

July 7, 2000

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley
President, Nuclear Generation Group
Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Regulatory Services
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500
Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: BYRON - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-454/2000010(DRS);
50-455/2000010(DRS)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On June 16, 2000, the NRC completed a routine inspection at your Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The results were discussed on June 16, 2000, with Mr. Levis and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to radiation safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on occupational radiation safety, the radiological controls implemented for access to radiologically significant areas, and the calibration, operability, and testing of radiation monitoring instrumentation.

Based on the results of this inspection, one issue was identified concerning the failure to adequately post a high radiation area. This issue was evaluated under the risk significance determination process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The issue has been entered into your corrective action program and is discussed in the summary of findings and in the body of the attached inspection report. The issue was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements, but because of its very low safety significance, the violation is not cited. If you contest this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Byron facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the *Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS)*. *ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at* <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gary L. Shear, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455
License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-454/2000010(DRS);
50-455/2000010(DRS)

cc w/encl: D. Helwig, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services
C. Crane, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
H. Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
R. Krich, Vice President, Regulatory Services
DCD - Licensing
W. Levis, Site Vice President
R. Lopriore, Station Manager
B. Adams, Regulatory Assurance Manager
M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General
State Liaison Officer
State Liaison Officer, State of Wisconsin
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-454; 50-455

License Nos: NPF-37; NPF-66

Report Nos: 50-454/2000010(DRS); 50-455/2000010(DRS)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd)

Facility: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 4450 North German Church Road
Byron, IL 61010

Dates: June 12 - 16, 2000

Inspector: Steven K. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist

Approved by: Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Byron Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-454/2000010(DRS); 50-455/2000010(DRS)

The report covers a one week period of announced inspection by a regional senior radiation specialist. This inspection focused on occupational radiation safety. In particular, the inspector reviewed access controls to radiologically significant areas, which included a verification of radiological boundaries and postings. The inspection also included a review of the licensee's calibration, testing, and operability of radiation monitoring instrumentation and a review of its respiratory protection program. The significance of issues is determined by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

- Green. The inspector identified a noncited violation for the failure to post a high radiation area in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1902(b). Specifically, accessible areas of the 1A letdown heat exchanger room, having radiation levels exceeding 100 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters (from the surface of the heat exchanger), were not posted as a high radiation area. Instead, the licensee had placed a caution sign with the words "NO ENTRY" on a plexiglass partition, which limited access to the area. Although the area was not adequately posted, the inspector concluded that it was unlikely that an individual could have inadvertently entered the area and obtained an overexposure. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Section 20S1.1).

Report Details

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)

2OS1 Access Controls for Radiologically Significant Areas

.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiological Boundary Verifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed walkdowns of the radiologically controlled area (RCA) to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspector performed confirmatory radiation measurements in the Auxiliary and Radwaste Buildings to verify that radiologically significant work areas (high radiation areas (HRAs), radiation areas, and airborne radioactivity areas) were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's procedures.

b. Findings

The licensee failed to properly post an HRA within the Auxiliary Building. During plant walkdowns, the inspector entered the 1A letdown heat exchanger room on the 383' elevation of the Auxiliary Building, which was posted as a radiation area. However, just within entrance to the room, the licensee had placed a 4-foot plexiglass partition (portable wall) with a posting indicating "CAUTION, NO ENTRY." Since access to the area was limited by the plexiglass wall, the radiation protection staff indicated that routine surveys beyond the plexiglass wall were not performed. Although the structure would have encumbered an individual's entry into the main area of the room, the inspector noted that the structure was not sufficient to make the area inaccessible and, therefore, that the radiological postings required by 10 CFR Part 20 were applicable to the area. At the structure, the inspector measured radiation levels of about 30 to 35 millirem per hour. The licensee performed subsequent surveys beyond the plexiglass wall, measured radiation levels of about 110 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the surface of the heat exchanger, and posted the area as an HRA.

The failure to post an HRA with a conspicuous sign or signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words "CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA" or "DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA" is a violation of 10 CFR 20.1902(b). However, this violation is considered a Non-Cited Violation (50-454/2000010-01; 50-455/2000010-01), consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Identification Form (PIF) No. B2000-01677.

