



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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April 25, 2002

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-348/01-06 and 50-364/01-06

Dear Mr. Morey:

On March 30, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings discussed on March 29, 2002, with Mr. Don Grissette and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license relating to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects, Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection
Report 50-348/01-06 and 50-364/01-06

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

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cc w/encl:

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Nos.: 50-348/01-06 and 50-364/01-06

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2

Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95
Columbia, AL 36319

Dates: December 30, 2001 to March 30, 2002

Inspectors: T. Johnson, Sr. Resident Inspector (SRI)
R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector (RI)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects, Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/01-06, IR 05000364/01-06, on 12/30/2001 - 3/30/2002, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine resident report.

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low significance identified by the licensee have been reviewed by an inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) during the period, except for brief periods during scheduled testing and maintenance.

Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except for a planned power reduction to 15% RTP on January 18-19, for maintenance and testing.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of procedure FNP-0-AP-21.0, Severe Weather, and procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.12, Cold Weather Contingencies, to determine if required compensatory measures for equipment affected by cold weather were satisfactorily completed. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of Electrical Maintenance procedure (EMP) FNP-1(2)-EMP-1383.01, Freeze Protection Inspections, which checked the units' freeze protection circuit thermostats. The inspectors walked down safety-related, risk significant, and fire protection equipment to verify adequate cold weather protection measures were taken for the following:

- Unit 1 & 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and associated instrumentation
- Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Water Storage Tanks
- Fire Protection Tanks and associated pump house
- Unit 1 & 2 Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitors
- Unit 1 Circulating Water Structure
- Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Transmitters
- Unit 1 & 2 Steam Generator pressure transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walk Down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk downs to verify the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service. The walk downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk downs included reviewing the Updated Final Safety

Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings listed in the attachment, and checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation.

- Unit 1 A train Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling, Purification, and Makeup Systems
- Unit 1 A train electrical distribution

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walk Down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete system walk down to verify that the Unit 1 and 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) systems were properly aligned in accordance with procedure FNP-1(2)-SOP-23, CCW System. The walk down include a review of plant normal operating and abnormal/emergency operating procedures, drawings, design documents, vendor manuals listed in the attachment, the UFSAR, and checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power, support equipment, and instrumentation. In addition, open maintenance work orders, outstanding design issues, operator work arounds, temporary modifications, hangers and supports, general area housekeeping and material conditions, and related condition report documents were reviewed to verify the design and alignment of the CCW system was not adversely impacted.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walk down of six fire areas located in the auxiliary building (AB) to verify the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. To verify implementation, the inspectors also checked that compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. The requirements were described in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection, FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame, FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches. The fire areas checked included the following:

- 1(2)-034, AB electrical penetration room
- 1(2)-035, AB electrical penetration room
- 1(2)-001, AB Radiation Control Area (RCA) side
- 1(2)-019, AB electrical switchgear room

- 1(2)-006, AB Non-RCA side
- 1(2)-023, AB electrical switchgear room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedure FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensee's simulator for a steam generator leak, fuel failure and offsite radioactive release, and a stuck open safety relief valve. The inspectors assessed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight against the performance standards of the licensee's scenario and applicable emergency operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule coordinator, and operations personnel. The following conditions were evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria, and FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual:

- CR 2001002688, Unit 1 Pressurizer (PZR) Power Operated Relief Valve air leak
- CR 2001003163, Unit 1 PZR level transmitter failure
- CR 2001003141, Unit 1 Steam Generator Water Level Control (SGWLC) steam flow 7300 card failure
- CR 2001002979, Unit 1 1A & 1C Feedwater Regulating Valves oscillations (1 outstanding Question)
- CR 2001003097, Unit 1 Seal injection Containment Isolation Valve failure
- CR 2001002975, Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump Inoperability

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors routinely assessed planned licensee activities against the requirements in procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group. The inspectors used the Maintenance Rule risk assessment guidance in 10CFR50.65 a(4) as an acceptance criteria. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's planning and control of the following work activities and assessed if the licensee had adequately identified and resolved risk challenges for emergent work:

- 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) overhaul
- 1B RHR outage
- 2A Charging pump
- High voltage switch yard work concurrent with main steam valve room inspections
- 1C Charging Pump seal replacement
- 2A CCW pump outage
- Unit 1TDAFW uninterruptable power supply (UPS) capacitor

