

July 19, 2001

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, President  
Exelon Nuclear  
Exelon Generation Company, LLC  
4300 Winfield Road  
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION  
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-373/01-08(DRP); 50-374/01-08(DRP)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On June 30, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your LaSalle County Station. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on June 28, 2001, with Mr. Schiavoni and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination by the resident inspectors of activities conducted under your license as they relate to reactor safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

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Sincerely,

Original signed by  
Bruce Burgess, Chief

Bruce Burgess, Chief  
Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374  
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-373/01-08(DRP);  
50-374/01-08(DRP)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-373, 50-374  
License Nos: NPF-11, NPF-18

Report Nos: 50-373/01-08(DRP); 50-374/01-08(DRP)

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company

Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 2601 N. 21st Road  
Marseilles, IL 61341

Dates: May 20 through June 30, 2001

Inspectors: E. Duncan, Senior Resident Inspector  
G. Wilson, Resident Inspector  
K. Riemer, Project Engineer  
J. Yesinowski, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

Approved by: Bruce Burgess, Chief  
Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000373-01-08(DRP), IR 05000374-01-08(DRP), on 05/20-06/30/2001, Exelon, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2, Routine Resident Inspection.

This report covers a 6-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and a regional project engineer. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

**Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity**

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

## Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Both units operated at or near full power until May 27, 2001, when the Unit 2 reactor automatically shutdown after experiencing abnormally high main turbine bearing vibrations. The issue was resolved and the unit was restarted and synchronized to the grid on May 29. Both units operated at power for the remainder of the inspection period.

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

#### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity**

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 1 "B" Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system to verify system operability during modification activities which rendered the 1A RHRSW system inoperable. A review of system documentation was performed by the inspectors to determine correct system lineup. These documents included plant procedures, such as abnormal and emergency operating procedures, as well as plant drawings. Also, the inspectors verified critical portions of the redundant or backup system and identified any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the correct lineup.

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

##### .1 Fire Protection Walkdowns

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following risk significant areas to identify any fire protection degradations:

- Fire Zone 2I1: Unit 1 Reactor Building General Elevation 673'
- Fire Zone 2I2: Unit 1 Reactor Building 673' - High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Cubicle
- Fire Zone 2I3: Unit 1 Reactor Building 673' - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump "B" and "C" Cubicle
- Fire Zone 2I5: Unit 1 Reactor Building 673' - RHR Pump "A" Cubicle

During the inspection, the inspectors places emphasis on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition, operational lineup, and

operational effectiveness of the fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation.

In particular, the inspectors verified that all observed transient combustibles were being controlled in accordance with the licensee's administrative control procedures. In addition, the inspectors observed the physical condition of fire detection devices, such as overhead sprinklers, and verified that any observed deficiencies did not impact the operational effectiveness of the system. The physical condition of portable fire fighting equipment, such as portable fire extinguishers, was also observed and verified to be located appropriately, and that access to the extinguishers was unobstructed. The inspectors verified that fire hoses were installed at their designated locations and the physical condition of the hoses was satisfactory and access unobstructed. The physical condition of passive fire protection features such as fire doors, ventilation system fire dampers, fire barriers, fire zone penetration seals, and fire retardant structural steel coatings was inspected and verified to be properly installed and in good physical condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

On May 21, 2001, the inspectors observed the fire brigade respond to a simulated fire in Fire Zone 5C11 (Unit 2 Turbine Building Elevation 710') to evaluate the readiness of licensee personnel to prevent and fight fires. Aspects of the response which were reviewed by the inspectors included the following:

- Proper use of self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Proper use of protective clothing.
- Verification that fire hoses were capable of reaching all necessary fire hazard locations, that the lines were laid out without flow constrictions, the hoses were simulated as charged with water, and the nozzle patterns were tested prior to entering the fire area of concern.
- Entry into the fire area in a controlled manner.
- Sufficient fire fighting equipment available at the scene by the fire brigade to properly perform fire fighting duties.
- Fire brigade leader communications effectiveness.
- Radio communications effectiveness.
- Effective smoke removal operations.
- Use of pre-planned fire fighting strategies.
- Adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario and success in meeting drill objectives.



b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee implementation of the maintenance rule requirements, including a review of scoping, goal-setting, and performance monitoring, short-term and long-term corrective actions, and current equipment performance status. The systems selected for inspection were all classified as risk significant by the licensee's maintenance rule program. The following systems were evaluated:

- Containment Monitoring System - Function CM-11: Containment Air Monitoring System (CAMS) Particulate and Gaseous Radiation Monitors
- Containment Monitoring System - Functions CM-1 through CM-10: Post-LOCA [Loss-of-Coolant-Accident] Monitoring, Drywell Monitoring, Primary Containment Isolation, and Suppression Pool Monitoring
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System

Function CM-11 of the Containment Monitoring System was selected based upon performance problems associated with the particulate and gaseous radiation monitors and maintenance rule (a)(1) classification. Functions CM-1 through CM-10 of the Containment Monitoring System were selected based upon the importance of the information the systems provide during and after an accident. The RCIC system was selected based upon its contribution to Core Damage Frequency (CDF).

