



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

July 26, 2001

EA-99-234

Tennessee Valley Authority  
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice  
Chief Nuclear Officer and  
Executive Vice President  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

**SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT  
50-327/01-02 AND 50-328/01-02**

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On June 30, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection which were discussed on July 5, 2001 with Mr. Richard Purcell and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection the inspectors did not identify any findings of significance. However, on February 7, 2000, a Severity Level II Notice of Violation was issued to TVA. This violation involved employment discrimination contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that TVA did not select a former employee to a competitive position in the corporate chemistry organization in 1996, due, at least in part, to his engagement in protected activities. The violation was directly related to your corporate office, and not site-specific; however, the violation was required to be docketed against Sequoyah and your other two nuclear facilities. The enclosed report provides the NRC administrative tracking information for this violation against the Sequoyah docket numbers.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

TVA

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Room from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 6  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328  
License Nos.: DPR-77, DPR-79

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report  
w/attachment

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

TVA

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-327, 50-328  
License Nos: DPR-77, DPR-79

Report Nos: 50-327/01-02, 50-328/01-02

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location: Sequoyah Access Road  
Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379

Dates: April 1, 2001 - June 30, 2001

Inspectors: R. Gibbs, Senior Resident Inspector  
D. Starkey, Resident Inspector  
R. Telson, Resident Inspector  
D. Roberts, Senior Resident Inspector - Catawba Plant  
T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Plant  
K. Poertner, Resident Inspector - Surry Plant  
E. Testa, Senior Health Physicist  
R. Carrion, Project Engineer

Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 6  
Division of Reactor Projects

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000327-01-02, IR 05000328-01-02, Integrated inspection report, on April 1, 2001 - June 30, 2001, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a senior health physicist, and a project engineer. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process," (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "no color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

### A. Inspector Identified Findings

#### Other Activities

Violation. On February 7, 2000, a Severity Level II violation with civil penalty was issued to the licensee. The violation was not site-specific and involved employment discrimination contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that the licensee did not select a former employee to a competitive position in the corporate chemistry organization in 1996, due, at least in part, to his engagement in protected activities. On January 22, 2001, the licensee denied the violation and on May 4, an Order was issued sustaining the violation and imposing the civil penalty. On June 1, TVA requested an enforcement hearing on the Order. (Section 40A5).

### B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On May 20, power was reduced to about 64 percent to repair secondary plant equipment. Power was returned to 100 percent on May 21 and the unit operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

### **1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness**

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

##### .1 Partial Walkdowns

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out-of-service. The walkdowns included a review of applicable operating procedures to determine correct system lineups and an inspection of critical components (e.g., power supplies, support systems) to identify any discrepancies that could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

- Safety injection train 1B-B
- Containment spray (CS) train 1A-A
- Residual heat removal (RHR) train 2B-B

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### .2 Complete Walkdown

###### b. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of selected accessible portions of the Unit 1 essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system. The inspectors verified proper equipment alignment by comparing actual equipment configuration to plant procedures, drawings, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors reviewed outstanding work requests, problem evaluation reports (PERs), and the system health report, which discussed open engineering issues, to determine if any conditions existed that would have prevented the system from fulfilling its intended safety function. The inspectors also performed a review of the corrective action program for substantive equipment alignment issues for all risk significant systems to ensure the licensee was

identifying and correcting problems appropriately. Selected documents reviewed during the inspection included the following:

- ERCW system flow diagram, CCD No. 1,2-47W845-5
- ERCW system flow diagram, CCD No. 1,2-47W845-1
- ERCW system flow diagram, CCD No. 1,2-47W845-2
- ERCW system flow diagram, CCD No. 1-47W845-3
- ERCW system flow diagram, CCD No. 1-47W845-6
- Procedure 0-SO-67-1, Essential Raw Cooling Water Valve Checklist 0-67-1.02
- Procedure 0-SO-67-1, Essential Raw Cooling Water Valve Checklist 0-67-1.03

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of areas important to reactor safety, listed below, to evaluate conditions related to: (1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and (3) fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors referenced Procedure SPP-10.10, Control of Transient Combustibles, and prefire plans for the areas listed below, as appropriate.

