

March 22, 2006

Mr. M. Nazar  
Senior Vice President and  
Chief Nuclear Officer  
Indiana Michigan Power Company  
Nuclear Generation Group  
One Cook Place  
Bridgman, MI 49106

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2  
NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2006002(DRS); 05000316/2006002(DRS)

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On February 10, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 10, 2006, with Mr. D. Fadel and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

N. Nazar

-2-

NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Julio F. Lara, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316  
License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000315/2006002(DRS); 05000316/2006002(DRS)  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: J. Jensen, Site Vice President  
L. Weber, Plant Manager  
G. White, Michigan Public Service Commission  
L. Brandon, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality -  
Waste and Hazardous Materials Division  
Emergency Management Division  
MI Department of State Police  
D. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists

NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,  
**/RA/**  
Julio F. Lara, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316  
License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000315/2006002(DRS); 05000316/2006002(DRS)  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: J. Jensen, Site Vice President  
L. Weber, Plant Manager  
G. White, Michigan Public Service Commission  
L. Brandon, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality -  
Waste and Hazardous Materials Division  
Emergency Management Division  
MI Department of State Police  
D. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists

ADAMS Distribution:

JLD  
PST  
RidsNrrDirslrib  
GEG  
KGO  
BJK1  
CAA1  
C. Pederson  
DRPIII  
DRSIII  
PLB1  
JRK1  
[ROPreports@nrc.gov](mailto:ROPreports@nrc.gov)

DOCUMENT NAME:E:\Filenet\ML060830130.wpd

Publicly Available       Non-Publicly Available       Sensitive       Non-Sensitive

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE	RIII		RIII		RIII		RIII	
NAME	GHausman: Is		CLipa		JLara			
DATE	03/22/06		03/22/06		03/22/06			

**OFFICIAL RECORD COPY**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-315; 50-316

License Nos: DPR-58; DPR-74

Report No: 05000315/2006002(DRS); 05000316/2006002(DRS)

Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company

Facility: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Bridgman, MI

Dates: January 23, 2006 through February 10, 2006

Inspectors: G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead  
A. Klett, Reactor Inspector  
M. Munir, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Julio F. Lara, Chief  
Engineering Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000315/2006002(DRS), 05000316/2006002(DRS); 01/23/06 - 02/10/06; Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

### **A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings**

#### **Cornerstone: Initiating Events**

No findings of significance were identified.

#### **Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems**

No findings of significance were identified.

### **B. Licensee-Identified Violations**

No findings of significance were identified.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

#### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems**

##### 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

The purpose of this inspection was to review the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power (CNP) Plant's Fire Protection Program (FPP) for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection (FP) features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors used the CNP Plant's Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) to choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire zones chosen for review during this inspection were:

<u>Fire Zones</u>	<u>Description</u>
• 18	CD Diesel Generator Room
• 19	AB Diesel Generator Room
• 45	ESS & MCC Room
• 46A	EPS Transformer Room
• 46B	EPS Control Rod Drive Room
• 46C	EPS Motor Control Room (CR)
• 46D	EPS AB Battery Room
• 47A	4kV AB Switchgear Room
• 47B	4kV CD Switchgear Room
• 58	CR Cable Vault

For each of these fire zones, the inspection focused on the FP features, the systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, determination of license commitments, and changes to the FPP.

##### .1 Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required the licensee to provide FP features that were capable of limiting fire damage to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safe shutdown. The SSCs that were necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown were required to be protected by FP features that were capable of limiting fire damage to the SSCs so that:

- one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the CR or emergency control station(s) was free of fire damage; and

- systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the CR or emergency control station(s) could be repaired within 72-hours.

Specific design features for ensuring this capability were specified by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire zone selected for review. Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. This review included the FP Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA).

The inspectors also reviewed the operators' ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the actions.

The inspectors reviewed the CNP Plant's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the licensee's engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, technical specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and deviations) to determine the licensing basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, required separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3 hour rating. If the requirements cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration should be provided in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3.