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed a Unit 2 secondary plant transient resulting from a loss of power to a portion of the digital electro-hydraulic control system computer on March 25. No reduction of unit power occurred, and a number of automatic control systems were affected. The inspectors assessed the licensee's use of system operating procedures, annunciator procedures, manual in field actions, and communication. Observations were compared to the requirements specified in licensee procedures listed in Attachment 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluations to assess the technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. Inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions. The licensee's evaluations were compared to the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination (OD), for the following:

- OD-01-10, Atmospheric Relief Valve Radiation Monitor R60A spiking
- 1C Charging pump seal leakage
- 1C EDG jacket water low temperature
- 1B EDG control power alarm failure
- Steam Generator level inaccuracies (Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) No.02-5)
- Main steam support cracking (CR2002000364)
- OD-02-01, TDAFW UPS capacitor operability

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work-arounds to assess if system functional capability or human performance were affected. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds on the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures, the potential to increase an initiating event frequency, and the potential to affect multiple mitigating systems. Additionally, the prioritization and actions required to address the operator work-arounds as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds, were evaluated for the following samples:

- Unit 1 letdown temperature control valve (TK144) in manual
- River Water system degradation
- 1C EDG jacket water low temperature
- 1B cold leg accumulator back leakage
- 2A Reactor Coolant system cold leg temperature monitor failure
- Unit 2 CCW FCV-3009B remote operation failure
- TDAFW UPS periodic checks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following systems were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability:

- 2A CCW pump after a preventive maintenance outage
- 1B RHR pump after a preventive maintenance outage
- 1B EDG after a routine overhaul and preventive maintenance outage
- Unit 1 TDAFW pump after a corrective and preventive maintenance outage
- 2B EDG after a routine overhaul and preventive maintenance outage
- 1-2A EDG after a routine overhaul and preventive maintenance outage
- 1A Charging pump after a preventive maintenance outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records to determine if the test adequately demonstrated equipment operability. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements, and FNP-0-AP-16, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Surveillance tests either reviewed or witnessed included the following:

- FNP-1-ETP-112, SGWLC Test
- FNP-1-STP-22.19, AFW Flow Path Verification
- FNP-1(2)-STP-11.2, 1B (2B) RHR Inservice Tests
- FNP-2-STP-62, Main turbine Valves Operability Test
- FNP-2-STP-24.22, 2B Service Water Booster Pump Inservice Test
- FNP-2-STP-80.6, 2B EDG 24 Hour Test
- FNP-0-STP-80.6, 1-2A EDG 24 Hour Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following open temporary modifications and minor departures (MD), and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation and the licensee's temporary modifications procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The inspectors reviewed implementation, configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for these temporary modifications:

- MD-01-2689, Replacement of the Service Water B Train Strainer D/P Root Valve
- MD-01-2693, Addition of a Steel Plate over the Unit 1 Vacuum Hogger Exhaust Pipe
- MD-01-2694, Addition of Stiffeners to the Unit 1 Main Generator Lead Box
- MD-01-2687, Turbine Building Main Steam Line Vibration Restraints

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed emergency drills on February 25 and 26 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments. The drills included activation of all emergency response facilities, including the alternate Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF). The inspectors used procedures FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, and FNP-0-EIP-27.1, Alternate EOF Setup and Activation, as the inspection criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data and the Technical Specifications (TS) to verify the accuracy of the fourth quarter of 2001 PI data submitted by the licensee for both units' unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours, scrams with a loss of normal decay heat removal, and unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours. The inspectors reviewed portions of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operator Logs for 2001, the daily morning reports (including the daily Condition Report (CR) descriptions), the monthly operating reports, Licensee Event Reports (LER), NRC Inspection Reports, and several Limiting Conditions for Operation. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a routine review of the licensee's corrective action program, including the effectiveness of problem identification, root cause analysis, and corrective actions. The inspectors verified that equipment, human performance, and program issues were being addressed as required by procedures FNP-0-AP-7, Corrective Action Reporting, FNP-0-AP-22, Nonconformance Control / Deficiency Reporting, FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing of condition Reports, Plant Event Reports and Licensee Event Reports, FNP-ACP-9.0, Root Cause Program, and FNP-0-ACP-9.1, Root Cause. The following issues were reviewed:

- CR 2001002568, Security equipment failures and associated Root Cause Report.
- CR 2001002778, Control rod slow insertion time in the dashpot region and associated Root Cause Report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. These CR evaluations were thorough and appropriately determined the root causes. Corrective actions taken or planned were effective and appropriately addressed the related causal factors.

