April 10, 2006

Mr. Theodore Sullivan
Site Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Northeast
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 110
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2006002

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On March 31, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 6, 2006, with Mr. Kevin Mulligan and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene W. Cobey, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-333
License No.: DPR-59

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000333/2006002
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.:	50-333
License No.:	DPR-59
Report No.:	05000333/2006002
Licensee:	Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility:	James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:	268 Lake Road Scriba, New York 13093
Dates:	January 1 - March 31, 2006
Inspectors:	G. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector D. Dempsey, Resident Inspector D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved by:	Eugene W. Cobey, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000333/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Routine Integrated Report.

This report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an announced inspection by a senior emergency preparedness inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by Entergy, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy have been entered into the corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The James A. FitzPatrick plant began the inspection period at full rated thermal power (RTP) and operated at or near full power for the entire report period, except for a brief power reduction to 45 percent due to an accumulation of frazil ice at the plant intake structure on March 3.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample. On February 17, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions regarding the onset of sustained winds approaching 50 miles per hour. The inspectors verified that operators implemented actions and monitoring specified by Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) -13, "High Winds, Hurricanes and Tornadoes," toured risk significant areas including the screenwell and emergency diesel generator buildings, and reviewed the electrical system lineup. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 3 samples, 71111.04S - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdown. The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns, each constituting inspection program samples, to verify equipment alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could potentially increase risk, cause initiating events, or impact the system operability. The inspectors compared system lineups to system operating procedures (OPs), system drawings, and the applicable chapters in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors also verified the operability of critical system components by observing component material condition during the system walkdown and reviewing the maintenance history for each component. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

- Train A and B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and train B emergency service water (ESW) on January 18, while train A ESW was out of service for crescent area cooler preventive maintenance;
- The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system on February 7, while the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was out of service for planned maintenance; and

- Train A core spray (CS) system on February 21, while train B CS was out of service for preventive maintenance.

Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the 125 volt direct current (DC) distribution system to identify any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the required lineup. This walk down constituted one inspection sample. During the walkdown, system drawings and OPs were used to verify proper equipment alignment and operational status. The inspectors reviewed the open maintenance work requests (WRs) associated with the system for any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its function. Documentation associated with unresolved design issues such as temporary modifications (TMs), operator work-arounds, and items tracked by plant engineering were also reviewed to assess their collective impact on system operation. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 8 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly. The inspectors toured eight areas important to reactor safety to evaluate conditions related to Entergy's control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors used procedure ENN-DC-161, "Transient Combustible Program," in performing the inspection. The areas inspected constituting eight inspection program samples included:

- East cable tunnel;
- West cable tunnel;
- Crescent area, East;
- Crescent area, West;
- Battery room complex;
- Emergency diesel generator building;
- Screenwell building; and
- Motor-generator set room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample)

c. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed FitzPatrick's Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and the UFSAR concerning internal flooding events and completed walkdowns of the reactor building crescent areas where flooding could have a significant impact on plant risk. The inspectors verified the validity of assumptions made in the IPE regarding flooding scenarios, the control of equipment and procedures needed to comply with the IPE analysis, and Entergy's review of applicable industry operating experience. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the testing and evaluation results for the crescent area unit coolers performed during the weeks of January 16 and January 30, focusing on efforts to restore design flow to cooler 66UC-22K. Heat removal capability calculations were reviewed to verify that cooler performance was consistent with design calculations and the UFSAR.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On January 25, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training to assess operator performance during several scenarios. The inspectors evaluated the performance of risk significant operator actions, including the use of emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, the implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely control board operation and manipulation, and the oversight and direction provided by the shift manager. The inspectors also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the degree of similarity to the actual control room. This observation of operator simulator training constituted one inspection program sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: proper Maintenance Rule (MR) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; characterization of reliability issues; changing system and component unavailability; 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; identifying and addressing common cause failures, trending key parameters, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified (a)(2) as well as the adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed system health reports, maintenance backlogs, and MR basis documents. The following two maintenance rule samples were reviewed:

- Reactor building ventilation system; and
- Containment atmosphere monitoring system.

The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed risk assessments associated with five different work weeks during the inspection period, each constituting one inspection program sample. The inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed in accordance with AP-10.10, “On-line Risk Assessment;” that risk of scheduled work was managed through the use of compensatory actions and schedule adherence; and that applicable contingency plans were properly identified in the integrated work schedule.

