U.S.NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Protecting People and the Environment

Palisades – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Oct 25, 2017
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
1-2 Diesel Generator Trip During Maintenance Resulting in Additional Unavailability of the 1-2 Diesel Generator

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, ?Procedures?, was self-revealed on March 31, 2017, when the 1-2 Diesel Generator (DG) tripped during performance of the monthly TS surveillance procedure MO-7A-2, ?Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.? Specifically, during conduct of the monthly surveillance procedure, restoration activities associated with maintenance of breaker 152-213, 1-2 DG to Bus 1D, were being performed. When maintenance personnel closed the trip cutouts for the Z-phase of the 1-2 DG differential overcurrent relay, an unbalanced current flow into the differential relay resulted in relay actuation. This actuation resulted in a trip of the output breaker and subsequently the 1-2 DG. The trip caused a delay in the TS surveillance activities, and resulted in extended unavailability and inoperability of the 1-2 DG. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) CR-PLP-2017-01291. Corrective actions included retesting the 1-2 DG and updating the work instructions associated with the differential overcurrent relays to include caution statements that opening or closing trip cutouts for the relays while the output breakers from the DGs to the associated buses were closed could cause the differential relays to actuate.

The issue was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, ?Issue Screening,? because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Attribute of Procedure Quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to

initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, ?The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,? Exhibit 2, since the inspectors answered ?no? to all screening questions. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work management, for failing to identify and manage risk commensurate to the work

Inspection Report# : 2017003 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity
Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety
Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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