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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
5	(ACNW)
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8	TUESDAY,
9	APRIL 19, 2005
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11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
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14	The Advisory Committee met at 8:30 a.m. in Room
15	T-2B3 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White
16	Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Dr. Michael T.
17	Ryan, Chairman, presiding.
18	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
19	MICHAEL T. RYAN, Chairman
20	ALLEN G. CROFF, Vice Chairman
21	JAMES H. CLARKE, Member
22	WILLIAM J. HINZE, Member
23	RUTH F. WEINER, Member
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1	ACNW STAFF PRESENT:	
2	NEIL M. COLEMAN	
3	JOHN FLACK	
4	LATIF HAMDAN	
5	JOHN T. LARKINS	
6	MICHAEL LEE	
7	RICHARD K. MAJOR	
8	RICHARD SAVIO	
9	MICHAEL L. SCOTT	
10	SHARON STEELE	
11		
12	NRC STAFF PRESENT:	
13	MERRI HORN	
14	ASHOK THADANI	
15		

1	OTHERS PRESENT:
2	TERRY DEVINE, CRCPD, via teleconference
3	BRUCE HINKLEY, DOE
4	JOHN KESSLER, EPRI
5	J. GARY LANTHRUM, DOE
6	ENGELBRECHT VON TIESENHAUSEN, Clark County,
7	Nevada
8	GARY LANTHRUM, DOE
9	MARTIN MALSCH, State of Nevada
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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-SAGENDA ITEM PAGE National Source Tracking System Department of Energy Repository Design Bruce Hinkley 61 Public Comment Martin Malsch, State of Nevada 130 Transportation Aspects of the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement Questions from the Public Electric Power Research Institute Topical Report on Future System States Adjourn

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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(8:30 a.m.)

If the meeting would come CHAIRMAN RYAN: to order please. This is the second day of the 159th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. My name is Michael Ryan, Chairman of the ACNW. other members of the committee present are Allen Croff, Vice Chair, and Ruth Weinberg, Jim Clarke and During today's meeting, the Committee Bill Hinze. will briefed hold discussions be and with representatives from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safequards on the National Source Tracking welcome. We will be briefed by the representatives from Department of Energy on the Status of Repository Design.

We will be briefed and hold discussions with representatives from the DOE, the Department of Energy, regarding the updates of the transportation aspects of the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement and we'll be briefed by representatives from the Electric Power Research Institute on their topical report on Future System States. We will prepare for the May 14th to 21st trip to the nuclear facilities and regulators on Japan. A subcommittee will be attending and we'll continue those activities

preparation and review for potential ACNW letter reports.

In addition, after our transportation presentation, Engelbrecht von Tiesenhausen from the State of Nevada will be offering some insights --

MR. von TIESENHAUSEN: Clark County.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: I'm sorry, Clark County, my mistake. Forgive me. Thank you for correcting me, Engelbrecht. Clark County, Nevada to offer some insights on our thinking about transportation from questions that he often gets from members of the public. So we thought it would be beneficial for us to get that on record so we could reply to them and carry them forward on our thinking and deliberations, and thank you for offering to provide us that insight. And again, I apologize for the error in location of the organization. My mistake.

Latif Hamdan is the designated federal official for today's initial session. The meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. We have received no written comments or additional requests from the one I mentioned for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's sessions. Should anyone wish to address the Committee, please

make your wishes known to one of the Committee staff. It is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so they can be readily heard.

It's also requested that if you have cell phones or pagers, kindly turn them off or place them in the mute mode. Thank you very much. There are a couple of just very brief scheduling items I want to bring to the -- mainly the Committee's attention. First, there's -- we have been copied the two ICRP Foundation documents that support their draft recommendations as they are being revised. be distributed to members today and I'm going to begin just looking at them and noting any comments and as you have comments over the next few weeks if you want to send them to me, I'll assemble them and our plan is to formally present those to NRC staff, namely, Dr. Don Cool at our June meeting. So that's where that one will be formally presented in that forum. a word ahead.

A couple of meetings of interest, Dr. Hinze and Dr. Marsh will be attending on behalf of the Committee the PVHA workshop, August 31st in Las Vegas. This is an ongoing series of meetings that Dr. Hinze

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1 and Dr. Marsh have been tracking on behalf of the 2 Sharon, you had mentioned that there now Committee. a date for Calvert Cliffs. 3 MS. STEELE: Yes, June 7th. 4 5 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Tentatively scheduled for June 7th so members can take note of that scheduling. 6 7 MS. STEELE: We're also looking at the 8 potential for the -- to join ACRS on the Browns Ferry 9 trip. 10 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay, so we'll update on The -- a couple other meetings of note. 11 that. There's an RES working group meeting on Determination 12 Dispersal Characteristics of 13 Spent 14 Cadarache, France on May 15th. The NMSS folks will be 15 visiting COGEMA Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling Facility 16 in La Hague May 23rd to 25th. And Dr. Weiner will session on 17 chair а RADTRAN Estimating Risk Transporting of Radioactive Materials at the ANS June 18 19 5th to 9th meeting in San Diego, California. The Bell Fourth International Conference 20 21 on Hormesis Implications for Toxicology, Medicine and 22 Risk Assessment is being conducted at the University 23 of Massachusetts in June 6th to 8th at Amherst, 24 Massachusetts. This is a topic that is of interest

and related to the Committee's charge from the

Commission so I think we need to figure out how that meeting will be covered, whether it will be members or staff or both and I just want folks to be thinking about that and looking at their calendars so we could figure out how to get that done. I'd be especially interested if Dr. Cool or Houlihan or others will be attending that meeting and how we'll gather information from it, because I think that's a fairly important conference that we need to have some coverage on.

With that in mind, that takes care of our action items, so thank you. Without further ado, I'll turn our meeting over for the National Source Tracking presentation and discussion to our cognizant member, Allen Croff.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thank you, Mike.

This section is going to examine the new regulation that will require licensees to report transactions involving the manufacture, transfer or receipt and disposal of high risk sealed sources. We have in the room to address the topic Merri Horn from the Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety in NMSS and I hope we have on a speaker phone Terry Devine from the Conference of Radiation Control Directors. Do we?

MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir, I'm here.

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VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Great. With that, I'll turn it over to Merri.

MS. HORN: Good morning. My name is Merri Horn. I am currently the Project -- NRC Project

Manager for the National Source Tracking System. I am both the Project manager for the overall project and also for the rulemaking and today we're actually here to talk about the rulemaking and I do appreciate this opportunity to discuss the source tracking project. It's actually very important, a lot of interest in this particular project.

In the limited time we have today, I plan to share some background -- hold on here. Thank you, sorry about that. We want to provide to you some background tracking in the source system, the organizational structure for the development of the National Source Tracking System, some of the details on the proposed rule and some scheduling information on the project. I do first want to emphasize that the Source Tracking System is only one piece of NRC's efforts to enhance the control of sources.

There are several other efforts that are currently underway. Some of them in place, some of them still in the developmental stages. These efforts are integrated and they are hopefully complimentary to

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each other. A couple of other examples are some of the orders that we have issued to the irradiator licensees, the manufacturers and distributors and it's limited maybe to some of the other reactor licensees.

These orders basically enhance security on the materials at those facilities. We also have orders that are in the developmental stage for transportation of radioactive material at these levels. Those -- we're hoping they'll be going up to the Commission later this spring. And we also have an import/export rulemaking that's actually -- the final rule is currently before the Commission and we expect that that will actually be published later this summer.

Also included in these are the GLTS system, the General Licensee Tracking System which I believe you may have been briefed on in the past, I'm not sure and also the Orphan Source Offsite Recovery Program, which I'm aware that you have been briefed on I believe in December most recently. In June of 2002 the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the NRC met to discuss the adequate protection of inventories of nuclear materials that could be used in an RDD. They actually — the outcome of that meeting was an actual interagency working group on RDD. This working

group, over the course of a year or so took a hard look at this topic and they actually entered a joint NRC/DOE report in May of 2003 entitled "Radiological Dispersal Device, an initial study to identify radioactive materials of greatest concern and approaches to the tracking, tagging and disposition". One of the recommendations from this report was that there should be a national source tracking system developed to better understand and monitor location and movement and sources of interest.

And within that report, there was a list of isotopes that were developed and thresholds which they thought that we should include in the source tracking system and these were the isotopes that warranted maybe an additional look from a security During that same time period, the NRC was standpoint. supporting also the U.S. Government efforts establish international quidance for the safety and security of the radioactive materials of concern. participated in an effort for a major revision to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources. This revised Code was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003 and it contains a recommendation that every state in this case it means country, should establish a national

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register of radioactive materials. And that recommendation was limited to certain isotopes and thresholds that were identified in the Code of Conduct.

And the U.S. has actually made a non-legally binding commitment to the Code of Conduct, so we are definitely embracing those and the import/export rulemaking that I mentioned earlier is the first rulemaking to implement some of the recommendations from the Code that this will be the second.

We have also made a commitment to Congress that we would develop a national source tracking system and that commitment was made in August 2003. As you probably are aware, the NRC does not regulate all materials licensees. We actually have agreement In this case, there are 33 agreement states states. that issue licenses for the medical, industrial and academic uses of nuclear material. regulations do not require tracking of sources. of the licenses that are issued actually possession limit, a maximum possession limit that a licensee can possess. So we didn't actually have information on what licensees truly had.

So to address that issue, starting in the

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fall of 2003, we started developing and interim inventory survey and we basically went out with the cooperation of the Agreement States, we went out to approximately 2600 licensees that could potentially possess sources of the Category 1 or Category 2 level from the Code of Conduct. This was a voluntary survey. It was considered a snapshot in time, so it was basically what you had at that time. And we plan to continue this survey on an annual basis until we actually have the National Source Tracking System up and operational.

I will point out, we actually had very positive results. We had very -- involved a lot of phone calling with some of the licensees, but we actually had a very good response rate on that and about half of the licensees that we contacted actually had Category 1 or Category 2 sources.

But we actually set up a muti-tier structure to address the National Source Tracking System. We have an interagency coordinating committee. We invited representatives from other federal agencies to participate on this committee and the idea was to address from an interagency perspective National Source Tracking, you know, what concerns do you have? We wanted to -- instead of different agencies going

out and contacting licensees, we wanted it to be one.

NRC would contact, and so we were trying to get all of
their needs into one place. So they met, they
identified from a high level standpoint what they felt
a source tracking system should include and then we
included that as we were developing the requirements.

We had actually 11 other agencies that participated on this committee and DOE, the agreement states, participated, State, Transportation, Commerce, EPA, FBI, Defense, Homeland Security, -- three different offices in Homeland Security. So there was a very wide scope participation. We also had formed a steering committee. The idea of the steering committee was to provide guidance on the critical issues that were related to the development of coordination and implementation of the system, and we had members from DOE and agreement states plus several various NRC offices.

And all of these helped guide the work of the actual National Source Tracking Working Group. The working group was actually chartered to develop the system, to coordinate it and actually implement it down the road. As I mentioned before, I'm the actual -- I'm the Co-chair for this working group. The other Co-chair is Clayton Brandt from the State of New York.

Again, we had working group members from both DOE and the agreement states and several different NRC offices. And this group, over the course of several months, developed the actual requirements for the system, putting in the language that both from an IT's perspective and a rulemaking perspective that we could then use to forward with the two projects.

Today we're really here to talk about the proposed rule. So we actually formed another working group to actually develop the rule language and I will say that many of the members were the same on both groups. The idea of the Source Tracking System is it would provide a life cycle account of nationally tracked sources. It will improve the source accountability, it will give better information to decision makers, because, as I indicated before, we don't know what licensees actually possess because they're not required to report that information to us.

So this is an opportunity that -- to get the information. As mentioned before, it is transaction based, so it's not real time tracking. It does not include the actual transportation of the sources. The information will be considered official use only, so it will be a need to know to have access to it. We do plan it to be a primarily web based

1 system, to make it easy for the licensees to report. 2 They would be assigned an account, a password. would go on line, log in and easily type in the 3 4 information that they want to report. And they would 5 only have access to their site information. The sources that they were interested in 6 7 -- the thresholds are from the IA Code of Conduct Categories 1 and 2 is what we're including. 8 Commission decided to add seven additional isotopes to 9 That was primarily because of DOE 10 list. participation in this effort and DOE has more of these 11 12 types of sources than NRC licensees. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Merri, can I just ask a 13 14 quick question on the previous slide? 15 MS. HORN: Yes. Sure. CHAIRMAN RYAN: You said that, and I may 16 17 already know the answer but I thought I'd ask anyway. The data base will be such that the licensees can 18 19 implement, for example, if they buy a new source and 20 so forth. 21 MS. HORN: Yes. 22 CHAIRMAN RYAN: How is that cross-checked 23 by the Inspection Programs, either NRC or Agreement 24 States or is there -- how do you envision that will be

verified?

MS. HORN: We do anticipate that the inspections for the source tracking system will become part of the routine inspection program. So that when an inspector is going out to do a radiation protection safety, they can take a look at what's in the system, take that information with them and actually check their records and see, yes, have you been reporting as you're supposed to.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay, thanks. I just wanted to make it clear that there is a plan to close the loop from the inspection standpoint.

MS. HORN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you.

MS. HORN: It's still an open issue on exactly how for the Agreement State licensees. I don't know how familiar you are with the 274(I) agreements but because this rulemaking is being done under common defense and security, technically, they don't have the authority to inspect and enforce. And so they have to enter into 274(I) agreements to be able to do that. We don't know if all the states will do that or not and they've had mixed results in some of the other areas, so that's something that we'll have to kind of wait and see. We may have to come up with some creative methods because it's a lot of

1	resources, obviously.
2	MEMBER HINZE: May I follow that up,
3	please?
4	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes, sir.
5	MEMBER HINZE: There must be a finite
6	number of suppliers of these radioactive materials.
7	Is there any effort made to determine from them who
8	they are selling to or
9	MS. HORN: Actually, that will be one of
10	the requirements of the rule, that when they
11	manufacture a new source, they're going to have to
12	report that to the source tracking system. Then when
13	they transfer that source, they will have to report
14	that transaction also. So we will have that
15	information.
16	MEMBER HINZE: Will there be any effort
17	made to try to determine what type of transportation
18	is being used to send them from the supplier to the
19	user?
20	MS. HORN: Not as part of this rulemaking.
21	There are other as I said, this is one of an
22	integrated many items that the NRC is looking at from
23	a security standpoint. And we have issued orders and
24	will be issuing additional orders to various licensees
25	that cover some of those aspects. Unfortunately those

1 are safeguards right now so I can't go into what those 2 details are but it is considered uncovered. MEMBER HINZE: 3 I understand. Are the 4 Agreement States involved in this as well or --5 MS. HORN: They have working group members on the working group and the steering committee that 6 7 are developing this. 8 MEMBER HINZE: Thank you. 9 As I mentioned, the current MS. HORN: 10 rule will include the Categories 1 and 2 from the Code of Conduct and the Commission currently is adding 11 seven additional isotopes to the list. 12 The most common isotopes that are in use are cobalt-60, cesium-13 14 137, iridium-192 and americium. Basically, these are 15 irradiators, some of the medical uses and the radiographer and well-logging are the primary uses for 16 this material. 17 Now, the IA Code of Conduct actually did 18 19 write the sources in terms of potential risk. 20 understand that that's an interest that you have. 21 terms of potential risk associated with the non-22 violent use and it considered the normal quantities 23 used in the various applications. And that considered 24 both radiological dispersal device and а

radiological exposure device.

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So they basically

came up with five categories in the Code of Conduct and they're recommending that for the source registry you include the first two categories because those are the ones viewed most likely to be used in these types of devices.

One of the isotopes that they have included in their recommendation was radium-226 and since NRC does not regulate that isotope, obviously, we're not going to include it in a rulemaking. The system itself, once it's developed, we would accept that if other states would want to impose requirements on the licensees that they have, but it will be -- from our standpoint, obviously, it would be a voluntary effort.

I mentioned briefly in response to your question but the basic elements of the rulemaking, we're going to require a licensee to report any time they manufacture a new source, they transfer to another licen -- or to another facility because it may not be a licensee. It could be say DOE that they're transferring it to. Any time they receive a new source and any time they dispose of sources. The rule currently would require that they report by the close of the next business day. We want to get this quickly information fairly from а securities

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1 standpoint in case there's problems, we would be able 2 to react. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Just another quick detail 3 4 there; you know, the Army has a large NRC license and 5 they transfer material among facilities under that one license. Would those kind of transfers from facility 6 7 to facility be covered as well? 8 MS. HORN: They should be covered as well, 9 yes. Okay, thank you. 10 CHAIRMAN RYAN: MEMBER HINZE: And that's also true of 11 12 well-logging organizations. They will move a source from one area to the other. 13 14 MS. HORN: The well-logging is a little 15 bit different because it remains under control of the We view -- even though under the Master 16 Materials License says it's one license, we're viewing 17 them kind of like an Agreement State so that they're 18 19 permitees. And so if they transferred it from one 20 permittee, if you will, to another, it would have to 21 be reported but because with a well-logging or a 22 radiographer, it's under the control of the same 23 licensee, they would not be required to report that. 24 Now, if they transferred it, say they have 25 a license in Oklahoma and they have a license in Texas

and they're now moving to another state, so they're operating under a new license, they would have to report that. But as long as they're operating within -- under that same license they would not need to report the temporary locations.

I will point out that the sources that we would be tracking do not include the fuel assemblies rods or pellets so it doesn't include any of the fuel aspects. Basically, from a transaction standpoint, the information that we're going to be asking the licensees to provide is basically the company identification number which is, you know, company name, the license number, your address, the basic identifying information. And we're also going to ask them to -- yes.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: I'm sorry, I'm just going to ask a question that got away from the previous slide you have. Manufacture, transfer, receipt and disposal, how about loss?

MS. HORN: No, there are already current requirements that require a licensee to report the loss of a source or a material in general, and instead of requiring a dual reporting, we're going to have -- we will just monitor the events or the NMED data and pull that information ourselves.

1 CHAIRMAN RYAN: So it will be NRC's 2 responsibility to take it out of the system. 3 MS. HORN: Yes. 4 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 5 MS. HORN: So, as I mentioned, the basic company identification information. We're going to 6 7 want to know the actual radioactive material in the We want to know the initial source strength 8 source. 9 at the time the source was manufactured, obviously the manufacturer or make is usually the term we use, the 10 model number, the serial number and then obviously, as 11 12 I said, the manufacture date. This is just the basic source identification information. 13 14 For transfer and receipt, again, the basic 15 company identification information, only in this case 16 we're going to want it on the company that's actually 17 shipping the material and the company that's receiving So if Company A is sending to Company B, we want 18 19 them to tell us they're sending it to Company B and 20 provide that license number so that we can actually, 21 again, figure out the transaction. 22 We'd also ask for the shipping date and 23 the estimated arrival date, so that at the other end 24 if the licensee, who is supposed to provide the

receipt date when they report, they haven't reported

to the system, we'd have an alarm and we could investigate. We'd call a licensee and say, "Hey, have you received this yet, did you forget to enter the information", or they didn't receive it and there's a problem, and so maybe now you actually need to go out and investigate. So it will provide some useful data.

There are some sources that are involved in a waste shipment, if it's going to a waste broker or if it's going to a disposal facility. In those cases, they would have -- the licensee would have to provide the waste manifest number and the container identification. And the idea on that is that's the information that the receiver is doing to have.

They're not going to have the detailed information.

So when the disposal facility reports theirs, they won't have to provide that basic source information because we're not asking them to verify that they receive a source. We don't want them to open up that shipment and dig out and say, "Yes, this source is in the container".

So what they would have to do is provide the -- again, the company identification number, the manifest number, and the container identification, and so the fact that they receive that container and put

1 the container and dispose of it is all that we're 2 looking for and then, obviously, the date and the 3 method. 4 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Again, just another detail 5 question, Part 35 licensees have, you know, for example, moly generators. I'm just wondering if that 6 7 rises up to Category 1 or 2 or how much of the Part 35 world is effected. 8 Some of the Part 35 world will 9 MS. HORN: 10 be captured. Molybdenum is not one of the isotopes 11 that we're tracking so that would not be but certainly 12 any of the -- some of the brachytherapy, some of the other dose therapy type issues, blood irradiators 13 14 certainly would be covered, so we will be capturing 15 some materials that they use. CHAIRMAN RYAN: The reason I ask is that 16 17 some of the Part 35 transportation is more general commerce, common carrier kind of situation where 18 19 perhaps some of the others are more of the sole use 20 kinds of carriers, so there's a little bit of a 21 difference of the transportation control aspect of it. 22 And again, this rulemaking does MS. HORN: 23 not impose any requirements on the transportation 24 That's actually something separate. 25 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Gotcha. Thank you.

1 MS. HORN: And I will say here that some 2 of the orders that have been issued require 3 coordination for timely receipt, so that's one way in 4 which the disposal facility is actually going to show 5 what they're receiving and other facilities also. 6 CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's not terribly 7 different than what goes on now for most shipments. 8 MS. HORN: No, it's not, no, it's not. 9 We're actually allowing a licensee a variety of 10 methods to submit this information. Again, as I said, it's close of the next business day after the 11 12 transaction so that if they receive something on Monday, by the close of business on Tuesday, they 13 14 would have had to have reported that information. 15 We allow them to report on line which is 16 what we hope most licensees will take advantage of 17 because this is going to be the easiest quickest, actually the most accurate method electronically. 18 19 They can basically do a batch load. They can upload 20 the information from their own system, send us an 21 electronic file and we would just download it into the 22 system. So between those two methods, we're hoping 23 that the majority of the licensees will actually use 24 these two.

We also obviously, are going to require or

allow them to submit by mail. They can fill out a paper form, they can mail it to us or they can fax it to us, either way. And we'll also allow telephone with a follow-up by facsimile or mail. We kind of view that as something that a licensee might use in an emergency. They've forgotten, the last minute, oh, we've got to get this in. So we don't expect that a lot of licensees will use that.

advantage of the But the on-line, basically once the source information been entered, you log in your information, which is associated with your password and everything, your company identification information is all there. the sources that you possess are there so you can basically go on line. You can click on this source saying, "I want to transfer it to another company", and then you just have to type in the company name. So it makes it a lot easier for licensees and it's less error because when they send in just a paper copy, then someone has to type that information into the system, there's another human error factor there.

Basically, we require licensees to report their initial inventory two different times, for Category 1 sources, by the end of year 2006 and for Category 2 sources, March 31st, 2007. For those

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licensees that have responded to the inventory survey that we did, we will actually take that information and load that into the National Source Tracking System, provide it to them and just ask them to update, so it would reduce the burden of them for reporting that initial inventory because basically this will be our baseline for the source tracking system.

And it's the same type of information, the manufacturer, make, model, serial number, the date of the activity. To maintain the system's accuracy and reliability of the information, we are going to require licensees to go in once a year and verify that the information is correct. Basically, if there is they'll have to complete the any discrepancies, appropriate report. If they receive a source and they forgot to report it, they would have to file the transaction report for that receipt. If during the initial inventory they missed a source, they would that, "We had this source in our just report inventory". So basically we're asking them to verify that the information in the source tracking system is correct against what their own inventory says that they have a the site.

And we'll require this during the month of

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June of each year, so it will be an annual verification. We're also requiring that if they discover error, why they submitted an transaction report and they put the wrong model number on it or they got the serial number off a little bit, once they discover that, they're supposed to correct that information within give days, five business days. So it's a two phase, if they discover an error, correct it, basically immediately and if you haven't caught it during your annual reconciliation, hopefully, they will be caught. As it goes down the line CHAIRMAN RYAN: a bit, say in the 2007 time frame when you have both Category 1 and 2 sources in, do you have an idea of

the number of licensees that will be in the system?

I think that there will be MS. HORN: about 1350 is the number that we're using. There were about half of -- there were about 1320 or so that actually reported under the NMED inventory and so we figured there will be a few more that maybe we've missed. There's a couple of reactor sites that may still have a source that -- because we didn't go out to the reactors for the inventory but we're quessing about 1350.

> Just a thought, you might CHAIRMAN RYAN:

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1	want to stagger by quarter who has to report on an
2	annual basis.
3	MS. HORN: We thought about that. That
4	makes it very difficult for to do it. We were
5	originally going to do it when they do their physical
6	inventory, but some licensees are required to do a
7	physical inventory quarterly, some semi-annually, some
8	annually, so you had you don't want they doing it
9	more than the one time. We just decided it was easier
LO	if we had everyone do it basically at one time.
L1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: It will make for a busy
L2	June though.
L3	MS. HORN: Yes, it will make a busy June,
L4	yes.
L5	MEMBER HINZE: This goes to access to the
L6	inventory. Will the licensees have access to the
L7	entire inventory or only their portion of it?
L8	MS. HORN: No, licensees will only have
L9	access to the information on their own facility.
20	MEMBER HINZE: On their own.
21	MS. HORN: Yes.
22	MEMBER HINZE: And who else will have
23	access to the inventory system?
24	MS. HORN: The only people that will have
25	access to everything that's in the system is NRC staff
	I .

1	and even that would be somewhat limited. It won't be
2	everyone that would have information to that.
3	MEMBER HINZE: The firewalls are there to
4	make certain?
5	MS. HORN: The firewalls will be there.
6	They're not there yet. The system doesn't exist.
7	MEMBER HINZE: Okay. To make certain,
8	they only can get into their own.
9	MS. HORN: Yes, this will be role-driven
10	permission type system. There's a lot of security
11	that will be associated with it. The procurement that
12	we're working on now, it's not complete yet, has a
13	long list of security related reg guide types, federal
14	guidance, different statutes that they will have to
15	meet.
16	MEMBER HINZE: Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Agreement States will have
18	access to their state?
19	MS. HORN: Agreement States will have
20	access to the information on their own licensees.
21	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay.
22	MS. HORN: There is one exception to that.
23	The information on loss and stolen sources which is
24	public anyway because it's in the NMED system and in
25	the event reports, there will be a broader range of

accessibility to that. Basically any Agreement State, any NRC staff, DOE and a few other federal agencies would have that direct access to just that list.

MEMBER WEINER: You mentioned your web security, firewalls and so on. Have you considered a closed network that only handles this particular aspect, only handles the national source tracking, you can still limit access from certain people but it would be more secure than firewalls and so on.

MS. HORN: I don't believe that that has been considered. I don't recall that being in any of our discussions. But basically we want the licensees to have access to it so it has to be over Internet and the -- if we were just dealing with I'll say the more sophisticated licensees, that might be easier to do but dealing with a general, more general type of licensee that don't have as many interactions with the NRC, I think that would be a lot more difficult.

Another aspect that the rule is going to require is that the manufacturers who create these sources need to assign a unique serial number to each source. The sources within the system will be tracking by the combination of the make, model and serial number. Now, we actually believe that most of the manufacturers already do this but since this is

what the system is going to be based on, we want to make sure that manufacturers are, so we're actually including that in the rulemaking.

The schedule for the rulemaking, the proposed rule is due at the Commission early next month, so hopefully we will actually be seeing this published in the Federal Register for public comment some time this summer. We plan on having at least two public meetings during the public comment period. We may have more. We haven't made the final decision on the number yet. We hope to have the final rule in place by July of 2006. That allows for a short implementation period before the final -- the initial loading of the source tracking system in December.

And during that time the final rule is published and the time they have to report December, we plan on having a series of stakeholder during basically workshops the fall and workshops would provide a demonstration of the system and to give them information -- allow them to actually play with it, you know, to have a little demo they can hands-on work if they wanted to, give them information on how they can actually set up an account for the system. Right now we'll probably hold at least one meeting in each region for the stakeholders.

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1 We also plan to have one for the OAS at the OAS 2 meeting for Agreement State personnel to teach them, and I suspect there will be several other meetings but 3 4 we do plan on that to try to get out to two of the 5 licensees who are actually going to be using the systems and teach them how. 6 7 And with that I thank you and if you have 8 any questions. 9 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay, questions? 10 Jim? 11 MEMBER CLARKE: Yeah, a couple questions 12 and I think they're related, but the people in the NRC that will be monitoring this, that will have access to 13 14 all the information, what are you really looking for? 15 I mean, what are -- what kinds of problems do you anticipate and what are the consequences? Are there 16 penalties associated with this rulemaking? 17 MS. HORN: As with any regulation, there 18 19 is -- if licensees violate it and we go out and 20 inspect, there is a possibility of civil penalties. 21 That would depend on the level of the violation, you 22 If someone violates it once, obviously, we're 23 not going to issue them a civil penalty. But if they 24 are repeatedly not doing reporting, I suspect that we

would escalate that and we maybe would go with that

approach.