The following work weeks and/or WRs were reviewed:

- The week of January 9, that included planned maintenance on west crescent area cooler 66UC-22E and preventive maintenance on hydraulic control unit 34-27 scram air valves;
- The week of February 6, during planned Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) maintenance on the RCIC system that included turbine inspection, valve, breaker, and inverter preventive maintenance, instrument and relay calibrations, and periodic rupture disk replacement;
- The week of February 13, that included emergent replacement of a rod select power switch;
- The week of January 30, that included replacement of master feedwater level controller 06LC-83; and

- The week of March 6, that included emergent replacement of negative phase sequence relay 71-46-1UPRN05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events (71111.14 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

For the non-routine event described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to determine if the response was in accordance with plant procedures. The inspectors observed operator actions in the control room and observed plant conditions in the screenwell.

On March 3, frazil ice formed on the intake bar racks which caused a lowering screenwell water level. Frazil ice forms under certain meteorological conditions and results in ice crystal formation on intake bar racks. The ice formation can restrict circulating water intake flow and lower the lake level measured in the screenwell. The inspectors observed that operators entered AOP-64, “Loss of Intake Water Level,” and carried out applicable portions of the procedure. Operators lowered reactor power to 45 percent and secured one circulating water pump. When conditions stabilized, the circulating water pump was restarted, and full reactor power was restored.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations to assess the acceptability of the evaluations; when applicable, the use and control of compensatory measures; and the compliance with TSs. The inspector’s review included a verification that the operability determinations were made as specified by ENN-OP-104, “Operability Determinations.” The technical adequacy of the determinations was reviewed and compared to the TSs, UFSAR, and associated design basis documents (DBDs). The following five evaluations were reviewed, and each constituted inspection program samples:

- CR-2006-00453, concerning environmentally qualified solenoid operated valves installed in the drywell beyond qualified life;
- CR-2006-00530, concerning inoperability of turbine building exhaust radiation monitors 17RM-431 and 17RM-432;
- CR-2006-00417, concerning accuracy of local power range monitor inputs to the average power range monitors;

- CR-2006-00979, concerning the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker isolation valve binding; and
- CR-2006-01149, concerning excessive leakage through main steam leakage collection system isolation valve 29MOV-200A.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether the effect of maintenance on plant systems was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon completion, the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the proper alignment necessary to perform its safety function. The following five post maintenance test activities were reviewed, and constitute inspection program samples.

- WRs JF-030170100 and JF-030495400, which involved cleaning and chemical flushing of west crescent cooler 66UC-22E and were conducted during the week of January 16. The retest was performed using ST-8Q, “Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST),” and ST-19I, “Crescent Area Unit Cooler Air Flow Verification Test.”
- WR JF-021048100, which involved RCIC system preventive maintenance during the week of February 6. The retest was performed using MST-013.01, “RCIC Turbine Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test and Adjustment,” ST-24D, “RCIC Automatic Isolation Logic System Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test,” ST-24R, “RCIC Turbine Slow Roll Test (Mode 1),” ST-24E, “RCIC Logic System Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test,” and ST-24J, “RCIC Flow Rate and Inservice Test (IST).”
- WR JF-0524100, which involved replacement of the “B” standby gas treatment system fan rotating element and bearings and was conducted during the week of January 30. The retest verified proper air flow, vibration, and bearing temperatures.
- Engineering Request (ER)-JAF-06-12734, which involved modification of the sample points of turbine building ventilation radiation monitors 17RM-431 and 17RM-432 and was conducted during the week of February 27. The retest verified correct sample flows and monitor readings.
- WRs JAF-06-14764 and JAF-06-14989, which involved troubleshooting and repair of main steam leakage collection system (MSLCS) isolation valves 29MOV-202A and 29MOV-200A, respectively and were conducted during the week of

March 20. The retest consisted of satisfactory performance of ST-1M, "MSLCS Valve Exercise (IST)," and diagnostic testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures (STs) and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied TSs, UFSAR, Technical Requirements Manual, and Entergy procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon ST completion, the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the status specified to perform its safety function. Seven STs were reviewed, and constitute inspection program samples:

