UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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February 13, 2004

Mr. Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President
Southern California Edison Co.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00206/04-010

Dear Mr. Ray:

An NRC inspection was conducted on January 26-29, 2004, at your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspection included an examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. Overall, the inspection determined that you are conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at (817) 860-8191 or Mr. Robert J. Evans, Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8234.

Sincerely,

/RA/

D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief
Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch

Docket No.: 50-206
License No.: DPR-13

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
050-00206/04-010

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No:	050-00206
License No:	DPR-13
Report No:	050-00206/04-010
Licensee:	Southern California Edison Co. P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674
Facility:	San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
Location:	San Clemente, California
Dates:	January 26-29, 2004
Inspector:	Robert J. Evans, P.E., C.H.P., Senior Health Physicist Fuel Cycle & Decommissioning Branch
Approved By:	D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle & Decommissioning Branch
Attachment:	Supplemental Inspection Information
ADAMS Entry:	IR05000206-04-010 on 01/26/2004 - 01/29/2004; Southern California Edison Co., San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; Unit 1. Decommissioning Report. No Violations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 050-00206/04-010

This inspection was a routine, announced inspection of decommissioning activities being conducted at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 facility. Areas inspected included organization, management, and cost controls; maintenance and surveillance activities; decommissioning performance and status review; and solid radioactive waste management and transportation of radioactive materials. Overall, the licensee was conducting decommissioning in accordance with regulatory and procedural requirements.

Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- The licensee had an organization in place that was sufficient to conduct decommissioning activities. The organizational structure was in agreement with permanently decommissioned technical specifications and quality assurance plan requirements. The organizational structure provided in the defueled safety analysis report was out-of-date, but the structure is expected to be updated during the next routine revision of the defueled safety analysis report (Section 1.2.a).

- The operations shift crew composition met or exceeded permanently defueled technical specifications requirements. A functional test of the remote alarm system used to compensate for periods when the Unit 1 control room was unmanned, revealed that the audible alarm was barely perceptible. The licensee issued an action request to correct the alarm deficiency (Section 1.2.a).

- The licensee continued to implement an employee safety concerns program that allowed interested parties to submit concerns for review. The licensee thoroughly investigated the 2003 concerns in a timely manner (Section 1.2.b).

Maintenance and Surveillance at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- Although the Unit 1 maintenance backlog was trending upwards, the inspector determined that the backlog was not significant (Section 2.2.a).

- The inspector observed the removal of a sump pump in containment. The As Low As Reasonably Achievable pre-planning, health physics support, and personnel protection actions taken by the licensee were excellent. During the containment tour, a 55-gallon drum connected to a vacuum cleaner collapsed under excessive negative pressure. Although there were no injuries, the licensee issued an action request to investigate the incident and to propose corrective actions to prevent recurrence (Section 2.2.b).

- The inspector observed the licensee conducting a surveillance of the fire water system valves. All valves were found to be in the correct positions to support system operability (Section 2.2.c).

Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors

- Plant tours confirmed that the radiologically restricted area was adequately controlled. Postings, signs, and radiological boundaries were in compliance with regulatory requirements (Section 3.2.a).

- The licensee was still cutting concrete blocks from the sphere enclosure building wall, although the work was almost complete. The licensee was conducting the work in a safe and orderly manner. The licensee reduced the number of blocks being cut and documented its technical justification in a calculation revision (Section 3.2.b).

- The licensee was maintaining the spent fuel pool within permanently defueled technical specifications and procedural requirements (Section 3.2.c).

Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

- The licensee had received an exemption from selected U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for shipment of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel. The inspector confirmed that the surface contamination and exposure rate levels for the reactor pressure vessel package were below exemption requirements or licensee commitments, and training was provided to applicable personnel. Immediately after the conclusion of the onsite inspection, the licensee publicly announced that the reactor pressure vessel shipment had been indefinitely deferred (Section 4.2).

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 was permanently shut down during November 1992 and was permanently defueled by March 1993. The unit remained in SAFSTOR until June 1999, when decommissioning was initiated. At the time of this inspection, the licensee was conducting decommissioning activities under the DECON option as stated in its Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report dated December 15, 1998.

Work completed since the previous inspection included removal of all Unit 1 fuel from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool (SFP) and placement into five advanced horizontal storage modules, construction and installation of the remaining 13 advanced horizontal storage modules, installation of the single-failure proof trolley on the Unit 1 turbine building gantry crane, construction of the roadway east of the turbine building (to be used for Unit 1 fuel movement to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), and cutting of an additional 150 blocks from the sphere enclosure building.