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis (SSCA) and Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis (SSSA) to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of a fire. This included a review of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions and make the necessary repairs to reach cold shutdown within 72-hours. The inspectors also reviewed procedures to verify that adequate direction was provided to operators to perform these manual actions. Factors, such as timing, access to the equipment, and the availability of procedures, were considered in the review.

The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems, fire area barriers, penetration seals, and fire doors to ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment was free of fire damage. To accomplish this, the inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems, fire barriers, and construction details and supporting fire tests for the installed fire barriers. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings, carbon dioxide pre-operational test reports, smoke removal plans, fire hazard analysis reports, safe shutdown analyses, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes to verify that the fire barrier installations met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that SSCs important to safe shutdown be provided with FP features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of fire damage. Options for providing this level of FP were delineated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where the protection of systems whose function was required for hot shutdown did not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, was required to be provided that was independent of the cables, systems, and components in the area. For such areas, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3, specifically required the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to be physically and electrically independent of the specific fire areas and capable of accommodating post-fire conditions where offsite power was available and where offsite power was not available for 72-hours.

a. Inspection Scope

On a sample basis, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of separation provided for the power and control cabling of redundant trains of shutdown equipment. This investigation focused on the cabling of selected components in systems important for safe shutdown. The inspectors' review also included a sampling of components whose inadvertent operation due to fire may adversely affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. The purpose of this review was to determine if a single exposure fire, in one of the fire areas selected for this inspection, could prevent the proper operation of both safe shutdown trains.

The inspectors evaluated selected portions of licensee's fuse/breaker coordination analysis for ground faults on the 4160 Volt alternating current (Vac) and 480Vac systems and the vital low-voltage ac and direct current (dc) power sources to determine whether



fire-induced faults on distribution system cables or buses could degrade post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically, the inspectors determined if selective coordination existed between branch circuit protective devices and the upstream distribution panel fuse/breaker feeders to ensure that in the event of a fire-induced short circuit, the fault would be isolated before the upstream feeder fuse/breaker tripped.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Alternative Safe Shutdown Capability

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that SSCs important to safe shutdown be provided with FP features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of fire damage. Options for providing this level of FP were delineated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where the protection of systems whose function was required for hot shutdown did not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the area under consideration was required to be provided. Additionally, alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be able to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions and achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72-hours and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the post-fire safe shutdown, the reactor coolant process variables must remain within those predicted for a loss of normal alternating current power, and the fission product boundary integrity must not be affected (i.e., no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary).

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capability

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.2.d, required that the process monitoring function should be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the functions necessary to achieve reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, and decay heat removal.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the actions defined in procedure 02-OHP-4025-001-001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown," and other procedures which were referenced by procedure 02-OHP-4025-001-001. Procedure 02-OHP-4025-001-001 was the procedure for performing a plant alternative shutdown from outside the CR. The inspectors reviewed the ability of operators to perform procedure actions within applicable plant shutdown time requirements. The inspectors also focused on the feasibility of the actions described in the procedure.

The inspectors' reviews of the adequacy of communications and emergency lighting associated with these procedures are documented in Sections 1R05.6 and 1R05.7 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Communications

For a fire in an alternative shutdown fire area, CR evacuation may be required and a shutdown is performed from outside the CR. Radio communications are relied upon to coordinate the shutdown of both units and for fire fighting and security operations. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.H., required that equipment provided for the fire brigade include emergency communications equipment.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Emergency Lighting

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J., required that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of areas in which a sample of the actions would be performed as described in procedure 02-OHP-4025-001-001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown," and other procedures which were referenced by procedure

02-OHP-4025-001-001. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Cold Shutdown Repairs

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.5, required that equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems should be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72-hours. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available onsite and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine if any repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown. The inspectors determined that the licensee did require repair of some equipment to reach cold shutdown based on the safe shutdown methods used. The inspectors reviewed the procedures for adequacy. The inspectors also reviewed completed surveillances of the tools and equipment needed to reach cold shutdown.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Fire Barriers and Fire Zone/Room Penetration Seals

