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## Three Mile Island 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Jul 07, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Failure to Correct Deficiency in Implementing Controls for Pre-Staging of Material in the Reactor Building**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action Program," because Exelon did not effectively correct a condition adverse to quality regarding the implementation of controls for pre-staging of materials in the reactor building. Specifically, Exelon did not effectively implement corrective actions regarding the control of pre-staging materials in the reactor building during power operations, which resulted in unsecured prohibited material in a location that had the potential, during a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), to be transported to and impact the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) sump. Exelon documented this finding in issue reports 2608560 and 2578255. Corrective actions include Exelon to establish a focus team, led by the maintenance manager, to ensure pre-outage loading of the reactor building is conducted in accordance with requirements and directly supervised by Exelon personnel.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without proper controls implemented, materials may be pre-staged in the reactor building in a quantity or configuration that may render the ECCS sump inoperable. The inspectors evaluated the finding against the Mitigating System Cornerstone using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," Exhibit 2, and determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Field Presence, because Exelon senior managers did not ensure the oversight of work activities by supplemental personnel [H.2]. (Section 40A2)

Inspection Report# : 2017008 (*pdf*)

**Barrier Integrity**  
**Emergency Preparedness**  
**Occupational Radiation Safety**  
**Public Radiation Safety**  
**Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

**Miscellaneous**

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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