- ERCW strainer room 1A-A
- 690' elevation of auxiliary building (general area adjacent to component cooling water pumps)
- 690' elevation of auxiliary building (Unit 1 penetration room)
- Auxiliary control room
- 6.9 KV train A shutdown board room
- 250 V battery board rooms 1 and 2

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 Individual Plant Examination, Section E.1, Sequoyah Internal Flood Analysis, to evaluate: (1) licensee-identified internal flooding initiating events and their associated frequencies; (2) flooding impact on plant equipment; and (3) those areas that can be affected by internal flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the following areas to verify that the floor drain system, including sump pump and level sensors, were operable:

- Auxiliary building elevations 653' and 669'
- Turbine building lower elevation
- ERCW pump house elevations 704' and 720'

A review of preventive maintenance (PM) for the following components/activities was performed to verify implementation of the PM program:

- Auxiliary building floor and equipment drain sumps
- Auxiliary building waste evaporator feed pumps
- Auxiliary building auxiliary waste evaporator feed pumps
- Auxiliary building sump tank pumps
- Turbine building station sump pump
- Turbine building emergency portable sump pump
- Monthly check for standing water in manholes/handholes for February through May 2001

The following procedures for coping with flooding events were reviewed to verify that the actions were consistent with the plant's design basis assumptions:

- Abnormal operating procedure (AOP), AOP-M.01, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water
- AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water
- Annunciator response procedure, 1-AR-M15-B, Miscellaneous 1-XA-55-15B
- System operating instruction, 0-SO-40-4, Turbine Building Sump Pump Operation and Yard Pond Alignment

In addition, related issues in the corrective action program were reviewed to verify that the licensee was identifying issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the program for timely resolution.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

.1 Containment Spray System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and discussed with system engineering Unit 1 CS heat exchanger performance data and PERs listed below. The inspectors evaluated the performance data for common cause heat sink performance problems and deficiencies that could mask degraded performance and potentially increase plant risk. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to evaluate whether the licensee had adequately resolved heat exchanger performance problems that could result in initiating events or affect multiple heat exchangers in mitigating systems and thereby plant increase risk. The following documents were reviewed:

- CS Heat Exchangers 1A and 1B Eddy Current Examination Report, Unit 1 Cycle 8, dated April 1997
- CS Heat Exchanger 1B Baseline Eddy Current Examination Report, dated August 1998
- PERs 99-004264-000 and 99-010436-000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Component Cooling Water System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the cleaning of Units 1 and 2 common B train (0B1 and 0B2) component cooling system (CCS) heat exchangers and conducted a review of the CCS performance test, 0-TI-SXX-070-001.0, Analysis of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Test Data, to evaluate heat exchanger performance. The inspectors observed the heat exchanger cleaning activities, reviewed the test acceptance criteria and results, verified that the test results were appropriately categorized against pre-established acceptance criteria and were acceptable, independently performed heat balance calculations, and evaluated whether the test frequency was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capabilities below design basis values.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed two simulator scenarios, one involving an anticipated transient without scram and the other involving a small loss of coolant accident caused by a stuck open reactor coolant system pressurizer safety valve. Both scenarios exercised the operators' ability to make timely and accurate emergency plan declarations. The inspectors referenced the licensee's simulator guide for these scenarios during the inspection. The inspectors observed for the following crew attributes: (1) clarity and formality of communication; (2) ability to take timely action in the safe direction; (3) prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms; (4) correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; (5) timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; (6) oversight and direction provided by the shift manager, including ability to identify and implement appropriate technical specification (TS) actions such as reporting and emergency plan actions and notifications, and (7) performance with respect to group dynamics.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled portions of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), listed below, as a result of performance problems, to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's maintenance practices. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation against Procedure SPP-6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator, Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting, NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants and Instruction 0-TI-SXX-000-004.0, of the same title. Reviews focused on: (1) MR scoping; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classifications; and (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