Initially, I don't think that we will be issuing violations. We'll be working with the licensees, helping them to become familiar with the system. We're actually going to be establishing a help desk as part of this system so that if licensees are having trouble getting their information, they can actually call and we'll -- it won't be actually contract set but we'll walk them through how you actually report and what you need to do, so we're trying to be as user friendly as we can for the licensees.

From the NRC staff standpoint, I don't think all those decisions have been made yet as far as implementation. The system will have lots of bells and whistles with it so that if you have transactions that aren't matched, you know, it will send a message to someone on the NRC staff to say, "Hey, here's an issue", and they can decide whether they think it's serious enough that they want to actually do an investigation or maybe they'll just call up a licensee and say, "Hey, this doesn't match, could you two parties please work it out and get the correct information into the system".

So it really depends. Now, obviously, if

1	it was a very large transaction that involved large
2	quantities of materials, obviously that would warrant
3	a little more attention than if it was a single source
4	that the mismatched transaction is on. So in part, I
5	don't know yet. As we go through and get it in place,
6	we'll start working out those type of implementation
7	details.
8	MEMBER CLARKE: Thank you.
9	MEMBER WEINER: Aren't most of your
10	Category 1 sources transported in Type B containers?
11	MS. HORN: I think so, but I'm not 100
12	percent sure.
13	MEMBER WEINER: Because I've been wracking
14	my brain trying to figure out how you could make an
15	RDD out of cobalt-60 in a safe keg.
16	MS. HORN: That's not my area but those
17	are the levels that everyone has expressed concern at.
18	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. Yeah, that's it.
19	I already asked about web security.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: You done?
21	MEMBER WEINER: Yeah, I'm done.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay, Mike.
23	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Maybe I can try and get
24	Terry Devine to join us. Terry, tell us about from
25	the perspective of the CRCPD and Agreement States

about the role-out and what issues you see and how this is going from your perspective.

MR. DEVINE: I've heard very little from the radiation control people in the states. this. I know they're interested. They're following I suspect that some of these the issues. considerations are spreading over into other issues. That has come to my attention in the matter of surety and bonding, they have a table of values of nuclides that seem to me to be somehow related to the table you're talking about. Of greatest concern, I know that over the years I've heard a great deal more concern about the hazard of material disbursed through buildings and grounds and being ingested and all.

I'm thinking particularly about the concerns for radium and plutonium, which on occasion have -- the source casks have ruptured and great concern to check the people out and decontaminate at great expense down to very low levels. And what I've heard on the other hand about your tables of nuclides of the greatest concern seems to be instead for acute lethal external radiation hazard. That's about all that I've heard of discussed and mentioned. I'm sure there will be a lot more, probably at the conference this week in Kansas City.

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1 MS. HORN: Actually, I'm scheduled to make 2 a presentation at the CRCPD meeting. MR. DEVINE: Good. I'm sorry I'm going to 3 4 miss that. 5 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, I think, you know, as other programs, you know, I think of Part 35 and 6 7 it's roll-out to states that their involvement will be 8 important and of course, I know NRC was well aware of 9 that relationship. How many of the sources are --10 what's the split between an Agreement State license fraction and an NRC direct license fraction for these 11 12 sources? MS. HORN: I have those numbers but I 13 14 don't know them off the top of my head. I can say that about a third -- about a fourth of the licensees 15 16 are NRC licensees and --17 CHAIRMAN RYAN: So roughly three-quarters of the action is in the agreement states. So that's 18 19 an important aspect. 20 MS. HORN: It doesn't mean that the number 21 of sources are the same split. 22 CHAIRMAN RYAN: No, no, no, I understand 23 but just the licensees, that's helpful because, you 24 know, I'm sure they're across the Unites States and, 25 you know, there's a lot to do.

1 Another question that came to mind, 2 heard from Paul Lohaus and the Agreement States 3 program and the IMPEP program. Will this be picked up 4 as part of that ongoing Agreement State program 5 review? MS. HORN: That's an unknown, because this 6 7 rulemaking, as I mentioned, is being done under common defense and security provisions, which means that it's 8 9 reserved to the NRC. 10 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I see. MS. HORN: There -- we don't know yet 11 12 exactly how the states will, from an enforcement, some of them may choose to enter the 274(I) agreements and 13 14 do the inspection and enforcement aspects for us. 15 Some states may not which means that we would have to 16 inspect them. We're also looking at maybe some other 17 options, something outside the box that we could use 18 to do that, and that's across all the security 19 initiatives because much of this is being done under 20 common defense and security versus public health and 21 safety. 22 Right. CHAIRMAN RYAN: 23 MS. HORN: It is a big issue and we're aware of it. 24 25 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yeah, I mean, that seems

1 to me to be the potential area where good thinking, 2 good work would help because if three-quarters of the 3 action is under the Agreement States' control, and 4 yet, you know, that role isn't flowing smoothly to the 5 Agreement States program, that, as you've pointed out, 6 that could be an area to make some good headway. 7 MS. HORN: We did have members on both the working group steering committee and the interagency 8 9 committee from the Agreement States, so they have had 10 involvement and they are aware at least in a limited extent. They obviously received the rule for comment. 11 12 Actually, we didn't get a lot. I was rather surprised. We briefed OAS at the OAS annual meeting 13 14 last year and I suspect that the one that they had the is fall we will be doing another briefing on this 15 16 So we are trying to get them involved. 17 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. Thanks. Briefly, I assume that the 18 MEMBER HINZE: 19 code audit does the matching, the correlation, the 20 tracking automatically; is that correct? 21 MS. HORN: I'm not quite sure I understood 22 your --23 MEMBER HINZE: Well, in other words, do 24 you find errors by manually viewing the --25 Oh, no, it would be a computer. MS. HORN:

1	MEMBER HINZE: Computer?
2	MS. HORN: Yes.
3	MEMBER HINZE: And how is the verification
4	of that code coming along?
5	MS. HORN: Actually, we don't we
6	haven't started that. The procurement for that system
7	has not hit the streets yet. We're hoping that this
8	summer that the request for procurement will be issued
9	and we'll have a contractor on board in the fall that
10	they'll start the development of work.
11	MEMBER HINZE: I see, okay. But plans are
12	underway to have a strict
13	MS. HORN: Yes, plans are underway. IT
14	procurement is slow, we've discovered.
15	MEMBER HINZE: Second question; this
16	preceded my tenure on the committee but I understand
17	that this committee suggested something about GPS
18	tracking of the sources. Is anything being done about
19	that? What's the status of that?
20	MS. HORN: I can't tell you the status of
21	that. For the source tracking system we're not
22	considering that because we're actually tracking the
23	sources. And to be honest, without redesigning some
24	of the sources, you wouldn't be able to accommodate
25	that because if you add a tracking bar, it's not going

1 to fit into the device that it's designed to go into. 2 MEMBER HINZE: Sure. 3 MS. HORN: You certainly could put a GPS, 4 I suppose, on the shipping containers that they're 5 But then you're actually tracking the shipping Someone could 6 container and not the source. 7 technically take the source out and then you're 8 tracking an empty container. But the security aspects and 9 transportation from the other things are 10 considered in a different part. This is literally just the tracking. 11 12 Thank you very much. MEMBER HINZE: And, Bill, just as a 13 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 14 matter, that letter that we did write, I think it's clear that the regulation addresses the other comments 15 we made and the tracking system is really in the 16 17 discussion that went on at that meeting, we talked about the very largest of the sources and really kind 18 19 of thought about it as a transportation type issue. 20 You know, once it's under the control of the licensee, 21 there is an obligation there but it really was a 22 transportation related question for the very largest 23 of the material sources. 24 MS. HORN: And we are working on some

transportation security related orders. Like I said,

1 they're supposed to go up to the Commission some time 2 this -- actually, I think maybe in the next couple of weeks. 3 4 CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's a separate step 5 from what we're talking about today. 6 MS. HORN: Yes, yes. 7 MEMBER HINZE: Thank you. 8 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: How does the 9 Department of Energy fit into all this tracking? 10 they trying to do something similar by the -- for their sources and how do they fit in as a manufacturer 11 12 of sources? They would fit in just like any 13 MS. HORN: 14 other manufacturer. I'll step back. DOE has 15 participated on both the working group, the steering 16 committee and the inter-agency committee meeting, so 17 they are supportive of the system. It addresses requirements that they have identified. 18 There's a few 19 things in there that they specifically wanted. 20 actual participation and reporting to the system is 21 still an unknown. They are going to participate at 22 some frequency. It may not be the same frequency that 23 we're requiring our licensees. 24 That's an answer -that's

decision that they still have to make but they have

1 been involved in the system and hopefully they're 2 going to be reporting on the same frequency. 3 commitment that we currently have is that a couple of 4 times a year they would provide basically their source 5 registry, the sources that they have at their sites, but they may not be willing to make the transaction 6 7 reporting. That's still an open issue. Okay, and in their 8 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: 9 manufacturing activities, they will put the serial numbers and whatever on these to conform to --10 MS. Ideally, yes, but that's 11 HORN: 12 something that they would have -- we can't control them because they're not a licensee. 13 14 they're going to make the same requirements on their 15 facilities as we're making on our licensees, but as I said, that's a policy decision that they're not --16 they haven't actually made yet. But I think that they 17 I think they'll be going along with this. 18 will. 19 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay, is there any 20 mechanism you can foresee to get the radium sources 21 into the system? I mean, I recognize the legal issues 22 but --23 We've actually suggested MS. HORN: Yeah. 24 legislation that would give NRC authority over

discrete sources of radium. I haven't heard recently

what the status of that is. I don't know if that will go forward or not. If it doesn't legally, we can't do anything because we wouldn't have the authority. If it were to go forward, it would be a simple matter for us to add another isotope to the system. We would just have to do -- actually, it would be a very simple rulemaking for just the source tracking system.

States could adopt their own regulations or they could issue orders to their licensees that would require them to report to the system because basically what we will allow is voluntarily reporting. We do recognize that means the data won't be very reliable but we figure a little bit of information in this case was better than nothing at all. So it's really -- at this point, it's up to Congress and the states and what they want to do.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay, now back to the list of radionuclides that have the source and I guess a couple reports that you mentioned, can you give a general summary of the qualities or criteria that makes a radionuclide high risk as opposed to not high risk if you will? I sort of -- I look at the list and I see some -- you know, some obvious suspects and I see some fairly obscure radionuclides and I'm sort of perplexed how they can end up all on the same

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1	list.
2	MS. HORN: Well, I wasn't involved in that
3	so I can't give you a whole lot of information. The
4	IAEA document uses the categorization of sources from
5	Tec Doc 1344 which provides some background for it and
6	they basically had some dose criteria that they used
7	and they looked at the isotopes that are out there in
8	common use, applied the criteria to them and this was
9	the list that they came up with.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: So the list doesn't
11	necessarily imply that material exists in those
12	categories in any significant quantities or at all.
13	MS. HORN: That would be correct, at least
14	from the domestic. Internationally they may but from
15	a domestic standpoint, they may not.
16	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Ruth, did you
17	have a follow-up?
18	MEMBER WEINER: I did have one follow-up
19	to Bill Hinze's question. For the Category 1 sources,
20	for shipping, since this does become a transportation
21	issue, have you considered hooking into the TRANSCOM
22	system that now tracks the shipments of the waste
23	isolation pilot plan?

the NRC hasn't decided exactly where we're going to go

No, we haven't.

MS. HORN:

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The concern --

yet with the requirements for transportation. It also
involved the Department of Transportation, obviously,
which actually regulates domestic transportation.
Once those decisions are made, we would probably
implement whatever is decided in a future rule-making.
This system down the road could accommodate that type
of information. It would just require another release
of the software. So, yes, ultimately some of those
things may be considered but until those final
decisions are made. We also have a little bit of
concern that when you start getting some of the route
information, the information becomes safeguards which
we wouldn't be able to put it in this system or you
would have to isolate it from other parts.
MEMBER WEINER: Thank you. Thanks.
VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: We have one over
here.
MR. SCOTT: Thanks, Mike Scott, ACNW
staff. I'd like to follow up on Ruth's question a
little bit. The very existence of this type of a
system clearly poses a risk/benefit trade-off, the
risk being that the bad guys get ahold of the list and
then they have sort of a road map to find the sources.
I understand from your presentation that Congress has

directed the development of the data base and I

presume --

MS. HORN: No, we've committed to Congress. They have not directed us to.

MR. SCOTT: Okay. All right, thank you.

And so you don't have guidance from above on how the

-- what the electronic format or -- in other words,

the vehicle, like the web based or whatever, where
that would come from, correct?

MS. HORN: No.

MR. SCOTT: Have you done a detailed let's say risk analysis posed by the choice of a web-based system? I understand the reasons why you chose it but of course, every day in the press you read about how this or that web system has been hacked and the information has been obtained. I'd just be curious as to your perspective on how important risk or let's say security considerations have been in the selection of the electronic format that you've used.

MS. HORN: I won't say -- we're certainly very aware of the security aspects and the need to take and secure the information. But from a pure workability standpoint, this is the easiest way to have the system. Otherwise the burden on both the licensees and the NRC staff is going to be humongous. We have a NMSMS, which is a Nuclear Material

Safeguards Management System for basically special nuclear material, and licensees provide that and they download, they transcript all the -- it's a very labor intensive system and it costs a lot more, obviously. So what we -- while we haven't done an actual risk analysis, we have certainly weighed those values, I guess qualitatively and we think we can come up with a system that provides adequate security and still is workable.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thank you. Latif?

MR. HAMDAN: Merri, my question pertains
to the lost and stolen sources and the question is, do
you have sufficient provisions or what kind of
provisions do you have in the rule pertaining to the
lost and stolen sources? Do you go and investigate,
find them and reveal them or you don't go that far and
if not, why not?

MS. HORN: No, we don't. The source tracking system certainly does not. This is just -the rule just establishes provisions for them to report, licensees to report transactions for the sources. You're getting more into the Off-site Source Recovery Program that we have with DOE which is totally separate type of program. If a licensee has a source that they would like to get rid of,

obviously, and it met our criteria, the fact that they have that source would be in the system. We do envision down the road that there would be maybe a way for the licensees to designate a particular source that they would like to get rid of and they can't find a home and so maybe through CRCPD there could be some matching or to the offsite source recovery program you put that on the list and eventually DOE would hopefully come and pick that up.

MR. HAMDAN: The concern I have is it has to be one of the main purposes of the tracking system is to make sure that sources don't get into the wrong hands, they're not stolen or lost and fall into the wrong hands, and is there another mechanism another process that would follow up and take it from there or because if there is not, then it seems to me that the rule should include provisions for that.

MS. HORN: I don't know exactly how you provide a provision for that. NRC certainly can't the possession of courses. We have worked with licensees, as I said, through CRCPD and through the offsite source recovery for those sources to be picked up either by another licensee or by DOE. But the tracking system is primarily so we know who has what, so that we know what material is out there. That's

really the primary purpose of that, so that we actually know that when you know, there's a security level alert, that we know in a particular region, you know, which licensees to go out and send security advisories to. That we just have a better feel for where this material is at because currently we don't have that type of information.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: It's an interesting question, Latif, and let's recall, too, that -- and correct me if I'm wrong Merri, but you're talking today about sources that licensees have and want and use.

MS. HORN: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's a little different question than sources that, let's take for example, a downhole logging source that gets lots, and I mean, lost down a bore hole, it's 3,000 feet down, it's not coming back up. So that's -- and there are reporting mechanisms if a licensee has a source and loses it beyond recovery, you know, and that has to be looked at from an Agreement State perspective and NRC and there's a process to do that.

MS. HORN: And that information would actually be in the system because we would take those reports. The system will actually record the end

point of a source. That end point could be that it's been exported to another country, that it's been lost. Obviously, that's a reversible end point, that's decayed below the threshold values, that it's been abandoned in a well logging hole or what have you. Those types of end points would be captured by the system but there would be nothing to recover. There would be no intent to recover that source.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yeah, there's a return to vendor provision. I think some sources get remanufactured and things like that, but --

MS. HORN: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: -- so I guess from you know the states tend to deal with a lot of those loops then the separate question and again, and I'm interpreting you know, what you're saying, but the separate question is an orphan source is a different matter all together. That's a source that for whatever reason disappeared for awhile and now it's back on the radar screen. But I think if I recall, Terry Devine and was it Joe Clinger from Illinois, gave us a pretty thorough report on that program for orphan source recovery and management as well as DOE's presentation a few months ago. So I don't think it's -- I think it's being looked at but I don't know that

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1 it's necessarily appropriate or part of this aspect of 2 this rule. That's my own view. 3 MS. HORN: Now on some of the -- typically 4 an orphan source is a source viewed that you found 5 somewhere and it really doesn't have a home, so it probably wouldn't even be in the system. Now, if it 6 7 was a source possessed by a licensee that they're 8 wanting to get rid of, then yes, that source would 9 probably be recorded in the system. And when DOE or 10 whoever picked it up, then you would record the transfer just like you would if it was going to a 11 12 licensee. If I may, it wouldn't hurt 13 MR. HAMDAN: 14 for you to consider since you're making this rule, to 15 really put some meat onto the stolen source or the 16 sources that you -- that may be of concern, that may 17 be Category 1 and then that was maybe stored or something. So maybe the rule is maybe an opportunity 18 19 to I think put something there, you know, that would 20 help some at least. 21 MS. HORN: I don't quite know what 22 provision you could put in a reporting system. 23 Investigation, for example, MR. HAMDAN: 24 for safety and types of storing sources. 25 That's more getting into the MS. HORN:

1 possession of а source versus recording the 2 transaction, so that would actually be more a licensee 3 who has sources that -- you're questioning the storage 4 of them, that would be part of the routine inspection 5 program. Latif, again, I emphasize 6 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 7 that I'm putting on my old licensee hat, there is a 8 very clear obligation to have a source, if it's lost 9 or stolen you must report it already. 10 MS. HORN: Yes. CHAIRMAN RYAN: That requirement is on the 11 12 books. The only concern I have is 13 MR. HAMDAN: 14 this tracking system is to see to it that sources 15 don't get into the wrong hands. Is that not true? 16 MS. HORN: No, no. 17 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, wait a minute. licensee has an obligation to have a source. 18 19 again, I can -- I'm visualizing the log book of 20 sources I used to keep up to date. And I just kept a 21 log book and it was routinely inspected against our 22 Now, that's being formalized and inventory. 23 centralized, but my obligation as the owner of that source is if it's missing, the minute I find it 24

missing, I report it.

1 MS. HORN: You're supposed to report it. 2 CHAIRMAN RYAN: That obligation has been 3 in place forever. 4 MS. HORN: 2201. So that part of the 5 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yeah. obligation is clear. I think what's being formalized 6 7 here is the tracking and recording aspect. So you're right, but what I'm trying to get across is that that 8 strict obligation to identify it's stolen immediately 9 or recognizing a loss or whatever the case might be 10 exists already. Is that helpful? 11 12 Thank you very much. MR. HAMDAN: Yeah, 2201 requires licensees 13 MS. HORN: 14 upon the discovery -- immediately upon discovery to 15 report lost material that meet the criteria and all 16 the Category 1 and Category 2 sources would meet the criteria. 17 18 Thank you. MR. HAMDAN: 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I guess I think the key 20 here is and maybe it's in the draft language of the 21 rules, that linkage ought to be pretty clearly 22 established that, you know, it does link with that. 23 I mean, in reference to --I think there is discussion in 24 MS. HORN: 25 the Statement of Considerations about lost and stolen

1	sources.
2	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay.
3	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay, John?
4	MR. FLACK: Yeah, just back on the risk
5	question, is the enforcement side of the rule going to
6	be risk-informed or is it going to be more compliance?
7	MS. HORN: It enforcement policy is
8	something we typically address at the final rule stage
9	versus the proposed rule stage, so I don't know.
10	Right now, I don't actually envision any changes in
11	the enforcement policy. We've taken a quick look at
12	it and at most, we might provide an extra example or
13	two but I suspect that it would be probably risk-
14	informed.
15	MR. FLACK: It will be risk-informed.
16	MS. HORN: I would suspect so.
17	MR. FLACK: Okay, but in elaborating a
18	little bit on that, how do you go about risk informing
19	it?
20	MS. HORN: Well, I think you can take a
21	look at the say maybe pay more attention to the
22	Category 1 sources versus the Category 2, you know,
23	the quantity that they're not reporting properly.
24	Also maybe the frequency which gets maybe into a

little bit of compliance but if someone is routinely

1 not reporting their transactions, obviously, we would 2 take a harder look at that than someone who misses one every now and again. 3 4 MR. FLACK: With some frequency. 5 MS. HORN: Yeah. 6 MR. FLACK: Okay. 7 MS. HORN: Obviously, Category 1 8 transactions are a little bit more important than the 9 Category 2. 10 CHAIRMAN RYAN: And Merri, that gets me back to this 274(i) aspect that if it was in the IMPEP 11 12 program, you got kind of that built in already, that sort of graded approach to ramp it up 13 14 performance indicators go negative. 15 MS. HORN: Right. DR. LARKINS: Yeah, there may -- John 16 17 Larkins, there may be some difference, though because differ 18 Agreement in their approach States 19 enforcement as opposed to the NRC. 20 And my understanding -- I could MS. HORN: 21 be wrong but my understanding is that the Agreement 22 States can't actually take enforcement. They can go 23 out and inspect and I think they can -- and they a 24 have to report. We actually have to take the 25 274(i) enforcement for anything that's under

59 1 agreement. 2 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Rich? Merri, do you know how the 3 MR. MAJOR: 4 rest of the world is doing on source tracking? 5 leading the pack or --I would say that we're probably 6 MS. HORN: 7 leading the pack. I know there are states that are beginning to take a look at that, countries. 8 9 them actually are requiring when they issue a license or whatever, their equivalent is that they actually 10 11 state the sources that a licensee is authorized to 12 possess so they actually have source information in the license which we don't do. I know that Canada is 13 14 starting to take -- is looking at this and they are 15 also looking at the import/export. They're looking if I remember correctly early next year to start. 16 think that we are probably on the forefront, but other 17 countries are looking at this also. We've met with 18 19 regulators from Brazil, Ukraine, Canada, 20 several other countries. 21 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks, any more 22 questions?

MS. STEELE: Yes. Sharon Steele. Have licensees from academia or medicine or other industries been involved in the working groups and if

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2 MS. HORN: No.

MS. STEELE: Okay, and the meetings that you have for the summer and the fall, where would they be?

MS. HORN: Location still to be determined. At least one of the meetings will be here at headquarters. The other one, if we just have one other one, it will be somewhere in the Midwest to West because that's where most of the radiographer type licensees are and that's kind of where the patch is. If we end up having more, we may have one in each region, but resource issue, we haven't decided that yet.

MS. STEELE: So then that would be the first time that they would know about the --

MS. HORN: I won't say that it would be the first time because we have gone out with the interim inventory surveys which went out last year and we're doing those updates and those letters, the NMSS newsletter we've mentioned that National Source Tracking is coming. While they haven't been directly involved, they have been informed. Some of the security meetings that they've been having with licensees, I believe that they've mentioned it in some

1 of those meetings also. 2 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Any other questions? 3 Okay, seeing none, we'll take up the issue of whether this is right for a letter or not later this afternoon 4 5 in the session for that purpose. So thank you very much for a very interesting presentation. 6 We're going 7 to take a short break here, despite it not being shown 8 on the agenda till ten o'clock. 9 (Whereupon, the proceedings went off the record at 9:37 a.m. and resumed at 9:55 a.m.) 10 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Let's come to 11 12 order here and we'll move on to the next presentation on pre-closure and repository design update. 13 14 going to hear from Bruce Hinkley from the Shaw/Stone 15 & Webster organization. And before turning the floor over, 16 understand that additional copies of the presentation 17 are being made. I think we ran out here. 18 And those 19 should be available shortly. 20 With that, Bruce? 21 MR. HINKLEY: Good morning. 22 Thank you for the opportunity to give you 23 My understanding is that the Committee has an update. 24 not had a design update for a little over two years, 25 so I'd like to think we've made some progress.

hopefully, after two years we certainly have.

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Before I get started, just quickly, my background. Again, Shaw/Stone & Webster. And I work in the Management Technical Support Group as a direct support to the Department of Energy and the engineering and project management areas. My background is all commercial nuclear power plants.

What I'd like to talk about this morning is the overall design status. Talk a little bit about the surface facility changes, subsurface facility layouts, the recent specific areas of focus from recent NRC interactions. Talk a little about the integrated waste stream management, thermal design requirements, the emplacement drift ground support and then wrap up with *R path forward.

Now moving to the surface facilities, what I mean by recent design changes is they're recent since two years ago when you were last updated. have been changed in the North Portal emplacement portal layout. And the layout and orientation of facilities changed to optimize operational aspects and to support the construction, which I'll talk about a little later. Transportation Cask Integration of the Facility with the Warehouse Non-Nuclear Receipt

Facility. Addition of the Fuel Handling Facility and addition of the Central Control Center. And the addition of the second closure cell to the Canister Handling Facility. And a change in the aging system capacity from 40,000 to 21,000 metric tons of heavy metal.

Now, it's easier to see up on the screen and, hopefully, your eyesight is a little better than me if you're looking at your handout.

This area right here is the Fuel Handling
Facility. This is the Central Command Center, Central
Control Center Facility. And this here is the Waste
Receipt and Cask Facility. We'll talk about the other
facilities, but quickly this is the North Portal or
the emplacement portal, and then the Canister Handling
Facility and then the Dry Transfer Facility.

Now, the Transportation Cash and Receipt Facility, we can walk through the cask operations. And if you can follow the numbers through, we receive transportation cask, the and we do receipt inspection then the and survey. And cask is transferred to the Site Rail Transfer system. And the transfer of the site rail transfer system from the Receipt building to one of the processing facilities.

Now, on the non-nuclear side of the

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facility we have site specific or aging cask And if you look at number four you'll see operations. where the aging cask receipt and inspection takes place. And then we transfer the aging cask and skid to the staging pad. And then, again, transfer the aging cask to the site rail transfer casks. And then we'd be transferring the aging cask to one of the separate process buildings.

And when they talk about waste package operations, again, in the non-nuclear receipt facility this is a storage area and a receipt facility for waste packages, the waste package lids. They'll install the trunnion collar. It is basically, for lack of a better term, a spare parts and parts that come on and off the cask and containers are stored in this area.

Now the Fuel Handling Facility I'll discuss next. But what I'd like to do is just briefly, the design process for a licensed nuclear facility takes into account numerous items with numerous independent reviews and analyses. For example, there are environmental issues; everything from tornado winds to maximum rainfall to flooding, to the seismic events. We take into account volcanic ash deposition on the ventilation systems.

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1 Besides that we have fire hazards, 2 personnel protection concerns. On heavy lifts we have 3 draw pipe. We have secure load paths and, for 4 example, not only what you can or cannot carry a heavy 5 load over, but you clear that load path from any sharp objects that could, say, endanger the package on the 6 7 case of a drop or bump. And then the subsurface then we have the 8 9 issue or during the mining operations of rockfall 10 concerns. Now, the mission of the Fuel Handling 11 12 Facility is to receive and package commercial and DOE spent nuclear fuel and Department of Energy high-level 13 14 waste for emplacement. It's a multi-level steel 15 reenforced concrete structure. And for a size idea, it's a little over 30,000 square feet with the 16 17 vestibule area, which is shown in just framework. Now what I'd like to do is walk through a 18 19 basic operation or disguise -- not disguise. 20 some of the major activities that happen in the Fuel 21 Handling Facility. 22 Right here is the vestibule. And this is 23 where the transporter and the cask is brought in. Now, 24 interesting thing is it is backed up. The

transporter backs the shipment in. And then you close

this access door. Well, let me -- this door is closed when you bring the package in. Once the transporter backs in, then they will go ahead and back the truck or the rail locomotive back out, and we will close this door. That is for environmental protection from basically the outside weather. And this is in the vestibule area here.

The major equipment in the vestibule area is a 200 ton Gantry crane. So we'll take the package, the cask coming in here. And then we'll take it into this area, again, another set of doors. And what we do is we have staged ventilation areas. And right over here is the highest contamination areas where we do the fuel operations. So that would be the lowest pressure. And then as you move out through the other areas of the building, that way we always have the contamination restricted by the airflow of the lowest pressure where the highest contamination is.