The inspector evaluated the risk significance of this issue using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (Appendix C to NRC Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process"). The failure to properly display the proper radiological posting resulted in a reduction in the barriers to prevent an unintended exposure and in a failure to alert workers of the potential radiological hazards present. However, the inspector noted that personnel entering the RCA were

required by radiation work permits to have electronic dosimetry, which would have provided an indication of an increased exposure in the area. In addition, the radiation protection staff stated that the "NO ENTRY" posting should have administratively limited access into the area. Based on these factors and the dose rates in the area, the inspector concluded that there was not a significant potential for an inadvertent entry that could have resulted in an overexposure. Therefore, the inadequate radiological posting was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

.1 Source Tests and Calibration of Radiological Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed calendar year 1999 and 2000 calibration records for the following radiological instrumentation:

- Ion Chambers;
- Underwater Survey Probes;
- Portal Contamination Monitors; and
- Whole Body Counters.

The inspector also reviewed the most recent calibrations for the following area radiation and continuous airborne monitors:

- Containment Building Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitors;
- Main Control Room Area Radiation Monitors;
- High Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors;
- Incore Seal Table Area Radiation Monitors;
- Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors; and
- Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's alarm setpoint justification documents for the area radiation monitors and verified that the setpoints were consistent with the licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, procedures, and plant conditions. The inspector also verified that selected alarm setpoints displayed by the control room console were consistent with the above documents.

The inspector observed source tests of tool monitors, portal contamination monitors, ion chambers, pancake Geiger-Mueller detectors, and the licensee's whole body screeners and observed calibrations of portable survey instruments and portal contamination monitors. In addition, the inspector reviewed quality control records for the post accident sampling system (PASS) and the comparison of both liquid and gaseous sample results with routinely collected samples.

b. Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.2 Respiratory Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the monthly testing records (January 2000 through June 2000) for self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) located in various areas within the site. The inspector also performed walkdowns of the locations and inspected a sample of the units to assess the material condition of the equipment. In addition, the inspector reviewed licensee qualification matrices and verified that applicable emergency response and control room personnel were currently trained and qualified in their use, as required by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the Emergency Plan.

b. Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.3 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's self assessments, audits, and PIFs (April 1999 - June 2000) concerning access controls, radiological instrumentation, internal exposures, and the respiratory protection program. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's resolution of a non-cited violation of NRC requirements concerning the respiratory protection program (Non-Cited Violation No. 50-454/99019-04 and 50-455/99019-04), which were documented in PIF No. B1999-03225. At the request of the NRC Region III office, the licensee also reviewed the effectiveness of its corrective actions in the respiratory protection program (PIF Nos. B1999-03225 and B2000-00374). The inspector reviewed these documents to assess the licensee's ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, and corrective actions which will achieve lasting results.

b. Findings

The inspector found that the licensee was effectively identifying performance issues and documenting those issues in its corrective action program. During the previous 12 months, no personnel contamination were identified which resulted in an internal exposure of greater than 100 millirem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE).

In reviewing the licensee's resolution to the above non-cited violation in the respiratory protection program, the inspector observed weaknesses in the licensee's corrective actions. During this inspection the inspector continued to identify some problems with the licensee's monthly inspections of SCBA storage areas. Based on discussions with the radiation protection staff and a review of additional records, the inspector concluded that the problems would not have effected the ability of the equipment to fulfill its function. Nonetheless, the radiation protection management staff acknowledged the continuing problems and indicated that additional attention to the monthly SCBA inspections was needed.

Following the non-cited violation documented by the NRC, the licensee's staff identified an additional lapse in SCBA fit testing for three personnel routinely assigned to fire brigade duties which occurred on January 29, 2000 (PIF No. B2000-00374). At the time of the event, the licensee verified that it had sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to form a fire brigade and that the identified individuals had not donned SCBAs.

Therefore, no violations of NRC requirements were identified. The radiation protection staff performed fit tests of the individuals on February 3 and February 4, 2000, which were successful. As a result of this additional problem, the licensee concluded that the corrective actions for PIF No. B1999-03225 were not sufficiently broad to prevent the additional, similar problem.