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.M, required that penetration seal designs be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test reports for three-hour rated barriers installed in the plant and performed visual inspections of selected barriers to ensure that the barrier installations were consistent with the tested configuration. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the fire loading for selected areas to ensure that existing barriers would not be challenged by a potential fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Fire Protection Systems, Features, and Equipment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the material condition, operations lineup, operational effectiveness, and design of fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, manual fire fighting equipment, fire brigade capability, and passive FP features. The inspectors reviewed deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings, carbon dioxide system pre-operational test reports, and fire hazard analysis reports to ensure that selected fire detection systems, sprinkler systems, portable fire extinguishers, and hose stations were installed in accordance with their design, and that their design was adequate given the current equipment layout and plant configuration.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that adequate compensatory measures were put in place by the licensee for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable FP and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features. The inspectors also reviewed the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to FP at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, work orders, design packages, and FP system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A5 Other Activities

(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000315/2003005-04; 05000316/2003005-04:  
Fire Spread Rating and Thickness Requirements for Epoxy Floor Coating

A URI was opened during the 2003 triennial FP inspection regarding the fire spread rating and thickness requirements for the epoxy floor coating used at the plant. The URI was opened pending NRC receipt and review of the licensee's evaluation and testing of the epoxy flooring's flame spread characteristics. Specifically, the inspectors were concerned that the epoxy floor coating that was applied over the cement flooring in various plant areas may have been a combustible that was not accounted for in the licensee's FPP.

During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities associated with the testing and evaluation of the epoxy floor coating. The results of the test reports indicated that the epoxy floor coating was a combustible material. As a result, the licensee conducted additional testing to identify the caloric heat content of the epoxy floor coating. The tests were conducted for several epoxy floor coating thicknesses (i.e., 0.035, 0.115 and 0.250-inches), which represented an application of a primer, second coat and topcoat. Of the three thicknesses, the licensee stated that the 0.115-inch was the most likely thickness used at the plant. The licensee stated that as a conservative measure the 0.250-inch thickness, which represented a caloric heat content value of 7,665 British thermal units per square foot (Btu/sq ft), was selected to assess the fire loading in their fire hazard evaluation. The results of the licensee's fire hazard evaluation indicated that the additional combustible loading due to the epoxy floor coating produced no impact on the fire load classifications in the FHA. Therefore, the licensee concluded that there was a negligible increase in hazard due to the epoxy floor coating and that sufficient margin existed for maintaining combustible loading/fire severity within the established allowable limits.

The inspectors reviewed the fire zone classification for those fire zones that contained the epoxy floor coating to verify that the areas did not rely on a 20-foot horizontal separation distance in order to meet Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requirements. All fire zones were classified as meeting the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.1 (Fire Zones 15, 16, 17D-G, 18 & 19) or Appendix R, Section III.G.3 (Fire Zones 4, 17A-C, 41, 42A, 42D, 45, 46A, 46D, 55, 60, 83, 88, 95, 100, 110, 111 & 127), except Fire Zone 29G, which was classified as Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Fire Zone 29G had cables wrapped in accordance with Appendix R, Section III.G.2(c), which does not include the requirement for "no intervening combustible or fire hazards" as required for Appendix R, Section III.G.2(b). Therefore, the combustible load represented by the epoxy floor coating did not impact Appendix R, Section III.G.2(c) compliance. The inspectors concluded that the fire zones that contained the epoxy floor coating did not rely on a 20-foot horizontal separation distance in order to meet Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requirements nor could cause a fire to spread from one fire area to another.

The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the licensee's corrective actions, or with the licensee's resolution of the inspectors' issue. Therefore, no performance deficiency or violation was identified and this URI is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting

On February 10, 2006, at the conclusion of the on-site inspection activities, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Fadel and other members of licensee management. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

No interim exits were conducted.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### Licensee

D. Fadel, Vice President Engineering  
R. Jervey, Regulatory Affairs  
D. MacDougall, FP Design Engineer  
A. Robertson, Operations Assistant Manager  
R. Gray, FP Program Owner  
R. Crane, Regulatory Affairs  
P. Schoepf, Design Modification Engineer  
J. Gebbie, PLE, Acting Director

#### NRC

B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector

## LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

### Opened

None.