When we bring the containers into here, this is the preparation area. Here we'll do the gas sample on the cask. In it, we'll remove the inner lid bolts and we'll put the lifting fixtures and start.

Now they come in horizontally. We bring it in here. And this is where we'll go ahead and stand it up in the package, put it on a different pedestal

and trolley and start moving it into the three transfer bays.

Now for purposes of this discussion, we'll say Transfer Bay 1 will have a waste package. Transfer Bay 2 is the aging cask. And Transfer Bay 3 -- I'm sorry. Transfer Bay 2 is the shipment. And Transfer Bay 3 is the aging cask.

Now once we bring the waste package in, there is a docking ring and the elevation above these transfer bays, transfers cells, is all controlled by remote manipulators where we will go ahead and move the spent fuel between the packages for thermal management concerns as well as optimization of the waste package. When we have taken the waste package and it is moved over to this area, which is the closure weld cell where it's all remotely sealed and welded, then the closed waste package comes back out, goes through the turntable, moved into the right direction. Take it out, lay it down, bring it back up. The transporter will pick it back up and take it to the emplacement portal.

If it goes to the aging cask where we have moved some of the fuel from the waste package and put it into an aging cask, when the aging cask is ready to be moved it, again, comes out to the turntable and

brings it out here. Lays it down or we can leave it vertical, bring it out and take it out to the aging pad.

Now the Fuel Handling Facility was modeled after the Test Area North Facility at Idaho. Again, it's designed to handle the uncanistered spent nuclear fuel in the fuel transfer cells. It's capable of handling canistered waste forms, and that's in -- we just take it and handle it in the large main transfer bay before it goes into the fuel transfer cells. And, again, we mentioned there was the one closure cell for waste package welding.

Now, the Canister Handling Facility, it provides limited throughput for handling only sealed defense high level of waste, defense spent nuclear fuel, I mean DOE spent nuclear fuel and high level waste, Naval canister and vertical, dual purpose canisters. It is about 120,000 square feet. And, again, multi-level concrete and steel. And I believe the canister handling facility and those operations were discussed last time you were briefed.

This sketch shows the material flow path through the building. The one thing I would like to talk about here is you have three transfer pits. And some of the issues and the safety requirements on the

1 pits are, of course, the drop height and between the 2 pits right now the current design has a crush pad so 3 that if there was a slap-down or a tip, that would 4 help in that analysis. 5 Now, one of the interesting things on -and the typical canister arrangement just is that we 6 7 would put one DOE high level waste canister in the 8 center of a waste package and then surround it with spent nuclear fuel. And that's really to optimize the 9 10 loading of the waste package. MEMBER HINZE: Where is that being done? 11 Where is that physically being done? 12 MR. HINKLEY: I'm sorry. Right here are 13 14 the pits and the waste package operations are, if you 15 can look on your drawing, we bring the waste package in through here. And then depending what the 16 17 canisters, we transfer the waste package onto a trolley. And here it gets surveyed and assessed. 18 And 19 then we transfer to the waste package pallet right in 20 here. And so the waste package operations are done 21 right here in these two cells. 22 And then once we consolidate the waste 23 package, we go ahead and do the laydown, put it on the 24 transporter and send it to emplacement.

So right here is where we can have the

1 canisters and move it to the necessary waste package, 2 and then bring it in here to do the sealing, and then 3 bring it out. 4 MEMBER CLARKE: Excuse me, Bruce? 5 MR. HINKLEY: Yes. When you say "waste 6 MEMBER CLARKE: 7 package, " are you using that as a generic term, are 8 you talking about a canister or the three that are --9 MR. HINKLEY: Well, the waste package is 10 transportation cask. When I say a "waste 11 package, " it's whatever we put in. In the Canister 12 Handling Facility it would be canisterized waste, if you would, the high level waste and the spent nuclear 13 14 fuel. And then once it's put into the, let's call it 15 the emplacement container or the emplacement assembly, then that would be considered a waste package. 16 17 yes, it's a generic term. 18 Is the fuel, the MEMBER WEINER: 19 commercial spent fuel also going to be in packages 20 surrounded by glass logs? 21 The commercial spent MR. HINKLEY: No. 22 nuclear fuel, it can come in as bare spent nuclear 23 fuel in its own transportation cask. And so it would 24 be picked up. It will not be encased in glass 25 packages.

1	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. Will it just be put
2	into the waste package?
3	MR. HINKLEY: Yes. Yes. And that would be
4	in the Fuel Handling Facility where we have the three
5	cells, and then we would use thermal management
6	techniques and analysis to make sure the thermal
7	concerns in those packages.
8	MEMBER WEINER: Thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Just another quick follow-
10	up, and I'm just trying to think of this from the
11	health physics and housekeeping perspective. In this
12	building, if I understood your process right, you're
13	really viewing this to be in essence a relatively
14	clean operation from a contamination control
15	standpoint because you're dealing with the sealed
16	packages?
17	MR. HINKLEY: This is the sealed
18	containers, yes.
19	CHAIRMAN RYAN: So it's external radiation
20	concerns and heat and so forth, as you've mentioned?
21	MR. HINKLEY: Right. More so than the Fuel
22	Handling Facility where we actually
23	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Where things are open and
24	so forth?
25	MR. HINKLEY: Yes.

1 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. And, of course, 2 that excludes your accident analysis and dealing with questions of rupture and so forth in this facility as 3 well. 4 5 If I could ask maybe just quickly go back to the other slide. It struck me that your first 6 7 survey that you do, you do that inside? 8 MR. HINKLEY: Actually, here is where the 9 container comes into the site and they'll do a quick 10 surface survey here. Just to accept the package to bring it onto the site. 11 12 Right. CHAIRMAN RYAN: MR. HINKLEY: However, when we bring it 13 14 into the Waste Transport and Receipt Building, that's 15 where the clean packages go. Now right in the vestibule of FHF, that is where we do the detailed 16 17 swipe survey and analysis. 18 CHAIRMAN RYAN: So you're really doing a 19 DOT arrival survey sort of approach right at the gate, 20 so to speak? 21 MR. HINKLEY: I would assume so. I don't 22 know the DOT rules. Right. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, I mean it's a first 23 24 check that it arrived intact before you actually get 25 inside the building?

1 MR. HINKLEY: And it's to verify the bill 2 of lading and --3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: All that stuff? 4 MR. HINKLEY: -- that it's the right 5 shipment and that kind of thing. 6 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 7 MR. HINKLEY: But more detailed analysis 8 inside the building. CHAIRMAN RYAN: 9 Gotcha. Thank you. 10 HINKLEY: Now the Dry Transfer Facility is about two and half to three times the 11 12 size of the Canister Handling Facility. It is a very, very large facility. And the mission is to receive 13 14 and package the commercial spent nuclear fuel. DOE spent nuclear fuel, high level waste and the Naval 15 spent nuclear fuel for emplacement in a repository 16 Again, multilevel structure of concrete and steel. 17 Now, the Dry Transfer Facility basically 18 19 has all the capabilities of the Fuel Handling Facility 20 as well as the ability to handle some of the 21 canisters. It is focused more on throughput and 22 productivity, whereas the Fuel Handling Facility is 23 more of a first-of-a-kind design for demonstration, 24 and as such would have less of a throughput. 25 would be considered the larger production facility.

Now, if I could. And so this drawing, you can see here. Here's an example of a horizontal shipment. And here is the cask standing up.

This area here, this bank of what looks like rows and rows of scuba tanks is the blending and

like rows and rows of scuba tanks is the blending and staging area. And that's where we do the initial thermal management effort.

And what we do is the transportation cask could bring in one to over 80 fuel assemblies. A waste package more or less holds between 12 to 40 or 45. So as such, you need the ability to, if you would, mix and match to optimize both for your thermal management issues and optimization of your waste packages. But it also allows us to sort and not categorize, but to handle the differences between the different boiling water reactor and pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies or packages.

Now, here are the closure cells similar to what we talked about in the Fuel Handling Facility.

Now when we talk about the aging pad, as I mentioned it was reduced to 21,000 metric tons. And the initial capacity necessary for a fuel handling facility operation is 1,000 metric tons. And by having an aging pad it allows for the uncoupling of the receipt and emplacement operations. It gives us the

flexibility to use a thermal management program.

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It also allows for accelerated emplacement of the hot spent nuclear fuel with cooler spent nuclear fuel. Again, to optimize the packages as they come in.

Now the aging pad system, if you would, it provides the aging casks, the aging pads and the cask transporters for the commercial spent nuclear fuel and staging the Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel and high level waste.

Now I mentioned earlier that we have opted at this point to go to a phased construction schedule. And that's both for budgetary concerns as well as optimization of the workforce and the sequence of the structures.

This diagram is color coded and if you at the light blue, that is the necessary facilities and support for infrastructure Fuel Handling Facility initial operating capability. That would then be followed by the Canister Handling Facility in the red. And then the Dry Transfer Facility is the large green building. And then there are also plans for a Dry Transfer Facility Number Two, which at this time is basically a cookie cutter of Dry Transfer Facility 1.

1 If you look in the upper left-hand corner, 2 that is 20,000 metric tons of aging. And the 1,000 3 that you need for Fuel Handling Facility initial 4 operating capacity is right here. And then the 20,000 5 up here. Looking at our 6 MEMBER HINZE: Excuse me. 7 figure, it looks like the Storage Facility is on a 8 pretty steep topographic gradient. Is that all going to be cut down to the lowest grade or how is that 9 10 going to be handled? 11 MR. HINKLEY: Well, there are a couple of 12 challenges with the footprint. They are still doing analyses on the final footprint of the buildings. But 13 14 there is going to be some grading and there are still 15 some studies going on to put the final determination of the footprint. 16 17 MEMBER HINZE: What is the present location of the various facilities predicated on? 18 19 HINKLEY: Well, part of it is 20 predicated on the ground conditions and the seismic 21 spectrum in that local area. What we learned from the 22 WTP project that a general seismic mapping or a ground 23 mapping may not provide the best answer for the 24 individual footprints of the building. So it's that,

as well as the shortest transportation routes and

1	where we can get the roads and the transporters and
2	the locomotive and the rail to get between the
3	different activities.
4	MEMBER HINZE: But these are not set in
5	concrete yet?
6	MR. HINKLEY: No, they are not. Again,
7	well it says "preliminary and not intended for
8	construction." This is our best layout right now.
9	But for example where the Fuel Handling Facility is
10	located right now, it happens to be covered by a very
11	large much pile where we excavated the tunnels. For
12	example, that would have to be removed and then we
13	would have to basically excavate and backfill with the
14	appropriate aggregate before we could even build the
15	building in that location.
16	MEMBER HINZE: While I'm interrupting you,
17	what are the storage casks? Are they vertical, are
18	they
19	MR. HINKLEY: The aging casks?
20	MEMBER HINZE: The aging casks?
21	MR. HINKLEY: The aging pad is designed to
22	handle both horizontal and vertical. Most of them
23	will be vertical, but there is a small area set aside
24	for the horizontal casks as well.
25	MEMBER HINZE: And this is because some of
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1	the casks, why will some of the
2	MR. HINKLEY: Some of the cask systems,
3	the transportation, that we receive is horizontal.
4	There is an allowance, if you would, or plans to allow
5	for the horizontal storage as well.
6	MEMBER HINZE: Thank you.
7	MR. HINKLEY: Right.
8	And I'd like to move on to the subsurface
9	facilities.
10	Again, recent as since you were briefed
11	two years ago, but there have been revised panel
12	layouts in the ventilation system, revision to the
13	ground support system, we returned to the rail system
14	for the waste package transporter. I believe a couple
15	of years ago it was multiwheeled crawler. Now we've
16	decided to go to the rail system.
17	We've increased the radius of the
18	emplacement drift turnouts and moved ventilation
19	control doors to the outer end of the turnouts.
20	Now this represents the proposed
21	emplacement sequence. It also talks about initial
22	development which would be necessary to support FHF
23	operations.
24	Basically we're going to develop three
25	emplacement drift, one of them will be used for

1 performance confirmation. What I mean by that is we 2 will have waste packages in that emplacement drift, 3 but it will be heavily monitored and instrumented as 4 performance conformation. 5 Now we will also have one monitoring drift is what we have planned right now. And that is 6 7 actually burrowed under or will be burrowed under the 8 performance conformation drift with bore holes, if you 9 would, that will go up so we will be able to monitor 10 temperature, humidity and etcetera through the rock up under the performance confirmation drift. And so 11 we'll have additional instrumentation. The monitoring 12 drift is not intended for any emplacement. 13 14 And then we would subsequently move on to complete the remaining drifts consistent with the 15 16 construction schedules and the capacities necessary. 17 MEMBER HINZE: Were is the monitoring drift in --18 19 MR. HINKLEY: The monitoring drift is not 20 shown on there. It is not constructed yet. It will be 21 bored under the three emplacement drifts. 22 On this drawing, to be honest, I'm not 23 sure exactly where it would be. 24 MEMBER HINZE: Is it designed for any 25 particular lithologic unit?

1 MR. HINKLEY: That is not my area of 2 expertise, but I would go on the assumption yes it is. I would hope so. 3 MEMBER HINZE: Yes. 4 Right. 5 MR. HINKLEY: So that we get the full mapping of the instrumentation and monitoring of the 6 7 drift. I was actually out in the tunnel last 8 Thursday, and for the members of the Committee who 9 haven't been out there, they walk through all the 10 11 different phases and went through all the testing and 12 monitoring program. And now is the time to go because the weather is good. It's a lot better now than it 13 14 will be in August. 15 And, again, emplacement length available is approximately 40 miles. 16 17 Here is, to give you an idea of the emplacement drift, a physical feel; the diameter is 18 19 about 18 feet across. As you can see, that we have 20 the rail system and it's on transverse support beams 21 and longitudinal support beams to keep it off -- it is 22 just not rail sitting on the bottom of the emplacement 23 drift. 24 Now, these are waste packages of different 25 types and lengths. If you've heard discussion of the

1	drip shield, this is the drip shield. This, and we'll
2	talk about it later, is what we will put in as a
3	Bernold sheet, but this is the ground support system
4	and these are the rock bolts, the stainless steel rock
5	bolts that will go in.
6	MEMBER HINZE: All of those support
7	systems are alloy, steels
8	MR. HINKLEY: The rock bolts are stainless
9	steel and the sheet will be stainless steel as well.
10	And we'll talk about that a little bit at the end.
11	MEMBER HINZE: Sorry.
12	MR. HINKLEY: Oh, that's okay.
13	Now, the next slide is a picture of a
14	little different picture of the entrance to the
15	emplacement drift. Again, here's where it talks about
16	the perforated steel sheets and the rock bolts, the
17	waste package.
18	This is the emplacement gantry. And we'll
19	talk about that in a little bit. I have a better
20	picture of that.
21	This is the locomotive power system. It
22	is well, I grew up outside of Boston, so it reminds
23	me of the old trolley cars in Boston. So you have a
24	connection and the wire cable power in the ceiling.
25	Now, the interesting thing and we'll talk

about it, but when you get to the doorway you obviously can't run wires through it and close the doors for any kind of confinement. So we'll talk about that as we go on.

Now if you see, the transporter will come in with the waste package, and then allows the gantry to come out over this, for lack of a better term, loading dock, pick up the pallet and then move it into the emplacement drift.

As I said before, my background is commercial nuclear plant operations. So all this subsurface and rail cars and everything gets to be real interesting.

One of the things to discuss is, you know, when you bring the cask in and then you do your operations of the waste package, you back it in and then you pull it out, well if you went in that way then the waste package is behind the cab and the locomotive. Well, when you have a 1,000 to maybe 1500 when you put those waste packages in the drift, really emplacement you don't the locomotive to go in head first. So we had to design a rail system so that you can go up, swing back and then always be able to back it in to provide the necessary shielding. And, of course, the cab to the locomotive

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1	is shielded.
2	Now the waste package transporter, it
3	transports the individual waste packages on pallets.
4	The waste package itself is never picked up by the
5	gantry. It is picked up on a pallet. It comes around
6	with fingers and picks up the pallet so that you're
7	not handling the waste package itself.
8	And it has manual and remote control, and
9	all digitally monitored and controlled from the
10	Central Control Facility.
11	MEMBER CLARKE: Bruce?
12	MR. HINKLEY: Yes.
13	MEMBER CLARKE: How does the waste package
14	get on the invert? Is it transported in that way or
15	is it placed on it?
16	MR. HINKLEY: How does it get in the
17	emplacement drift?
18	MEMBER CLARKE: Yes.
19	MR. HINKLEY: Okay. Next slide. Thank you
20	very much.
21	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay. I'm sorry.
22	MR. HINKLEY: No, that's okay. Thanks.
23	Now, again, the waste package transporter
24	brings it in. What I didn't mention is the waste
25	package transporter has an extended bed with the

1	pallet on it. So when you slide the pallet on to the
2	extended bed, it goes in let me go back. This
3	right here is a shielded area on the transporter. So
4	this is the extended bed. And then that waste package
5	will slide in under there so there's shielding as you
6	move it to emplacement. Okay.
7	Now the emplacement gantry, which we saw
8	in the previous picture, it moves in and places the
9	waste packages on pallets within the emplacement
10	drift. So it takes it, picks it up off the
11	transporter and then carries it along. And it's
12	controlled to a precise exact location to then go
13	ahead, lower it into the emplacement drift. The pallet
14	goes in and just stays there. So you put the waste
15	package and the pallet in the emplacement drift.
16	MEMBER CLARKE: So what you're calling
17	"pallet," I'm calling invert is that
18	MR. HINKLEY: Well, the pallet is
19	basically like a forklift in a warehouse.
20	MEMBER CLARKE: Yes.
21	MR. HINKLEY: So when you pick up the wood
22	pallet, but this is the pallet used to support the
23	waste package. Are you talking invest as
24	MEMBER CLARKE: Just the final resting
25	place for the

1 MR. HINKLEY: Yes. Yes, invert -- and I'm 2 not a mining person, but when they talk to me to about 3 inverts in the mines and where the rail is, those are 4 basically very large concrete support grounded 5 structures. No, the pallet is separate --MEMBER CLARKE: Right. 6 7 MR. HINKLEY: -- than the invert. 8 MEMBER CLARKE: Okay. And so --9 MR. HINKLEY: Because the invert, and the 10 way I understand it, is under the rail system. a support for the rail system. The pallet is simply 11 a support pallet for the waste package. 12 MEMBER CLARKE: Okay. I understand. 13 14 MR. HINKLEY: Okay. Okay. 15 limits And again, when we put operating heights and that, that's due to controlling 16 the energy in case there is any kind of drop of off-17 condition. And, again, it's remotely 18 normal 19 controlled. We do not send anybody in with the waste 20 package into the emplacement drift. 21 Now, this is a little more recent. 22 October 8th we received a letter from the Nuclear 23 Regulation Commission which basically identified areas 24 where additional design information and specifics

would be helpful to be able to support the license

application review. And I'll talk about a few of those just to kind of move us into a little more current state of where the design is.

It has to the aging cask design analysis, the electrical distribution system. And I'll talk a little bit about target reliability data and what that means.

The Department of Energy and Bechtel SAIC identified potential surface facility enhancements as well. And they were based upon the design at the time. And we have defined the work scope for the design enhancements, and those are on schedule.

Now, the basis and objectives for these enhancements are to continue development of the design for the operations approach. We need to make sure that we don't design for design's sack and that we can actually make sure there is some efficiency and optimization of the operations.

It was to increase to conservatism in the Pre-Closure Safety Analysis. For example, use of bounding values verses mean values. And we have also made efforts to enhance the design solution, and these are voluntary enhancements, not necessarily NRC regulated actions. And we've also improved the documentation of how the design satisfies the design

1	basis. And I'll talk a little bit about that on a
2	diagram of how we handle reliability when we have
3	decisions or design decisions based on reliability,
4	what we're going to do to make sure there's the
5	necessary information.
6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Maybe this isn't the right
7	point, but the use of bounding analysis you always
8	have to be careful because you may be masking a risk.
9	MR. HINKLEY: Yes.
10	CHAIRMAN RYAN: So are you going to talk
11	a little bit more about that?
12	MR. HINKLEY: I wasn't intending to, but
13	I know Carol's here. If more detail on the Pre-
14	Closure Safety Analysis or any of that would be
15	helpful.
16	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And maybe the best thing
17	is to think about that for a more detailed
18	presentation at a later time.
19	MR. HINKLEY: Sure.
20	CHAIRMAN RYAN: But I think that's a
21	subject we'd be interested in. You know, as you know
22	the Committee's had an ongoing interest in more of a
23	risk-informed approach. While bounding analyses
24	perhaps have a place, you always have a risk that

you're satisfying yourself when there may be other

1 things that need to be understood as well. 2 Agreed. MR. HINKLEY: 3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 4 MR. HINKLEY: Carol, do you have that? 5 Thank you. A couple of examples or three examples of 6 7 the enhancement development are expanding the design details for the aging system, defining the system 8 boundaries for the important-to-safety electrical 9 system and then advancing the design of nonstandard 10 equipment to confirm Pre-Closure Safety Analysis 11 12 reliability. Now with the aging system, which we talked 13 14 about earlier, where evaluating dry storage system 15 designs already certified under Part 72 for compliance with Part 63. And, again, what we want to do is take 16 advantage of any licensing and analysis precedents. 17 design is supported by 18 And the 19 calculations in NUREG-1567 and 1536, which is the standard review plan for spent fuel storage facilities 20 21 and for dry cask storage facilities. 22 The advantage, there's been discussions in 23 the press and other issues on spent fuel pools versus 24 dry cask storage and susceptibility to attack and 25 things like that. But the two advantages of storing

1 spent fuel in dry cask storage is: (1) it's a passive 2 system and it only depends on air circulation for cooling, and it divides the inventory of spent fuel 3 4 into smaller discrete packages. 5 Now, in the electrical system, portions of the electrical system where necessary to support the 6 7 analysis will be designated important to safety, which brings with it increased requirements for maintenance 8 9 testing, manufacturer traceability, etcetera. The grid reliability is also modeled, not 10 just inside the fence, if you would, but the grid 11 12 reliability is modeled as part of the whole fault tree What we found is a loss of grid power 13 concurrent with a Category 1 is classified as a 14 15 Category 2 event sequence. The diesel generators provided defense-in-16 17 depth, but at the present time the current analysis shows that they are a belt and suspenders, not 18 19 necessarily required for providing the important-to-20 safety reliability features. 21 And the grid, the onsite distribution and 22 component reliability will be monitored to ensure that 23 their performance is within the reliability values 24 used in the analysis.

Now I talked about how would we handle

reliability based information in our license application, if you would. The real focus on this slide is the standard equipment and nonstandard equipment. Where we are relying on what we would call standard equipment, which is familiar in the industry and has been analyzed and potentially licensed before, then we will have a report, we'll have available to support the LA, the report demonstrating capability to meet the credited safety function.

Now, on nonstandard equipment, which would have limited licensing precedence or more of a first of a kind, then where we may not have the completed report demonstrating the capability, what we will have is the design development plan which will describe what we are doing and the plan and the schedule where we will be able to verify the equipment meets the accredited safety function when installed.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: I'm sorry. Just what split do you see between the one of a kind versus the industry standard equipment so far?

MR. HINKLEY: Well, for example cranes and heavy lifting devices. A lot of that could be standard equipment. Anything having to do with the locomotives and the specially designed trolleys and turntables, and things like that, although they have

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1 standards, they have not been in licensing proceedings 2 before. So we would expect where we're doing, if you 3 would, first of a kind design, that we'd have the 4 design development. I don't have a ratio as to --5 In my mind, tell me if I'm 6 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 7 wrong, I think about things inside the drifts as being relatively unique and new and maybe combinations of 8 9 things that we know a little bit about, but Fuel Handling Facility and other things of that sort are a 10 11 little bit more in the arena of standard? 12 MR. HINKLEY: That's true. Is that fair enough? 13 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 14 MR. HINKLEY: That is true Yes. 15 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. Now I'd like to talk a 16 MR. HINKLEY: 17 little bit about integrated waste stream management, 18 which is basically the program philosophy of 19 operations, if you would. 20 Now, waste stream management starts at the 21 utility and the DOE sites and we use the waste 22 generator records to derive thermal output. 23 waste stream management it continues throughout the 24 repository pre-closure period, so it's a cradle-to-

grave program.

1 Now the commercial spent nuclear fuel heat 2 load is the key variable. We will age the young or the 3 most recent fuel to meet the thermal criteria. 4 again, as we talked about in the different facilities 5 and in the waste packages, we'll blend the commercial spent nuclear fuel to meet the thermal criteria. 6 7 Now the primary tool for planning is the 8 DOE Design Basis Waste Stream report. And what we 9 talk about the youngest fuel first and minimum age out of the reactor, you know, five or ten years. 10 Right now the average waste stream for the 11 12 youngest fuel first ten years, the commercial spent nuclear fuel is about 17 years out of the reactor and 13 14 4 percent enrichment. 15 And, again, we use the records and the information at the generator site, if you would. 16 17 if it's different than expected, we continue to be committed to operate within our analyzed safety basis, 18 19 so we would just prevent it from shipment until we 20 would be able to be designed to accept and take that 21 fuel. 22 Now, the waste package emplacement follows 23 an nominal pattern where we intersperse the commercial 24 spent nuclear fuel with the cooler DOE spent nuclear

fuel and high level waste. And, again, the actual

emplacement pattern may vary, but the thermal criteria and the design basis of the thermal criteria has to be met. And so as it follows, it will require alternating placement of hotter and cooler waste packages.

Some of the waste stream management tools, we have the Total System Model which evaluates the Office Civilian entire of Radioactive Waste Management, the system including throughput. throughput modeling evaluates facilities and emplacement operations. And it includes the waste receipt, spent nuclear fuel assembly management, aging needs and the waste package loading and emplacement.

Now a little bit about thermal design requirements and criteria. So when we talk about the commercial spent nuclear fuel, the key or the critical criteria is to maintain the cladding below the allowable temperature limits. And during surface operations 400 degrees C. And when your surface operation is off normal limits, which would be an operational impact, those operations and what we would do in an off normal condition are under development. And as we get ready and closer to operation, we'll have our own standard set of procedures and tech specs, and that kind of thing.

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Subsurface operations and post-closure, the cladding is limited to 350 degrees C.

Now, for the DOE spent nuclear fuel and high level waste, we maintain the canisters below the allowable temperature limits. And in both surface and subsurface operations, you know, depending in what's in the package and what kind of spent nuclear fuel, there will be different canister temperatures. And it'll all be monitored.

Now besides the cladding and the specific fuel types, then we have natural and engineered barriers as part of the repository. And what we'll be monitoring is emplacement drift wall post-closure temperature and pre-closure temperatures, emplacement drift rock pillar, the center portion stays below 96 degrees C, waste package surface temperature of 300 degrees C. And then the last two items are really the design basis thermal load, if you The waste package thermal power of 11.8 kilowatts, which is the limit we blend to prior to emplacement to put in the package. That is our blending value, if you would. And then the initial maximum average thermal line mode of 1.45 kilowatts per meter.

Now when we move to repository closure,

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the design requirements are that the thermal pulse after closure doesn't exceed the emplacement drift wall specified temperature, waste package surface temperatures, the spent nuclear fuel cladding and the associated temperature for high level waste.

Now the thermal condition is important for closure. The repository temperature at closure, the repository thermal power at closure and the thermal power rate of change when we get to closure. And, again, we have the performance confirmation to confirm our thermal calculations.

Now, this slide shows the different sizes and shapes of the different transportation casks and canisters, and waste packages. And what you can see is that they range or vary significantly in dimensions. And if you remember the picture of the transporter or when we had the emplacement drift, it showed the different size of waste packages both lengths and diameter and how it would have to emplacement them and space them as part of the thermal management plan.

Some of the design features to help with the thermal management is, again: The basic design and structure of the transportation casks; the waste package, use of the aging system for thermal

management and the ability in the surface waste processing facilities to go ahead and load the different waste packages and/or aging casks; the HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems in the facilities, and; then the design of the subsurface facility itself and its naturally engineered barriers and the subsurface ventilation system.

Now the concept of operations for the surface facilities is, again, generator records are evaluated prior to waste shipment to determine, you know so if you would a heads up in a plan so you have preplanned what the waste disposition upon arrival at the repository. It can go into the waste packages for emplacement or into the aging casks for the aging pad. And we're designed to take a wide range of waste characteristics depending on the inventory of the waste shipper.