The inspectors independently verified the licensee's implementation of maintenance rule requirements for these systems by verifying that these systems were properly scoped within the maintenance rule; that all failed structures, systems, or components (SSCs) were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2); that performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) were appropriate; and that the goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1) were appropriate. The inspectors also verified that issues were identified at an appropriate threshold and entered in the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities and verified that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately

managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments and verified that the licensee's planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of online risk were adequate. The inspectors also verified that licensee actions to address increased online risk during these periods, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, were accomplished when online risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant SSCs. The following specific activities were reviewed:

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of May 21, 2001. This included work associated with the 2D Condensate Pump, the 1A Service Water Pump, and the Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment System. The inspectors also reviewed planned surveillance activities to ensure that they did not adversely impact the availability of the respective systems.
- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of June 11, 2001. This included planned maintenance activities associated with the 2A Control Rod Drive Pump, and emergent work on the "B" Main Control Room Ventilation System. The inspectors also reviewed planned surveillance activities to ensure that they did not adversely impact the availability of the respective systems.
- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of June 25, 2001. This included planned maintenance activities associated with the Unit 2 Station Air Compressor and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator air compressor. The inspectors also reviewed planned surveillance activities to ensure that they did not adversely impact the availability of the respective systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)

.1 Unit 2 Startup From Forced Outage L2F32

a. Inspection Scope

On May 27, 2001, Unit 2 automatically shutdown after experiencing abnormally high main turbine bearing vibrations. The inspectors observed portions of the Unit 2 restart activities, including the approach to the point-of-adding-heat following criticality, startup and operation of the main turbine, synchronization of the main generator to the grid, and power ascension.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-374/01-01: Reactor Scram Due to Blown Fuse in Feedwater Control System During Maintenance.

On April 6, 2001, LaSalle Unit 2 automatically shutdown from 100 percent power due to a blown fuse in the feedwater control system. Some equipment performance problems were noted subsequent to the reactor scram. Following the scram, the motor-driven reactor feedwater pump feedwater regulating valve could not be initially opened which rendered the pump unavailable until operators manually re-aligned the system for use. After operators manually initiated the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for reactor vessel level control, the system operated in an unstable manner in the automatic mode until operators elected to manually operate the system. After restoring reactor water level, the RCIC pump was secured, however, the inboard and outboard RCIC injection check valves unexpectedly indicated open instead of closed. Due to the equipment performance problems which occurred, a special inspection was initiated in accordance with Inspection Procedure 93812, "Special Inspection." The results of that inspection are documented in NRC Special Inspection Report 50-374/01-09. The inspectors reviewed the subject LER. No new issues were identified. This LER is closed.

1R15 Operability Evaluation (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected Operability Evaluations (OEs) and Condition Reports (CRs) concerning degraded and non-conforming conditions affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity to ensure that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The following Operability Evaluations and Condition Reports were reviewed:

- CR L2001-02985 Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) Openings

This condition report identified that there were HVAC openings between the Turbine Building and the Auxiliary Building which provided a path for the propagation of High Energy Line Break (HELB) effluents from equipment qualification (EQ) harsh zones to EQ mild zones. The inspectors verified that there were no equipment operability concerns from the effects of radiation, humidity, and temperature due to the open flow paths in the HVAC openings.

- CR L2001-01689 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Operability

This condition report identified that there was a potential PCIS valve operability impact during periods when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 250 volt direct current (VDC) buses were cross-tied. The inspectors verified that there was adequate voltage available for the valves to perform their safety function and that no equipment operability concerns existed.

- OE 01-012 Inaccurate Decay Heat Curves

This operability evaluation identified that General Electric (GE) notified the GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group in Service Information Letter 636 that design and licensing basis analyses that used decay heat curves based upon the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979 Decay Heat Standard, may be affected by actinides and activation products not included in the original analysis, but which collectively may have an impact on the total decay heat time for long-term calculations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator challenges (OCs) to identify any potentially adverse impact on the function of mitigating systems or the ability to implement an abnormal or emergency operating procedure. The following items were reviewed:

- OC 323: Reactor Water Level Control System Problems

This operator challenge identified that Reactor Water Level Control System problems associated with Unit 2 had challenged operators. In particular, problems related to the turbine-driven reactor feedwater pumps had led to a number of plant transients, including a September 1999 Unit 2 scram. The inspectors verified that although the problems associated with the system had caused transients and, on at least one occasion, a plant scram, the function of accident mitigating systems and the ability to implement procedures to respond to the events had not been adversely impacted.