### Closed

05000315/2003005-004;  
05000316/2003005-004

URI Fire Spread Rating and Thickness Requirements for Epoxy  
Floor Covering (Section 4OA5)

### Discussed

None.



## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

### CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
12-E-N-PROT-RLY-001	4kV Elect Protection Coordination Study	0
12-EHP-2270-SSA-004	App R SSD Cable & Assoc Circuit Analysis	1
2-E-N-ELCP-250-001	U2 250Vdc Coordination Study	0
PS-EPCS-001	Elect Protection Coordination Study	August 14, 1993
SSCA	SSD Capability Assessment	12
SSSA	SSD Sys Analysis	8
TE 11.15	GL 86-10 Technical Eval 11.14	3
TE 12.7	SSD MA Feasibility Study	4

### CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (CRs) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
06012079	NRC Identified Concern with Presence of & Potentially Degraded Asbestos Cables in U1 & U2 MCR Cable Vault	January 12, 2006
06012087	Inconsistencies Between SSSA Rev 8 & SSCA Rev 12	January 12, 2006
06025021	For FZ 18 & 19 FHA Table 3-2 Shows Fire Severity Limit as <i>MODERATE</i> --FHA Table 3-3 Shows Limit as <i>HIGH</i>	January 25, 2006
06027010	NRC Question U2 MCR Cable Vault Entry w/o Hard Hats	January 26, 2006
06039008	SSSA Compliance Assessment Summary Discrepancy	February 8, 2006
06040016	Correct Errors in NFPA Code Deviation Documentation	February 8, 2006
06041009	High MR Functional Failure Criteria for App R & EBLs	February 10, 2006

### CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (CRs) ISSUED PRIOR TO INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
02313012	Control Transformer Inside Breaker Cubicle Smoked	November 9, 2002
03085009	During the 2003 FPTI It Was Noted by One of the NRC	March 25, 2003
03092067	Document DC Cook Epoxy Coating Program Controls	April 2, 2003
03093033	Lack of Documentation for CO <sub>2</sub> Concentration Tests	April 3, 2003
03275031	Thermistor Strings Partially Painted Over	September 1, 2004
03316038	The Timeline to Recover Post-fire RCS Makeup	November 11, 2003
04210061	Epoxy Coating Flame Test Exceed Regulatory Guidelines	September 7, 2005
04284058	Calculation PS-600V Has Gap in Methodology	October 10, 2004
04341068	Failed App R BATLITS	December 6, 2004
05230065	Ineffective Corrective Action Assoc with Removal Plan	August 18, 2005
05241024	Large Adverse Trend of eSAT's Written on BATLITS	August 29, 2005
05297034	Over-Dutied 600V Molded Case & 4kV SWGR Breakers	2005

**CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (CRs) ISSUED PRIOR TO INSPECTION**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
06003036	Track NFPA 805 Transition Process Issues That Arise	January 3, 2006
06022013	1-OHP-4025-LTI-2-1 Step 9.a Requires Breaker	January 22, 2006
06022014	EBL 1-BATLIT-95 Aim	January 22, 2006
P-00-05014	2-TBP-BS-1B Has Smoked Control Power Transformer	March 31, 2000