The waste could be processed through the Waste Transfer Facility. Any commercial spent nuclear fuel that exceed the emplacement thermal criteria will be sent to the aging pad. And the buffer areas in the aging pads support limited segregation of the waste forms. What I mean by that is it's, for lack of a better term, a campaigning effort where it allows us to thermally manage and mix and optimize the waste

package loading.

The facilities and systems are designed to maintain the specified thermal units. The Dry

Transfer Facility includes, you know, staging for the

48 pressurized water reactor and 72 boiling water

reactor spent nuclear fuel assemblies and 10

Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel or high level waste canister.

The Canister Handling Facility has its own staging area. And the Fuel Handling Facility has the cell for the aging cask in lieu of a staging area so that we have that aging cask as we move the fuel and mix it or manage it the thermal management process.

Thermal analysis for the bounding waste form heat loads. And then we have the thermal analysis for our normal conditions, for example, the loss of ventilation.

Now for the aging pads, again, the aging casks allow the assemblies to cool until the commercial spent nuclear fuel meets the thermal emplacement criteria. We mentioned the capacity earlier. It potentially utilizes various types of casks to accommodate various types of commercial spent nuclear fuel. And it potentially includes the capability for aging existing dual purpose canisters.

1 Now, as far as thermal management as it 2 relates to individual waste packages. The waste 3 package loading controls are still being developed. thermal criticality and shielding 4 address 5 concerns. Will probably be or most likely be similar to controls on loading the existing dry casks. 6 7 Primary commercial spent nuclear waste package have the capacities as stated: 8 21 9 pressurized water reactor or 44 boiling water reactor. 10 Now the waste package, the 12 pressurized water reactor waste package is available for the 11 12 longer spent nuclear fuel, but can also be used for particular hot spent nuclear fuel assemblies 13 14 maintain the overall thermal output limit. But this 15 would result in a larger waste package inventory and inefficient use of the drift links. 16 Again, and then 21 and 44 waste packages 17 should be short loaded to meet thermal units, but then 18 19 again, you would be in an inefficient use of the waste 20 packages and the drifts. 21 So this means you're MEMBER HINZE: 22 varying the distance between the casks in the drift? 23 HINKLEY: Well, there is limits MR. 24 between the casks, but more so it's what you put in

the waste package.

1	MEMBER HINZE: I understand.
2	MR. HINKLEY: And then that by itself, it
3	won't change the difference if you would between the
4	casks as much as just the total length of what you're
5	going to put in the emplacement drift, because some
6	are shorter and some are longer.
7	MEMBER HINZE: So what is the distance
8	between the casks?
9	MR. HINKLEY: I do not know, but I can
10	find out and let you know.
11	MEMBER HINZE: Well, you have said that
12	you blend to reach an average thermal generation. But
13	you also have alternating hot and cold casks?
14	MR. HINKLEY: Well, two things are
15	blending, if I would, and I apologize if I've confused
16	everyone.
17	You blend to reach the thermal limit
18	inside the individual waste package.
19	MEMBER HINZE: Okay.
20	MR. HINKLEY: Then you also have a design
21	requirement for the average thermal load, a longer
22	distance. So you have, if you would, two thermal
23	management activities. You don't really blend in the
24	emplacement drift, but you can sequence.
25	Now that's another reason why you want

1 the flexibility of the aging pad because you don't 2 want to move them around once you get them in there. So, I mean, that's why the preplanning. It's really a 3 4 pretty comprehensive plan as to say, okay, this is 5 what's coming in and this how we're going to put it in in what sequence to be able to meet those limits. 6 7 MEMBER HINZE: Thank you. 8 MR. HINKLEY: You're welcome. 9 Now in the subsurface, again, designed to meet the thermal units, duration and flow rates for 10 ventilation are established. After final emplacement 11 it's basically planned to have 50 years of pre-closure 12 ventilation. 13 14 The waste package and cladding can withstand extended interruption in ventilation based 15 16 on the current analysis. And once again, the original 17 post-closure must be met, you know, prior to closure. Now, to give you physical feel, this is a 18 19 typical aging facility. This is at a commercial 20 nuclear station. And since there's trees and green 21 grass, you're obviously not out at Yucca Mountain, but 22 it just gives you an idea if you take a look at that 23 truck what the size and robustness of these aging 24 casks are.

the ongoing evaluations

Some

of

1	thermal management: Still taking a look at the
2	throughput capability of the waste handling
3	facilities; trying to optimize system operations; the
4	safety and operational evaluations continue. As,
5	again, we are in the early design phases and so a lot
6	of the conditions for operator dose, minimization of
7	handling of the waste forms are still under
8	development. Taking a look at waste package and aging
9	cast loading. And, again, how we sequence in the
10	emplacement drift. And continue all our thermal
11	evaluations.
12	As we mentioned before, the Total System
13	Model, some of the ongoing evaluation. The effects of
14	varying the waste stream on the facility operations,
15	the duration of facility operations and, once again,
16	trying to optimize how we operate the facility.
17	The Total System Performance Analysis,
18	which evaluates post-closure performance.
19	And then the Pre-Closure Safety Analysis
20	which is, you know, evaluates the effects of thermal
21	management on compliance with pre-closure performance
22	objectives.
23	To summarize in thermal management. The
24	thermal emplacement limits require some aging. The

aging systems will be similar to the existing Dry

Storage Facilities. 1 The ventilation is required to 2 meet thermal limits in both surface and subsurface 3 facilities during operation. And the thermal goals 4 must be satisfied before repository closure. 5 Now I'd like to talk quickly, I believe there was a question about the emplacement drift 6 7 ground support that the Committee wanted to have a 8 quick conversation on. 9 drift ground support is Bernold The 10 stainless steel plates secured with the stainless steel rock bolts, if you can remember from the 11 12 artist's picture, if you would. These allow for airflow to eliminate any moisture traps between the 13 14 plate and the rock wall. They're not classified as 15 important to waste isolation. They're used for the confinement of the 16 17 rock surface, which is really just to prevent the unraveling of the small rock particles during pre-18 19 And they're designed for closure. no planned 20 maintenance. We may have inspection, but that's when 21 we went to stainless steel so there would be no 22 requirement for plain maintenance on the ground 23 support. 24 This gives you an idea of what a Bernold

It's another example which shows

plate looks like.

1	the overlap at the joint.
2	And to conclude, I hope after I've talked
3	this long that you think we've made significant
4	progress on the design, at least since you were
5	briefed over two years ago. And that our current
6	project focus is on readiness for the license
7	application and then the continued readiness for
8	support of the NRC information needs post-submittal or
9	during and post-submittal of the license to handle the
10	outstanding technical issues.
11	And that's all I have.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thank you. Do we
13	have additional questions?
14	Thank you.
15	This Bernold stainless steel plates, this
16	is only for the pre-closure period then?
17	MR. HINKLEY: These are permanently
18	installed and they stay installed.
19	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Right. But they are
20	not important to isolation and they're strictly for
21	the confinement of the rock surface during pre-
22	closure, is that right, or do I understand this?
23	MR. HINKLEY: Right. They are not
24	required to prevent analysis shows that they're not
25	required to prevent a rockfall or any rockfall of

1	significant size that would damage the waste package.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. The size of
3	the aging pad, you mentioned that that had been cut in
4	half, approximately from what was heard a couple of
5	years ago?
6	MR. HINKLEY: Correct.
7	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Could you give us
8	some clue as to why that has happened?
9	MR. HINKLEY: I think the original design
10	was 40,000 metric tons. Now before I say the wrong
11	thing, we did respond to the NWTRB and I brought that
12	letter. I think I want to make sure we tell the same
13	story to both groups.
14	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Right or
15	wrong, it will be consistent, right?
16	MR. HINKLEY: I do not want to misspeak.
17	Now that I said that, I probably left it back there.
18	What I can tell you is that the latest
19	analysis showed that the 21,000 was sufficient to
20	support and I'll read. This is a letter from the
21	U.S. Department of Energy to the NWTRB. And I'll just
22	read you part of it.
23	Is that the preliminary throughput
24	analysis support an operational need from 15,000 to
25	17,000. And what we did was we added 4,000 for margin.

1 And then the current estimates show that the 21,000 2 will be sufficient to address all the necessary aging and staging requirements. 3 4 My supposition is that potentially on the 5 earlier studies, the 40,000 just included additional But based on current analysis, the 21,000 6 7 already includes 4,000 for margin. So where the 8 original number came from, I'm sorry, I don't know. 9 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. The blending 10 is done in a couple of different ways here. 11 about in terms of the input to the repository, 12 facility from the generators and for DOE? In other words, how much of the blending is going to be from 13 14 the nuclear power plants and what they're sending you 15 and what DOE is sending you? Is there any information 16 on that? 17 MR. HINKLEY: It's not my area of expertise, but my understanding is that the plants, 18 19 they will put and load their spent nuclear fuel as 20 necessary to meet the transportation or storage 21 requirements that are within their license. And I 22 don't believe there is a requirement for them to do 23 any blending that would facilitate any reduction in 24 blending for us.

I see.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF:

1	MR. HINKLEY: I mean, because we have the
2	facilities to move between different shipments,
3	different types, different plants, that kind of thing.
4	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: While we're on the
5	aging area, your slide 15, I believe, shows a dashed
6	zone to the east of the repository which it looks like
7	a possible repository. Is that a possible additional
8	or is that a possible substitute?
9	MR. HINKLEY: For the aging pad?
10	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Yes.
11	MR. HINKLEY: Yes, as I recall, that's an
12	older drawing that I wasn't smart enough to figure out
13	to take that piece off.
14	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay.
15	MR. HINKLEY: But however, what it was is
16	if you look at the original drawings that may have
17	been briefed and submitted, that would have been the
18	if they wanted to go to 40,000, that's probably where
19	the expanded aging pad would be. But right now there
20	are no plans to do that.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. And that's
22	not a substitute then?
23	MR. HINKLEY: No, no, no.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. A final
25	question. Are all these canisters Alloy 22 at this

1	time?
2	MR. HINKLEY: I can't I really don't
3	know. I know that
4	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: In the inverts, I
5	think that Dr. Clarke asked the question. The inverts
6	are concrete or are they Alloy 22 or
7	MR. HINKLEY: The inverts in the tunnel
8	under the rail system were concrete, because that's
9	what I saw. I'm not the right subsurface person.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thank you.
11	MR. HINKLEY: But we can get back to you.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thank you.
13	MR. LEE: I think the inverts are
14	concrete. The existing plan, I believe, is to
15	continue with the use of concrete.
16	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thanks. It is clear that
17	you've changed in the last two years, so you met your
18	goal.
19	When I take a look at some of the sketch
20	drawings, say, 20 and 21 and so forth, I come into
21	question how far along in design are you? I mean, are
22	we at a detailed design step or are these still
23	preliminary or conceptual, are you down to the nuts
24	and the bolts?
25	MR. HINKLEY: Well, depending on the

1 facility and the discipline, that varies. With all 2 the regulators here in the room, we certainly want to be at a sufficient level of design to put our license 3 4 application in. Now, that will vary. 5 Now, as you might imagine, much of the civil structural and certainly the concrete and the 6 7 ground work is more advanced than the detailed design and instrumentation and controls. 8 But the major focus 9 on the design effort for Bechtel, I say I see right now is to provide sufficient detail for the license 10 applications. It's still -- we have a ways to go 11 before in detail design. 12 But it sounds like 13 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 14 different from, say, two years. You really made some 15 commitment steps that we're going to go this way? 16 MR. HINKLEY: Yes. 17 CHAIRMAN RYAN: And we're not considering options or alternatives or, you know, you've made some 18 19 commitments to do for example, your rail system and 20 the drifts and emplacement approach, that sounds like 21 it's pretty firm at this point. 22 It appears that the MR. HINKLEY: 23 subsurface approach is pretty solid right now. we continue to look at the surface facilities to be 24

able to optimize operation and minimize handling

operations.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: I noted on 35 your slide showing the canisters and casks and so forth. It just struck me that you're going to have an awful lot of grappling equipment around to handle all these different packages and types and so forth.

MR. HINKLEY: Yes.

aspect of design because not only, of course with canister the radiation questions, but heavy lifting I imagine will be a real issue for you, and it leads me to this question. How have you thought about occupational and industrial safety kinds of questions which are, you know, heavy lifting specific rather than radioactive material specific? Has that been integrated into your design and have you done that?

MR. HINKLEY: It has been integrated into the design. And the backup -- for example, a couple of backup documents, if you would, to the safety analysis report would be the facility design description and the system design descriptions which would take and, if you would, crosswalk you from the design requirements to how they're being implemented.

Another thing when you talk about the manipulators and the different heavy lifting handling

1	equipment, the buildings are designed that much of
2	that equipment that can be moved to a maintenance area
3	so they are not having to be maintained in a rad field
4	or a high contaminated area.
5	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Again, with nine different
6	final casks, is there's a lot of movement of material
7	that's unrelated to actually handling a package, I
8	would imagine.
9	MR. HINKLEY: A tremendous amount of
10	fixtures and different rings and lifting rigs, which
11	again when we talk about the Waste Receipt and
12	Transfer Facility, a lot of that is just storage of
13	different lifting and handling equipment.
14	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Sure. Okay. Thank you.
15	MEMBER WEINER: What happens to your flow
16	of materials into the repository if there's an
17	accident of some sort of the cask is dropped, or
18	something like that that requires a stop in
19	operations?
20	MR. HINKLEY: Let me answer from my
21	background at a commercial nuclear plant, and I will
22	have to go on the assumption that our operational tech
23	specs and response would be similar.
24	When you find yourself in an off normal
25	condition, then the philosophy is to basically stop

1 all operation, go to a safe condition and then perform 2 the evaluation and then take the necessary off normal 3 action steps. 4 I don't think -- well, we are not far 5 enough long that we had developed those operational procedural. 6 7 The design requirements in, for example, the locomotive, the entry crane, the requirements are 8 9 that it will stop in a safe condition. Because the 10 answer may not be to stop right away. It may be to put the package back down on a pallet, for example, to 11 continue the operation rather than stop and leave it 12 So those are in the design. 13 hanging it up. 14 MEMBER WEINER: But my question is more 15 what happens to trucks or rail cars then back up at 16 the entrance and what happens to the flow that you 17 theoretically have, or do you have alternate entry ports where the transporters can go in? 18 19 MR. HINKLEY: My understanding is that, 20 again, we will have whatever the bounds are on the 21 safe operating envelop for our license. And if 22 anything is outside of that, then we would 23 basically -- you know, ideally you'd like to stop the 24 shipment before it leaves the generator.

That's a great question. I don't know. I'm

1	not one of the emergency planning people. But I assume
2	well, I'm not going to assume because I really
3	don't the answer. But we'll get back to you.
4	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. Okay. Thank you.
5	Could you go back to your slide 18 for a
6	moment, please?
7	MR. HINKLEY: They told me we have old
8	fashioned slides. We have to go all the way back by
9	this.
10	MEMBER WEINER: That's fine. Yes.
11	Are you filling those drifts back to front
12	or something? I'm not sure from your drawing? I
13	gather you're filling Panel 1 first. But what's the
14	sequence, or do you know?
15	MR. HINKLEY: I'm not the subsurface. My
16	area is not in the subsurface construction. But I
17	know that we will be able to continue development of
18	the emplacement drifts while we are in operation with
19	Panel 1. That I know we will be able to do
20	concurrently. That's the way it's designed.
21	MEMBER WEINER: What happens if you find
22	a cask that has some kind of a corrosion pit or a leak
23	or something and it's already back and there are
24	things that are placed in front of it? How do you
25	handle that?

1	MR. HINKLEY: Well, the system is designed
2	for emplacement and retrieval. So we can actually put
3	the emplacement gantry back in and we may have to move
4	them back out and then put them in different shielded
5	areas and relocate to get to the exact package. But
6	it is designed to do that.
7	MEMBER WEINER: It is designed for
8	retrieval?
9	MR. HINKLEY: Yes, ma'am.
10	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. The final thing is
11	on your slide 35, the one with all the different kind
12	of casks on it. You have to go forward.
13	MR. HINKLEY: Oh, yes. Luckily, they told
14	me I'd be stumped.
15	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. How close are these
16	to existing casks? Do you have existing casks that
17	can be used for any of these designs? Are there casks
18	that are now commercially exist that you can buy?
19	MR. HINKLEY: Remember, the utilities
20	have, many of the power plants have dry fuel storage
21	capabilities, so they have their own aging casks. So
22	what we want to do is take advantage of the aging
23	casks.
24	Now, when you talk about the canisters and
25	containers to move the fuel, we're in prototype

1	development and that kind of thing.
2	MEMBER WEINER: And the waste packages
3	that are going to be emplaced, I imagine you don't
4	have
5	MR. HINKLEY: Still are under development.
6	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. Thank you.
7	MR. HINKLEY: Thanks.
8	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Jim?
9	MEMBER CLARKE: Just a couple of quick
10	ones. I guess all the welding for the LI 22 will be
11	done in surface facilities, all the final sealing of
12	the waste packages?
13	MR. HINKLEY: Yes.
14	MEMBER CLARKE: And I was wondering about
15	the number of transfers that a material might undergo.
16	Am I correct in assuming that everything will undergo
17	at least one transfer and maybe two?
18	MR. HINKLEY: Well, yes. If we are going
19	to move spent nuclear fuel to be able to stay in the
20	thermal management program, yes then we will be moving
21	it. You know, you may have the ability to take it out
22	of the transportation cask and if the world is good,
23	move it right into a waste package and it's the right
24	kind and the right aging, and that.
25	MEMBER CLARKE: Right.

1	MR. HINKLEY: And be able to put it in
2	one. Go ahead and take the waste package over to be
3	welded, sealed and then sent to emplacement.
4	MEMBER CLARKE: Right, that's the best
5	case.
6	MR. HINKLEY: That's the best case.
7	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay.
8	MR. HINKLEY: So it could require, you
9	know for example in one of those cells, for example
10	let's talk about FHF. You'd have an aging cask right
11	there as well. So, you know, you may take part of an
12	incoming shipment, put part of it in the aging cask.
13	And so then you might have to be able to wait for the
14	next one and move them until, you know, you could get
15	your right thermal mixing.
16	MEMBER CLARKE: Yes. And then out of the
17	aging cask and into the waste package?
18	MR. HINKLEY: Right. And back and forth.
19	Because, you know, really that's kind of the staging
20	area, if you recall. In FHF it's really just that
21	cell.
22	MEMBER CLARKE: Do you have pretty good
23	information to manage all that? I mean
24	MR. HINKLEY: Yes. The requirements for
25	the generator, in fact, are very detailed. So we

would have the best information available on those 1 2 fuel records. Remember, some of the fuel has -- some of 3 4 it as been the pools for a very long time. So I think 5 it will still be a challenge on handling fuel that hasn't been handled in a very long time. 6 7 MEMBER CLARKE: Thank you. 8 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I guess I'm not sure what 9 the plans might in the generator end, Bruce, but I 10 would think too that there's an opportunity for fuel that's in pools now to at least have some kind of an 11 12 inspection and view of it it as goes into transportation or aging at a power plant. 13 14 We did hear a presentation, what? About 15 a year ago? On some examination of some spent fuel 16 that had been in dry storage for a while, and that was 17 an interesting presentation that there wasn't any real evidence of degradation over I think it was 15 years 18 19 So I think there's an additional opportunity 20 to get more information as fuel starts to move on the 21 generator end. 22 Right. MR. HINKLEY: 23 Regarding the VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: 24 packages, is it still the plan to have a fill gas

inside the package, like helium?

1	MR. HINKLEY: When the packages are
2	received?
3	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: No, before they're
4	emplacement in the waste packages?
5	MR. HINKLEY: That's the current plan,
6	yes.
7	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: And how does that
8	get in? I assume it means somehow pumping the air
9	out, putting the helium in. But are there valves on
10	this? And at what stage does this all get done?
11	MR. HINKLEY: I'd prefer to get back to
12	before we get into that specific design. But it would
13	be done over in that waste closure cell, you know
14	prior to the final welding and that kind of thing.
15	Because there are ports remember when it comes in
16	we take a gas sample as it comes in.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Yes.
18	MR. HINKLEY: So I would assume there'll
19	be an ability to have the port and put the gas in the
20	waste closure cell. But I'm not the right one to
21	answer that question, but we can get back to you.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. At closure,
23	is it still the plan to backfill the emplacement
24	drifts?
25	MR. HINKLEY: I'm going to have to defer

1	that one, too. I'm not the post-closure person.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay.
3	MR. HINKLEY: Sorry.
4	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: At what point in the
5	emplacement sequence do the drip shields get put in?
6	Is it late, close to closure or soon on or
7	MR. HINKLEY: Yes. My understanding is
8	they'll be put in much later in the process. You
9	know, basically once your emplacement drift is full,
10	yo know, then you have the option to put the drip
11	shields in there.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: So there will be
13	some kind of a device that will somehow go down the
14	line
15	MR. HINKLEY: It's all done remotely, yes.
16	By a special device.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. And how does
18	management of low-level waste generated at the site,
19	do you generate any liquid waste? Is there a waste
20	processing facility of some kind?
21	MR. HINKLEY: My understanding well, of
22	course we will have some low-level waste. And I don't
23	know what the details of the waste processing facility
24	are. But for example, we have additional monitoring
25	on the drains in the rooms and that kind of thing.
ļ	I control of the cont

1	The design requirements says hey keep monitor away
2	from the fuel. But we will have both storm drains and
3	floor drains and things like that that we'll be
4	monitoring and I assume process.
5	I don't know what the design of the low-
6	level waste processing system is.
7	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thanks.
8	Mike?
9	MR. LEE: Mike Lee.
10	Nice presentation, Bruce.
11	MR. HINKLEY: Okay.
12	MR. LEE: One for Dr. Hinze. The last
13	design we saw for the aging pad was a cut and fill
14	design that was in reference to an earlier question.
15	MEMBER HINZE: Well, as I understand it,
16	there are 80 meters from top to bottom. And whether
17	that's 40 and 40, 40 cut and 40 fill makes a
18	difference from the seismic response.
19	MR. LEE: Right.
20	Just a couple of quick questions. Last
21	time the Committee was briefed there was a talk of
22	doing some prototype development work up at the Atlas
23	facility or some off-site location. Can you talk to
24	the Committee about what DOE plans are for proof of

system, if you will, for some of the unique features

1	of the repository?
2	MR. HINKLEY: Well, I mean there's
3	prototype development for the waste packages that is
4	ongoing. As far as there are as part of the
5	overall plan and schedule there are prototypes for any
6	of the specialized lifting and handling equipment.
7	And all I can tell you is I know they're on the
8	schedule, because I get to look at the schedule.
9	Exactly where they're being done, I don't
LO	know.
L1	MR. LEE: This came up in an earlier
L2	presentation because I think the thinking from the DOE
L3	representatives was at some point the prototypes would
L4	be perfected and there was a need to begin to work
L5	through some procedures and tests, and get some
L6	operational experience but do so in an environment
L7	that was outside the test site area.
L8	MR. HINKLEY: I know those discussions are
L9	still ongoing. And there is prototype development in
20	the integrated schedule.
21	MR. LEE: Okay. Is there any prep work
22	going on at the site right now in advance of the
23	construction authorization application, like utility
24	work or things like that?
25	MR. HINKLEY: No.

1 MR. LEE: Okay. And just as a data point 2 for the members, we have in the queue a request for presentation on the staff's October 8th letter, that's 3 4 in June where the staff will get into some of the 5 issues that they raised concerning the level of detail in the design, as well as the pre-closure safety 6 7 analysis perspective from the NRC's perspective. 8 MR. SCOTT: Mike Scott. 9 there has Over the years been considerable amount of discussion about whether the 10 transfer system should have liquid pools or entirely 11 The way I understand from your presentation, the 12 dry. new one or the one you have now is entirely dry. 13 14 that correct? 15 MR. HINKLEY: Yes, sir. 16 SCOTT: Okay. That presents 17 interesting questions about recovery from casualties of moving equipment because of the radiation fields 18 19 associated with that. I would be interested to hear 20 how your design is addressing recoverability from 21 moving equipment type casualties and to what extent 22 you've used operating experience information in the 23 design for those type of considerations? 24 MR. HINKLEY: What I'd like to do, Mike, 25 is get back to you on that. I am, again, on any of

1 the off normal operations, we have off normal 2 considerations. I'm not prepared to discuss that. That wasn't part of what I was ready to brief. But we 3 4 can follow-up with either a letter or some 5 information. What I do know is that the design of the 6 7 remote handling equipment and manipulators, there are designed into the building features that allow us to 8 9 do both remote maintenance with a separate set of 10 manipulators as well as to remove some of equipment. 11 Now, there are still conversations going 12 Ideally, of course, you don't ever want to go 13 14 into the transfer cells. But that's still under consideration what we would have to do and what 15 16 requirements would be necessary to ever to go into those cells. 17 Maybe that's a subject 18 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 19 that we could take up at a briefing. You know, I 20 don't know that a long letter would be as helpful as 21 maybe an interactive briefing that could think that 22 off normal condition recovery question and other 23 design detail questions for a briefing down the line. 24 So is that fair enough?

MR. HINKLEY:

That's fair.

1	MR. SCOTT: Can I just follow-up on the
2	second part of the question was operating experience.
3	Do you have a formal operating experience program to
4	incorporate lessons learned, especially dry fuel
5	handling facilities into your design?
6	MR. HINKLEY: Again, the specific
7	methodology of the design and operating experience
8	would be on the Bechtel SAIC side.
9	I know that, for example, Cogema is part
10	of the design development team. And that they have
11	also utilized some other fuel fabrication facilities
12	and some utility operating experience, but not on dry
13	fuel operations. And they've dealt with some of the
14	national labs. But I don't know how formal that
15	program is.
16	MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: John Flack?
18	MR. FLACK: Just from a risk perspective,
19	and again commercial reactors, is the risk being
20	driven I would think it would be driven by load
21	drops, dropped casks somewhere in the process or have
22	you looked at that as
23	MR. HINKLEY: No, no, no. That's one of
24	the major contributors, yes.
25	MR. FLACK: Yes. Okay. And that's

1 usually driven by human error. So when you do your 2 reliability analysis, do you look at that from that 3 perspective? You know, since you're still in the 4 design phase, especially with the I&C and that sort of 5 thing, that you've looked at what kinds of errors could occur that could cause these sort of accidents 6 7 to take place and try to design them out at this stage 8 when you have a chance? 9 MR. HINKLEY: Well, I know that's part of 10 the design process, again, from BSC and that's their fault tree analysis and their reliability 11 12 modeling. Again, the process exists. 13 We're very 14 early in the design phase. Let's say that process and 15 that methodology is in place, but right now we're pretty preliminary on most of the design and control 16 17 systems. 18 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Ashok? 19 MR. THADANI: Let me first follow-up on 20 John's question, and then I have another point that I 21 know you will appreciate. 22 in design Do you have the any 23 consideration of where you cut off things to consider, accidents to consider or eliminate? Is there such a 24

thing as a cut off frequency, that this is really not

1 credible; and you can quantify that, if you will? 2 MR. HINKLEY: Well, because it's in, if 3 you would, because in Part 63 then it is really a 4 reliability based accident analysis and fault tree. So 5 by definition since it's driven by probability, you know there are combinations of accident scenarios that 6 7 would be eliminated as part of that analysis. So then going to what I 8 THADANI: 9 think Ruth was trying to understand, you know do you have a real backdown design basis and then beyond 10 design basis? I'm using reactor language because I'm 11 12 a reactor person, like you. I mean, is there such a thing as accident management strategies that you think 13 14 of as you go forward? 15 MR. HINKLEY: Let me try and answer it in 16 two parts. I know that we have design criteria and 17 the safety analysis report, of course, would be based 18 19 on if you would, the design basis and the design 20 criteria. So that clearly exists. 21 What the accident management strategy is, 22 I'm not in the licensing area. I'm probably not the 23 right person to answer that question. I don't know 24 what all the accidents are that have been analyzed in 25 the pre-closure safety analysis.

