
25	SpecMicro 200 were licensed, and one of the bits of

1 evidence that was considered were the qualifications 2 323-1974, were under IEEEthose processes 3 couldn't be applied. 4 And I guess the other question is, in the standard review plan, where it gives guidance to the 5 reviewer, and says for I&C systems in mild 6 7 environments the reviewer should ensure that processes of IEEE 323 are followed, is that also 8 9 asking the reviewer to look for something that cannot 10 be applied? And when the Triconix system, Tricon, and 11 12 Common Q system from Westinghouse, and the the Telepharm system from Framatone were reviewed for 13 14 certification, and their qualification, according to 15 IEEE 323 program were reviewed, were those also things 16 that could not be applied? The explanation is that 17 MR. AGGARWAL: George had pointed out earlier, that the topic of 18 19 qualification will be addressed in Reg. Guide 1.89. 20 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I was wondering why 21 you didn't say that here in your response. 22 MR. AGGARWAL: Well, right now, we are 23 going to make a -- well, we could add that, but that 24 is implicit. We are going for a public meeting on 25 that topic, because we want to define the scope of the

1 Reg. Guide in terms of the harsh environment and mild 2 environment. And also, there were some sound reasons 3 to -- contrary in the Req. Guide 1.89, which we think 4 do not apply. 5 The issue related to the TID source term as versus the new term, so it is all almost new 6 7 different topic, and this is the agency position -that the issue related to that will be addressed in 8 9 the Reg. Guide 1.89, or another Reg. Guide. It would be nice to 10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: say something about that here, because the response is 11 very different. 12 It says that it's a non-issue. Is that what it says? 13 Well, if I may -- yes, it says 14 DR. WOOD: 15 it's a non-issue. But what prompted the comment was there is an existing staff position that's articulated 16 17 in the standard review plan, and that has been in effect and in practice. And that position is relaxed 18 19 by the acceptance of this -- of this version of the 20 standard, because of the wording change. It's a 21 subtle wording change, but it effectively relaxes the 22 position. 23 And I've seen no technical justification 24 for relaxing that position. And maybe that will be

corrected in a new Reg. Guide, but my question is:

1 why is there no technical justification for relaxing 2 the position with the issuance of this guide? MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is that a conscious 3 4 decision to --5 MR. AGGARWAL: No, it is our position that there is no relaxation. Our position will remain as 6 7 and the standard is not saying anything different. It is how you read on making 8 9 interpretations of a given sentence. 10 Our position is clear: Req. Guide 1.89 currently covers equipment located in harsh 11 12 environment only. But the staff is considering either a new Reg. Guide for mild environment or make it part 13 14 of the Reg. Guide 1.89. The bottom line is that if their qualification issue is related to computers, 15 that they will be addressed in the Req. Guide. 16 And all the standard here is saying, that 17 go back and look at 323, which is, you know, with 18 19 respect to Regulatory Position 3 we are telling that 20 if we start with the position, then you will follow 21 that. 22 My name is -- this is Bill MR. KEMPER: 23 If I could interject something here for a 24 moment, Richard. This committee has reviewed Draft

Guide 1077 sometime ago, which was specifically

1 designed to cover the qualification -- environmental 2 qualification requirements of computer-based, safetyrelated systems. 3 4 The result of that, when it went out for 5 public comment, we got quite a bit of comments back on that, which caused us to reconsider our position, and 6 7 we have changed it -- revised it dramatically. And, 8 in fact, it's in the process now to come back to this 9 committee for another review assuming that we get complete concurrence from all of our counterparts on 10 this -- this is the approach we want to take. 11 So right now that vehicle is on track to 12 come through this committee and ultimately address 13 14 your question. 15 Well, in summary, my MR. AGGARWAL: position is that this Standard 7-4.3.2 takes you back 16 to IEEE 323, and it is the staff's position that we do 17 not need any relaxation in this standard. 18 19 related to mild environment is the subject matter of 20 another Reg. Guide, and if any clarification is needed 21 at that time we'll do so. 22 DR. WOOD: If I may, 7-4.3.2 doesn't 23 mention 323. It's mentioned in 603. 24 MR. AGGARWAL: Yes, that's right. 25 DR. WOOD: But the definition of equipment qualification, which is the topic of this subject, relates to environmental qualification. guidance that is now in 323 -- I mean, 7-4.3.2-2003 changes the terminology from equipment qualification computer qualification testing, and gives definition which is more akin to acceptance testing than qualification testing. And that's the concern. And all I was asking in the public comment is, first, note that there has been a change; and, second, give a technical justification for why that is acceptable. And I didn't see either. Well, the statements just MR. AGGARWAL: made are totally correct. If you look in the Standard 5.4 of the 603, it references 603 and 623, which is also part of our regulation, which is So 603 is of our incorporated by reference. and a Reg. Guide cannot override the regulation, regulation. So the licensee, then -- 50.49 again required qualification. Again, I repeat, and I do not want to go -- we see to go on a tangent -- the staff position is We do not see the standard has a relaxation. And if their issue is pertaining to qualification of