As requested by the NRC Region III office, the licensee performed an additional independent review of the resolution of PIF Nos. B1999-03225 and B2000-00374. During this review, the licensee identified that it had not implemented some of the assigned corrective actions for the more recent PIF (No. B2000-00374). Specifically, the licensee had not created administrative surveillances to ensure that certain policy guidance (Byron Site Policy Memo No. 200.12, "Fire Brigade Qualifications") was properly implemented. Despite these omissions, the licensee verified that no additional lapses in SCBA qualifications had occurred. As a result of these cumulative corrective action problems, the licensee initiated PIF No. B2000-01688 to determine why the corrective actions were not performed and to develop an appropriate course of action to prevent the recurrence of future respirator mask fit qualification deficiencies.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA5 Temporary Instruction 2515/144

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the data collection and reporting process for the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the licensee's definition of terms, procedures and instructions, and clarifying notes used by the licensee to ensure consistency with industry guidance document NEI [Nuclear Energy Institute] 99-02, Revision 0.

b. Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

4OA6 Management Meetings

The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Levis and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 16, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

B. Adams, Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Colglazier, Regulatory Assurance
A. Creamean, Radiation Protection Operations Supervisor
M. Ginzel, Dose Assessment Health Physicist
G. Heesaker, Nuclear Oversight
S. Kerr, Chemistry Supervisor
J. Kuczynski, Health Physicist Supervisor
W. Levis, Site Vice President
R. Lopriore, Station Manager
M. Roberts, Radiation Protection Supervisor
S. Robinson, REMP/ODCM Health Physicist
R. Tucker, Radiation Protection Supervisor
P. Vitalis, Instrument Coordinator

NRC

B. Kemker, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-454/2000010-01	NCV	Failure to post a high radiation area in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 (2OS1.1).
50-455/2000010-01		

Closed

50-454/2000010-01	NCV	Failure to post a high radiation area in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 (2OS1.1).
50-455/2000010-01		

Discussed

None.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CEDE	Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
HRA	High Radiation Area
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
OS	Occupational Radiation Safety
PASS	Post-Accident Sampling System
PERR	Public Electronic Reading Room
PIF	Problem Identification Form
RCA	Radiologically Controlled Area
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Audits and Assessments

1st Quater 2000 Self-Assessment Monthly Observation Summary.

Byron Station Radiological Protection Areas 3rd Quarter 1999, 4th quarter 1999, and 1st Quarter 2000.

Byron Station Radiological Protection 4th Quater Monthly Observations Summary.

Nuclear Oversight Assessment (NOA) No. NOA-06-99-008.

Self Assessment Report, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas for Byron Station," conducted June 7 and 8, 2000.

Miscellaneous

Attachment C to NSP-CC-3011 (Revision 1), "UFSAR/FPR Change Review Form," No. 7-235, dated February 4, 2000.

Attachment F to NSP-AA-4004 (Revision 4), "CARB Review and Approval Form for RCRs, TIRs, SACEs and Effectiveness Reviews," concerning PIF No. B1999-03225.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Dave Hoots, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated April 18, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Dave Hoots, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated June 14, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Stephen Kuczynski, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated April 18, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Stephen Kuczynski, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated June 14, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to William McNeill, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated April 18, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to William McNeill, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated June 14, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Terry Schuster, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated April 18, 2000.

Memorandum from Janice Kuczynski to Terry Schuster, "Expired Respiratory Qualifications and Others Coming Due," dated June 14, 2000.

Problem Identification Forms (PIFs) Nos.

B1999-00941, B1999-01039, B1999-01122, B1999-01800, B1999-03225, B1999-03761, B1999-04325, B2000-00556, B2000-00658, B2000-00819, B2000-01053, B2000-01152, B2000-01493, B2000-01630, B2000-01651, B2000-01663, B2000-01664, B2000-01677, B2000-01686, and B2000-01708.

Procedures Nos.

