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## FitzPatrick – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

#### Barrier Integrity

**Significance:** G Aug 07, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply (CREVAS) System

A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply (CREVAS) System," and TS 3.7.4, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System," was identified for the failure to declare one subsystem of the control room AC and CREVAS systems inoperable. Specifically, on August 16, 2016, control room operators failed to declare the 'A' CREVAS and 'A' control room AC subsystems inoperable due to a degraded damper actuator. As a result, the 'A' CREVAS and 'A' control room AC subsystems were inoperable from August 16, 2016, until a compensatory measure to assist the damper linkage by hand as needed was implemented on September 19, 2016, which exceeded the TS allowed outage time. On October 4, 2016, FitzPatrick personnel replaced the actuator. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as JAF-CR-2016-3593.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, and component (SSC) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this resulted in the 'A' control room AC and 'A' CREVAS subsystems being inoperable from August 16, 2016, to September 19, 2016, and the exceedance of the allowable TS out-of-service times. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, and the finding did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere (i.e. the 'B' train of both subsystems remained

operable). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because FitzPatrick personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that resolution addressed the cause. Specifically, FitzPatrick failed to fully evaluate the degraded condition during troubleshooting following the failed post-maintenance test (PMT) on August 16, 2016. Thorough testing and evaluation of the degraded actuator would have led to the identification of the need for replacement to restore the damper and its actuator to fully operable status.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

## **Emergency Preparedness**

## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

## **Public Radiation Safety**

## **Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

## **Miscellaneous**

**Significance:** SL-III Dec 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

### **EA-10-090/EA-10-248/EA-11-106 RP Technician Willful Violations**

During NRC investigations initiated on July 1, 2009, February 5, 2010, and April 8, 2010, violations of NRC requirements were identified. The following requirements were violated: 10 CFR 20.1703, 'Use of individual respiratory protection equipment'; 10 CFR 20.1501, Subpart F, 'Surveys and Monitoring'; 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and accuracy of information'. Contrary to the listed requirements, the licensee employees willfully violated multiple procedures and incorrectly documented completion of surveys and respirator fit tests.

These violations are categorized collectively as a Severity Level III violation. The NRC offered and Entergy accepted to conduct Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for the above listed violations. The NRC has issued Confirmatory Order (CO) EA-10-090, EA-10-248, EA-11-106 in response to the agreed upon ADR actions. As addressed in the CO, no civil penalty was assessed based on previous actions completed and actions agreed to be completed by the licensee.

Inspection Report# : 2011009 (*pdf*)

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

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