Work in progress during the inspection included cutting and removal of the containment sumps, and continued installation of the turbine building gantry crane and fuel handling building modifications. The turbine building gantry crane modifications included upgrading of turbine building structural steel, installation of horizontal rails, structural upgrade of the crane, and installation and testing of a new single-failure proof trolley. The fuel handling building modifications included rerouting of the primary makeup system piping, modifying the decontamination pad, and widening the roll-up door.

The Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel was still onsite. The vessel was being stored in its shipping container adjacent to the sphere enclosure building. The reactor pressure vessel package had been scheduled to be shipped to a disposal site in South Carolina during February 2004, but just after the conclusion of the onsite inspection, the licensee announced that it was deferring the shipment until further notice.

1 Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (36801)

1.1 Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's organizational structure to ascertain whether there was sufficient staff to support decommissioning activities. Also reviewed was the licensee's nuclear safety concern program to ascertain whether it was functioning in accordance with management directive requirements.

1.2 Observations and Findings

a. Organizational Structure

The licensee's organizational structure is described in the permanently defueled technical specifications (PDTS), defueled safety analysis report (DSAR), and the quality assurance program topical report. The organizational structure in place at the time of the inspection was compared to the required organizational structures. The inspector concluded that supervisory and managerial level positions continued to be filled with qualified individuals dedicated to the decommissioning of Unit 1.

The inspector noted that the actual organizational structure was in agreement with PDTS and quality assurance program requirements, but not in agreement with the DSAR. The DSAR was last revised during August 2002. The next routine revision was planned for August 2004. The DSAR update is expected to include the most current organizational structure in place at that time.

The inspector made unannounced visits to the Unit 1 control room. The number of operators on duty always met the requirements specified in PDTS Table D6.2-1, "Minimum Shift Crew Composition." Either a shift supervisor or a shutdown operator was in the Unit 1 industrial area as required by PDTS because fuel remained in the spent fuel pool.

During November 2003, the licensee implemented a change to the Unit 1 control room staffing policy. The licensee began allowing the Unit 1 shift supervisor to leave the Unit 1 industrial area to work in other areas of the facility. In addition, the remaining control room operator was allowed to leave the Unit 1 control room for short periods of time to conduct work in the industrial area.

As a compensatory measure, the licensee installed a remote alarm system in the common Units 2 and 3 control room. If an alarm were to actuate in the Unit 1 control room while it was unoccupied, the alarming condition would activate a remote alarm in the Units 2 and 3 control room following a short time delay. The remote alarm system was tested by plant operators on a daily basis.

The inspector reviewed the Unit 1 operations logbooks, in part, to determine the operating history of the remote alarm system. The remote alarm failed to operate for short durations on several different occasions during the last several months. The inspector concluded that the number of incidences and length of each equipment outage were not considered significant.

To verify operability, the inspector observed the plant operators conduct a functional test of the Unit 1 remote alarm system in the Unit 2 and 3 control room. The visual alarm actuated as expected, but the audible alarm was barely perceptible. The volume control for the audible alarm apparently was adjusted downward. In response to this finding, Unit 1 operators initiated an action request to formulate short and long-term corrective actions to ensure that the audible alarm would perform its function.

b. Employee/Safety Concerns Program Review

The nuclear safety concerns program was reviewed to determine if the program allowed employees and other individuals to voice concerns related to Unit 1 activities. The program requirements were described in the licensee's Nuclear Organization Directive D-008. The nuclear safety concerns program was a stand-alone department that reported to the vice president, engineering & technical services. The nuclear safety concerns program manager was authorized to take concerns directly to the executive vice president-generation or the executive vice president-general counsel if the issue involved other vice presidents.

Employees could submit concerns via internal mail, U.S. Postal Service mail, telephone, electronic mail, in person, or drop boxes located throughout the plant. To ensure employee awareness, the nuclear safety program issued annual memorandums to plant personnel as well as handouts to incoming and outgoing personnel.

The inspector reviewed concerns submitted to the nuclear safety concerns group during calender year 2003. These concerns had been investigated by the licensee in a timely manner and corrective actions were taken as appropriate.

During April 2003, a contractor for the licensee conducted a nuclear safety culture survey. The survey concluded that the safety culture was "healthy." The survey identified a number of licensee strengths and weaknesses related to safety. The nuclear safety concerns program was listed as one of the strengths of the safety culture survey. The results of the safety culture survey were presented to the NRC during an open meeting conducted on November 13, 2003.

1.3 Conclusions

The licensee had an organization in place that was sufficient to conduct decommissioning activities. The organizational structure was in agreement with PDTS and quality assurance plan requirements. The organizational structure provided in the DSAR was out-of-date, but the structure is expected to be updated during the next routine revision of the DSAR.