1 MR. THADANI: Maybe as Mike indicated 2 earlier, when you talked about making bounding 3 assumptions versus mean values, if you will, there is 4 a relationship here in terms of the issues. 5 MR. HINKLEY: Yes. I'm a reactor person, like 6 MR. THADANI: 7 you, and you might recall that same sort of thinking went into earlier designs and even recent designs of 8 nuclear power plants. The philosophy of often times 9 making bounding assumptions. 10 11 MR. HINKLEY: Yes. 12 And I'm reminded an event. MR. THADANI: analysis for overpressure protection of 13 14 reactor coolant pressure boundary, you want to assume that the power operated relief valves didn't exist. 15 And we know from the experience at Three Mile Island 16 that was not a very good way to address the issue of 17 18 overpressure protection. What that tells me is it seems to me that 19 20 you would first want to make sure, I'd say regardless 21 of licensing requirements, what would be doing some 22 realistic analysis, what would be the expected 23 response, expected response and then depending, I 24 suppose, some other requirements establish what

you're heading on.

margins

1	MR. HINKLEY: Yes.
2	MR. THADANI: And so it sort of ties in
3	with this issue of bounding assumptions can mask
4	potentially important safety matters. So it always
5	helps to do a realistic analysis. And this is an
6	issue, it seems to me, it would be very useful to
7	understand.
8	MR. HINKLEY: No, I understand your point.
9	Again if in a follow-up briefing you'd like a more
10	detailed discussion on the pre-closure safety analysis
11	and the accident management strategy, then we'd be
12	pleased to do that.
13	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And I think your
14	presentation today, Bruce, has really helped us shape
15	these ideas a little bit. So don't feel like we don't
16	recognize the progress you've made. It always leads to
17	good questions.
18	MR. HINKLEY: Thank you.
19	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: John, did you have
20	a question.
21	DR. LARKINS: I just had a quick question.
22	You mentioned the ventilation system that's required
23	to meet the thermal limits in both the surface and
24	subsurface. How far along are you in the design of
25	the

1	MR. HINKLEY: I added during operation.
2	DR. LARKINS: During operation?
3	MR. HINKLEY: During operation. Well, for
4	example, the modeling, the HVAC modeling and the
5	design requirements has been established. But as far
6	as detailed design and the fan sizes, motor force and
7	that kind of thing is still very preliminary.
8	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Latif?
9	MR. HAMDAN: Yes. Bruce, this definitely
LO	was an example you make it sound as if it's easy
L1	for those who are not into the design.
L2	My question to you then is from your
L3	standpoint are there some challenges in design? Are
L4	there some design issues that you consider to be more
L5	challenging than others and what are these, if you
L6	care to share that with us?
L7	MR. HINKLEY: Well, anytime you have these
L8	kind of radiation contamination challenges and a lot
L9	of first of a k ind engineering, having to use
20	locomotives and going underground and a lot of lifting
21	and turntable and trolleys. So there's a lot of
22	mechanical engineering challenging.
23	Realistically speaking this is not an
24	operating plant. There is not a lot of high pressure

systems. There's not a lot of instrumentation and

1 controls relatively speaking. So most of the 2 challenges are in the development of the waste 3 packages which then involves, you know, rolling of 4 very steel and some challenges in the welding and 5 final closure. But the manipulation of such heavy loads so frequently, that all has to be done remotely 6 7 is one of the significant challenges. Now, interestingly, if you take -- you 8 have a challenging design and then you move it out 9 into Yucca Mountain, which has its own challenges 10 being just because of the remote location and the 11 There are a lot of human factors that 12 environment. are involved, whether it was a standard facility or a 13 14 nuclear facility, you know to get the design done. So those are the major challenges now. 15 I'd like to think we're still on schedule to have 16 sufficient design to submit the license application at 17 year end. So then let's say we'll still have the 18 19 design concepts, but the final calculations and the 20 material section that, we still have a ways to go. 21 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thanks. 22 think we're about out of questions and out of time for 23 this. 24 Thank you very much for an interesting

And we thank you. Look forward to

presentation.

1	hearing from you again in a year or two.
2	With that, I think there's one final item.
3	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. We've had an
4	additional request for somebody to speak to the
5	Committee. And it's Martin Malsch. And we slotted
6	this few minutes here to hear what Mr. Malsch has to
7	say.
8	MR. MALSCH: Should I move to the front?
9	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Please, so I can get it on
10	the record.
11	MR. MALSCH: Okay. Thank you. I just
12	wanted to make a few brief remarks on behalf of the
13	State of Nevada.
14	My remarks are in three categories.
15	First, a few brief comments on the presentation here
16	this morning. Second, some more slightly lengthier
17	comments about something that the NRC staff said
18	yesterday about following up on the ongoing
19	investigations of the USGS. And then something about
20	the presentations this afternoon, and in particular
21	the nature of a petition for rulemaking, which Nevada
22	filed a few weeks ago.
23	First let me address briefly the remarks
24	this morning. First, it struck me that as the speaker

said, there's a ways to go before the final design is

developed. I understood the Commission in part contemplated that the LA would include a level of detail equivalent to what we would now see in a final safety analysis report. And it struck me that the DOE is a long ways away from that. And quite aways away from meeting a schedule of filing an LA or submitting an LA in 2004.

Among other things, I didn't hear anything at all in the presentation about airplane crashes. Now that, of course, goes to overall site suitability. But as we know also from the experience in the Private Fuel Storage Facility proceeding there's a possible spillover into the facility design as to whether certain features of facilities are designed or hardened against airplane crashes. And I heard no presentation about that.

Then there's this question about the aging facility, which always fascinates the State of Nevada. Apparently the purpose of the facility is to enable the site to accept spent fuel that doesn't meet emplacement thermal criteria. There's even a reference someplace in the slides here to accepting the youngest fuel first, which I thought was contrary to the overall design philosophy of accepting the oldest fuel first. This combined with what we still

think is a rather large aging facility leads Nevada to be curious about whether this is really nothing other than a monitored retrievable storage facility in disguise, which of course is something which is prohibited by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The third comment I would have about this morning's presentation is that I notice that the emplacement drift ground support materials are not classified as important to waste isolation, and I don't know whether or not that's true. I suppose that depends upon how they factor into the total systems performance assessment. But somewhere along the lines here DOE seems to have forgotten about the concept of retrievable. And I'm wondering whether they are consciously building into the design a retrievability option, which is of course as required by Part 63. And I saw that missing from the presentation.

Let me now go over into the remarks which the NRC offered yesterday about how they're following up on the allegations concerning USGS.

I just wanted to emphasize that the problem goes far beyond USGS. These allegations only came to light after DOE was forced to review some so-called archival emails as a result of Nevada's challenge to the original LSN certification. We had

1	been reviewing the old emails and, of course, we can't
2	predict what the review of the new emails might still
3	produce in terms of surprises for us. But we have
4	looked at some of the old emails. And I'd like to
5	have you just consider what they tell us about the
6	project so far.
7	They show current project management
8	Bechtel SAIC directing its quality assurance personnel
9	not to the use "violated" in their reports. A less
10	disturbing term, non-complaint was preferred.
11	They showed project personnel adopting the
12	position that the NRC should only be given the minimum
13	information on the KTIs.
14	Project personnel afraid to call whole
15	programs deficient because fixing them would be too
16	expensive.
17	Secret communications. The question of
18	whether of critical representations to the NRC about
19	safety priorities are correct.
20	Efforts to keep some people in blissful
21	ignorance about technical problems.
22	An assumption that the proof that will get
23	through the so called regulatory hoops need not be
24	rigorous from a scientific point.
25	A program that carefully manipulates

1 statistics to assure that the results are always in 2 the right place. 3 A program where scientific instruments are 4 documented as properly calibrated before they're even 5 received, much less calibrated. And a project where discord and distrust 6 7 rampant that senior officials are called "swindlers, certifiable jerks" and worse. 8 9 the management to the principal And 10 contractor is called "craven and ignorant." They evidence a project where dramatic and 11 unexpected information in an email entitled "Water, 12 water everywhere" apparently gives DOE ulcers but not 13 14 enough discomfort to delay a scientific report to the 15 Congress. Let me just focus on two emails in 16 particular which I think the Committee might find 17 interesting. 18 19 There's an email in the year 2002 speaking 20 about the whole effort to prioritize the KTIs. 21 part, we see an email which says: "I already saw a 22 note, though secretly sent to his favorite DOE folks, 23 arquing that prioritization based on any kind of TSPA 24 results is not to be trusted." I've already said,

it's directly contrary to representations which DOE

made to you people and to the NRC about how one could base a prioritization on the KTIs on the TSPA.

Then there's another email that dates back to 1998 which says, in part, as follows: "In the absence of statistics they have relied on expert opinion alone, but mostly internal experts like Bruce. I would not characterize this as emphasizing elicited information." And then here's the important part.

"Who's kidding who? These guys are going to assign probability distributions that keep the expected values in the right place."

But there are some good people in the project. There is another email which says, as follows: "I don't know how to fight lies and misinformation. And no one seems to care about the truth or even making sure the right people are doing the right stuff." Apparently the email drafter here was concerned about the truth and doing the right stuff.

All these emails are attached to the State of Nevada's testimony a short time ago before the House Subcommittee of Federal Workforce and Agency Organization. If the Committee's interested, I'm happy to leave a copy of the emails with you if you'd like to look at them.

And then thirdly and very briefly, let me address some of this afternoon's remarks in which there will be some discussion about DOE's plans for

its NEPA review of transportation issues.

In the oral argument before the Court of Appeals the NRC staff represented with respect to NEPA that it would not adopt the DOE Environmental Impact Statement unless it satisfied the requirements of NEPA, the NRC's regulations and the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality. And that meant, of course, that it would be open to any participant or party in the licensing proceeding who opposed the adoption of an DOE Environmental Impact Statement to raise any issue within the scope of NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations and the NRC's As opposed to, for example, being regulations. raise issues only dealing with new confined to information or new changes developed since the Environmental Impact Statement.

Our petition for rulemaking that we filed a few weeks ago asked the NRC essentially to codify that representation to the Court of Appeals into the regulations, so there should be no question about this. That's the thrust of our petition for rulemaking. But I thought that it was important for

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1	you to know that because it influences the scope of
2	the Commission's review of the DOE EIS and then it
3	also, perhaps, conceivably the scope of this
4	Committee's role with respect to the DOE EIS.
5	And with that, let me conclude and say
6	thank you for allowing me to address you this morning.
7	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you, Mr. Malsch. We
8	did have your petition documentation. It came to the
9	Committee's attention, and that's been distributed.
10	And if you'd like to make your written
11	material as part of your presentation, we'd be happy
12	to have that copy as well.
13	MR. MALSCH: Sure. Thank you very much.
14	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you.
15	With that, we're scheduled for finishing
16	this morning. Mr. von Tiesenhausen will be up after
17	the following presentation after lunch.
18	Thank you all very much.
19	We'll reconvene sharply at 1:00.
20	(Whereupon, the Committee was adjourned at
21	11:42 a.m., to reconvene this same day at 1:00 p.m)
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: On the record. Okay.
23	We'll come to order please. I would like to remind
24	everybody to please put your cell phones in off or
25	mute. That would be helpful. Thanks very much. And
l	I and the second

1 this portion of the meeting on Transportation Aspects 2 of the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement 3 (EIS) Update will be led by Dr. Weinberg. Ruth. 4 MEMBER WEINER: Thank you and I would like 5 to welcome Gary Lanthrum, Director of the Office of National Transportation and to clarify that this is 6 7 not an update on the EIS but an update on Department 8 of Energy transportation plans. Is that correct, 9 Gary? 10 MR. LANTHRUM: That is correct. Is it all mine now? 11 12 MEMBER WEINER: It's all yours. Take it 13 away. 14 MR. LANTHRUM: Thank you very much. I see 15 a number of familiar faces out here and for the familiar faces, there'll be a number of slides you've 16 17 seen before. Unfortunately, the Transportation Program has not been charging ahead at a rapid pace, 18 19 partly because of funding and other issues, but we'll 20 get into that as we go along and hopefully for some of 21 you, all of the slides will be new. 22 As a bit of background, the Office of 23 National Transportation (ONT) within the Office of 24 Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, we have office 25 within offices and directors reporting to directors

reporting to directors. It's a confusing organizational chart. But the Office of National Transportation was formed in 2003. I came on board in August of that year and it was about time the Transportation Program got some new legs again after the site recommendation which was made in 2002.

Following that, funding increased for Transportation in 2003 in the genesis of a program to focus on what it would take to ship spent nuclear fuel and high level waste to a repository began in earnest and I was lucky enough, I still think, to get the job and pull that together. I've organized the Office of National Transportation into two divisions and you'll understand a little bit more later as I go through it. But there's an Infrastructure Development Division and Operations Development Division.

All of the work since we're trying to build the capability to do operations and we're trying to build the capability to make shipments, all of the work is project ties right now. Although at some point, those projects are going to transition into actual operations. But the bulk of the projects are to buy things. We're going to be a very contractintensive organization. We have to buy casks. We have to buy rail cars. We have to buy construction of

a railroad to connect to the repository and all of the things that we're buying fall into the responsibility of the Infrastructure Development Division.

The Operations Development Division is dealing with a lot of the planning issues developing transportation protocols, working with states emergency preparedness training funds. A lot of the soft issues surrounding development of а transportation system are being handled in the Operations Development Division.

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, all of our casks that we procure have to be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and we must provide advanced notice per the NRC requirements for shipments that we're going to make to the states and we've made the policy decision to also try and include others as necessary. But how will be notified is still something that's still part of an ongoing discussion on the security front, but we will be following the NRC requirements for pre-notification.

We are required under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to use private industry to the fullest extent practicable and that's why I indicated earlier there's going to be a lot of contracts. They're going to be the heart of the development of the

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transportation system.

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Under Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, we have to provide technical assistance and funds to states and tribes, to do emergency preparedness planning and training. We are working with states and tribes through a transportation external coordinating work group right now to define the kinds of activities that would be allowable under that funding and to define the process for approving the funding in the grant process and we're making some good progress there.

Overall, Transportation is interesting area. There's a lot of work to be done and yet pretty much all of the infrastructure that I'm responsible for developing is being driven by outside It would be wonderful to be king for a requirements. day and say, "I have to build a transportation system or we have to build a transportation system and here's what it's going to look like." Unfortunately, we're not in the driver's seat about what's going to be shipped when nor are contracts or at least agreements between the Department and the utilities that have the spent nuclear fuel at sites around the country, the 72 sites around the country.

They are really in the driver's seat and

that driver's seat is driven by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act so that the utility, the corporate entity, that has the oldest fuel has a ticket in line to ship first. They can use that ticket in line for any fuel that that corporate entity has. So they don't have to ship their oldest fuel. They can shift their youngest fuel. They can ship anything they want or they can trade that place in line with other utilities. So there's a complicated framework with all of the contents that could be shipped, trying to guess what will be shipped and make sure that we have the right infrastructure in place to handle it.

We also have the requirements for the receipt of the spent fuel and high level waste at the repository. I think you heard this morning that they have a phased approach to building the repository capability and there may be some constraints on the repository side about what can be received during initial operations. Those questions haven't been answered for me. So I'm in kind of a gray zone trying to figure out what exactly I need to buy in terms of casks, in terms of rolling stock whether it's cars or trucks or rail cars.

It would be nice to have absolute definition about what it is we're going to be shipping

at least in the first couple of years so I could focus the acquisition efforts on that. In absence of any clear direction about what it is we're going to be shipping, we have to try and procure infrastructure that has the broadest capability possible for the dollars invested. So that decisions are made, we have the highest probability of being able to succeed.

Ideally, I'd be in a position of procuring all the infrastructure for all the contents that would have to be shipped and have that all available in year one so that whatever decision was made, I could pull the right items off the shelf and deploy them. I'm not going to be in that position and I think you've seen the funding profiles and there's going to be a fairly significant constraint, I am expecting, on funding profiles for transportation as well as the program as a whole.

In the middle, I have a line that shows the stakeholder interfaces coming down the middle and that's also a driver because we have an awful lot of states that are going to be transporting these contents through as well as tribes whose lands are going to be crossed. There's a lot of interested players in the industry. There are a lot of other folks that are passionately engaged in the discussion

about what this transportation network should look like and what should be done to make sure it is safe and secure. So all those external drivers are shaping some of the things that we're doing and try and keep that in mind as I go through the rest of the presentation here.

On the institutional side in trying to get information from the shippers to identify what the ideal content would be, in November of 2003, we published a strategic plan for Transportation and we got a little bit of a challenge on it because it looked like more an institutional plan. But what it really said was strategic. It said that all of our decisions are going to be developed collaboratively with a broad base of stakeholders. We're going to include the industry. We're going to include the We're going to include people that states and tribes. have lots of experience transporting the kinds of contents we're going to moving, the naval reactors organization and the EM organization within the Department of Energy plus other countries that have significant experience shipping spent nuclear fuel. working very diligently on this So collaborative development of what the infrastructure should look like.

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Now we're trying to establish the approach cask procurement for both the use transportation and for use in aging at the repository. I imagine you heard today in discussions about the repository development that there's an expectation that some of the contents that come in will have to be aged for a period of time before the heat load gets to the point where they can be disposed. So there will be aging casks that they will have to use for storage onsite for some period of time until they get the right balance between heat loads to actually be able to dispose and we in Transportation are looking at the procurement of casks that could support both the aging function at the repository as well as the transportation function.

We're also have some considerable discussion with the development of the surface facilities at the repository to make sure that the casks and rolling stock that we do procure will adequately interface with their facilities, with their access and egress, routes from the repository.

The priorities we have for this year, the primary one we have is support from the Nevada Rail Alignment Environment Impact Statement. Ruth indicated that my presentation is not on "The

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Environmental Impact Statement" and there was the significant EIS that was done for the repository itself that also included the information on transportation that was basis for our record of decision on both mode of transport which was mostly rail and the corridor for studying alignment options for building a railroad to connect an existing mainline track to the repository.

currently working that We're on environmental impact statement. We had originally hoped to have the draft done in the spring of this year, but during scoping, we had scoping meetings in five locations around the State of Nevada. received over 4,000 comments from interested participants and were wading through that huge body of comments.

What's that done is it's caused us to increase the scope of the EIS. We are actually considering additional alignment options that were not in the repository FEIS and we've actually tossed out some options that were in there that we were asked not to pursue any further. I think it's appropriate that we wade through that and it's just going to be challenging to get the EIS out in the timeframe that we had hoped. The EIS that we're studying is the

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alignment options within the Caliente corridor. That's a nominally 320-mile long corridor, but we're going to be studying about 600 miles of alignment options to make sure we address all the comments that we received during the scoping process.

Support for state regional groups. I mentioned that we're doing a lot of collaborative work on our planning process and trying to identify what kinds of activities would be fundable under one of the provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. That work is done through both the Transportation coordinating group where we bring the states, tribes and industry together but we also have groups of states, the state regional groups, there's four of them that we support through cooperative agreements.

You really can't do transportation planning one state at a time. The ingress and egress routes from one state have to match up with those of their adjacent states and so we've grouped the country into four regions. There's a northeast region, a southern states region, a Midwest region and then the bulk of the western states are in a separate region. We are working very diligently both with these groups individually and through them combined at this Transportation External Coordinating Working Group

(TEC) sessions that we have twice a year. We're making progress both on the effort to try and define the criteria and methodology for selecting the routes that we're going to use as well as identifying the funding requirements and allowable funded activities under this 180 Section under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

We're also this year trying to focus on acquisitions that will advance infrastructure development without major capital requirements. Again, our funding this year was substantially lower than what our request was. In Transportation, we had requested \$187 million and we got \$25 million. kind of hard to buy as many things as you had hoped to buy when your funding is that short.

What we are trying to do is to develop request for proposals on conceptual designs. The paperwork we have enough money to do to further some ideas about how to close the gap between the casks that exist currently and the certificates that exist currently and that we're going to need possibly to conduct shipments during the first year of operations.

This is a plot of the funding profile that I indicated. It's interesting. You can see during these early years in the late `90s and early 2000

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where the funding was around \$2 million to \$3 million. It crept up to \$4 million in 2002. It's actually bleaker than it looks because during that period of time, Transportation was not an standalone organization. It was Transportation and Waste Acceptance were combined into one organization and the bulk of that funding was going towards efforts in Waste Acceptance not in Transportation.

After the site recommendation was made in 2002, the Transportation funding crept up to \$10 million in 2003. I came on in the tail end of that year and helped craft a strategy that identified four projects to focus our efforts on. In 2004, we have fairly substantial funding and we're building up to advance to the ability to effectively spend \$187 million this year which primarily would have gone towards acquisitions. It would have bought the prototype rail cars.

The Association of American Railroads has a new requirement for cars that ship spent nuclear fuel and high level waste. No cars exist that are approved to meet that standard right now. So we had anticipated using a fairly substantial chunk of that money to actually have conceptual designs done, prototypes built and testing begin.

A lot of that's backed off. We're back into just the conceptual arena. Both the cask front and the repository front are in the rolling stock front and focusing the bulk of the funding that we got now this year on the rail line with EIS.

We did accomplish a fair amount withe \$64 million we had in 2004. There's a good cross section here, but we did set up our strategy plan which was issued in November of 2004. It was a highlight. pulled the state region groups in for a meeting with the Under Secretary shortly after that expressed his interest in supporting their activities and we actually challenged the state regional groups propose projects that identified areas $\circ f$ significant interest to their region that might also benefit the planning activities within the Office of National Transportation.

A couple of good projects have been proposed. One of them, the Southern states want to study the options for moving contents from sites that don't have rail access to a railhead by using barges. So we're working with them to identify the scope of that project and to fund it. Again, I think the Northeastern region has also decided to piggyback with the Southern states on looking at the barge options

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for getting contents from sites without rail access to a railhead. The Midwest has other interests. The Western states are primarily interested in some of the planning models that we are developing. Looking at what the infrastructure needs might be under various scenarios and so we're engaging all of them in projects that benefit both their planning efforts and would further our needs as well.

We did get our record of decision out in April of 2004 on both mode and the corridor. The mode again is mostly rail mode to transport. Although there will be some truck shipments, we're hoping to ship the majority of the waste by rail. We had scoping meetings that ended in May and we began the actual EIS in June of 2004.

A lot of this is about the setting up the projects. The work breakdown structure, we actually organized four primary projects within the Office of National Transportation and there was a Nevada rail project which we talked a bit about here. There are other acquisitions which includes casks, rolling stock and facilities. There is an operations development project and there's institutional outreach.

Our 2005 plans, again we're focusing primarily on getting the environment impact statement

thoroughly funded and to address all the comments that we got during the scoping meetings to make sure that we have a draft EIS when it does come out that addresses all the concerns that have been raised. We are working on the conceptual design for casks and rail cars. We're trying the pull the requests for proposals together. We would expect to get those requests for proposals out this year, but probably not have the selections made and the funding done until fiscal year 2005.

We're hoping to make decisions that will enable more robust planning. One area that we've been getting a lot of feedback on is whether or not we will use dedicated train where you would have a train that would only ship one cargo that would be destined just for the repository as opposed to having repository cargoes intermixed with other cargos on longer, regular or key trains. We believe that's a policy decision that the Department can make outside of the NEPA process and we are doing the staffing work to try and get that done.

One of the significant things about the decision of whether to use dedicated trains or not is it provides a much more clear framework for the states to do their planning within and it provides a lot more

flexibility on whether you do or don't have specific discussion about routing.

We're also hoping to expand our consultation with the tribes. The Transportation External Coordinating Working Group that we have has tribal participation and we have a Tribal Working Group but not all of the tribes that are on potential routes between shipping sites and the repository participate in TEC.

We sent out letters to 40 tribes that are within a half mile of potential transportation routes and ask how they would like to be engaged in a government-to-government relationship with the Office of National Transportation and with the Department. A few of them have contacted us and actually the Tribal topic group with TEC let us know that if you want to talk to the tribes, writing letters and making phone calls is probably not going to do it. That was a requisite first step, but we're going to have to wind up doing a lot of visits and actually request audiences with them at their tribal locations and that will be the next phase that we go through.

We're continuing to work with the state regional groups on both the activities that they're participating in through TEC and with their special

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The Yucca Mountain final EIS (FEIS) was issued in 2002 and in there, there were two modes of transport that were covered, the mostly rail and the mostly truck. There were five corridors considered for access to the repository if rail were selected. There was no preference of a corridor in the final repository EIS but there was a preference for the mostly rail mode of transport.

On December 21, 2003, we put out a Federal Register notice stating our preference for the Caliente corridor. That preference was based on input from stakeholders. Going through the repository FEIS, we did not feel that there was any environmental driver that would rate one of the five corridors analyzed higher than the other, but we did look at the potential land use conflicts. Some of the corridors had considerately more private land in them than We winded up selecting a corridor that was 99.9 plus percent BLM land in hopes of avoiding land use conflicts to the maximum extent practicable.

We also looked at the indirect costs associated with the decision on what corridor it would be and we had received unwavering opposition from both the State of Nevada and from the City of Las Vegas and

from Clark County over selection of any corridor that would transit the Las Vegas valley and there were two corridors that would have been much simpler to construct that did cross either the northwest edge of the Las Vegas Valley or the eastern edge of the Las Vegas Valley. So both of those were tossed out to avoid those land use conflicts.

The Caliente corridor itself that we did select in our April record of decision starts, and I believe we have a slide here, yes, here near the town of Caliente on the western edge of the State of Nevada. It curves around and where the line turns from red to pink is where we go from what we call a common segment to alignment options. What you typically have in the middle there is a terrain feature, mountain range or something that you have multiple passes that you could to get around. So we have a number of alignment options that were proposed even in repository environmental impact statement.

We come back to a common segment and then this is the Nevada Test and Training Range in the brown here. On the western edge if the Nevada Test and Training Range again there are multiple alignment options. Some are to avoid train features. Some were to avoid environmental features like springs. Others

were to avoid towns.

During the scoping process, we got some very interesting feedback. This are in the northwest corner of the Test and Training Range is near the town of Goldfield. There are a lot of mining activities between the town of Goldfield and the Nevada Test and Training Range. We had originally anticipated that the mining interests might actually be excited about the possibility of having rail access out there.

Well, it turns out the kind of mining they're doing is primarily cyanide leach extraction of gold from existing tailings. So they don't have large quantities of ore to move and they really wanted us to just stay out of there. They didn't want anything that would interrupt their ability to collect tailings to use for additional extraction operations.

At the same time, the City of Goldfield really said they would like us to come closer to the city. So there are some cities that actually see the potential of a rail line as being beneficial rather than something that's problematic. So that's one of the things that we're considering in our EIS now is an alignment option that does come over to the west side of the town of Goldfield.

You can also see if you look really

closely that some of these pink options actually dip into the Nevada Test and Training Range and those alignments were there in the original repository FEIS. The Department of Defense and the Air Force made it again unequivocally clear that they did not want to see any line that would transit the Test and Training Range. That was unviable space for them. They had significant national security activities going on and didn't either construction operations want transportation operations going on in that space and so we did drop two options from further consideration, one here in the northwest corner and one down a little There was an option that did just dipped bit further. into the Test and Training Range down there that we are no longer studying. There are a number of other options that we are looking at and we're hoping to have all of those outlined in the draft EIS when it comes out possibly later this year.

same time preference as our statement for the Caliente corridor, we made our announcement to do through a notice of intent to do an We're covering not environmental impact statement. just the alignment options but we're also covering the potential construction operation and eventual abandonment of a rail line to the repository. All of

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that's part of the scope and again, this is the note that we have over 4,000 comments in the five locations that we held meetings in Nevada.

We're moving forward. The EIS contracts were all awarded in good time. We're engaged pretty heavily in conducting field surveys and for those of you that have come all the way from Nevada to participate, you know that this has been one of the wettest winters that they've seen in a long time. The whole Southwest has had a real deluge this winter which has been great for the drought that they've had but it's been really difficult for the field work that we need to be doing.

Between the activities in the Nevada Test and Training Range, their flight operations and other activities and the bad weather, we've not been able to complete the aerial survey work that we had hoped to have done by now. So we're still engaged in that. We are working on the conceptual design for the railroad. We do have the bulk of the geotechnical work done and the bulk of the hydrology work done out along the corridor and the alignment options and so we've made significant progress in the EIS front moving towards a draft EIS.

This is again some of the areas that we're

collecting data on to feed both the EIS and the ongoing design work for the railroad that will go beyond what's required for the EIS itself. But it's the geotechnical work, the aerial surveying and aerial mapping. We have really good data from the USGS now, their mapping data that's down to a nine meter contour interval. But we're trying to drive down with the aerial mapping as a five foot contour level which will give us a lot greater capability of doing optimal alignments from construction perspective for the rail line within the corridor.