**DRAWINGS**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
1-MS-I-013	S/G 1 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 2, 1993
1-MS-I-014	S/G 2 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 2, 1993
1-MS-I-015	S/G 3 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 2, 1993
1-MS-I-016	S/G 4 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 2, 1993
1-PP-50E	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
1-PP-50W	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
1-RCS-I-004	PZR H <sub>2</sub> O Level Indicator App R Loop WD	July 29, 1993
1-RCS-I-007	Source Range Monitoring App R Loop WD	October 8, 1993
1-RCS-I-011A	RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 30, 1993
1-SSS06	S/Gs 2 & 3 Process Monitoring SSD Logic Diagram	0
1-SSS07	S/Gs 1 & 4 Process Monitoring SSD Logic Diagram	0
2-2069-56	ESS Circuits Power & Control Cable Schedule	56
2-2072-36	ESS Circuits Power & Conduit & Cable Schedule	36
2-2089-41	Miscellaneous Conduits Conduit & Cable Schedule	41
2-5623-2	Local SD Indication Cabinets	2
2-5623A-3	Local SD Indication Cabinets	3
2-ICM-305	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-ICM-306	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-IMO-910	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-IMO-911	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-IMO-210	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-IMO-220	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-MS-I-013	S/G 1 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	June 29, 1993
2-MS-I-014	S/G 2 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	June 30, 1993
2-MS-I-015	S/G 3 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	June 30, 1993
2-MS-I-016	S/G 4 Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	June 30, 1993
2-QMO-200	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QMO-201	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QMO-225	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	1
2-QMO-451	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QMO-452	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QRV-111	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QRV-112	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QRV-113	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QRV-114	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-QRV-161	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0

## DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2-QRV-251	SSD Component Cable Fault Analysis	0
2-RCS-I-004	PZR H <sub>2</sub> O Level Indicator App R Loop WD	July 13, 1993
2-RCS-I-007	Source Range Monitoring App R Loop WD	October 4, 1993
2-RCS-I-011A	RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 29, 1993
2-RCS-I-011B	RCS Wide Range Pressure Indicator App R Loop WD	July 30, 1993
2-SSS04	CVCS SSD Logic Diagram	0
2-SSS06	S/Gs 2 & 3 Process Monitoring SSD Logic Diagram	0
2-SSS07	S/Gs 1 & 4 Process Monitoring SSD Logic Diagram	0
12-5267-10	Fire Facilities Basement Plan EL 591'-0" & EL 587'-0"	10
12-5268-8	Fire Facilities Mezzanine Floor EL 609'-0"	8
12-5974-8	FHA Mezzanine Floor EL 609'-0" U1 & U2	8
12-5975-4	FHA Plan EL 601'-0", 609'-0", 620'-6" to 625'-10"	4
12-5976-8	FHA Turbine Building Main Floor EL 633'-0"	8
12-5980-4	FHA Sections D-D, E-E & F-F U1 & U2	4
OP-2-5129-47	Flow Diagram CVCS Reactor Letdown & Charging	47
OP-2-12062-12	DC AUX One-Line 250Vdc Bus AB ESS (Train B)	12
OP-2-12073-18	DC AUX One-Line 250Vdc Bus CD ESS (Train A)	18
OP-2-985612-2	Charging Header Excess Letdown & RHR Valve	2
OP-2-98991-23	FP Detection Sys Elementary Diagram	23
OP-2-98592-4	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Indicators ED	4
PS-2-92376-6	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Sub-PNLS WD	6
PS-2-92390-5	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Cabinet-LSI-4 WD	5
PS-2-92400-4	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Cabs LSI-5 & LSI-6 WD	4
PS-2-92558-3	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Cab LSI-5XX WD	3
PS-2-92559-3	Emerg Plant SD & CD Local Cab LSI-6XX WD	3
R1-985422-0	RCS Wide Range Temp Recorder Loop 2 & 4 App R	March 24, 1997
R1-985831-0	S/Gs 1 & 2 Wide Range Level Indication App R	March 24, 1997
R1-985832-0	S/Gs 3 & 4 Wide Range Level Indication App R	March 24, 1997
R2-985422-0	RCS Wide Range Temp Recorder Loop 2 & 4 App R	March 24, 1997
R2-985831-0	S/Gs 1 & 2 Wide Range Level Indication App R	March 24, 1997
R2-985832-0	S/Gs 3 & 4 Wide Range Level Indication App R	March 24, 1997