The operations shift crew composition met or exceeded PDTS requirements. A functional test of the remote alarm system, used to compensate for periods when the Unit 1 control room was unmanned, revealed that the audible alarm was barely perceptible. The licensee issued an action request to correct the alarm deficiency.

The licensee continued to implement an employee safety concerns program that allowed interested parties to submit concerns for review. The licensee thoroughly investigated the 2003 concerns in a timely manner.

2 Maintenance and Surveillance at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (62801)

2.1 Inspection Scope

The inspector observed the performance of selected maintenance and surveillance activities to verify if structures, systems, and components were being maintained in compliance with PDTS and procedural requirements.

2.2 Observations and Findings

a. Trending of Corrective Maintenance Activities

The inspector reviewed the licensee's backlog of corrective maintenance activities to ascertain whether maintenance tasks were being completed or routinely deferred. At the time of the inspection, the number of open maintenance tasks was slowly trending in an upward manner, from about 35 to 51 tasks in the last 6 months. In summary, the inspector concluded that the number of backlogged maintenance activities was not excessive.

The licensee prioritized maintenance tasks based on a number of factors. Unit 1 corrective maintenance tasks typically had lower priorities than similar tasks at the two operating units because Unit 1 was considered an industrial project. Plus, the availability of manpower fluctuated based on the work in progress at the two operating units. In general, whenever a refueling outage was in progress, work at the Unit 1 site would slow down because of the reallocation of resources to the outage. Once an outage ended, typically, the maintenance backlog at Unit 1 would be addressed by the licensee.

During the inspection, an outage was about to commence in Unit 2. The Unit 1 maintenance backlog was a result, in part, of the reallocation of resources to Unit 2. Once the outage was complete, then the licensee was expected to address the Unit 1 maintenance backlog.

b. Removal of Containment Sump Pumps

The inspector observed decommissioning activities in progress inside of containment. One activity in progress was the removal of a recirculation sump pump. The work crew was using a gasoline-fueled torch to cut the pump from its foundation. The work was being conducted in accordance with Construction Work Order 03100878000. Overall, the work was being conducted in a safe and orderly manner.

The inspector noted excellent As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) preplanning and health physics work controls. The work controls included construction of a tent to contain the torch fumes, installation of a dedicated ventilation system to process the air in the tent, pre-job briefings, and continuous health physics technician oversight during the work. Personnel protective equipment included flame retardant clothing and respirators.

Once all of the pumps have been removed from the three containment sumps, then the licensee planned to remove the sludge material that was present in the sumps. The licensee expects this material to be highly radioactive; therefore, additional health physics controls were being implemented during the inspection to protect the workers. The licensee had pre-staged 55-gallon drums to store the waste material and installed a lead-lined tent inside of containment to safely store the drummed material. Once the material is collected, the licensee plans to sample the material to determine its waste disposal classification.

In parallel with the torch cutting of the sump pump, the work crews were also vacuuming the containment floor drains. The workers were using a "super-vac" vacuum cleaner connected to a 55-gallon drum. During the inspection, a 55-gallon drum collapsed inward from excessive negative pressure. There were no personnel injuries from this incident, but the licensee issued an action request to investigate the incident and formulate corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

c. Walkdown of Fire Suppression Water System Valves

The licensee conducted routine surveillances of the fire water system to ensure that the fire hydrants, supply lines, and sprinkler systems were functional. In accordance with General Fire Protection Procedure S01-XV-4.5, Revision 9, "General Fire Suppression Water System," the system flow path is required to be verified functional, in part, by verifying once per 31 days that each valve in the flow path is in its correct position.

During the inspection, the licensee conducted a walkdown of the Unit 1 fire water system to verify if the valves were in their correct positions. This walkdown was conducted in accordance with instructions provided in Surveillance Operating Instruction S01-12.3-18, Revision 18, "Fire System Valve Alignment and Functional Test." The inspector observed a Unit 1 operator conduct a walkdown of portions of the surveillance procedure. All system valves were in their correct positions as stipulated by the procedure.

The Unit 1 fire water piping was connected to common plant areas and buildings located just outside of the Unit 1 industrial area. The verification of the valve positions in these common areas was the responsibility of the emergency preparedness organization. The inspector confirmed that a walkdown of these common areas had been conducted within the last 31 days as stipulated in the applicable fire protection procedure. The surveillance of the common area valves was last conducted on January 7, 2004.