- ST-2AL, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST);"
- ISP-16, "Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flow Loop Functional Test/Calibration," and IMP-22.11, "Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Flow Loop Functional Test/Calibration;"
- ST-6HA, "Standby Liquid Control A Side Quarterly Operability Test (IST);"
- ST-18A, "Technical Support Center Ventilation Operability Test;"
- ST-8G, "Intake Deicing Heaters Feeder Ammeters Test;"
- ISP-7-2, "Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) Shear Valve Explosive Actuating Cartridge Test/Replacement (IST);" and
- ST-1M, "MSLCS Valve Exercise (IST)."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two temporary plant modification (TM) samples. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for the TM; that the installation was consistent with the modification documentation; that the drawings and procedures were updated as applicable; and that the post-installation testing was adequate. The following samples were reviewed:

- JAF-TA-05-047, "Condenser Bay Envelope Free-Air Opening Reduction; Gates & Turbine Deck Floor Openings;" and

- JAF-TA-06-010, “Removal of Manual Actuator Coupling Block From 27AOV–101A, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker.”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing (71114.02 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

An onsite review was conducted to assess maintenance and testing of Entergy’s alert and notification system (ANS). The inspector observed and interviewed a county staff member conducting a communication test of the siren system. The inspector also interviewed another county staff member regarding the tracking and distribution of tone alert radios within the emergency planning zone. Condition reports pertaining to the tone alert radios were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The inspector interviewed Entergy personnel responsible for their portion of the ANS program. The inspector noted that Constellation Energy at Nine Mile Point plant assumes a majority of the responsibility for the siren portion of the ANS. Therefore, the inspector did not review CRs associated with the sirens during this inspection. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation (71114.03 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

A review of Entergy’s FitzPatrick ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying the ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and for timely facility activation. Records from call-in drills and one recent mustering drill were reviewed. The inspector reviewed procedures and CRs associated with the ERO notification system and drills. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the training records for a sample of ERO members. The inspector also verified that the EP department staff was receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria. This review constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

Prior to this inspection, the NRC had received and acknowledged the changes made to the FitzPatrick Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. These changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), which Entergy had determined did not result in a decrease in effectiveness of the plan and concluded that the changes continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. During this inspection and during an in-office review conducted on January 27, 2005, the inspector conducted a sampling review of the changes that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness. This review does not constitute an approval of the changes and, as such, the changes are subject to future NRC inspection. The associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews for the changes were sampled by the inspector. Also, the NRC reviewed Entergy's emergency action level (EAL) scheme for logic and consistency. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 4. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria. This review constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports to assess Entergy's ability to evaluate its performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs initiated at FitzPatrick from drills, self-assessments, and audits. The review was conducted to evaluate the significance of the issues, to determine if repeat problems were occurring, and to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. A list of the CRs reviewed are contained in the Attachment to this report. This inspection was conducted according to NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 05. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria. This review constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed simulator activities associated with the licensed operator requalification training graded scenario on January 25, 2006. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notification activities were properly completed as required by IAP-2, "Classification of Emergency Conditions." This observation constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 - 1 sample)

Routine PI&R Program Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into Entergy's corrective action program. The review was accomplished by accessing Entergy's computerized database for CRs and attending CR screening meetings.

In accordance with the baseline inspection modules, the inspectors selected corrective action program items across the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones for additional follow-up and review. The inspectors assessed Entergy's threshold for problem identification, the adequacy of the cause analyses, extent of condition review, and operability determinations, and the timeliness of the specified corrective actions. The CRs reviewed are noted in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153 - 1 sample)

(Closed) LER 05000333/2005006-00, Inoperable 115 kV Line in Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Out of Service Time

Between November 29 and December 19, 2005, 115 kV offsite power line 4 was inoperable due to an undetected failure of a bus bar connector. The condition exceeded the seven-day allow outage time specified by TS 3.8.1 for one offsite power source out of service. The violation occurred because Entergy did not have an effective means of

monitoring the condition of the line. This event and NRC enforcement aspects of this violation are documented in section 1R13 of inspection report 05000333/2005006. Entergy entered the event into its corrective action program as CR-2005-05289. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On April 6, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin Mulligan and other members of Entergy management. Entergy acknowledged that no proprietary information was involved.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

- Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 requires that if an open reactor-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker is not closed within 72 hours the plant be placed in the cold shutdown condition within the next 48 hours. Contrary to this, from February 23 to March 6, 2006, reactor-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker 27AOV-101A was closed and the plant was not placed in the cold shutdown condition. The vacuum breaker was not in the full closed position although it indicated closed in the control room. The problem was identified in Entergy's corrective action program as CR-2006-00979. This finding is of very low safety significance because it does not represent an open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Entergy Personnel