computer, we will address it in the Req. Guide which

So if we are taking a position that there

is coming.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	is no relaxation, then I'm not going to give you a
2	technical justification. I will only give and I
3	will concede that there is a relaxation.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: It sort of sounds like
5	there is confusion in the definition of terms. Is
6	that correct?
7	MR. AGGARWAL: No. If you go back to the
8	IEEE Standard 7-4.3.2-2003, 5.4, it says in addition
9	to qualification criteria, the requirement listed in
LO	5.4.1, 4.2, are necessary. And it is referring to
L1	603.98, which dates back to 623.
L2	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
L3	MR. AGGARWAL: So ultimately and if you
L4	go back to our Position 3, it tells you that if the
L5	staff has issued a Reg. Guide on a particular
L6	standard, the this is expected to meet the
L7	requirement. I mean, this way I can sit here and
L8	discuss 200 different standards which are mentioned
L9	here, but this is not the proper place.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: I'm just thinking of the
21	poor design engineer who has to weed through all of
22	this to find out what he is supposed to do.
23	MR. AGGARWAL: Some of the old-timers are
24	still around, and we are trying to train as many

people as we can in terms of the standard development,

1	and so on.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Your response,
3	though, could have been a little clearer that you
4	don't believe there is a relaxation. I mean, I would
5	stop that
6	MR. AGGARWAL: There is
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, there is no
8	relaxation. That would have been that way. Any other
9	comments from the public or the staff?
10	Mr. Chairman, 16 minutes before the
11	allotted time.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you very much.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you very much,
14	gentlemen.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Staff and public
16	comments?
17	MR. AGGARWAL: My only observation is that
18	we are only making one change in that one sentence,
19	which, George, you pointed out.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And tell me again
21	what sentence that is.
22	MR. AGGARWAL: Well, you pointed it out in
23	the Reg. Guide, so we will put some clarifying words
24	in there.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

1	MR. AGGARWAL: 1.152, page 6, right?
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It all came back now,
3	yes. And I must note that, as a result of Mr.
4	Sieber's advice, I read D, implementation, and I
5	and I guess it's a standard sentence no backfitting
6	is intended.
7	MR. AGGARWAL: Which you will find in
8	every Reg. Guide.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But you guys are not
10	saying the other stuff, that this is intended for new
11	reactors.
12	MR. AGGARWAL: No. It does say that, too,
13	that you
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I know, I know.
15	We're not.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So how many times in our
17	last presentation did you object to backfitting when
18	it's a standard format they always have to use that
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I still object.
20	(Laughter.)
21	I think it's the wrong thing to put in
22	there. The thing about this Committee is that we are
23	not bound by tradition. It's pure logic.
24	(Laughter.)
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay. George, are we

1	through with this one?
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I said 16 minutes,
3	and I didn't hear any praise.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's now 15. Well, I
5	have
6	MEMBER DENNING: Others were able to do a
7	half an hour or better, George.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You haven't given the
9	meeting back to me yet.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This guy had only six
11	minutes.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, if you'd stop
13	speaking, I will congratulate you. George, are you
14	handing this back to me now?
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. I handed it
16	back three times. I am handing it back to you.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: In that case, I
18	congratulate you on finishing before the due time by
19	15 minutes. We no longer need the transcript.
20	MEMBER POWERS: Mr. Chairman, could I
21	object, because it was an insufficient exploration of
22	the issue.
23	(Laughter.)
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are you serious in your
25	objection?

1	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: He can object. Let
2	him object.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We have finished with
4	the presentations, the formal presentations. We no
5	longer need the transcript. Thank you very much.
6	Since we are ahead of time and we no
7	longer have to meet the agenda time scale, we will
8	take a 15-minute break. We'll come back at 5:00. Not
9	at 5:15, 5:00. What I want to do then is to go
LO	through the ACRS reports. We have six reports to
L1	write. I'd like to know where we stand on each one of
L2	them.
L3	I propose to take them in the order in
L4	which they are listed on the agenda. If we have
L5	drafts, it would be very useful if you would make them
L6	available to the members at the time of this
L7	whoever has a draft, maybe some of you have drafts,
L8	I'd like to have them available.
L9	The purpose is to go through and see if
20	there are major comments that the writer needs to have
21	in order to put them into the letter.
22	Thank you very much, staff. So we will
23	then take a break until 5:00.
24	(Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the proceedings
25	in the foregoing matter went off the record.)
	1