U.S.NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Protecting People and the Environment

Indian Point 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 05, 2017
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Maintain B.5.b Mitigating Strategies

An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) and NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), ?Conditions of Licenses,? the Unit 2 FOL Condition 2.N, and the Unit 3 FOL Condition 2.AC was identified for failure to maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions. Specifically, Entergy failed to maintain the B.5.b strategies when the site?s Diesel Contingency Pump (B.5.b Pump), B5B-101-PMP, was declared non-functional and unavailable on March 20, 2017, due to a deficiency associated with the pump?s engine and failed to promptly restore the pump to a functional status or establish any compensatory measures. Entergy entered this issue into its CAP and promptly completed repairs B.5.b pump.

This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors (e.g., fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent core damage. The team evaluated the significance of the finding in accordance Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix L, ?B.5.b Significance Determination Process.? The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because, although the B.5.b Pump was considered unavailable, the team concluded that the pump was recoverable. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Resources (H.1), in the area of Human Performance, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear

safety. Specifically, procedural guidance and equipment were not available to operators to implement adequate compensatory measures when the B.5.b Pump became non-functional and unavailable.

Inspection Report# : 2017007 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Oct 27, 2017
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Component Misalignments Following Scheduled Maintenance

A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, ?Procedures,? with two examples was identified when Entergy failed to implement procedures to ensure correct system alignment for the nuclear instrumentation permissive interlock, P6, and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow transmitter, FI-1201. Entergy promptly corrected the alignment issues and entered them into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-IP2-2017-02193 for the P6 permissive interlock and CR-IP2-2017-02150 for the AFW flow transmitter.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affects the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, in both cases, the instrumentation was left disabled following maintenance such that they could not perform their safety functions required by TSs. Additionally, the first example was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, example 2.g, because Entergy changed plant modes from Mode 5 to Mode 2 without ensuring P6 was operable. The second example was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, examples 5.a and 5.b, because Entergy failed to return the AFW flow transmitter to service after the refueling outage. The inspectors assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Management, because both examples demonstrated a failure in the planning, control, and execution of work, and a lack of coordination between work groups to ensure quality. [H.5] (Section 4OA3)

Inspection Report# : 2017003 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity
Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety

Significance: G Jan 17, 2017
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: VIO Violation
Inadequate Control of Floor Drains to Minimize Groundwater Contamination
The inspectors identified an NOV of 10 CFR 20.1406(c), "Minimization of Contamination," for Entergy's failure to conduct operations to minimize the introduction of residual radioactivity into the subsurface of the site (groundwater). Specifically, Entergy did not maintain the floor drain systems clear of obstructions and interferences and did not verify

the ability of the floor drains to handle the volume and flowrates for draining activities being conducted. In January 2016, a spill caused by multiple floor drain obstructions resulted in the backup of contaminated water onto the floor of the 35-foot elevation of the primary auxiliary building (PAB) and the subfloor of the FSB and subsequent leakage to onsite groundwater. Entergy entered this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-00264, CR-IP2-2016-00266, and CR-IP2-2016-00564 with actions to characterize and evaluate the leak. Similarly, in June/July 2016, another event occurred due to an obstructed flow path through a floor drain in the FSB, which spilled to the subfloor and contaminated the onsite groundwater. This event was documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-05060.

The issue is more than minor because it is associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure Entergy's ability to prevent inadvertent release and/or loss of control of licensed material to an unrestricted area. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because Entergy had an issue involving radioactive material control but did not involve transportation or public exposure in excess of 0.005 Rem. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, in that effective corrective actions to address issues identified in two prior groundwater contamination events since 2014 were not implemented in a timely or effective manner, which could have prevented two additional groundwater contamination events that occurred in 2016.
Inspection Report# : 2016003 *(pdf)*

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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