- OC 282/212: 1(2)PL15J and 1(2)PL75J Problems

This operator challenge identified that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 particulate and gaseous containment radiation monitors, 1(2)PL15J and 1(2)PL75J, were unreliable during normal operation. The inspectors verified that these monitors did not mitigate the consequences of an accident and were not referenced in LaSalle Abnormal Operating Procedures (LOAs). The inspectors also verified that although these monitors were referenced in LaSalle Emergency Operating Procedure (LGA) VQ-01, "Containment Vent," Revision 7, and LGA-VQ-03, "Primary Containment Purge," Revision 8, and that the function of the monitors was only to monitor radiation conditions in containment, if the monitors were not already isolated. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the function of accident mitigating systems and the ability to implement procedures to respond to the events had not been adversely impacted.

- OC 326/327: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Check Valve Indication

As discussed in NRC Special Inspection Report 50-374/01-09, the inboard and outboard RCIC injection check valves, 2E51-F066 and 2E51-F065, unexpectedly indicated open instead of closed after the Unit 2 RCIC pump was secured following a scram. In response to this issue, operators performed LaSalle Operating Procedure (LOP) RI-03,

“Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation and System Shutdown,” which restarted the RCIC system in an attempt to close the injection check valves. The problem, open indication of the injection check valves, had been observed during previous system operations and licensee personnel suspected the cause was due to a hydraulic locking effect. Following the performance of this activity, position indication for the outboard injection check valve, 2E51-F065, changed from open to closed. However, despite additional attempts to close 2E51-F066 via performance of LOP-RI-03, position indication for the inboard injection check valve, 2E51-F066, remained open. To address the open indication associated with 2E51-F066, licensee personnel entered the Unit 2 drywell and slightly rotated the 2E51-F066 position indicating rod, which resulted in a closed indication in the control room. Licensee personnel concluded that due to inherent design tolerances in the check valve, some “play” in the interface between the check valve shaft and the position indicating rod existed, which when removed, caused the closed indication limit switch to actuate.

As discussed above, licensee personnel utilized LOP-RI-03 to attempt to close the RCIC injection check valves which indicated open. The inspectors identified this as a potential operator workaround since it appeared that this condition may complicate the operation of plant equipment and was compensated for by operator action. The inspectors identified that the rotation of the position indicating rod associated with 2E51-F066 may also be an operator workaround. The inspectors discussed both of these issues with licensee personnel who indicated that both conditions were known historical problems which had not been evaluated as potential operator workarounds. At the end of the inspection, licensee personnel generated CR L2001-02148 to process both of these conditions as a potential operator workaround.

During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the impact of this operator workaround on the function of mitigating systems or the ability to implement an abnormal or emergency operating procedure. In particular, the inspectors verified that in the event that this problem recurred, licensee personnel would take actions to ensure that although normally energized valves would be de-energized and closed to satisfy Technical Specification requirements, that personnel would be stationed locally to ensure that a flowpath could be established to ensure that the system remained available.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

During post-maintenance testing observations, the inspectors verified that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed, and that the testing acceptance criteria was clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors also verified that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied;

and that the test data was complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors verified that the test equipment was removed, and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The inspectors reviewed work requests (WRs) and observed the following post-maintenance testing activities involving risk significant equipment:

- WR 990254432-03 Unit 1 Scram Insertion Times for Control Rod Drive Water Accumulator Replacement

The inspectors observed and reviewed the data from LaSalle Technical Surveillance (LTS) 1100-4, "Scram Insertion Times," performed on Unit 1 for the replacement of Control Rod Drive Water Accumulators. The review evaluated the surveillance acceptance criteria and the adequacy of the post-maintenance testing.

- WR 01323060-05 Unit 1 Turbine Control Valve (TCV) #3 Servo Replacement

The inspectors observed the performance and reviewed the data from the replacement of the Unit 2 #3 Turbine Control Valve Servo. The review evaluated the valve stroke and control loop surveillance acceptance criteria to verify the adequacy of the post-maintenance testing.