## IMPAIRMENT/REMOVAL PERMITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
05129095	Electric Fire Pump	June 22, 2005
05243088	U2 4kV Zone 9 Detector 9-1-E	September 1, 2005
R0255109-01	East Diesel Fire Pump	August 5, 2005

## MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2-DCP-4364	EBL Addition/Update for U2	0

## PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1-2-EDS-619-0	EDS Approved Damaged Cable Repair	0

## PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
02-OHP-4025-R-1	Restore PZR Heaters	1
02-OHP-4025-001-001	Emerg Remote Shutdown	5
12-OHP-4025-001-002	Fire Response Guidelines	1

## REFERENCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
-----	CNP FPP Project Plan for Transition to NFPA 805	January 13, 2006
-----	CNP App R MA Habitability Eval LOV Sys	1
-----	ELTG-00-350 Action 15 Response (Memo)	April 13, 2000
-----	Fire Pre-Plans	2
-----	Genesis Solution Suite ® Report: Penetration Seals W9963, W9962, W9259, & W9384	February 7, 2006
-----	Low Pressure CO <sub>2</sub> Sys Field Test Report	November 7, 1977
-----	NFPA Code Deviations & Justifications	1
ES-FIRE-0601-QCF	Specification for Fire Rated Seals	October, 2, 2004
FPPM	FPP Manual	9
N90060	Eval IMPC Response to Post-Fire SSD Methodology	April 26, 1990
NFPA-12-1968	STD for CO <sub>2</sub> Fire Extinguishing Agent	1968
NFPA-12A-1977	STD for Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Agent	1977
NFPA-14-1971	STD for the Installation of Standpipe & Hose Sys	1971
NFPA 72E-1974	STD on Automatic Fire Detectors	1974
PA-05-08	FPP Performance Assurance Audit	October 5, 2005
UFSAR	Chapter 9.8.1 FP Sys	20

## SURVEILLANCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
02-OHP-5030-APR-001	App R Toolbox & Ladder Inventory	December 11, 2005
12-EHP-4030-ATR-224	CR Cable Vault Halon FP Sys Test	June 17, 2003
12-IHP-5030-EMP-010	EBL Units	10
12-PPP-4030-066-007	CR Cable Vault Halon Tank Surveillance	September 27, 2005
12-THP-4030-STP.224	CR Cable Vault Halon FP Sys Surveillance Test	August 2, 1985
PM Task EL 010	Elect PM Task Sheet App R Elect Emerg Equip	6

## VENDOR DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
VTD-EXID-0001	Exide Lightguard Installation & Operating Instructions for Model B200 Emerg Lighting Unit	0
VTD-EXID-0006	Exide Lightguard Installation & Operating Instructions for Model L100 Emerg Lighting Unit	1

## WORK REQUESTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR-H-21	Perform App-R BATLIT Discharge Test	January 14, 2003
AR-M-21	Perform App-R BATLIT Discharge Test	October 6, 2003

### LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AC or ac	Alternating Current
ADAMS	Agency-Wide Document Access and Management System
App	Appendix
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CD	Cooldown
CNP	Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power
CR	Control Room
DC or dc	Direct Current
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EBL	Emergency Battery Light
ED	Elementary Diagram
EDS	Electrical Design Standard
ESS	Engineered Safety System
FP	Fire Protection
FPP	Fire Protection Program
GL	Generic Letter
FZ	Fire Zone
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
IPEEE	Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR	Inspection Report
k	kilo
MCC	Motor Control Center
MCR	Main Control Room
MR	Maintenance Rule
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NUREG	NRC Technical Report Designation
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PM	Preventive Maintenance
S/G	Steam Generator
SD	Shutdown
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SER	Safety Evaluation Report
SSA	Safe Shutdown Analysis
SSCA	Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment
SSCs	Structures, Systems, and Components
SSD	Safe Shutdown
SSSA	Safe Shutdown System Analysis
SWGR	Switchgear
Sys	System
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI	Unresolved Item
V	Volt