<u>SSC Performance Problem Inspected</u>	<u>Additional Documents Reviewed</u>
RHR heat exchanger bypass valve, 2-FCV-74-32, failed to stroke open	Cause determination evaluation form (CDEF) 1259; PER 01-002283-000
6.9KV boardroom chiller B train failure	CDEF 1281; PER 01-003935-000
Hydrogen recombiner 1B-B thermocouple failures	PER 01-002193-000
Motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump A level control valve, 1-LCV-003-156, failed stroke time test	CDEF 1270; PER 01-003514-000
ERCW pump L-B motor breaker failure to close	CDEF 1297; PER 01-004867-00
480V boardroom chiller 1B found tripped	CDEF 1287; PER 01-003859-000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate for selected work activities: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (3) the maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems for adequate identification and resolution. The inspectors referenced Procedure SPP-7.1, Work Control Process, and Instruction 0-TI-DSM-000-007.1, Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix during these inspection activities.

<u>Selected Maintenance Activity</u>	<u>Additional Documents Reviewed</u>
Planned spent fuel pit cooling system outage	AOP-M.06, Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling; Alarm Response Procedure 1-AR-M6-D, E-3; control room narrative logs
Planned maintenance on ERCW pump M-B	PER 01-004914-000; maintenance shift log dated May 23, 2001
Emergent maintenance on RHR heat exchanger 2A-A component cooling water outlet valve 2-FCV-70-156	PER 01-005036-000; control room narrative log for May 29, 2001; MI-11.2C, Limitorque Operators Corrective Maintenance Procedure for SMB-000 Thru SMB-00 Actuators with HBC-0 Thru HBC-3 Actuators
Planned maintenance on intake bay associated with ERCW pumps J-A and K-A	Control room narrative log for June 13, 2001; Sentinel calculation of plant risk profile

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluationsa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected technical operability evaluations (TOEs) and PERs, listed below, and related documents for issues affecting risk-significant mitigating systems to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) and the risk-significance in accordance with the SDP. The inspectors

referenced Procedure SPP-10.6, Engineering Evaluations for Operability Determination, as needed, during the course of these inspection activities.

<u>Operability Evaluation Inspected</u>	<u>Related Documents Reviewed</u>
Hydrogen recombiner 1B-B temperature indicators reading high	TOE 1-01-083-2193, PER 1-002193-000; UFSAR section 6.2.5.5
Potential to exceed capacity of vital batteries I and II due to usage of high wattage emergency lighting bulbs	TOE 0-01-250-2424, PER 01-002424-000
Emergency diesel generator (EDG) engine 1A1 starting air pressure found low outside procedure limits of 190 psig to 200 psig	PER 01-004032-000; Alarm Response Procedure, 0-AR-DG-1A-LCLA, (F-1), Revision 11; Setpoint and Scaling Document 0-P-82-162
Inoperability of RHR heat exchanger 2A-A component cooling water outlet valve, 2-FCV-70-156	PER 01-005036-000; PER 01-005127-000; 2-SI-SXV-000-201.1, Full Stroking of Category "A" and "B" Valves Required in All Modes; 10CFR50.59 evaluation for placing 2-FCV-70-156 in open position; 2-SI-OPS-070-032.A, Component Cooling Water Valves Position Verification Train A; EA-74-1, Placing RHR Shutdown Cooling in Service; ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump
Vital instrument power board transfer switches with termination lugs not in accordance with vendor requirements	PER 01-004545-000; TOE 0-01-250-4545, work request 453276