- WR 99188026-02 2A Control Rod Drive Pump Functional Test

The inspectors observed the performance of post-maintenance testing associated with the 2A Control Rod Drive pump which was placed out-of-service to address identified oil leakage and to replace a faulty run-time meter. The review evaluated the surveillance acceptance criteria and the adequacy of the post-maintenance testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment and verified that the SSCs selected were capable of performing their intended safety function and that the surveillance tests satisfied the requirements contained in Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and licensee procedures. During surveillance testing observations, the inspectors verified that the test was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria was clear. The inspectors also verified that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; the test data was complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure; and that the test equipment range and

accuracy was consistent with the application, and the calibration was current. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors verified that the test equipment was removed, and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The following surveillance testing activities were observed:

- LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS) RH-Q1: 2B RHR Service Water System Operability and Inservice Test

On May 22, 2001, the inspectors observed the performance of Attachment 2E of LOS-RH-Q1. The inspectors verified that the RHR service water pump flow and vibration readings were within surveillance and inservice testing acceptance criteria.

- LaSalle Instrument Surveillance (LIS) NR-211A: Unit 2, LPRM [Local Power Range Monitor] Flux Amplifier Gain Adjustments for APRM [Average Power Range Monitor] Channels

On May 24, 2001, the inspectors observed the performance of LIS-NR-211A. The inspectors verified that the APRM gain adjustment factors were within surveillance and testing acceptance criteria.

- LOS-RP-M5: Turbine Control Valve Surveillance

On May 30, 2001, the inspectors observed the performance of LOS-RP-M5 on Unit 2. The inspectors verified through a review and observation of the operations activity that the Turbine Control Valves operated properly and all associated alarms actuated in accordance with surveillance testing acceptance criteria.

- LOS-RI-Q5: Unit 2 RCIC System Pump Operability, Valve Inservice Tests in Conditions 1, 2, 3 and Cold Quick Start

On June 4, 2001, the inspectors observed the performance of LOS-RI-Q5 on the Unit 2 RCIC system. The inspectors verified that the RCIC system operated properly and pump flow and turbine speed were within the surveillance testing acceptance criteria. The inspectors also reviewed GE Service Information Letter (SIL) 336, "Surveillance Testing Recommendations for HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] and RCIC Systems," Revision 1, dated December 8, 1989, and verified that GE recommendations had been appropriately incorporated into the surveillance testing procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

###### **Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems**

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the reported 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2001 data for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system unavailability performance indicator. The inspectors utilized the performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 0.

The inspectors reviewed operator log entries for periods of HPCS system unavailability. The inspectors verified that planned and unplanned unavailability hours were characterized correctly in determining performance indicator results. The inspectors verified performance indicator data through independent calculations. The inspectors reviewed operations surveillance testing procedures and instrument maintenance surveillance procedures associated with the HPCS system and verified that no unrecognized unavailability of the HPCS system during these surveillance testing activities existed.

The inspectors also verified that discrepancies identified by NRC inspectors and documented in Condition Report L2000-04891 and NRC Inspection Report 50-373/200013; 50-374/200013 during the previous review of this indicator had been corrected.

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### 4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

###### .1 Unit 2 Reactor Scram

###### a. Inspection Scope

On May 27, 2001, the Unit 2 reactor automatically shutdown after experiencing abnormally high vibration associated with main turbine bearing #1. The high bearing vibration occurred during the routine performance of LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS) RP-M5, "Turbine Control Valve Monthly Surveillance." The main turbine bearing #1 high vibration condition initiated an automatic trip of the main turbine, resulting in the Unit 2 automatic reactor shutdown. In response to the event, the inspectors observed plant parameters and status, including mitigating systems and fission product barriers; evaluated the performance of mitigating systems and licensee actions; and confirmed that the licensee properly reported the event as required by 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors determined that all systems responded to the event as



designed, the automatic shutdown was not complicated by material condition deficiencies associated with mitigation equipment, and that no human performance errors complicated the event response. Details of the event were communicated to the region-based risk analysts who determined that the event was of low risk-significance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Licensee Event Report 50-374/01-01: Reactor Scram Due to Blown Fuse in Feedwater Control System During Maintenance.

On April 6, 2001, LaSalle Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to a blown fuse in the feedwater control system. Details of this event are documented in NRC Special Inspection Report 50-374/01-07 and Section 1R14 of this report.

40A6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Schiavoni and other members of licensee management on June 28, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

### Exelon

D. Bost, Site Engineering Manager  
D. Enright, Operations Manager  
F. Gogliotti, Design Engineering Supervisor  
C. Pardee, Site Vice President  
J. Pollock, System Engineering Manager  
W. Riffer, Regulatory Assurance Manager  
M. Schiavoni, Station Manager

## ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

### Opened

None

### Closed

50-374/01-01                          LER    Scram Due to Blown Feedwater Fuse

### Discussed

None