The inspector conducted a technical review of the surveillance procedure by comparing the procedure valve list with piping and instrument diagrams. The inspector noted that an applicable drawing displayed a valve that should have been included in the procedure. In response, the licensee claimed that this particular valve and associated piping had been permanently removed from service and that the drawing was in error. Unit 1 operators generated an action request to investigate why the piping and instrument diagram had not been updated although the valve and associated piping had been permanently removed from service.

2.3 Conclusions

Although the Unit 1 maintenance backlog was trending upwards, the inspector determined that the backlog was not significant.

The inspector observed the removal of a sump pump in containment. The ALARA pre-planning, health physics support, and personnel protection actions taken by the licensee were excellent. During the containment tour, a 55-gallon drum connected to a vacuum cleaner collapsed under excessive negative pressure. Although there were no injuries, the licensee issued an action request to investigate the incident and to propose corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The inspector observed the licensee conducting a surveillance of the fire water system valves. All valves were found to be in the correct positions to support system operability.

3 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (71801)

3.1 Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated whether the licensee and its contracted workforce were conducting decommissioning activities in accordance with license and regulatory requirements.

3.2 Observations and Findings

a. Site Tours/Control of Decommissioning Activities

The inspector conducted tours of the Unit 1 facility to observe radiological area postings, boundaries, and housekeeping. Access to the restricted and contaminated areas was controlled by radiation caution signs, barricades, boundary lines, locked doors, and gates. Radiological boundaries were well defined and postings were up-to-date in all areas. The inspector conducted radiological ambient gamma radiation surveys of the Unit 1 restricted areas using a Ludlum Model 2401-EC2 survey meter (NRC No. 016295G), in part, to confirm the accuracy of the restricted area postings. The radiation areas were properly posted with warning signs and barriers as appropriate.

At the time of the inspection, the areas or items remaining inside of containment with elevated radiation levels included the residual sludge in the sphere, reactor, and recirculation sumps, the liner in the reactor vessel annulus, the floor drains, and portions of containment walls.

b. Sphere Enclosure Building Cutting Project

During site tours, the inspector observed the licensee cutting portions of the concrete sphere enclosure building wall. The first block was cut, lifted, and lowered to the ground

on July 30, 2003. At the conclusion of the onsite inspection, the licensee had cut and removed 245 blocks from the wall. The work was being conducted in a controlled manner with extra safety precautions because of the safety hazards involved. The licensee used extra rigging to ensure that blocks would not fall during the cutting and lifting process.

The licensee originally planned to cut 338 blocks out of the wall. The licensee issued a design change to reduce the number of blocks to be cut with the diamond-wire saw assembly. The design change was made, in part, because the project was behind schedule and could negatively impact future fuel handling activities.

Following approval of the calculation revision, the number of blocks was reduced to 256. (In reality, the licensee will remove 251 blocks. Five blocks were removed in pairs with other blocks.) The inspector reviewed the revised calculation. The calculation included modeling of how the wall would react to an earthquake. The model concluded that the remaining wall material would not impact the safe storage of spent fuel pool. The remainder of the wall that was not cut with the diamond wire saw assembly will be demolished in the near future using an excavator.

c. Spent Fuel Pool Safety

The PDTS provide the safety limits, limiting conditions of operation, and surveillance requirements for the SFP. Plant tours, record reviews, and interviews with plant operators were conducted to verify if the SFP was being maintained in accordance with PDTS and procedural requirements. The records for November 2003 through January 2004 were reviewed during this inspection.

Safety Limit D2.1 specifies that the water level in the SFP shall be maintained above plant elevation 16 feet whenever fuel assemblies are stored in the SFP. Further, a water level limit of 40-foot, 3 inches was specified in plant procedures. The inspector reviewed operations logs and noted that the pool had been maintained between 40-foot, 7.5 inches and 40-foot, 10.5 inches, indicating that pool level had been maintained above both the PDTS and procedural limits.

On December 22, 2003, the Unit 1 control room received intermittent SFP low level alarms. An operator was dispatched to investigate the causes of the intermittent alarms. The operator observed that the water in the pool was oscillating back and forth in a wave-like fashion. The wave action was observed to dampen and pool level returned to normal. Later that day, the Unit 1 operators noted that an earthquake had occurred near San Simeon, California, some distance away from the plant. Although the earthquake was not intensive enough to activate the plant seismic monitors, the SFP wave action was attributed to the earthquake.

Table D3.1.3-1 of TS requires that both chloride and fluoride be maintained less than or equal to 0.15 parts per million. The pool was sampled monthly by the licensee. The sample results document that chloride and fluoride concentrations were less than 0.01 parts per million. The SFP was routinely sampled for other chemical constituents such as boron concentration, pH, conductivity, sulfate, tritium content, and gamma ray

activity. The records indicated that no parameter was outside of the ranges that were established in the applicable chemistry procedure.