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated operator workaround (OWA) #SQ99001WA, Generator Seal Oil TCVs Not Controlling Temperature Due to Low System Heat Load, dated January 12, 1999, for its potential effects on the functionality of mitigating systems and the effects on initiating event frequencies. The OWA was reviewed to determine: (1) if the functional capability of the system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event was affected; (2) the effect on the operator's ability to implement abnormal or emergency procedures; and (3) if OWA problems were captured in the licensee's corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated a modification to the CCS that affected both units. The CCS surge tanks were modified such that the vent line valve tail pipe connections were changed and the level instrumentation was replaced. This modification was selected because of its potential for common cause failure of the CCS and its high risk-significance. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs had not been degraded by the modification and that the modification did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors observed portions of the modification work in the field and related control room indications. The inspectors discussed the modification with engineering and operations personnel and reviewed TS 3.7.3, the licensee's risk assessment, DCN D-20421 and D-20422, Work Orders (WOs) 00-005098 and 00-005099, the instrument data packages, post-modification testing results, and related procedures and drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Procedure SPP-6.3, Pre/Post Maintenance Testing (PMT), which governs the licensee's PMT process, and WOs and/or test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function.

Post Maintenance Test Inspected

Test of centrifugal charging pump 2B-B following routine preventive maintenance

Related Documents Reviewed

2-SI-SXP-062-201.B, Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B-B Performance Test

Test of EDG 2B-B following replacement of failed motor operated potentiometer	0-SO-2-4, Diesel Generator 2B-B; PER 01-004478-000
Test of containment spray pump 1B-B following planned maintenance	1-SI-SXP-072-201.B, Containment Spray Pump 1B-B Performance Test
Test of condenser hotwell recirculation valve, 1-FCV-2-35, following valve failing open	WO 01-004938-000; PER 01-004937-000
Test of component cooling water pump 1B-B following planned maintenance	1-SI-SXP-070-201.B, Component Cooling Pump 1B-B Performance Test
Test of RHR heat exchanger 2A-A component cooling water outlet valve, 2-FCV-70-156, following corrective maintenance	0-MI-EMV-317-144.0, Procedure for Testing Motor Operated Valves Using MOVATS Signature Analysis System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs conducted using the surveillance instructions (SIs), listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met TS, the UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements, and to verify that the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

<u>Surveillance Test Inspected</u>	<u>Related SIs Reviewed</u>
Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump performance test	2-SI-SXP-003-201.S, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 2A-S Performance Test
Component cooling water pump 2A-A performance test	2-SI-SXP-070-201.A, Component Cooling Pump 2A-A Performance Test
Unit 2 B train solid state protection system/reactor trip breaker test	SI-90.82, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test (SSPS)
Verification of radiation monitor 0-R-90-102 due to initiation of auxiliary building isolation	0-SI-ICC-090-102.A, Channel Calibration of Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor (Train A) 0-R-90-102, Section 6.8

Auxiliary building gas treatment system operability test

0-SI-SFT-030-149.A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Vacuum Test Train A; PER 01-004734-000; PER 01-004265-000

EDG 2B-B fuel oil transfer pump performance test

0-PI-SXP-018-007.6, Diesel Generator 2B-B Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps, Lube Oil Circ Pumps, Fuel Oil Priming & A-C Lube Oil Soak Back Pumps Performance Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two related temporary plant modifications (temporary alteration control forms (TACFs) 1-01-0003 and 1-01-0004), related to the disconnection of reach rod drives for valves 1-VLV-062-0538 and 1-VLV-062-0541, by-pass and drain valves, respectively, of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design bases documentation, including the UFSAR and TS to ensure that risk-significant functions of the CVCS were not affected. A walkdown of the modifications was performed to verify that their installation was consistent with the modification documents. In addition, the adequacy of configuration control was verified by reviewing the updated system drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness**