40A3 Event Follow-up(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/2001-003, B Train Loss of Off-Site Power (LOSP) Sequencer Failed to Sequence Loads During Surveillance Test

This event occurred on October 29, 2001, during LOSP sequencer testing. The licensee determined that the LOSP sequencer function had been inoperable since the previous LOSP sequencer test on August 2, 2000. There were no inspector identified findings of significance. A licensee identified violation is discussed in Section 40A7. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR 2001002756.

40A6 Meetings.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Don Grissette, Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management on March 29, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) - Annual Assessment Meeting

On March 27, 2002, the NRC Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief and the Senior Resident Inspector assigned to FNP met with SNC, to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the NRC's annual assessment of FNP safety performance for the period of April 1, 2001 - December 31, 2001. This meeting was open to the public. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the FNP assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included FNP site management, members of site staff, members of the local news media and members of the public.

Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML020600179. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

40A7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violations (NCVs). If the licensee denies these NCVs, they should provide a response with the basis of their denials, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

<u>NCV Tracking Number</u>	<u>Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet</u>
NCV 50-348/01-06-01	<p>On October 29, 2001, the licensee identified that the Unit 1 B train automatic load sequencer did not respond to a LOSP test signal. This failure resulted in a loss of the automatic function to start safety related loads on the 1B emergency electrical bus during a LOSP. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1c requires that each emergency bus/electrical train have an operable automatic load sequencer. TS 3.8.1 action G requires restoration in 12 hours or be shut down if the sequencer has not been returned to service. Contrary to this requirement, the Unit 1 B train automatic load sequencer was inoperable from August 2, 2000 until October 29, 2001. This violation is of very low safety significance (Green) because the ability to manually start safety related loads was available and detailed procedures existed which would direct operators to start plant equipment. This issue was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001002756 (Section 4OA3.1).</p>
NCV 50-348/01-06-02	<p>On December 13, 2002, the licensee identified that the Unit 1 1B Service Water (SW) pump breaker was racked out to a disconnect position, but the breaker was not seismically qualified in this condition. This condition also affected the adjacent 1A and 1C SW pump breakers. Therefore, the Unit 1 train A SW system was considered inoperable while the 1B SW pump breaker was in the non-seismically qualified position. FNP-0-SOP-36.6 states that an ESF 4160 V bus 1L breaker cannot be left in the disconnect position unless the seismic modification has been implemented on both the breaker and cubicle. Contrary to this requirement, the Unit 1, 1B SW pump breaker was left in the disconnect position causing the Unit 1 A train SW system to be inoperable from December 12, 2002 until December 13, 2002. This violation is of very low safety significance (Green) because only the Unit 1 A train was affected and it was for a short duration (approximately 24 hours). This issue was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001003071.</p>

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-348/01-06-01	NCV	Unit 1 B Train LOSP Load Sequencer Inoperable
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50-348/01-06-02	NCV	Unit 1 1B Service Water (SW) Pump Breaker in a Non-seismically Qualified Position
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Closed

50-348/2001-003	LER	B Train Loss of Off-Site Power (LOSP) Sequencer Failed to Sequence Loads During Surveillance Test
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50-348/01-06-01	NCV	Unit 1 B Train LOSP Load Sequencer Inoperable
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50-348/01-06-02	NCV	Unit 1 1B Service Water (SW) Pump Breaker in a Non-seismically Qualified Position
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Attachment: Supplemental Information

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. V. Badham, Administration Manager
C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager
R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager
C. D. Collins, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
K. C. Dyar, Security Manager
D. E. Grissette, Plant General Manager
J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager
B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager
C. D. Nesbitt, Training Recovery Manager
W. D. Oldfield, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Nuclear Support General Manager, Farley Project
R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
L. Williams, Training Manager
T. Youngblood, Operations Manager

NRC

S. J. Cahill, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 2

INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04

FNP-1(2)-SOP-23, CCW System
FNP-1(2)-SOP-54, SFP Cooling System
FNP-1(2)-SOP-7, RHR System
FNP-1(2)-SOP-36, 4160V AC Electrical Distribution System
FNP-1(2)-AOP-9, Loss of Train A or B CCW System
FNP-1(2)-AOP-5, Loss of Electrical Train A or B
FNP-1(2)-AOP-12, Loss of Train A or B RHR System

Section 1R14

FNP-1(2)-ARP-0001, MCB Annunciator Panel
FNP-1(2)-SOP-28.9, EH System