The procedural limit for SFP temperature was 150 degrees Fahrenheit with a high temperature alarm setpoint of 125 degrees. The pool temperature varied between 64 and 73 degrees indicating that pool temperature remained well below the procedural limit.

A leak chase system monitors for leakage from the SFP liner. Procedures require pumping of the leak detection well whenever the water level in the well exceeds plant elevation 2.5 feet. The inspector reviewed the SFP liner leak detection records to ascertain whether leakage was increasing or decreasing. According to the licensee's records, the liner leak rate was 0.32-0.35 gallons per day since January 2003. The liner leak rate included condensation and groundwater in-leakage into the collection system. This leak rate has been relative constant in recent years.

3.3 Conclusions

Plant tours confirmed that the radiologically restricted area was adequately controlled. Postings, signs, and radiological boundaries were in compliance with regulatory requirements.

The licensee was still cutting concrete blocks from the sphere enclosure building wall, although the work was almost complete. The licensee was conducting the work in a safe and orderly manner. The licensee reduced the number of blocks being cut and documented its technical justification in a calculation revision.

The licensee was maintaining the SFP within PDTS and procedural requirements.

4 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials (86750)

4.1 Inspection Scope

The purposes of this portion of the inspection effort were to determine whether the licensee properly processed, packaged, stored, and shipped radioactive materials, and to determine whether transportation activities were being conducted in compliance with applicable NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations.

4.2 Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed the status of the shipment of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) package. In 2002, the licensee cut and removed the RPV internals which constituted greater than Class C waste. The RPV was then grouted to stabilize the remaining internals. The RPV was lifted out of the containment sphere on October 12, 2002, and placed directly into a cylinder-shaped shipping canister. The canister lid was

then welded shut and the annulus space between the inner wall of the canister and the outer wall of the RPV filled with grout to stabilize the RPV during shipment.

The RPV was calculated to contain 46,600 curies of total activity, primarily from the neutron activation products iron-55, cobalt-60, and nickel-63. Based on the definitions provided in 49 CFR 173.403, the RPV will be shipped as a low specific activity LSA-III package. Based on the sum of fractions rule specified in 10 CFR 61.55, the RPV was determined to be Class C waste. The most limiting radionuclide was nickel-63, followed by niobium-94. As such, the RPV can only be buried at a disposal facility that was specifically licensed to accept Class C waste. The licensee chose a state-licensed facility located near Barnwell, South Carolina, for permanent disposal of the RPV.

The licensee applied for a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) exemption for shipment of the RPV and requested several exemptions from DOT regulations. The DOT subsequently issued Exemption DOT-E 12871 to the licensee. The exemptions include shipping of the RPV as a non-specification package because the drop and stack tests could not be conducted. The DOT also waived the leach test. Revision 2 to the Exemption was issued on December 23, 2003, which extended the expiration date to November 30, 2004.

The DOT Exemption included training requirements for personnel who perform a function subject to this exemption. The inspector confirmed that the licensee conducted training sessions which included an overview of the RPV transport project, details of the exemption, and environmental considerations. The training was conducted during October 2003. The licensee planned to provide additional tailboard meetings just prior to movement of the RPV.

The DOT Exemption also referenced the radiological limitations. The inspector compared recent surveys conducted by the licensee with the DOT regulatory limits and licensee commitments. The surveys measured and documented the surface contamination levels and exposure rates. The inspector confirmed that the RPV's actual surface contamination and exposure rate levels were below the DOT requirements and licensee commitments.

The licensee had planned to begin transporting the RPV package on February 12, 2004. Immediately after the completion of the onsite inspection, the licensee publicly announced that it had indefinitely deferred the shipment of the RPV to South Carolina until further notice. The licensee is expected to announce a new shipment date at a later time.

4.3 Conclusions

The licensee had received an exemption from selected DOT requirements for shipment of the Unit 1 reactor vessel. The inspector confirmed that the surface contamination and exposure rate levels for the RPV package were below exemption requirements or licensee commitments, and training was provided to applicable personnel. Immediately after the conclusion of the onsite inspection, the licensee publicly announced that the RPV shipment had been indefinitely deferred.

5 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on January 29, 2003. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector.

ATTACHMENT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

36801	Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
62801	Maintenance and Surveillance at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
71801	Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
86750	Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

None.

Closed

None.

Discussed

None.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
DSAR	defueled safety analysis report
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
PDTS	permanently defueled technical specifications
RPV	reactor pressure vessel
SFP	spent fuel pool