T. Sullivan, Vice President, Operations
S. Bono, VP Engineering
D. Wallace, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
K. Mulligan, General Manager, Plant Operations
N. Avrakotos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
J. Costedio, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
M. Durr, Manager, System Engineering
J. Gerety, Manager, Design Engineering
D. Johnson, Manager, Operations
J. LaPlante, Manager, Security
A. McKeen, Manager, Radiation Protection

J. Pechacek, Manager, Programs and Components Engineering
M. Jacobs, Manager, Training
W. Rheaume, Manager, CA&A
B. Sholler, Manager, Plant Maintenance
D. Wallace, Director of Safety Assurance

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

Closed

05000333/2005006-00	LER	Inoperable 115 kV Line in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

ARP-09-6-2-23, “Service Water Pump Strainer Differential Pressure High”
ST-9R, “Emergency Diesel Generator System Quick-Start Operability Test”

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

OP-22, “Diesel Generator Emergency Power
OP-21, “Emergency Service Water (ESW)”
OP-15, “High Pressure Coolant Injection”

OP-14, “Core Spray System”
FM-46B, “Flow Diagram Emergency Service Water System 46 & 15"
OP-43A, “125 Volt DC Power System”
OP-43B, “24 Volt DC Power System”
OP-43C, “LPCI Independent Power Supply System”

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Pre-Fire Plans

PFP-PWR01 - Fire Area/Zone II/CT-2
PFP-PWR02 - Fire Area/Zone IC/CT-1
PFP-PWR14 - Fire Area/Zone XVII/RB-1E
PFP-PWR15 - Fire Area/Zone XVIII/RB-1W
PFP-PWR04 - Fire Area/Zone III/BR-1, BR-2; IV/BR-3, BR-4, BR-5
PFP-PWR31 - Fire Area/Zone V/EG-1, EG-2, EG-3
PFP-PWR33 - Fire Area/Zone IB/FP-1, FP-3; XII/SP-1, SP-2
PFP-PWR23 - Fire Area/Zone IA/MG-1

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

JAF-RPT-MULTI-02107, “IPE Update, Appendix H, Internal Flooding Analysis”
MP-088.01, “Load Handling”
Calculation 0090-00066-C-003, “JAF NPP Fire Suppression Effects Analysis”
DBD-076, Tab VIII, “Plant Drains System”
ST-50, “Floor Drains Flow Test
CR-OEN-2005-00193, Response to NRC Information Notice 2005-011, “Internal Flooding/Spray-Down of Safety-Related Equipment Due to Unsealed Equipment Hatch Floor Plugs and/or Blocked Floor Drains”

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

ST-8Q, “Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST)”
ST-19I, “ Crescent Area Unit Cooler Air Flow Verification Test”

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

JENG-APL-02-013, “Reactor Building Ventilation System Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan
JAF-RPT-RBC-02295, “Maintenance Rule Basis Document for System 066 Reactor Building Ventilation System”
JAF-RPT-CAD-02312, “Primary Containment Atmosphere Control and Dilution System 027"
DBD-027, “Design Basis Document for The Air Treatment Systems”

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control

OP2A, “Feedwater System”

Section 1R14: Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events

JAF-SE-05-002, “Safety evaluation revising the design and licensing basis of intake bar heaters”
MST-071.17, “Intake Deicing Heaters Rated Power Surveillance Test”
JAF-CALC-CWS-00384, “Determine Acceptance Criteria Operational Limits for Intake Deicing Heaters”
JAF-CALC-CWS-02604, “Intake De-icing Heater Minimum Circuit Ground Resistance and Minimum Total Required Feeder Amps”
ST-8G, “Intake Deicing Heaters Feeder Ammeters Test”
RT-04.05, “Ice Potential Determination”
AOP-64, “Loss of Intake Water Level”
11825-FC-43B, “Intake Structure General Arrangement”
11825-FE-53A, “Conduit Plan and Details - Screenwell Intake Tunnel”
11825-FC-443E, “Intake Structure - Heater Bar Rack and Miscellaneous Detail”

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

FM-29A, “Flow Diagram, Main Steam System 29"
AOP-39, “Loss of Coolant”
ST-1M, “MSLCS Valve Exercise (IST)”
WR JAF-05-30653 concerning valve 29MOV200A seat leakage
QDR-35.03, “Qualification Documentation Report - ASCO/Model NP-1 Series Solenoid Valves”