We're looking at the hydrology. Another good thing about the rain over the winter is that everything is blooming out there. So the ability to look at endangered and threatened plants and animals, we have very good coverage of the plants that are out there because everything is blooming this spring. So that's been very encouraging.

Upcoming milestones for the EIS activities is to complete the data collection that will feed the draft EIS. We're hoping to have that draft EIS out this year. It's probably going to be six months later than originally expected again because of the increase in scope. We hope to have the public hearings after the draft EIS, time to incorporate the feedback we get

during that process. I'm not expecting to have a final environmental impact statement or a record of decision about what alignment would be chosen until sometime in FY `06.

Shortly after issuing the record of decision on both end alignment that would be selected and the decision to actually construct a railroad which has not been made yet, we would then do the contracting work for the final design construction of a railroad itself.

On casks, we've had a number of meetings with the NRC to talk about casks both one on one with the Spent Fuel Project Office who will be responsible for actually doing the cask certification, Bill Brock and the people that work for him. We're talking about what we've done both in terms of looking at existing cask designs and capabilities and what gaps there are between what we could possibly have to ship when the repository opens and what we can ship now.

Our goal is to procure the minimum suite of casks and go through the fewest number of certifications required to make sure that we have all coverage we need. Again, we would like to spend as little money as possible and we'd like to not complicate the NRC's life anymore than necessary in

looking at additional designs. We'd like to have casks that provide the maximum flexibility in terms of both fuel compatibility and handling capability.

It's interesting that when we first started our review we invited the cask vendors to come and talk to us and asked them what percentage of what's out there can be shipped with the existing casks with existing certificates and we got some pretty good answers from them, very encouraging. But we knew there was an element of sales involved in those visits and so we said, "Put it in writing."

But not to put a burden on them rather than say, "Just make some proposals to us," we paid them to develop cask capability reports and again to keep an even playing field, all of the vendors that had an existing certificate with the NRC for a Type B cask were allowed to participate. We wanted qualified viable vendors. Out of that invite, we had six takers and we got cask capability reports and when we waded through all the data that was presented to us it looked like about 60 percent of the contents out there that we would be responsible for shipping, this is on the commercial side, 60 percent of that content could be covered by existing hardware designs with existing certificates. Well, unfortunately, the world's never

1 simple enough that you can stop with just talking to 2 one group of stakeholders. Just to clarify, that was 3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 4 60 percent by rail. Or was that rail and road? 5 MR. LANTHRUM: Sixty percent representative of rail and truck. 6 7 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 8 MR. LANTHRUM: Right. There were casks 9 that could cover 60 percent of the contents and that 10 included both some truck shipments and some rail shipments. 11 12 I just wanted to get CHAIRMAN RYAN: detail. 13 14 MR. LANTHRUM: You bet. The cask 15 perspective is not the only perspective you have to 16 look at unfortunately. So we also went out to try and 17 update information about the utilities themselves and capabilities they had 18 what in terms of crane 19 capacities, ingress/egress. Do they have real access? 20 Do they not have real access? How much lay-down space 21 do they have? Can they get casks into their spent fuel pools? How much space is there? 22 23 Getting those reports back and blending 24 that with the information that we got from the cask 25 vendors indicates that we only have about half the

coverage that we had hoped for. So about 30 percent of the content out there can be served both by existing cask designs and by the infrastructure that's at the utilities. So we have a bigger gap that we have to close than we would have liked to have had. The good part is we have some very good information now to work from.

That gap that we've identified that combines both the utilities capabilities and cask matching with the fuel types itself will be the starting point for our next round of procurement which will be for conceptual designs to close the gap, again, with the eye on what the limitations are at the utilities not keeping it freeform for the cask vendors to propose solutions that wouldn't really be useable. This goes into the cask capability reports I just talked about and the next steps are to issue the RFP for conceptual designs to close that gap.

On the rolling stock, we did somewhat the same approach. We are obligated we believe to produce rail cars that meet this new AAR 2043 standard. Obligate may be too strong a word. The standard is an industry standard and so there's no regulatory requirement to meet it. The fact that the industry has bought into the standard would make it very

difficult in contracts base to not meet it.

Looking at the basis of the standard there is nothing new on the cars that are specified under the standard. What the standard does is it combines the best of existing technologies in a number of areas to provide a rail that has the best operational characteristics possible. That seems a pretty good argument to me whether we're obligated regulatorily or not may be a separate question. But looking at having the best rolling stock possible seems to be a good goal to strive for. And whether it's cars that meet the AAR standard or just the best available technology, it's a worthwhile goal.

We invited the rail car manufacturing community to come in and talk to us, both the people that produce passenger cars and the people that produce freight cars, talk them to about whether or not they felt that this AAR standards was achievable, what kind of timeframes and again, the feedback we got was fairly encouraging. The timeframes that we were looking at, five year window from the procurement of conceptual designs through prototype development through testing for approval and then getting into the final procurement process for the actual fabrication, they all said it was doable.

One thing that we had anticipated doing since we are looking at the possibility of having both the cask bearing cars, the buffer cars that would be provide space between the locomotive and the cask cars and between the cask cars and the escort cars where our security force would be and the escort cars themselves, all three of those cars would have to meet the standard. We had originally anticipated a separate contract for the escort car because it's much more like a passenger car and a separate contract for combined buffer car/load-bearing car because those are both more like the freight type cars.

The consistent input we got from the vendors was that it's not just the performance of the cars that's part of the standard, but the performance of the consist where the consist is the whole train. If you're looking at the dynamics of how the cars work with each other in the consist, they recommended that we do a single procurement for one manufacturer to do all the cars even if that manufacturer had to do a subcontract for one particular type of car that they may not be a specialist in. They felt that that would ensure that the consist was designed to be functional and to pass the dynamic testing that's required as part of the standard. So we've taken that into heart

as we move forward with our RFPs on the next steps.

In addition to the rail cars and the casks and the possibility of having some truck shipments, we also have a number of facilities that we're going to be responsible for. One of the largest ones is the Fleet Management Facility. We have to have a place to maintain the casks to the 10 CFR 71 Subpart H QA/QC requirements.

There's at least an annual maintenance requirement and then other maintenance requirements that vary from certificate to certificate depending on the cask design. A place to do that, a place to maintain the records, a place to have a compliant operations are going to be necessary.

We're going to have to have a Fleet operations center, a place to actually track the shipments, to maintain communications with the escort force that we have. It could be collocated with the Fleet Management Facility. It could be located separately but that's another operational functional requirement that we're going to have to have.

Where the track ends near the repository, we're going to have to have an end-of-the-line facility. Somewhere when we procure all of our rail cars and casks, we need a significant amount of lay-

down space for all the hardware. We're anticipating having a very large siting located as an end-of-the-line facility where our inactive rail cars would be staged, where we could do reorganization of the material as it's coming into the repository, where we could do final security trade-off, hand-offs between the security provided for Transportation and the security provided for the repository itself. So there are a number of facility requirements that we're going to have that we're looking into right now.

With my unease over our challenge with getting full funding in parallel with looking at the facility requirements and conceptual design for the facilities, we're also looking into what it would take to procure services instead of building facilities if that were necessary during the first few years of We've contacted some of the cask vendors operations. that do those services for the casks that they produce currently and we've talk to the railroads about their ability to maintain rail cars that we might We believe that all that can be done as a procuring. service procurement. Even though our operational costs would be higher, it would defer the need for high capital costs for facility construction at least during the initial years of operation which would be

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possibly helpful.

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In the Nevada Rail Alignment EIS for study purposes, we are looking at multiple locations that could be used for each of these facilities to provide an environmental basis for the footprint and the ground disturbance. No decisions have been made yet and it's possible even though we are considering locations within Nevada. Some of the facilities like the operation facility could be located outside of Nevada, but at least, we're considering the possible locations within this rail line at EIS that we're currently conducting.

On operational planning, one of the areas that we're looking at after talking to our international partners, the Europeans use burn-up credit fairly extensively in order to get maximum utility of the casks that they have. Under the current regulatory framework, we don't get any credit for the fact that the fuel that we are transporting, the spent fuel, has a significantly-reduced component of the fuel that is actually fissionable and there's significant increase in components of fission products that act as poisons in any kind of a calculation of what you would have in terms of the criticality if you were to have an accident.

One of the reasons we don't get to take credit for that is there's not a good benchmarking between the analytical work that's been done in this country and actual performance, actual measurement of true spent fuel. The French actually have a fairly significant set of data that they have produced from their fuel to provide a benchmark for their analytical work that's provided the basis for certificates to let them take credit for that. We are working with the French to procure some of their data. We're working with the NRC very closely on that. In fact, we are procuring the data and based on our willingness to do that, the NRC is going to fund the actual analytical work that could then be the basis for data that would be provided to the cask vendors to use in applications to take credit for burn-up.

The practical benefit, there is nothing that we would not be able to ship without burn-up credit. That's too many double negatives. We could ship everything without it. What you might be constrained with though is without being able to take burn-up credit, you might not be able to put as much fuel in a cask as the cask could physically hold. One of the ways to deal with the potential for criticality is just not put enough material there to get a

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critical reaction even without the conservatism that's put back in with the burn-up credit. So we're hoping to actually improve our efficiency of operations by pursuing burn-up credit, but we would be able to ship again a derated cask, if you will, with contents without the burn-up credit. But I think it's an activity worth pursuing.

We're also working on an optimization model for transportation planning and the first phase of the optimization model is looking at what our procurements need to have in terms of assumptions on turnaround time for casks at utilities, transit time for loaded casts to the repository and then turnaround time for casks at the repository, the amount of time casks would be in maintenance to meet their 10 CFR 71 Subpart H requirements, to get a feeling for the actual volume of infrastructure that we have to have to do ongoing operations at the phased approach, the amount it is looking at, which was 400 metric tons the first year and increasing gradually over five years to 3,000 metric tons per year. So the first iteration of the model is really an investment planning model, how many casks do we need, how many rail cars do we need to get the kind of through-put we're talking about with a set of assumptions.

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we'll be looking at how do you actually structure your operations to maximize the through-put with the resources that you do have. And again, we have the constraint of not knowing who's going to be shipping nor of knowing how many casks the shipper will be able to load. So we're looking at range of scenarios that would include things like the possibility of using marshaling yards where you could take one or two casks from one utility, combine them with one or more casks from another utility and combine those in a single train that would then transit to the repository, again reducing the number of shipments that you would make

There are a number of modeling tools that we're supporting in Transportation. RADTRAN is one that Ruth is intimately familiar with. It's a radiological risk assessment tool that's combined with other tools to look at the risk associated with transportation activities both normal and acts of transportation. TRAGIS is a routing tool that looks at all the DOT requirements. It has U.S. Census data in it that's a very robust routing tool that has very good information about roads and railroads for doing transportation planning.

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The combination of RADTRAN and TRAGIS is

a very effective tool for both the Department to use

and we're hoping for our states to use. We actually

conducted a training operation for our state regional

groups down in Oak Ridge last January, I believe it

was, where we went through both the RADTRAN and the

TRAGIS operations. They aren't always as user-

friendly since they were developed for the working

community not for the lay community, but we have some

very strong interest in the part of the state regional

groups to get more engaged and we will support them in

their efforts to try and come up to speed on the use

of the tools and helping them deploy them.

We're also looking at other policies on

15 best practices in operations. I believe I have some

slides later, but one of the areas that

concerned about right now is the security

We expect that between now and the time requirements.

start shipping there's a potential for some

significant changes in th security requirements for

operations and so we're working very closely with a

group in GSA that's developing best practices for

transportation operations. They pulled in Department

of Homeland Security, Department of Defense,

25 Department of Transportation and the Federal Railroad Administration, a subset of DOT, to talk about best practices in transportation on a variety of fronts and security is just one of those. So we're hoping that as we stay engaged with other agencies that are going to have an impact on the requirements area that we'll be able to inform the development of the system as we go along.

Security. We did have a joint meeting with the NRC, DOT, DHS and others to talk about a joint transportation classification guide. One of the challenges we have is that each of the agencies has a different criteria for classification of documents which makes it very difficult to share information and then you have different terminology about the degree of classification or the kind of classification that you're using.

The first joint meeting of the interagency classification guide was held last month here in Washington. It was a good starting point. Most of what it highlighted was how much work there is to do, but at least we've kicked off the effort and we'll continue in that regard.

We're going to continue collaboration with our international partners. I'm very interested in seeing the degree to which the French and others have

developed the recovery capabilities for spent fuel
shipments. I'm hoping to participate in an accident
training exercise in France this summer.
Domestically, the Office of Naval Reactors has about
every five years they do an exercise where they
simulate an accident. They did one last summer in
Kansas City that we participated in. We learned a lot
from that. It was a very good exercise and again, it
pulled in not just the Federal agency participants,
but all of the state and local responder groups were
able to participate as well. It was a very good
exercise and we're looking at collaborating both with
our international partners and with states on
developing our own view on how to actually test the
system that we develop before we actually deploy it.
We're ongoing with looks of threat

We're ongoing with looks of threat analyses. When we started off, we thought we would mimic what DoD does which is really to focus on design basis threats where you look at the "granddaddy of all threats" and you build your protection coverage around the granddaddy of all threats. But as we talked to both the technical review board and others a better approach was suggested that rather than relying on analysis of the worse threat, you develop a matrix of the spectrum of threats and you look at the spectrum

of mitigating actions that you could take to deal with those threats and out of those, you find the ones that are easily to deploy and you wind up with a ranking of deployable mitigations and actions that you can take that will cover a range of threats that has perhaps more utility than something that focuses only on the most significant of threats. We're still working with the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance within DOE to establish this matrix of threat scenarios as well as a matrix of mitigating actions that could be taken to deal with those threats.

Looking in security in a very broad sense, Secretary Abraham before he departed has announced in a meeting in Oak Ridge a security for the 21st century initiative which included personnel security, physical security, information security, cyber security and a whole bunch of aspects to it and it's very fortunate Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance that has the charter for implementing Secretary Abraham's vision on security for the 21st They were looking for projects to apply some century. of the ideas that they had and we came along at just the right time. So our transportation activities are being used as more or less a pilot project for them to

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actually make some significant advances and that's encouraging.

On our institutional front, we're working with the state regional groups on developing the routing criteria and the route selection methodology. Again, I told you that we were working with the efforts to identify what activities are possible under 180(c) funding and how you would allocate the funds for that and we're encouraging them to develop special Again, the idea of project is it's project proposals. something that would benefit both them and the government, that would have a defined beginning and end, that you'd have some funding applied to activity that would produce a result and then you move on to the next one instead rather than having just a base level of funding that's provided in perpetuity that may or may not have any direct benefits for either the states or the government.

Some of the topic groups that are active. We've had a creation of a new Security Topic Group that deals with the public aspects of security, what sort of information you will be able to share, who you will be sharing it with, the degree of planning integration that you have, who needs to be involved in planning integration and at least identify in the

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context that would have the security clearance to be involved in the more detailed discussions about both security threats and mitigating actions.

We have this Tribal Topic Group that I've mentioned and we've expanded it to include all the tribes along the transportation routes or potential transportation routes that were identified in the repository FEIS and again, we've not had a resounding success in getting response from the tribes. It's going to be our job to get out and engage them rather than waiting for them to response and engage us. We'll be doing that over the next year.

I mentioned the Routing Topic Group did have its working session on RADTRAN and TRAGIS in Oak Ridge in January and we continue to work on the DOE Transportation protocols which is really the operational aspect of implementing a transportation system and that will be done between now and the time that operations start.

Overall, we have some challenges. Not getting the money that we wanted is not the least of our challenges. The encouraging thing is that a lot of the work that we have to do doesn't require money. Money is really primarily to buy things and with the little bit of cushion we have in timing because of the

status of the repository itself, I can focus planning activities that don't require buying hardware right now. But at some point, I'm going to have to spend a lot of money to buy casks, rail cars and facilities. We are looking at our infrastructure acquisition plans and we're moving them forward in phases where we're dealing with conceptual design work right now which is not as expensive and we are focusing on completing the Nevada rail alignment and EIS which will define at least an alignment option that we could perhaps select for development of a natural railroad which we think is key to making the repository successful. With that, I'll make myself available for questions. Thank you. Bill. MEMBER WEINER: That's really impressive.

MEMBER HINZE: That's really impressive.

Let me ask you. You were talking about challenges.

What's the major challenge in laying out the Nevada rail alignment?

MR. LANTHRUM: There's a slide I've used in some of my other discussions. I'm wishing I had it here now. What I did was I took the terrain that we have in Nevada from the starting point in Caliente to the endpoint and I looked at just the elevation changes over distance and I compared it to five other

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operating Class I railroads in this country and elsewhere. It's a cakewalk by comparison. We do not have a difficult technical challenge.

That said, it's not going to be easy to build, but the technology is there. We're looking at trying to operate this at a two percent grade. We have seven mountain ranges to cross, but the elevation difference between the valleys and the tops of the mountains, that's a fairly worn down mountain range. So we're looking at 2,000/3,000 foot elevation differences. It's not like going across the Rockies or the Sierras or the Cascades even.

So from a purely technical perspective, we're not expecting to have to do any tunneling. We're not expecting to have to do significant cuts and fills to get the two percent grades that we want. The biggest issues we have are trying to impact the people that live on and use that land as little as possible in building a railroad.

There are a lot of ranchers out there and they've expressed some significant concerns about what having a railroad out there could do to their operations and we're trying to figure ways that we can mitigate the concerns that they have on the water developments that they've done, on where they move

their herds whether it's cattle or sheep between grazing areas seasonally. They have some significant concerns about the willingness of animals to cross railroad tracks.

The animals out there are a lot more wild than the animals that you have in much more lush environs and they're not used to seeing people.

They're not used to seeing vehicles. They're very skiddish and they've indicated that just getting them to cross roads is sometimes very difficult. So those are the kinds of challenges that we're dealing with primarily as how do we build a railroad across terrain that's very buildable and have the least overall impact possible with the residents, land owners and land users that are out there and there's a lot of interest out there.

MEMBER HINZE: Is the presence of capable seismic faults of concern? Is this entered into the alignment of the railroad line?

MR. LANTHRUM: It hasn't been a strong concern of ours looking at where other railroads have built. Again, you build railroads. You don't have high centers of gravity. You don't have things like tall buildings and so your seismic sensitivity is going to be less than a lot of other structures.

We're looking at shipments on the order of two to three a week. So our frequency of operations is fairly low.

What I'm actually more concerned about than seismic activity is drainage. Again, I referenced the significant weather we've had out there in January and a lot of you might have seen some of the washouts that happened in Nevada as well as There were significant portions of track California. that follow canyons on the edge of rivers that were The track actually fell off. So what I'm washed out. more concerned about from an operational perspective is designing drainage and looking at the hydrology out there more so than seismic activity.

MEMBER HINZE: You mentioned the possibility of the mining companies and the city of Goldfield using the track. How do you interact your use of the line with the commercial uses of the line?

MR. LANTHRUM: One of the specific questions we asked when we started into the environmental impact statement was whether or not there was interest in making this line available for common carriage. So we specifically asked for input from the communities and from the land owners and from the land users out there if there were things that

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2 that might be shipped out to make the line for common 3 carriage. 4 We have not made a decision yet about 5 whether it would be available for common carriage, but 6 the EIS scoping process is where we got the primary 7 input and we're continuing to discuss with the communities out there possible uses for that railroad 8 9 as part of our ongoing interactions and that will be part of the consideration when a decision is made. 10 There's not a lot of industrial activity out there 11 There is some hope that having a railroad 12 now. available would make things possible 13 some 14 currently are not possible. So a lot of the talk 15 about possible common carriage uses of the rail line are for things that might come not things that are 16 17 there currently. 18 MEMBER HINZE: If I understood correctly, 19 you haven't made a decision on whether you're going to 20 use dedicated trains or not. 21 MR. LANTHRUM: That's correct. 22 MEMBER HINZE: And is that also true in 23 not just for the Nevada line but for the other areas 24 of the country? 25 MR. LANTHRUM: Well, it's primarily true

they'd like to see shipped in or things that they saw

for other areas of the country. I think by default once you get to Nevada even if we were in a key train once you decouple from the mainline track in Caliente and connect to the line that goes to the repository, it's not likely there would be anything else.

So by default, it becomes a dedicated train at that point unless there is some significant interest in developing common carriage activities. But even if there, the line would be available. We wouldn't necessarily have to be shipping those commodities with our shipments. But it nominally is going to be a dedicated train once it gets to Nevada just by default.

MEMBER HINZE: Coming from Indiana and realizing that on the front page of our little local newspaper, quite frequently there are comments about nuclear waste trains passing through our city. Have you changed your criteria, modified your criteria, for the selection of routes as a result of your interaction with the state regional groups?

MR. LANTHRUM: What we're doing right now with the state regional group is to try and come up with again the criteria and the methodology, what kind of things would you weigh. It's a challenge particularly for rail shipments. For highway

1 shipments, the states have a lot of latitude 2 designating alternate highway routes and it's a state 3 prerogative under DOT regulations. 4 For rail shipments, the states don't 5 really have any role because the rail shipments are It's not state land or federal all on private land. 6 7 land. Interestingly though, the railroads have some of the same criteria in terms of industry standards 8 9 that DOT establishes for highway shippers and the basic requirement for highway shipments is that you 10 interstate highways the maximum 11 use to extent 12 practicable with the understanding that you're going to have to get from a shipping site to the interstate 13 14 system and then from the interstate system to the 15 receiving site wherever that is. Similarly, the railroads encourage the use 16 of Class 1 track which is their equivalent of the 17 interstate system 18 Right. 19 MEMBER HINZE: 20 A lot of states have MR. LANTHRUM: 21 expressed shipments through major concern about 22 population areas. 23 MEMBER HINZE: Exactly. 24 MR. LANTHRUM: But that's where the Class 25 1 track is and what we're working with the states on

1	is how do you weigh and again, Ruth has been helpful
2	in some of the work that she's done on decision
3	models, helping people weigh attributes that they're
4	concerned about and weigh them against each other in
5	helping to make informed decisions. If population
6	concerns are a bigger deal than track quality, that
7	would form one type of decision. If track quality is
8	a bigger concern than population densities, then the
9	decision would go another way. So we're giving the
10	tools to the states.
11	We're working with them on developing a
12	criteria, but we're not expecting the same criteria to
13	be applied in all areas. There will be regional and
14	local differences in what the expectations are and
15	we'll be working closely with our state and local
16	groups to identify our operational commitments based
17	on their input. Again, the decisions are going to be
18	Department's but we are asking for significant input
19	and we're giving our stakeholders significant tools to
20	work with to help make informed decisions.
21	MEMBER HINZE: Good. Thanks very much.
22	I appreciate it.
23	MEMBER WEINER: Mike.
24	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Just one. Thanks for a

real informative presentation. It strikes me though

1 as we heard two presentations today, one about the 2 design and issues related there and one about the 3 transport system that we heard in both presentations 4 the idea of optimization. 5 MR. LANTHRUM: Yes. CHAIRMAN RYAN: And then it was clear how 6 7 that's done, but as I was sitting here thinking about transportation, my principles of optimization there 8 9 might be different than they might be for 10 engineering facility. How are you going to couple this optimization process so that you address both 11 ends of it that may be compatible or may actually have 12 points of conflict? 13 Let me give you an example. You might say 14 15 well I can ship anything anytime if you give me a few hundred more million dollars that buys as many casks 16 17 of each type as I need. 18 Right. MR. LANTHRUM: 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Obviously, that's probably 20 outside the envelope. 21 No, please. MR. LANTHRUM: Let's keep it 22 in the envelope. 23 CHAIRMAN RYAN: There'll be a limit. 24 from a facility operation facility, their optimization 25 may be on wanting to get certain types of certain

1 locations at one time and they could either be 2 harmonious or clash. Have you guys put your heads together on that yet? 3 MR. LANTHRUM: We do a little bit. 4 What 5 I'm really seeing is that the optimization that I would do when I run the programs, I'll run it from a 6 7 purely transportation perspective. How can I get the 8 most through-put with the resources that I have 9 available? That would be my goal. I'm not kidding myself that I'm going to 10 be the decision maker. What I do is I bring that to 11 the table with the head of RW and say this would be a 12 great transportation perspective. How does that play 13 14 into the program decisions about what has to be done? 15 CHAIRMAN RYAN: The latter question is the 16 key one because the through-put may or may not be acceptable at the other end. 17 18 Absolutely. MR. LANTHRUM: 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: So I guess I just see that 20 the facility design and their capabilities is as much 21 a question for the transportation program as the 22 routing and all the other challenges you so well 23 articulated today. 24 MR. LANTHRUM: Absolutely. What I have to 25 bring to the table is the view that I can offer an

optimal system but that if I'm directed to deliver something suboptimal, there will be consequences. It will cost more for what I'm able to move and part of it is to show that I'm able to actually do good planning by presenting an optimal view.

If I'm given constraints, the modeling is capable of then taking the constraints that I'm dealt, that I have to work with, and reoptimizing within those constraints. It won't be as optimal a solution as I would come up with unconstrained, but I can refine things within a set of constraints.

For example, if there are a few specific sites that have a particular type of fuel that is of interest for delivery during the first year of operations and they are not located anywhere near each other. So I have assets spread at opposite ends of the country. That would not be an optimal setup. But how I conduct those shipments, I might be able to construct a view that would use fewer resources over a short period of time, for example, doing campaigning where I have more casks per train coming from distant locations and I stage things like I indicated in marshaling yards to build a fairly significant train before I run it to again maximize the use of resources within a constrained environment.

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1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Sure, and I can appreciate
2	the view that you have the key responsibility on the
3	transportation side. But from a risk perspective or
4	an optimization perspective, I don't separate the two.
5	I look at the repository and the transportation system
6	as a system that has to be optimized on whatever
7	principle or point of optimization you pick. But it's
8	very much a system.
9	MR. LANTHRUM: And it is going to be an
10	iterative solution process.
11	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Right.
12	MR. LANTHRUM: But something has to be
13	brought to the table to iterate and I think I want to
14	be the first there.
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you.
16	MEMBER WEINER: Jim.
17	MEMBER CLARKE: I'm just curious about
18	this and this may be premature but as the train pulls
19	out of Caliente headed for the repository, what will
20	it look like? Will you have flexibility concerning
21	how much you can put in the middle, the buffer cars,
22	the locomotive, the escort cars? Is that a fairly
23	flexible design?
24	MR. LANTHRUM: Well, it's a little bit
25	flexible. The escort car under current designs would

typically be at the end of the train just because the escort cars are often lighter than the load-bearing cars and from train dynamics, you don't run a light car in between two much heavier cars. You certainly don't want a really heavy car behind a light car when you hit the brakes. That's just not a good deal. It can tend to cause jack-knifing and other track problems.

It's very likely to be two engines and very likely to be puller engines as opposed to pusher engines followed by a buffer car followed by a series of load-bearing cars with casks followed by another buffer car and an escort car. How many cask cars? Again, it's desirable to have as many as you can so you can reduce the number of shipments that you have to conduct. But in the repository FEIS, we analyzed from one to five shipments per train. We can revisit that later if there were an opportunity of increasing it beyond five.

MEMBER CLARKE: Yes, I just wondered how that would coordinate with the repository, what's coming and when it's coming it.

MR. LANTHRUM: And actually when I talked about the end-of-line facility, that would anticipate to be near the receipt gate. The sally port where you

actually do the hand-off between the transportation activities and transportation security requirements and where the repository of the security requirements take over, that sally port as originally designed would not have been long enough to get three of our consist cars in with casks. So we're working with them closely since that design hasn't been finalized to make the sally port larger.

But it may be that we'll have to do if we're able to run larger trains we may have to put three cars in, clear those in the repository while keeping two cars or more cars out in the line facility in the transportation area with our responsibility for security and then phase them into the repository.

Again, their cask handling capability, we made sure that the bounding requirements for our casks were going to be accommodated by their facility designs, their grappling hooks, their crane capacities, all of that would meet with both our largest casks and be able to handle the smallest casks that we're looking at. We've been working on that very closely with them.

And they do have the ability to stage things in lead storage. I think they've probably showed you the aging facility. There is an aging

facility adjacent to the cask handling facility as well on the more distant location and they could stage things in the aging facility and then feed them through the actual fuel handling facility or cask handling facility as they were ready for them.

MEMBER CLARKE: Thank you.