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's emergency response Blue Team perform a quarterly emergency plan drill. The inspectors evaluated drill conduct and the adequacy of the licensee's drill critique to identify weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario and plan, and observed drill performance in the technical support center (TSC). The inspectors also attended the TSC post-drill critique.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 2. RADIATION SAFETY

### Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

#### 2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the plant collective exposure history, current exposure dose trends, and the year 2001 annual site dose goal to determine if the licensee was implementing ALARA practices as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(b) and Procedure RCI-10, ALARA Planning Report Criteria. The inspectors also evaluated dose controls for pregnant females, source term reduction efforts, and the incorporation of ALARA into licensee radiation work permits (RWP). The evaluation included: ALARA planning, dose goals and estimates, daily dose results, job dose trends and problem identification and resolution. The Unit 2 Cycle 10 ALARA outage report was evaluated for outage dose performance, dose rate trends, shutdown chemistry crud burst and clean-up, temporary shielding, and ALARA post-job review for lessons learned. The inspectors attended a split pin replacement planning meeting to assess ALARA preparation for the replacement work. The inspectors attended a pre-job briefing for the low level radioactive waste onsite storage facility RWP #01000027, observed the removal of the storage module cell cap, and placement of a polyethylene high integrity container of waste.

The following initial ALARA planning reports for the Unit 1 cycle 11 refueling outage were reviewed for lessons learned and dose goal planning:

2001-10 Refueling Operations  
2001-12 S/G Primary Maintenance  
2001-19 In-service Inspections  
2001-24 Scaffolding  
2001-26 Temporary Shielding  
2001-29 RCP #2 Platform Mods  
2001-34 Split Pin Replacement

##### b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

##### Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours, Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal, and Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed monthly operating reports and licensee event reports (LERs) for the period from April 2000 through March 2001 to determine whether the submitted PI statistics were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. In addition, the licensee's corrective action program was reviewed to determine if any problems with the collection of PI data had occurred and if resolution was satisfactory.

- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
- Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### 4OA5 Other

On February 7, 2000, a Severity Level II violation with civil penalty was issued to TVA. This violation involved employment discrimination contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that TVA did not select a former employee to a competitive position in the corporate chemistry organization in 1996, due, at least in part, to his engagement in protected activities. On January 22, 2001, TVA denied the violation and on May 4, an Order was issued sustaining the violation and imposing the civil penalty. On June 1, TVA requested an enforcement hearing on the Order. Pending resolution of this violation, this issue is identified as Violation 50-327, 328/01-02-01, TVA Corporate Employee Discrimination.

##### 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exits

###### .1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Richard Purcell, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management on July 5, 2001. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Annual Assessment and State/Local Officials Meeting Summary

Subsequent to the end of the inspection period, on July 10, 2001 the NRC Resident Inspectors and the Region II, Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief assigned to Sequoyah met with TVA, to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the Sequoyah annual assessment of safety performance for the period of April 2, 2000 - March 31, 2001. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the Sequoyah assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included Sequoyah site management, members of plant staff, several local officials, and news media personnel.

Following the annual assessment meeting, a meeting was held with local officials to discuss the ROP and NRC activities involving Sequoyah.

These meetings were open to the public. Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML011980088. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

## ATTACHMENT

### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

#### Licensee

T. Carson, Maintenance Manager  
R. Drake, Maintenance and Modifications Manager  
E. Freeman, Operations Manager  
J. Gates, Site Support Manager  
C. Kent, Radcon/Chemistry Manager  
D. Koehl, Plant Manager  
M. Lorek, Assistant Plant Manager  
D. Lundy, Site Engineering Manager  
R. Purcell, Site Vice President  
P. Salas, Manager of Licensing and Industry Affairs  
K. Stephens, Security Manager  
J. Valente, Engineering & Support Services Manager

#### NRC

R. Bernhard, Region II Senior Reactor Analyst

### ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

#### Opened

50-327, 328/01-02-01	VIO	TVA Corporate Employee Discrimination (Section 40A5).
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