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

JAF-CALC-RCIC-04222, “RCIC Flow Instrument Loop Uncertainty Analysis”

Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing

Wyle Research Report WR-82-26, Qualification of the Oswego County Prompt Notification System for Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plants (August 1982)
Wyle Research Report WR-84-22, Evaluation of the Oswego County Prompt Notification System (June 1984)

Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing

March 16, 2004 CAN Test
May 11, 2004 CAN Test
August 9, 2004 CAN Test
November 15, 2004 CAN Test
April 11, 2005 CAN Test
July 19, 2005 CAN Test
October 25, 2005 CAN Test
January 30, 2006 CAN Test

November 4, 2005 Muster Drill
TR-4.05, "Emergency Response Training"
SAP-7, "Quarterly Surveillance Procedure for On-Call Employees"
SAP-20, "Emergency Plan Assignments"
ERO Qualifications
ERO Qualification Matrix
ERO Qualification Matrix (Forecast)

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level Revision Review

EN-EP-305, "Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program"
10 CFR 50. 54(q) Reviews:
IAP-2, "Classification of Emergency Conditions"
EAP-16.2, "Joint News Center Operation"
EAP-17, "Emergency Organization Staffing"
SAP-3, "Emergency Communications Testing"
EPlan Section 2, "Scope and Applicability"
EPlan Section 4, "Emergency Conditions"
EPlan Section 5, "Organization"
EPlan Section 6, "Emergency Measures"
EAL Category 1.4, "Other Radiation Monitors"
Emergency Plan, Section 4, "Emergency Conditions"
IAP-2, "Classification of Emergency Conditions"
EAP-4.1, "Release Rate Determination"
EAP-16.2, "Joint News Center Operation"
EAP-17, "Emergency Organization Staffing"
SAP-3, "Emergency Communications Testing"

Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

QA-7-2004-JAF-1, "Emergency Preparedness Program Audit"
QA-7-2005-JAF-1, Emergency Preparedness Program Audit"
Learning Organization Condition Report LO-JAF-2005-00061
JAF-LO-2005-00116, "Snapshot Assessment of JAF Eplan-related Activities at the NYS EOC"
Snapshot assessment on adequacy of available number of SCBAs to support the JAF fire protection program and the emergency plan
LO-JAFLO-2005-0013, "JAF Benchmarking Report: Emergency Repair Team Dispatch"

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Condition Reports

2003-02176	2004-01401	2005-00210
2004-04364	2004-05188	2005-00212
2004-04437	2004-02564	2005-00693
2004-05510	2004-02751	2005-01809

2005-04359	2005-04795	2005-00498
2005-01439	2005-04796	2005-02464
2005-03010	2005-04797	2006-00744
2005-03025	2005-04798	2006-00746
2005-04369	2005-04800	2006-00530
2005-04378	2005-04802	2006-01149
2005-04500	2005-04804	2006-01153
2005-04504	2005-04807	2006-01137
2005-04505	2005-04810	2006-01138
2005-04506	2005-04811	2006-01237
2005-04507	2005-04812	2006-01036
2005-04508	2005-04814	2006-00306
2005-04509	2005-04815	2006-00841
2005-03479	2005-04816	2006-00246
2005-04714	2005-04817	2006-00816
2005-04751	2005-04818	2006-00712
2005-04794	2005-04048	
2006-00584	2006-01030	2006-00161
2006-00543	2006-00085	2006-00107
2006-00643	2006-00329	2006-00184
2006-00417	2006-00298	2006-00178
2006-01293	2006-00273	
2006-01054		

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOP	abnormal operating procedure
ANS	alert and notification system
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	condition report
CS	core spray
DBD	design basis document
DC	direct current
EAL	emergency action level
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EOP	emergency operating procedure
EP	emergency preparedness
ER	engineering request
ERO	emergency response organization
ESW	emergency service water
HPCI	high pressure coolant injection
IP	inspection procedure

IPE	individual plant examination
IST	inservice test
LCO	limiting condition for operation
LER	licensee event report
MOV	motor-operated valve
MR	maintenance rule
MSLCS	main steam leakage collection system
MST	maintenance surveillance test
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OP	operating procedure
PI&R	problem identification and resolution
RCIC	reactor core isolation cooling
RHR	residual heat removal
SSC	structure, system, and component
ST	surveillance test procedure
TIP	traversing incore probe
TM	temporary modification
TS	technical specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report
WR	work request