MEMBER WEINER: Staff questions? Ashok.

MR. THADANI: Thank you. You know I am shocked. When I was heading up our Office of Research, even I didn't take the kinds of (budget) cuts you are experiencing here. It's incredible. that does raise a question and that is the design fabrication of casks is fairly expensive understand and if you're going to conduct any testing that would be pretty expensive as well. So you talked about the accomplishments. This significant reduction of resources obviously it has fleshed out your plans and so on. But you didn't really say what's the real impact.

MR. LANTHRUM: The real impact is I did not buy casks or rail cars this year. If I had gotten the \$187 million that we requested, we would have actually funded development of prototype rail cars and started testing at TCCI. We're not going that. I would have bought casks this year and we would have

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started that process. We're not buying casks.

We're going to push out an RFP and we're going to push it out towards the end of the fiscal year so we don't have to award the contract until the next fiscal year. So that's what it's done. It's delayed the procurement of hardware. But the bulk of the funding, the real expense that I have, in the near term is in buying hardware.

About four to five years before we start, actually four years before we start shipment, the costs aren't going up significantly in providing training funds for states and tribes for emergency preparedness, but that's a little bit further off. We expect that to start around 2006 for shipments in 2010. Now the 2010 is not going to be happening. The start of that funding process will then be tied to what the new date is when it's set by the repository and by the program.

MR. THADANI: Just a comment. In terms of criticality in getting the burn-up data from the French, it seems to me that would be the correct way to go to be able to do more realistic assessment of what the risks would be. So certainly, I think the path you're on is an important one.

MR. LANTHRUM: When we started the new

Office of National Transportation, we had these big
tech meetings where we bring in all of our
stakeholders and one of the clear messages that they
gave us was don't reinvent the wheel. If there's
something that's been done and the world has been
shipping spent nuclear fuel for an extended period of
time and has a good safety record in doing that. The
said build on that safety record. You can make it
better. You can do new things, but don't start from
scratch. So we've taken that lesson to heart.
MR. THADANI: There's another safety
benefit in that the number of trips, I guess, will be
reduced if you do more realistic assessment. So I
think there is some benefit too.
MEMBER WEINER: Mike and John, questions
Then I'm going to ask if you can keep them as short as
possible because we have another member of the
audience that
MR. SCOTT: Mike Scott, ACNW staff. The
District of Columbia is currently in court attempting
to deny the railroads the permission to take hazardous
materials through the District and I read in the paper
this morning that a Federal judge has refused to block
them from doing that. You mentioned that you're

either planning to or you're already in negotiation

1	with states and other entities. Do you see this court
2	battle going on currently as having applicability to
3	your situation?
4	MR. LANTHRUM: Depending on how it goes,
5	it could clearly have some other applicability if
6	other states wind up jumping onto it and if they
7	continue to have success with their new prohibition.
8	If they do, it just becomes another constraint that I
9	have to consider in the way. It would make
10	transportation more difficult, but it's always going
11	to be achievable. It's just an additional constraint
12	that we'd have to deal with.
13	MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
14	MEMBER WEINER: John. Engelbrecht von
15	Tiesenhausen from Oh, I'm sorry.
16	DR. LARKINS: Just a quick question.
17	MEMBER WEINER: John.
18	DR. LARKINS: You mentioned one of the
19	inhibitions to making progress in developing an
20	optimization model was not knowing up front what the
21	utilities might want to ship first. Why not engage
22	them in the discussion, some pre-planning, as to what
23	types of
24	MR. LANTHRUM: They're suing us.
I	
25	DR. LARKINS: Okay.

MR. LANTHRUM: The discussions are very 1 2 difficult with the current litigation. Now I'd like to recognize 3 MEMBER WEINER: 4 Engelbrecht von Tiesenhausen from Floric County, 5 Nevada and who has some questions for you, I assume, 6 Gary. 7 DR. LARKINS: Okay. Actually, he had some 8 MEMBER WEINER: 9 questions for the Committee on concerns that --10 Engelbrecht suggested that he could help and could 11 relay some questions that he often hears from members 12 of the public and I thought it would be helpful for the Committee to hear these questions in our session 13 14 today. So, Engelbrecht, welcome. Thank you. 15 MR. von TIESENHAUSEN: Thank you, Dr. Ryan, Dr. Weinberg for giving me this opportunity to 16 voice some of the questions that the public in the Las 17 Vegas area has about transportation issues. Some of 18 19 these are directed at the NRC. Some of these are 20 directed at the DOE and some of these I'm not sure, 21 but I'll just go through the list. 22 Cask certification is always an issues 23 that comes up in the public's eye especially as far as scaling goes if there are any difficulties. 24

Scaling fires are sometimes problematic.

1 Current status on the PPS. What will be 2 What tests are planned and when will they be done? 3 done and possibly where? 4 One big issue that always comes up and 5 nobody ever has a good answer is Price-Anderson and liability issues. When does Price-Anderson kick in? 6 7 How much is covered? If there are economic impacts 8 due to a release that are not directly attributable to 9 contamination, is that covered under Price-Anderson or 10 not? Spent fuel characteristics versus fresh 11 12 A lot of the transportation experience that is fuel? often quoted has to do with fresh fuel transportation. 13 14 What would be the differences if you used spent fuel? If it was in accidents that ruptured a cask, a remote 15 16 possibility it may be, but what would be 17 difference in release in fresh versus spent fuel? Routing issues. The NRC does have a role 18 19 in routing issues and it is not clear to the public 20 exactly what that is. If a railroad is constructed, 21 who will run it? Maybe that decision has been made 22 what are the ramifications to the various 23 decisions that could be made as who is responsible for 24 the operation of the railroad? 25 Notification requirements and how will the

1	public be advised? I know Gary touched on this a
2	little but not completely. And will they be advised?
3	What are the differences between safety
4	and security? How are those addressed?
5	That's about the end of my questions.
6	Thank you for the opportunity to put this on the
7	record.
8	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Sure, Engelbrecht, and
9	again as I mentioned, I think it's helpful for us to
LO	hear those questions and as we think about
L1	transportation issues we can have them in our mind and
L2	in our record to refer back to. So I appreciate your
L3	sharing those. Thanks.
L4	MR. von TIESENHAUSEN: Thank you.
L5	MEMBER WEINER: Back over to you.
L6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay.
L7	MEMBER WEINER: Thank you by the way.
L8	Thank you very much for an excellent presentation and
L9	thank you, Engelbrecht, for bringing up the questions.
20	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you very much.
21	Let's see. Who's up next?
22	MEMBER WEINER: EPRI is up.
23	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Our next session, the
24	cognizant member is Dr. Hinze. So I'll turn the
25	meeting over to you.

MEMBER HINZE: Fine. We'll let people get arranged here a bit. This brings to mind that John Kessler is going to be appearing before the Committee to discuss time of compliance and this is just about the decadal anniversary of the time that he made us a presentation on the same topic at a working group of this committee. John and the EPRI group have been looking intensively for the last couple of months of the concerns revolving around the time of compliance and the need to reconsider and to change the time of compliance issues in 40 CFR 197 and 10 CFR 63. will be telling us about the results of his deliberations. Thank you, John.

MR. KESSLER: Thank you, Bill, and thanks to the Committee for providing time on your agenda for me to discuss this report.

The report was released a week ago yesterday. There's the title, "Yucca Mountain
Licensing Standard Options for Very Long Timeframes,"
and really the majority of the report is about the
technical bases for what we think the standard at
least we need to consider as well as the compliance
assessments. The website is there. This is available
to members of the public. If you click on that
website or enter that, you should be able to download

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I would like to acknowledge the authors. The lead author, Matt Kozak, from Monitor Scientific is here. I was sort of the second author. There is another major author, Matthew Huber, from Pursue who helped us with teacher issues, climate surveying what's known about paleoclimates and how we might use that as well as the uncertainties. other contributors are Austin Long from Arizona who also discussed historically a future climate in every report, Mick Apted also from Monitor Scientific who talked about performance assessment issues as well as bringing in some of the international perspectives and Fraser King up in Canada talking about long-term material issues.

I think for the zero to one of you in the room I can go through real quickly. Those of you who don't know the background of this, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, EPA was to contract with the National Academy of Sciences to provide the technical bases for the Yucca Mountain specific standard. EPA's rule is to be based upon and consistent with the NAS recommendations. And then NRC is to issue an conforming/implementing regulation.

In 1995, the NAS TYMS Committee, Technical

Basis for Yucca Mountain Standards, issued their report. In 2001, EPA and NRC issued their regulations. There were multiple law suits on those two regulations as well as other issues that didn't have to do with the regulations.

And last summer, the Court of Appeals ruled on those law suits. All the challenges raised were denied except one. The Court ruled that EPA did not follow the TYMS recommendations on the time period of compliance and gave EPA two options. One was EPA could go back to Congress and the other was that EPA could reissue a standard or issue a new standard or whatever based upon and consistent with the TYMS recommendation. So the options were reissue the original standard with appropriate explanation, I suppose, or what we're assuming for this report is that they may choose to issue a new standard with requirements for time periods to peak dose.

The purpose of the EPRI report here was to assess the technical implications and options that are associated with regulatory compliance periods in excess of 10,000 years that are consistent with the July 9th Court of Appeals ruling. So we're trying to come up with options and considerations that are based upon and consistent with the TYMS recommendations, but

also would result in a standard that provides "meaningful" protection of public health and safety.

I've put "meaningful" in quotes there because that was something that the TYMS Committee report talked about was a necessary requirement and that also would be "reasonable" and implementable in a regulatory environment. "Reasonable" is in quotes there because that showed up in the House language that backed up the Energy Policy Act.

environment, what do I do and more what do I don't mean by implementable. What we mean by implementable is that NRC assuming they received an application, would be able to make a regulatory decision based on the information that could be provided by DOE. That is essentially you could have a docketable license application, that it is possible to pull together information to get a docketable license application.

So what we don't mean there is that we want a regulation such that we know Yucca Mountain is going to be pass, just that the information can be collected. Then it will be up to NRC to decide. We also want to avoid revisiting issues that were settled in the Court of Appeals ruling. We don't want to cover old ground.

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We made a few assumptions in the report

that the July 9, 2004 Court of Appeals ruling is used

as the primary guidance. What that means is that for

the bottom bullet there we use the TYMS Committee

report really as the bible. The Court ruling says

make it based upon and consistent with that TYMS

report. So we tried to suck that TYMS report dry in

terms of everything that we could get out of it on how

to come up with issues and approaches to what a

regulation extending past 10,000 years would look like

and admittable it there for the purposes of the

arguments made in this report, we assumed no

Congressional action. We understand that there may be

Congressional action that will essentially bypass what

EPA may be doing but for the purposes of this report

we didn't assume that Congressional action occurred.

Really, our main concerns that caused us

to want to pull together some ideas here with the

regulatory time of compliance for these very long

timeframes are laid out here. First of all, as I'll

try to show and talk about in a little bit more

detail, we do believe that uncertainties grow with

time and we're not alone in feeling that way. I'll

talk about a lot of other organizations that discuss

5 their feelings about uncertainties growing with time.

The other concern is that it's really more

of a recognition. We recognize that there will be an

adjudicatory nature to the NRC licensing process with

the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings that

will occur. We think that that's just going to drive

the need for detailed models and data to very high

degree and we're concerned that if uncertainties grow

with time and we have an adjudicatory nature of a

licensing process that it could present some issues.

Another thing about very long timeframes is that they are unprecedented in the U.S. and nearly so internationally. I would say really they are unprecedented even internationally in the sense that those countries that are calculating and do have requirements in their books for calculations to very long timeframes, none of them are anywhere near ready to subject that to the rigorous licensing process like

may be occurring in the near future here in the U.S.

for Yucca Mountain.

Another concern is that we're concerned that it could potentially penalize a good repository system. I mean system not only the geologic features but the engineer, really the combination of the engineering and geologic. One of the things about a good repository system is it's going to delay peak

dose and you want the peak delayed. It's better from a safety standpoint. You get more radioactive decay.

The problem then is that it's harder to know the details of the repository behavior very far out in time. So in a sense, your good repository system could be harder to defend in an NRC's licensing process than some system with poorer characteristics that might have a peak that occurs much earlier in time.

Our last concern is that potentially we're really just talking about the math here with potentially little to no safety benefit. What do I mean by that? We've already seen DOE change their design in response to the very demanding requirements in the existing Part 197 and Part 63. We've seen them make some major changes to their engineer design because of that and we're not really sure whether simply extending the time period would add to that safety or would just require a lot more analysis and demonstration of the existing repository system design and its safety.

A quick going through the chapters of the report. We have an intro and background. We talk about treatment of uncertainties and the increase of uncertainties of time at Yucca Mountain. We have a

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chapter specifically on climate change. You're going to hear me talk a lot more about specifically climates to change in this report and what we think the implications are.

We have another chapter on international approaches to addressing uncertainties over long time timeframes. Then we have a section on really matching the regulations to the time scale and time dependent factors where we present some various options. about the pros and the cons οf Then we really summarize the elements of approaches. what we think would be a new Yucca Mountain standard that we feel is based upon and consistent with the TYMS report. Conclusions and then we have an appendix really to talk about what we do and don't know about climate change and evolution and really why we think it's so difficult to deal with climate change details and why that's important.

Okay. I'm going to try to go through the long logic trail we have in this report as to how we got to the recommendations at the end that we got to.

So we start with the bible. We talk about some of the main TYMS Committee recommendations and their comments. First is that they say that we recommend a compliance assessment be conducted for the time when

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greatest risk occurs within the limits imposed by long term stability of the geologic environment which means one million years as they go on to explain.

They also talk about the standard needing to be meaningful and what they meant there was the form of the standard. They talked about individual health risk is their preferred criterion. They talked about the compliance assessment also being based on conceptual and numerical models that reasonably reflect present day understanding of the features, events and processes (FEPs).

They also discussed which is the main part of this report that some FEPs necessary to perform those health risk assessments over very long time timeframes are less well understood than others and they talk a bit and provide an example or two as to how you deal with those less well-known FEPs. You will see that we don't think they went far enough in describing all the cases as to how to deal with those less well-known FEPs and we proposed some things that we think are based on their approach. The last point is that they mentioned in the report that they like the concept of the negligible incremental risk (NIR) to screen FEPs and I will talk a bit about how we took that and came up with an approach.

MEMBER HINZE: I think it would be worthwhile, John, if you just described what NIR is.

MR. KESSLER: I will get to that.

Negligible incremental risk, what they're arguing is that if you're below a certain risk level than you can essentially screen out those FEPs from further consideration and I'll talk about that in a bit more detail later on.

This really from the cartoon came international literature. It's a presentation by Masuda in Japan, but it's being used quite a bit in other international publications. It just gives you in cartoon fashion. The components of the repository on the right there is some understanding of the predictability in terms of the confidence that we know the details about those particular components of the system over time and really the take-home message is that they're not all the same. We know some parts of the better than know others and system we specifically, details about the biosphere and human behavior the predictable. Surface are least environment comes next and then the geosphere and engineered barrier systems which is consistent with the TYMS report are the most predictable or most understood for the longest period of time.

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Getting into the issue about uncertainties. We asked ourselves, "Do uncertainties grow with time?" The answer we believe is yes, they do grow in time and in various ways. One thing that we note in the report is that current approaches where we deal with uncertainties, that a lot of them are fixed in the sense that we assume some uncertain distribution on neptunium, solubility or general corrosion rate for Alloy 22 and we don't tend to say that this band for the first 10,000 years in some other uncertainty band beyond that.

But does that mean that uncertainty grows We argue it does mean it actually does uncertainties grow with time because mean projections of those fixed uncertainties as you make one assumption you get one essentially pathway of what you think dose versus time will be versus something else and that does expand in time.

example, you could present uncertainty band and the growth of uncertainties in two different ways. This is just an example of two different ways that uncertainties are being presented. Fortunately, for whatever it's worth, more often, we present these dose versus time on uncertainties in a log-log plot as you see at the left. And I believe

that when the Court of Appeals was seeing some of these view graphs, they were seeing the ones on the left and they were saying, "Gee, it looks like uncertainties don't grow with time. The bands stay the same distance apart." We're arguing that's because it's on a log-log scale.

If you presented it on a semi-log scale, you could actually see now that the uncertainties do grow with time. Another point we'd like to make is that TYMS panel did note that eventually the uncertainties might decrease with time. We see that too. What I'd like to point out is that the uncertainties are growing right up to the time of peak dose and that's what matters is what uncertainties happen up to the time of peak. Whether they decrease again past peak dose is immaterial.

Stepping back here, the next main bullet there is that another way uncertainties grow with time is that our understanding of the FEPs that governs system behavior also decreases with time. For example, the long-term material degradation mechanisms would become less certain of what they really are. I'll talk a lot more about our understanding of future climate state that also decreases with time and what that means.

As I mentioned earlier, the TYMS report partially recognized that uncertainties do grow with time. There are words in there that talk about that, but they also noted that some uncertainties decrease with time. They provided in the report a specific example on waste packages. They say eventually they've all failed. That means essentially the uncertainty as to whether they failed or not has decreased with time.

I would argue that's a specious argument because what we really care about is the peak failure rate. That's what tends to govern peak dose, not that whether all the containers have failed or not. But rate at which they're failing seems to be much more important to peak dose risk. I talked about that.

Going back to the bible again, they had some comments about uncertainty. They concluded that geological physical and processes most are sufficiently quantifiable and related uncertainties sufficiently boundable, performance that the assessment can be assessed over timeframes during which the yadda, yadda, yadda. The geologic record suggests that timeframe is on the order of 10⁶ years.

What they're noticing, for example, is that once an exposure scenario has been adopted, and

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they're talking about mostly human behavior issues here, performance assessment calculations can be carried out with a degree of uncertainty comparable to the uncertainty associated with geologic processes and engineered systems.

So to summarize what all that says is in two points. They say most processes are sufficiently quantifiable and that you can include them. But they say some have to be specified such that the overall uncertainty is governed by these physical and geological processes. What we dive into in the report are what are those that have to be specified and how does one go about doing it based on the TYMS recommendations.

So the TYMS Committee had some options for dealing with uncertainties. They talked about, first of all, that the regulation and compliance assessment should be risk-based from the overall standpoint and that wherever possible include the consequences weighted by their probability of occurrence. They also included some other options for dealing with uncertainties. The primary one is to include the probabilities directly in the compliance assessment for most physical and geological processes.

The two we're going to talk about here

that the EPRI report talks about are the others. For effects that aren't amenable to scientific analysis, establish their properties via rulemaking and human behavior they went on to great lengths in the report as an example of one of those that isn't amenable to scientific analyses where we don't know the details as something that should established via rulemaking. They also said with very few words that other FEPs can be bounded and they mentioned three: seismic and igneous processes and climate change and I'll talk a bit more about those in a minute.

First of all, I'd like to go through what we understood their philosophy was on the human behavior. They say it's highly uncertain. We agree. They say it's not subject to scientific analysis and the details and especially the future details of human behavior. We agree it's difficult to do. And therefore, the TYMS Committee recommended fixing human behavior to present day behavior. It seems like a reasonable approach.

The associated issue that TYMS also recommended fixing was the health physics quantities. For example, they recommended the use of standard dosimetric conversions. What does that really mean? That means that DOE now doesn't have to consider

1 dosimetric uncertainties. That's taken off the table. 2 So really, there were two things where the TYMS panel 3 suggested you don't have to deal with the 4 uncertainties. Just fix certain values and that was 5 human behavior and dosimetry. EPA adopted both recommendations. 6 7 suggested fixing human behavior to present day which included details about the groundwater plume size when 8 9 that comes into the analysis as well as requiring standard dosimetric conversions. 10 Getting back to those ones where there's 11 12 just a few words in the TYMS Report about sufficiently boundable, they mentioned three: seismic processes, 13 14 igneous processes and climate change. So in the report we asked if these three are indeed sufficiently 15 16 boundable and how to treat them one way or the other. I'll talk about seismic and igneous first. 17 Our feeling was having looked at it initially that we 18 19 think that both seismic and igneous activity processes 20 seem sufficiently boundable in the following way. 21 note that for seismicity that information on tectonic 22 deformation rates over time periods greater than one 23 million years is already being used to establish the 24 importance of seismicity in that regard.

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The next one is more of a subtle point in

that DOE analyses on the physical limits of ground motion also look at applicable to longer time periods. What do I mean by that? I'm guessing that you may be aware of the work that DOE is doing now looking at recurrence intervals for earthquakes.

Right now, they're taking projections of essentially you have the magnitude of the earthquake across the X axis and the probability of recurrence across the Y axis. Obviously, you have a descending You can have higher and higher magnitude earthquakes with lower and lower recurrence What they find is that that curve or the frequencies. slope of that curve has been based on information collected for much shorter-lived facilities, say, nuclear power plants where maybe you have some facility life on the order of $10^{1}/10^{2}$ years.

Well, now they're having to project those recurrence intervals out to these very low probability cases and they're finding that you exceed the physical limits of the geology to transmit that kind of an earthquake magnitude. If you simply extend it, you get accelerations in the three to 10 or more Gs which just isn't physically reasonable. So they're already having to make physical arguments to bound that for their 10,000 year analysis. We would think that those

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same kinds of physical arguments would be equally applicable for time periods beyond that.

Whether they actually get around to making those arguments, we don't know. But we think that we're planning to do arguments like that if DOE doesn't actually. They can talk about physical limitations and we all think that that's something that they can reign in seismicity in terms of something that can continue to be boundable.

For igneous activity, we think the nature and probability of eruptions being considered for the first 10,000 years also seems extendable for much longer time periods. For example, the igneous activity information that they're using already extends over the quaternary period which is much longer than one million years. It looks like some of the shortest records extend back about four to five million years that they're considering. So going just out to one million years at least for that aspect of it seems doable. And the last part of that is that is that DOE analyses that we've seen suggests that the dose risk due to igneous eruption peaks at or near 10,000 years anyway.

So the last one is future climate details and I'd like to say that they have to be addressed

somehow. What I have here is a figure out of DOE's Yucca Mountain final environmental impact statement which is their projections of dose versus time. You see lots of peaks there that we think are being driven by a combination of the details of the climate as well as their choices in models.

Our thoughts about that figure that are relevant to how one deals with the long term of regulations is that the peaks are the results of assumptions about the details in climate change and the modeling approach. DOE uses a series of steady-state flow and transport models for each assumed climate state. They have instantaneous step changes in the climate.

They've also assumed that for all their Monte Carlo realizations that every climate change occurs at the same time. So what happens then is that at some particular time from time T to T+1 you have net infiltration flow-focusing water table and saturated zone flux changes that all happen. And what you get in modeling space is almost a flushing sometimes of radionuclides that can cause these peaks that we see in the FEIS.

Another point that could be made is that there is no change in the assumed human behavior.

They assume present day human behavior for all of these other climate states and we would argue that for an internally-consistent performance assessment, one should recognize that humans in a full-glacial maximum climate are going to be doing different things. specifically, their uses of potentially-contaminated water could be quite different as well as details about the growing season and the crops they grow. also they have think that а conservative infiltration response that's assumed to future water climate states that's also part of that figure.

I think the figure, though it is here, was okay for its intended use and for Part 197 at the time in the sense that it was simply there to use to bound potential environmental impacts. It wasn't used for compliance purposes. If now the time period of compliance got extended, there would need to be some changes to that figure or how they do their analysis.

So one could ask "Why doesn't DOE just switch to a set of transient models?" I suppose theoretically DOE could switch to transient models. The question we asked was "To what end" because DOE would still need input on the magnitude of the climate change and its uncertainty, the timing of the change in uncertainty and what's potentially important is the

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rate of change between climate states as well as that uncertainty. That seemed to be what mattered to their models.

The magnitude and especially the rate of climate state change are both highly uncertain and they become even more so over very long timeframes. And there's still the issue of addressing the inconsistency with present day human behavior for future climates.

Back to what TYMS says specifically about future climate state uncertainties, they say it's well known that a climate can vary significantly over geological periods of time. Although the typical nature of past climate states is well known, it is obviously impossible to predict in detail either the nature or the timing of future climate change and this fact adds to the uncertainty of their model predictions.

We agree the details are impossible to predict. A review of the climate change issues and the uncertainties we provided in the appendix to suggest just how little we do know about the rates of change from climate state A to B. And it may be that those details may well drive the peak dose estimate. EPRI is very concerned that details that are

"impossible" to predict should be what govern peak dose estimates out in these long time periods.

That drives us to the conclusion that it's necessary that the climate details should be established by the regulator to avoid requiring DOE to do something impossible, very much in the same philosophy that the regulator established future human behavior so that DOE doesn't have to speculate about what future humans are doing.

The question is for climate change "Should the peak dose be a function of these largely arbitrary assumptions DOE would be forced to make with respect to climate change? They just answered the question "no." It should be treated in a similar manner. It must be established to be a rulemaking and the rulemaking must also address climate change and human behavior in a self-consistent manner.

We recommend fixing the long-term climate to present day interglacial. Why? We think that recent evidence suggests that net infiltration has changed less than previously estimated. We understand there's some data that Yucca Mountain Project is pulling together that when they look at certain minerals they note that the rate of mineral growth is pretty constant through various climates that might

imply that net infiltration hasn't changed that much from climate state A to B and so on.

We've also noticed that the biosphere dose conversion factors are greater for the interglacial climate than they are for glacial climate having to do with groundwater use, the growing season, the types of crops you grow where we have BDCFs that are lower for glacial and that they're the highest for interglacial.

We also say that if you fix the climate to the present day interglacial you can maintain an internally-consistent compliance assessment by using present day human behavior for which you do have information and you wouldn't have to speculate or pull in some other human behavior that might be relevant to a colder, wetter climate.

And the present day interglacial is the only climate state for which we have more detailed information. All the other climates we would have to speculate and make assumptions about past behavior being indicative of future climate states. We think the above is similar to the philosophy that's in the TYMS Report on use of human behavior.

I think I mentioned a bit that we found almost no guidance in the TYMS Report or in the EPA or NRC regulations for that matter on a boundable

processes. One could ask how does one combine the three kinds of FEPs into a meaningful compliance assessment, in other words, those with sufficient information that uncertainties can be quantified, those that need to be fixed via rulemaking or those that one needs to somehow bound.

We didn't find any words in TYMS on that and so we had to go supplement and look elsewhere. We looked into an international guidance here and we noticed a couple things that came up over and over again in the international guidance. The first was a use of a stylized approach at very long timeframes. I'll talk a bit more about that in a minute.

They looked at the different dose limits in some cases and they also looked at alternative indicators of performance to using dose or health risk as the measure of performance. Most commonly when they looked at alternative indicators, they looked at things like flux and concentration. We only mention those in the report because at least our understanding of the court ruling was that NAS recommended that it be health risk-based and we're not quite sure what leeway there is for using alternative indicators based on the TYMS Report in combination with the court ruling.

One of the things I would like to clarify, well, I'm not sure it will clarify, is the feeling that scientific accuracy is impossible to achieve over analyses stretching over many thousands of years. On the other hand, regulatory confidence can be achieved and that's because the process for achieving regulatory confidence is different than going after scientific accuracy.

It's not really necessary to have 100 percent accurate answer but a range of possible answers may be all that's needed to establish sufficient regulatory confidence. So many use the concept of a stylized approach to do that.

In the report, one of the things that I asked Matt to do, we both looked hard when we see everybody using the word "stylized" and we never saw a definition of it. We adopted the following one that we think they mean and that works for us and that is "a set of assumptions established by policy that is used to limit the range of uncertainties considered in a performance assessment so that the assessment would yield a meaningful test of the ability to protect the public health and safety." The major parts of this are "a set of assumptions" that they're "established by policy." That may be the regulator. That may be

in this case DOE establishing what they do for those set of assumptions that's used to limit the range of uncertainties when we may not know what the right range is or that it's really a wide-open range that was considered in the performance assessment so that it still yields this meaningful test.

So back to the international thoughts about this, we kept noticing that there was this consistent international thought about moving to a more stylized approach at these long times. The first one is ICRP 81. They note that another approach is the consideration of quantitative calculations further into the future making increasing use of stylized approaches in considering the time periods when judging the calculated results and I'll talk a bit more about ICRP in a few minutes.

Another one that came from the Nuclear Energy Agency where they note in a 2004 report that there is international consensus that a stylized approach is an appropriate means to define these assumptions. The appropriate approach defines a range of alternative, credible illustrations or stylized situations including for example different possible climate states, agricultural practices and exposure pathways in analyzing the resulting dose or risk for

hypothetical, critical groups. They note that this avoids the open-ended speculation on issues such as future human habits for which uncertainties are large and irreduceable.

