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Hatch 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Nov 14, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Installation of Non-Conforming RPS Equipment

- Green. An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" was identified for failure to translate regulatory requirements and the design basis of the scram discharge volume (SDV) thermal probes into the System Evaluation Document, which resulted in the installation of a nonsafety-related terminal board in the reactor protection system (RPS). As an immediate corrective action the licensee installed fully qualified equipment. The failure to classify reactor protection system components as safety-related in accordance with design documents was a performance deficiency. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10344772.
- The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the ensured reliability of the RPS system was adversely affected because the installed components were not qualified for the application. The team used IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," issued June 19, 2012, for Mitigating Systems, and IMC 0612, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have an associated cross-cutting aspect because this finding did not occur within the previous three years and is not reflective of current licensee performance. (Section 1R18)

Inspection Report# : 2017003 (*pdf*)

Significance: G Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly

Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified when technicians performing maintenance on the 2C emergency diesel generator observed pitting on the lower crank component gears and did not initiate a condition report as required by procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, "Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection." The licensee's failure to initiate a condition report, as required by 52SV-R43-001-0 'Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection', for the pitting observed on the lower crank component gears was a performance deficiency. The violation of regulatory requirement occurred on or about November 2015 until the licensee replaced the 2C EDG cross drive assembly and restored compliance on August 25, 2016. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10263236.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to evaluate gear pitting would allow progression of a degradation mechanism to the point of EDG inoperability. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. Because all four questions in Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," were answered "no," the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the 'Resources' aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure adequate procedural guidance to recognize the difference between normal and destructive pitting. [H.1] (Section 40A3)

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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