BCP 320-40 (Revision 3), "Obtaining a Diluted Reactor Coolant Sample for Operability;"
BCP 320-41 (Revision 1), "Obtaining an Undiluted Reactor Coolant Sample for Operability;"
BCP 400-T162 (Revision 0), "HRSS Operability Program Schedule;"
BRP 5510-13 (Revision 4), "Inspection and Use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus;"
BRP 5800-01 (Revision 8), "Use of Air Ionization Chambers and Geiger-Mueller Instruments
For Measuring Personnel Exposures;"
BRP 5800-03 (Revision 15), "Area Radiation Monitoring System Alert/High Alarm Setpoints;"
BRP 5800-06 (Revision 3), "Administrative Controls for Health Physics Instrumentation;"
BRP 5800-07 (Revision 8), "Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and Calibration;"
BRP 5822-07 (Revision 4), "Operation and Calibration of the IPM-7/IPM-8 Whole Body Frisking
Monitor;"
BRP 5822-10 (Revision 5), "Operation and Calibration of the PM-7 Portal Monitors;"
BRP 5822-11 (Revision 4), "Operation and Calibration of Nuclear Enterprises (SAM) -- Small
Articles Monitor;"
BRP 5823-39 (Revision 2), "Operation and Calibration of the Merlin Gerin AMP-100;"
BRP 5823-40 (Revision 1), "Operation and Calibration of Merlin Gerin Telepole;"
BRP 5825-03 (Revision 5), "Operation and Use of the J.L. Shepherd Model 89 Gamma
Calibration Range;" and
RS-AA-122-115 (Revision 1), "Performance Indicator -- Occupational Exposure Control
Effectiveness."

Surveillance and Testing Records

BCP 400-T103 (Revision 4), "HRSS Performance Check Worksheet," completed for the 1st and
2nd Quarters of 2000.

BIP 2500-135 (Revision 4), "Calibration of Particulate, Iodine and Gas (PIG) Process Radiation
Monitor (PR)," completed on July 23, 1999 (monitor 0PR-024).

BIP 2500-142 (Revision 3), "Calibration of Area Radiation Monitor (AR)," completed on April 1,
1999, (monitor 1AR-014); October 27, 1999, (monitor 2AR-014); and January 4, 2000, (Monitor
0AR-062).

BISR 3.3.2-207 (Revision 2), "Surveillance Calibration of High Range Containment Radiation
Monitor (AR)," completed on April 7, 1999, (monitors 1AR-020 and 1AR-021) and October 28,
1999, (monitors 2AR-020 and 2AR-021).

BISR 3.6.6-200 (Revision 2), "Surveillance Calibration of Containment Building Fuel Handling
Incident Radiation Monitor," completed on April 7, 1999, (monitors 1AR-011 and 1AR-012) and
October 30, 1999, (monitors 2AR-011 and 2RE-AR012).

BISR 4.15.4-200 (Revision 2), "Surveillance Calibration of Containment Atmosphere (PIGG)
Radiation Monitor," completed on March 17, 2000, (monitor 1PR11J) and March 29, 2000,
(Monitor 2PR-11J).

BRP 5510-13T1 (Revision 1), "Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Inspection," completed
January 13, 2000, through June 12, 2000.

BRP 5800-7T1 (Revision 6), "Calibration Record for Dose or Exposure Rate Survey Instruments," completed on June 13, 2000, for RSO-50E (Serial No. C250E); completed on June 3, 2000, and September 29, 1999, for RSO-50E (Serial No. B254Z); completed on April 9, 2000, and October 8, 1999, for RSO-50E (Serial No. B263Z); completed on August 26, 1999, and March 2, 1999, for RSO-50E (Serial No. B277K); and performed on August 26, 1999, and March 4, 1999, for RSO-50E (Serial No. B2774).

BRP 5822-07 (Revision 4), "Operation and Calibration of the IPM-7/IPM-8 Whole Body Frisking Monitor," calibrations of monitors 138, 187, and 241 (August 1999 through June 2000).

BRP 5822-10 (Revision 5), "Operation and Calibration of the PM-7 Portal Monitors," calibrations of monitors 144, 145, 146, 147, 173, 178, 179, 180, and 181 (during 1999 and 2000).

BRP 5823-39T1 (Revision 9), "MG AMP-100 -- or -- Telepole Source Check, Calibration Sheet," completed on June 13, 2000, (Serial No. 6696-089); on June 29, 1999, and November 19, 1998, (Serial No. 5095-024); on October 17, 1999, and July 16, 1998, (Serial No. 5095-011); on January 4, 2000, and July 8, 1999, (Serial No. 5095-008); and on January 5, 2000, and July 8, 1999, (Serial No. 5095-005).

Surveys Nos.

00-0436, 00-0437, 00-0708, 00-0716, 00-0979, 00-0980, 00-1132, and 00-1133.