I'm going to go through just to point your This was something taken from a McCombie and Chapman report. This summarizes various countries' approaches on this time period. All of these approaches were in existence before July 9, 2004. is that the timeframes for quantitative. Canada shows 10,000 years. Finland, there's something in there changing at 10,000 years. France, again you see 10,000. Germany, again 10,000. Sweden talks about 1,000 and I'll talk a bit more about some recent SSI guidance there. Switzerland is one where they have no particular time limit. Essentially they don't have a time limit. U.K., it's a little more complicated. I'll talk a bit more about the U.K. one. And the U.S. ones are there.

I will note that there are two things that are incorrect in this particular table. In terms of 191, the dose limits and the groundwater concentrations are also applicable at 10,000 years. But really what I want you to focus on here is that all the other guidance that where you see this 10,000

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year time is time when something else changes. That's what this view graph says. While differences exist, this 10,000 years in the future is broadly recognized as the time when something in the analysis should change.

This 10,000-year break point isn't inconsistent with the court decision in the sense that these other regulations came up with this independently. The fact that the EPA may choose to do something different at 10,000 years isn't inconsistent with the court decision. It's certainly not inconsistent with what other people have already thought about.

Also we notice that there's some shift away from direct dose or risk analyses and most still with dose or risk but they note that increased uncertainty renders these estimates less reliable. couple examples. The NRPB in the U.K. notes that for times greater than 100 years or so but less than about 10,000 risk to members of the critical group should be estimated for comparison to the risk constraint. go on and say "As the time period of an assessment increases, assumptions about human environment and behavior will necessarily become increasingly arbitrary and therefore should be replaced by more

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general ones." And they note specifically about "the gradual change or the rate of change in such assumption may be difficult to implement in assessment and therefore for simplicity the board recommends that general assumptions should be applied after about 10,000 years."

Another example is that SSI vaguely the equivalent of EPA in Sweden has issued some draft regulations for comments and they note that before 1,000 years they really wanted a detailed compliance assessment paying particular attention "to conditions in the development of and processes early repository that can affect its long-term protective capability." Then beyond 1,000 years, essentially, "the analyses should be successively regarded as an illustration of the protective capability of the repository assuming certain conditions" and that for very long time periods, hundreds of thousands of years, "the risk analyses may be based on stylized description of future cycles of major climate changes and large harmful occurrences such as earthquakes." So again, that theme comes in.

ICRP 81 and more recent ICRP guidance says some bit more about it. Now I'm switching to dose limits. We would argue that dose limit needs to take

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into account the growing uncertainties with time. ICRP 81 says on this issue that "as the timeframe increases, some allowance should be made for assessed dose or risk exceeding the dose or risk constraint." They note specifically that "this must misinterpreted as a reduction in the protection of future generations and hence a contradiction with the principle of the equity protection but rather is an adequate consideration of the uncertainties associated with the calculated results." And at the time we wrote that, we didn't know whether that really meant that dose constraint could be higher at longer times or an acceptance criteria through the practice may change and that we notice that practically there's no difference and that dose constraint need not be applied as a strict limit.

Something that I didn't know existed until last night because it just came out last week was there is another draft for consultation document out from ICRP Committee IV on optimization of radiological protection and in Annex II, they have a couple things that are useful to talk about. One is they suggest that you might relatively weight doses as you go out into time. They say for example "the weights can be assigned according to the time at which exposure is

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predicted to occur. Progressively less importance could be given to individual exposures received in the far future due to increasing uncertainty."

They noticed that in general, "both the individual doses and the size of the exposure population becoming increasingly difficult to predict" and they say, "As such, the use of exposures for decision making purposes becomes increasingly problematic as those exposures are predicted to occur farther and farther out into the future." Commission feels that "our current state of knowledge and our ability to model populations becomes more difficult" and beyond such timeframes the Commission recommends that "predicted doses should not play a major part in decision making processes." this out simply because there's this common drumbeat among other international organizations, most of which have recognized it well before the court made their ruling that uncertainties grow and that something about at 10,000 years needs to change in how we do this.

Continuing with the dose constraint issues, again from ICRP guidance, they suggested dose constraints for various situations. The one I have highlighted in blue here up on the screen seems to be

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the one that would be applicable to deep geological They're suggesting a maximum constraint on disposal. That's 100 the order of 1 millisievert per year. millirem per year for situations that have a societal benefit but without individual direct benefit and that there's no information, no training, no individual assessment for exposed individuals for normal situations. That kind of sounds like a deep geologic disposal application and that would be 100 millirem per year.

There's other dose limit considerations that one could get into. Certainly, everybody is aware of the intergenerational versus the intragenerational equity arguments. The intergenerational equity is that future generations should not suffer undue burdens. intragenerational equity is to present that present generation should not suffer undue burden.

An example here is the National Association of Public Administrators, principals, where they really have four here and I would argue that three of them, trustee, sustainability and precautionary really address intergenerational equity, but intragenerational equity is also noted in the third one where they say that "near-term concrete"

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hazards have priority over long-term hypothetical hazards" when one is making decisions about what to do.

Another point that comes along for dose limitations is the concept dose apportionment. Generally, most regulations consider that there's a dose constraint and then that dose constraint has to be divided up among maybe multiple sources, man-made sources, of radioactivity that the same individual could be exposed to such that the dose limit on any one of those activities is lower than the constraint.

We would question that 10,000 years out into the future especially for a site like Yucca Mountain whether there would be of these multiple sources for which one would need to apportion. This new ICRP document also addresses that in that they say that "should more than one licensed facility expose the same public individuals further consideration of the appropriate dose and strength for each such facility would be necessary." They are opening the possibility that one need not apportion doses and it would depend upon the situation.

The last point on this view graph is that there is a controversy about what the health risks are at low doses such that there may be a range of doses

that there may be little to no health risk according to some.

The last component that we think needs addressing is how to do features of end step processes or FEPs screening for very long timeframes. And here's where we get back to this TYMs recommended concept of the negligible incremental risk. TYMs noted that they've adapted this from the negligible incremental dose concept which essentially says that "scenarios with a sufficiently low combination of probability and dose consequences need not be considered in compliance analysis."

In the TYMs Report, they recommend that a negligible incremental risk equivalent to a negligible incremental dose of one millirem per year is a starting point for EPA consideration. Again they recognize that this is a policy call for EPA to make but that was their recommended starting point for discussion.

So if we look at that, our take is that the current FEPs screening probability cutoff which is simply pure probability based is very conservative compared to this NID, negligible incremental dose, of suggested level of one millirem per year. The EPA adopted a probability cutoff of less than 10⁻⁴ and 10⁴

years which translates to about less than 10⁻⁸ per year. We would argue that's an extremely low screening level compared to the NID level suggested in the TYMS Report. For example, if some FEP had a probability of occurrence that was 10 percent, it would be screened only if the dose consequence was greater than about 10 millirem per year for this NID risk of one millirem per year.

What our argument is there is that DOE is presently conservative in the sense that they're addressing many more FEPs than would be the case if the TYMs recommended NID standard were to be used. We can't imagine an additional FEPs that would meet a one millirem per year NID risk criterion beyond 10,000 years.

Finally, getting to the recommendations. Because the court rejected all the challenges to the existing regulations governing the first 10,000 years, we would recommend that EPA could take a surgical approach to revising its standard, meaning that specifying beyond 10,000 year requirements is a separate standalone provision that don't alter what's already required regarding the first 10,000 years.

We recommend that a change of approach to the regulation and its implementation should be

adopted for those provisions of the regulation that will address timeframes beyond 10,000 years if the regulation as a whole is to remain implementable. Part of that change of approach is that a stylized approach for scenario identification and level of rigor in the model should be established by the NRC for time periods beyond 10,000 years.

In the sense that while EPA can make recommendations about stylization, it really comes down to the nuts and bolts in the details. It's up to NRC and DOE to hash that out. Those details would need to be established by NRC.

On future climate states, we would argue that they should be fixed by rulemaking to one or at most two what we think are bounding states. One would be, the one that we really argue could be the single bounding one, is the present day interglacial with the glacial being the other one.

If a glacial state climate is specified, the regulation should also specify a set of assumptions to govern human behavior that is consistent with the way humans would be expected to live. However, we think that it's preferable to simply assume the present-day interglacial climate state continues for the entire compliance period since

it is likely to be reasonably bounding and the most implementable.

No additional FEPs screening is required for the time period beyond 10,000 years. As we noted earlier, that is because current FEPs screening criterion is already overly inclusive compared to the approach recommended by the TYMS panel. However, if it is so desired or required that additional FEPs screening beyond 10,000 years be done, the concept of the negligible incremental dose should be used as the screening tool.

And finally, a two-tiered dose limit should be specified, one level for the first 10,000 years and a second higher level that is consistent with the increased uncertainty should be used for the period beyond 10,000 years. While EPRI is not advocating an exact numerical limit that would be a policy choice of EPA, we note that there is guidance out there from other bodies that would support a dose limit on the order of 100 millirem per year.

Where are we going next? We've requested in the report and when I sent out the email notifying people of the report that we seek feedback from all interested parties on the content and the recommendations made in the report, we'll note that we

already have received preliminary comments from the State of Nevada and they have indicated in that first letter to us that they might provide additional comments later on.

We are still mulling over whether we will hold a workshop on this issue in the next few months just to talk in general about what are people's feelings on what the issues are and how one might address these longer time periods of compliance. EPRI really feels that it would be useful to have some sort of discussion about this early on so that all of us and especially EPA and NRC get some feeling for what people may be thinking about this.

Our eventual plan is to issue a final because this was an interim report that we were seeking feedback on that takes into consideration the input we receive, if we have a workshop, the discussion other related that goes on there, for documents, example, this **ICRP** new recommendation that came along since we put out this report as well as other documents that others have For example, I know that NRC has already written a letter with their preliminary thoughts to EPA on what they think the regulations should be as an Then the final report would also response to example.

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1 the EPA draft rule assuming that no Congressional action that may affect this promulgation occurs. 2 3 questions? 4 MEMBER HINZE: Thank you very much, John, 5 and I also want to thank the two Matts for their contributions to this logically-presented argument and 6 7 for your very meaty discussion. With that, we'll turn 8 it over the Committee for any questions that they 9 might have. James. 10 MEMBER CLARKE: Not right now. MEMBER HINZE: 11 Ruth. 12 MEMBER WEINER: That was a lot to digest in a short time. 13 14 MR. KESSLER: Sorry about that. 15 That's a really very MEMBER WEINER: 16 thorough discussion. I just have one. uncertainty increases with time and the basis of the 17 recommendation 18 court's is this peak dose 19 recommendation, is it possible that dose uncertainty 20 band would be broad enough that you could argue that 21 the dose didn't really increase significantly? 22 other words, if you took the peak dose in the pre 23 10,000 year period and just called that a point and 24 then broaden the uncertainty, the dose band, saying

that your uncertainty increased estimating some kind

1 of increase function, would it be possible to argue 2 that? MR. KESSLER: I think I'm still not quite 3 4 understanding where you're coming from. In the sense 5 In the sense that the 6 MEMBER WEINER: 7 uncertainty and dose, they become so large that you 8 don't really know where in that uncertainty band the 9 most likely dose is. MR. KESSLER: 10 I see what you're saying. We would argue that uncertainties that the band 11 becomes larger as you approach peak dose and that if 12 you're looking at uncertainty bands say that are 13 14 between the 5th and the 95th percentile that may encompass two or more orders of magnitude, one can ask 15 the question is that such a wide uncertainty band that 16 the meaning of that band should we impute some meaning 17 from that uncertainly band. 18 19 I think that we would argue that the 20 meaning is you need to know that, and I think that a 21 lot of these international recommendations recognize, 22 that the meaning of the mean dose, even the maximum 23 likelihood dose, becomes less because there could be 24 a wealth of possibilities leading to significantly

different consequences depending on how things play

1	out. So if that's answering your question
2	MEMBER WEINER: That is.
3	MR. KESSLER: Okay.
4	MEMBER WEINER: Thank you.
5	MEMBER HINZE: Dr. Ryan.
6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thanks, John. Thank you
7	for your presentation. I'll just note for the
8	Committee's benefit. We're taking a look too at
9	these. There are two draft reports from ICRP.
10	MR. KESSLER: Right.
11	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And just so that
12	everybody's on the same page, these are drafts for
13	consultation.
14	MR. KESSLER: Correct.
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And they are foundation
16	documents for the main recommendation that they have
17	now extended the schedule for for about a year. So I
18	just wanted to put all of that out. All of that is in
19	a state of flux. I just thought that would be helpful
20	to note.
21	I guess this is in your report in more
22	detail, but could you explain a little bit more about
23	this transition point and what you see changing? I
24	wrestle with the question that Ruth raised and your
25	answer in terms of how do you transition from a

1 quantitative approach to a qualitative or one that's 2 less reliant on quantitative thinking? 3 MR. KESSLER: I think that one is -- Given 4 the regulatory environment we have in the U.S., I 5 think that we're going to remain quantitative. There's going to be an estimate that's quantitative 6 7 compared to some sort of limit no matter what the 8 timeframe is. So we came at it from the other way, 9 Mike, which is to say how one comes up with that estimate needs to have some bounds around it when 10 these uncertainties grow with time. 11 The TYMS Report make it very clear in the 12 example of human behavior how one puts bounds around 13 14 uncertainties. We're arguing that additional bounds 15 need to be put on specific things like climate state, but in addition, the level of rigor that's required in 16 data and models for those long-term periods such that 17 18 come up with some sort of quantitative 19 in the regulatory estimate that can be used 20 I hope that answered your environment we have. 21 question. 22 That's a good start, but CHAIRMAN RYAN: 23 if you could go to that graphic of uncertainty bands. 24 MR. KESSLER: Do you have a graph number 25 for me?

1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, it's on page six.
2	So it's probably slide 12.
3	MR. KESSLER: Okay.
4	CHAIRMAN RYAN: There you go. Help me
5	with that axis on the Y-axis. I guess I'm reading
6	that the peak I'm looking at this semi-long plot of
7	the peak.
8	MR. KESSLER: Yes.
9	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Is it, oh, I don't know,
10	1.4 something millirem per year correction?
11	MR. KESSLER: Right.
12	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Help me understand that
13	magnitude. What is that from?
14	MR. KESSLER: This is something from some
15	assessments. This is an example of the bands. It's
16	not the be all and the end all even for EPRI's
17	analysis. What we were trying to illustrate here was
18	what you might see or what might get masked in terms
19	uncertainty changes with time. Where the 1.4 number
20	comes from essentially, but our estimate based on more
21	best estimates rather than conservative analyses of
22	the nominal release scenario. So it excludes things
23	like igneous and human intrusion as to what we think
24	is a reasonable upper range on dose estimates for that
25	particular case.

1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: It seems to me that this
2	transition point between 10,000 years and beyond is
3	really related to that order of magnitude on the Y
4	axis. That the dose numbers get higher on the Y axis
5	at the peak based on whatever scenario you want to
6	assume or gets accepted or whatever the thing might
7	be. The comfort or the confidence that you get going
8	beyond that peak in time or to that peak in time is
9	influenced by the magnitude of the peak. I wonder if
10	you thought about that. If a peak dose is much nearer
11	the limit, there's going to be more question about it
12	than if a peak dose's order of magnitude below a
13	limit.
14	MR. KESSLER: I think that you're talking
15	about
16	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Given that the calculation
17	that everybody's looking at is accepted as a
18	reasonable calculation.
19	MR. KESSLER: Let's separate concepts
20	here. Okay. We're talking about irrespective of what
21	the exact number is in these analyses.
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's what you've done
23	here, but it led me to the question that I'm now
24	posing to you.
25	MR. KESSLER: Right.

1 CHAIRMAN RYAN: What do you think of that 2 notion that the magnitude of the peak has an influence 3 on how you might think about it as you approach it or 4 as you pass it? 5 MR. KESSLER: In a sense, it should not. What we're talking about here and we're advocating is 6 7 a different dose limit that recognizes the inherent uncertainties in calculating doses for any site. 8 9 In a sense, this is a generic part. recognizing that some parts of the system, almost any 10 system, become inherently uncertain. We look at ICRP 11 12 draft quidance that suggests that a higher dose --They put it the other way 13 Let's see. 14 In its most recent draft guidance, they talk 15 potentially reducing the weight about οf the importance of a particular dose number out at these 16 specifically 17 long times to take into account increasing uncertainties with time. So that's all the 18 19 generic part and that's totally separate from what we 20 may happen to be finding for a particular number at 21 the time of peak dose. 22 CHAIRMAN RYAN: And there's lots to wrestle with there, too, because it's in a way an 23 24 artifact to say the longer amount of time a dose is

the less weight I give it.

estimated,

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So I'm

1	multiplying it by 0.1 instead of 0.5 as a weighting
2	factor. That's a little bit qualitative in how you
3	get to that. You've translated a qualitative judgment
4	into a numerical one.
5	MR. KESSLER: Yes.
6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And the good news is if
7	three people did it according to the rule, they would
8	all get the same numerical answer.
9	MR. KESSLER: But doing that kind of
10	approach is very precedented. We're doing it right
11	now for human behavior just as an example that we're
12	taking a qualitative statement.
13	Let's use present-day human behavior in
14	Amargosa Valley. Now NRC and DOE have the task and
15	they're saying take that general guidance and put it
16	in real numbers and they did that. Nothing different
17	here.
18	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And again, I'm not
19	offering these comments to criticize your report or
20	anything in any way.
21	MR. KESSLER: Right.
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Just to explore the
23	concepts out loud for everybody's benefit especially
24	my own. It's interesting. You have a lot of food for
25	though. I think the next step is let's read the

1 report in detail and call you back. 2 KESSLER: And I welcome feedback formal or otherwise. 3 4 CHAIRMAN RYAN: All right. Thank you. 5 MEMBER HINZE: Allen. I'm, I quess, with 6 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: 7 Ruth. I'm reeling just a little bit here, but the 8 thing that struck me the most is the same that both 9 Ruth and Mike have asked or followed up on. make sure I understand what you've said and that's 10 11 this business, the notion, that uncertainties grow 12 with time at least up to the peak. It seems to me, I think, as you stated a feeling or a belief or maybe an 13 14 article of faith, but we don't necessarily know that 15 or it has not been documented in a logical way and subject to proof if you will. We simply believe that 16 is the case but don't know that is the case. 17 Is that an accurate characterization? 18 19 MR. KESSLER: No. You may be talking 20 about one kind of uncertainty. I mentioned in 21 whatever view graph I have here, I'll wind up taking 22 too much time looking for it, that we talked about 23 these fixed uncertainties and how they manifest

themselves in time when you make your projections.

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1 uncertainties do grow. Our knowledge or our lack of 2 certainty causes us to have a wider and wider potential projection of dose versus time up to some 3 4 time. That's one aspect. 5 Then the other aspect which I think you're probably talking about is this idea that conceptual 6 7 model uncertainty, do we understand or is there some 8 point in the future when we're confident that we even 9 the fundamental processes understand and some 10 particular set of FEPs starts to break down? That one is less well documented exactly when that happens and 11 it of course varies from one to the next. 12 I'm thinking we get 13 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: 14 some of that in juxtaposed against radioactive decay. 15 MR. KESSLER: Right. 16 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Where there's just 17 less and less there as a function of time and when I add all that up, I'm not saying your belief 18 19 But I'm saying I don't know that it's incorrect. 20 correct either. I'm asking has anybody really tried to go through and lay out all this and work this out. 21 22 Or are we still -- Like I say, is it still a belief? 23 MR. KESSLER: Right. I think Matt Kozak 24 would like to add something here. 25 MR. KOZAK: Yes, if you look at those

curves, the peak dose quite frankly associated with Yucca Mountain isn't influenced heavily by decay and so it can take that to a large extent out of the equation. The neptunium and it's progeny are what are leading to the peak dose and in fact to some extent, you get an increase as you go further out in time because you have more time for the in-growth for some of the progeny.

It's happening over the same time scale as we're coming to peak. So you're right. The short-lived stuff is disappearing but that's happening in the first 10,000 years. When we start getting out in the post 10,000 years, the decay more or less has happened and we have something else going on.

Let me just interject one more thing and that is that the one thing that people's intuition leads them to say that the uncertainties grow comes from the idea that around 10,000 years is when we may see the next major climate change. Now some of the discussion that we have in the report says maybe we don't even know that, but that I think is where the gut reaction of a lot of people comes from.

If you look at the Nordic countries at 10,000 years, they go to some other indicator because they say at that point we're under a kilometer of ice.

So why are we doing those calculations? So it's considerations like that that people have to start thinking about things after 10,000 that they don't have to consider before.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: I understand the

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: I understand the specific examples. I'm not sure that we can generalize it. If one would imagine that it took 100 million years for the neptunium to reach the biosphere as opposed to one million or a half or whatever it's currently projected to do, we started getting into a very different regime in terms of decay and what's important and what's not and whether there's anything left to be important.

MR. KOZAK: Yes.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: I just wanted to

MR. KESSLER: In some, we're not generalizing it, Allen, in the sense that there's these couple different options for dealing with uncertainties and one is that I think we would agree that for a lot of the geologic and some of the physical processes that they can be treated with a reasonable amount of uncertainty such that they can be fully incorporated in a probabilistic compliance assessment. It's just some of them that need

raise.

1	additional specification or at least be addressed in
2	some particular way.
3	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. I don't think
4	there is an answer to this so I'll pass.
5	MEMBER HINZE: Dr. Clarke.
6	MEMBER CLARKE: I just had a quick one,
7	John, to clarify. I think it's on page 17, slides 33
8	and 34 is where I found them.
9	MR. KESSLER: Thirty-three?
10	MEMBER CLARKE: Yes, the cutoff for the
11	negligible incremental dose at one millirem per year.
12	That's at a risk level of what would that be? 10^{-5} .
13	MR. KESSLER: No, that's at where
14	essentially P equals 1.
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: The risk level of one
16	millirem here is 10^{-7} .
17	MEMBER CLARKE: 10 ⁻⁷ .
18	MR. KESSLER: Oh, health risk. Sorry. I
19	misunderstood the question.
20	MEMBER CLARKE: I was thinking 15 but it's
21	10 ⁻⁴ .
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: What I remember is 10^{-7} .
23	MEMBER CLARKE: I'm using the cutoff 10^{-4}
24	which is 15.
25	MR. KESSLER: Too many different kinds of

1	risks here.
2	MEMBER CLARKE: I'm sorry.
3	MR. KESSLER: No. I misinterpreted your
4	question. Mike answered.
5	CHAIRMAN RYAN: (Off mic) is in fact
6	below that.
7	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay.
8	MEMBER HINZE: Staff. Michael.
9	MR. LEE: Michael Lee. I read the report.
10	Nice report, John. Congratulations to you and your
11	authors. It gives us a lot of food for thought for
12	everyone in there. I just have a couple questions and
13	observations. In May 2005, NEA is going to have a
14	working group on the treatment of uncertainties in
15	long-term PAs. I think the goal of that working group
16	is to try to develop a consensus document on how
17	repository developers and decision makers could use
18	these results. Does EPRI intend on observing or
19	sending a participant to that working group?
20	MR. KESSLER: If we're invited.
21	Obviously, we are not a member of NEA and it would
22	only be if an NEA member felt it was useful for us to
23	be there. I do know that it's my understanding that
24	some members of the NEA group have had the website

forwarded to them. So at least, they're aware that it

1	exists.
2	MR. LEE: Sure. The other
3	comment/question I had is a few minutes ago you made
4	reference to an NRC letter to DOE. Is that is recent
5	letter? The EPA, excuse me. The EPA.
6	MR. KESSLER: NRC letter to EPA. If I
7	said, I misspoke.
8	MR. LEE: Maybe it was to
9	MR. KESSLER: I think I did The example
10	that I remember was about NRC, and if I misspoke I
11	apologize, and a DOE interaction that established for
12	example the quantitative details of human behavior.
13	That's what I remember or at least meaning to say if
14	I didn't use those words.
15	MR. LEE: Thank you. For some folks in
16	the audience, they may not be aware that NAS wrote a,
17	for lack of a better description, rebuttal paper on
18	the EPA standard after EPA implemented its
19	recommendations. You didn't make reference to that in
20	the report.
21	MR. KESSLER: No.
22	MR. LEE: Would you care to elaborate for
23	the Committee's benefit as to why?
24	MR. KESSLER: The rebuttal was used by at
25	least one of the parties in the lawsuits and our

1 reading of how the court dealt with that essentially 2 was if it's not in the bible document the court didn't 3 consider it as part of their ruling. That's why we 4 didn't consider it. 5 But in your opinion just as an opinion, is it valuable for the parties as they go 6 7 back and reexamine the NAS recommendations to take 8 into account what the TYMS Committee said regarding 9 possible implementation of their recommendations? I think it's valuable for 10 MR. KESSLER: EPA and NRC to take into account everything that they 11 12 can within the confines of the court ruling. Last question. Our previous 13 MR. LEE: 14 speaker made reference to being king-for-a-day and if 15 you had an opportunity to be king-for-a-day, would you have any recommendations on future standards relative 16 to issues NRC should focus on as opposed to EPA? 17 There's always been a little tension between the two 18 19 agencies on what EPA should specify in its standards 20 and what NRC should be given a discretion over in 21 terms of the implementation. 22 MR. KESSLER: Well, oh dear. This is a 23 king-for-a-day comment. It is not industry policy or anything else. I think it would be useful for EPA to 24

recognize who is actually implementing this regulation

1 and it's not EPA. The more EPA knows about the actual 2 processes and the actual way NRC is going to have to 3 deal with whatever they are handed the better. 4 example, it would be nice if the EPA decision makers knew what the heck an ASLB was as an example. 5 In terms of specific recommendation, I 6 7 would like, we have them in the report, in terms of 8 what we would like this to be. If we go back to the 9 recommendations we made to the NAS in 1994, EPRI recommended that the time period of compliance should 10 be 1,000 years because of growing uncertainties. 11 12 we've not revisited that because the court made its ruling and we weren't going back over old ground. 13 14 I would say that starting from here, we've 15 provided specific recommendations and our opinion is 16 that while EPA has to set the overall regulation, 17 they're not the implementing regulator. Since that's the way the law reads, it would be useful for EPA to 18 19 take into account how NRC does business. 20 Thank you. MR. LEE: 21 MEMBER HINZE: Further questions? 22 John, I too thought it MR. HAMDAN: Yes. 23 was an excellent not only presentation but the ideas 24 that you and your team came up with are excellent and

worth further discussion in my opinion. As you have

1 been saying, EPA is the agency who is going to issue 2 the standards. So the question for you is has EPRI or you personally talked to EPA about these ideas and 3 4 these thoughts because after they are going to come up 5 with the standards in two or three months and did you talk to EPA about it? What do you think the EPA's 6 7 response is going to be? MR. KESSLER: Certainly, we talked to EPA 8 9 I was there yesterday and about this report. 10 essentially just walked through the exact presentation with them. I gave them the ideas that 11 12 were in the report. Did I get any indication of what EPA is thinking or what they thought was good or what 13 14 they thought was bad? None whatsoever. Other than 15 what's already reported in the press, I have no idea 16 what EPA is thinking. 17 MR. HAMDAN: Apart from your discussion yesterday, what do you think EPA might do with your 18 19 recommendations? 20 MR. KESSLER: I have no idea. 21 MEMBER HINZE: We have no one in the 22 audience that is going to comment on it. 23 MR. KESSLER: Honestly, I do not know. 24 EPA didn't share anything with me. I didn't ask for 25 It's not appropriate. All I wanted to do anything.

1 was to make sure that EPA had some thoughts from us 2 and I walked through the same presentation with them 3 yesterday. 4 MEMBER HINZE: Dr. Ryan. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thank you. 5 Again, thank We appreciate your presentation and your 6 you, John. 7 response to questions and dialogue. It's helpful for 8 us as we think ahead. Thank you very much. We're on 9 schedule for a break. Let's see Latif or somebody from staff. Mike, do we need the recorder at this 10 11 point? We're going to consider just subjects and our 12 trip to Japan slides and so forth. I think we're off the record for the rest of the day. Thank you very 13 14 much. We'll reconvene at 3:40 p.m. please. 15 (Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the aboveentitled matter concluded.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25