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## Oconee 3 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to comply with 10 CFR 55.49.**

A green NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, "Integrity of Examinations and Tests," was identified because the licensee engaged in an activity that compromised the integrity of examinations. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that current week simulator scenarios could not be predicted based on the previous week's simulator scenarios during the annual operating exams required by 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification." While inspecting the annual operating examination schedules for the required simulator examinations for 2016 and 2017, the inspectors identified that one of the two scenarios that were administered during a single week of the annual exam cycle could be predicted for administration the following week. The licensee did not implement any immediate corrective actions because the exams were completed and there was no evidence of compromise. The licensee documented the issue in nuclear condition report (NCR) 2114313.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, using predictable exam development and administration techniques adversely affected the integrity of the administration of the operating exams, which test licensed operator performance in order to ensure timely and correct mitigating actions during an event. Using the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no known compromise of the examinations occurred. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to ensure that adequate training procedures were available to meet industry standards and ensure that the potential for the compromise of regulatory examinations did

not exist. [H.1] (Section 1R11)  
Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Mar 24, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to identify and correct a broken cable trench cover.**

The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure to assure that a condition adverse to quality associated with a damaged trench cover on the "yellow" trench was identified and corrected. Specifically, the seismic design function of the trench cover was not identified or recognized at the time of the licensee's original identification of the issue and subsequent NCR generation, and, due to this error, appropriate corrective actions were not assigned or completed. In response to the issue, the licensee replaced the broken trench cover on the "yellow" trench with a temporary cover on March 22, 2017, and planned work order 20147282 to replace it with a permanent cover to restore the design configuration.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control Attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate identification and correction of this condition adverse to quality adversely impacted the trench cover's reliability and capability to perform its function during and following a seismic event. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. The team determined that the finding was indicative of current licensee performance, because the issue was first identified in January 2017. A cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process [H.13.] in the Human Performance Area was assigned because individuals did not use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. (Section 1R21.2.1.5)

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

**Barrier Integrity**

**Emergency Preparedness**

**Occupational Radiation Safety**

**Public Radiation Safety**

**Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

**Miscellaneous**

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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