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Browns Ferry 3 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

4Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Jul 26, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Inadequate Fire Risk Evaluation for Postulated Fires Affecting EECW Strainers

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, Section 2.4.2.4 was identified for the licensee's failure to perform an adequate engineering analysis to determine the effects of fire on the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria. Specifically, the licensee's fire risk evaluation (FRE) of the effects of fire on the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) strainers did not have an adequate basis. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed plant-specific analyses to determine the effects of fire on the functionality of EECW strainers and EECW system. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1263434.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that failure to adequately

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analyze the effects of fire damaged cables for the EECW strainers and backwash valves impacted the objective of ensuring the reliability of the EECW system during a fire. This finding was determined to be Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours of a fire event. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency (H.12) within the cross-cutting

area of Human Performance because the licensee did not recognize that historical assumptions about long-term strainer functionality could contain mistakes and latent issues during development of the nuclear safety capability analysis.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jul 26, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Assure EECW Design Basis Capability

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified for the licensee's failure to correctly translate the design basis of the EECW system into technical instruction 0-TI-579(EECW). The effects of instrument uncertainty and diesel frequency variations were not considered when establishing the minimum allowed inservice test low alert pump flow limits. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee evaluated the operability of the EECW pump and initiated corrective action to make changes to the test criteria and/or the system design analysis. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1288208.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the B3 EECW pump since portions of the adjusted pump curve would be below the minimum pump curve established in the design basis calculation. Additionally, there was a significant reduction in available margin for the pump under design basis conditions. The finding was determined to be Green because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating system, but the pump maintained its operability. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance (H.6) within the cross-cutting area of Design Margins because engineers did not demonstrate the characteristic of ensuring that design margins were guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area

. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.7.1 was identified for a worker who entered a High Radiation Area (HRA) (Unit 1 reactor building steam tunnel) without proper authorization. This performance deficiency was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The licensee entered the issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1219539, and took immediate corrective actions including restricting Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) access for the individuals involved and performing confirmatory surveys of the area. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Teamwork, [H.4], because a significant contributor to this event was poor communication between different work groups (workers entering the reactor building steam tunnel and RP personnel at the control)

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Perform Airborne Radioactivity Surveys

An inspector-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the licensee's failure to obtain an air sample while performing work in an area with smearable contamination levels greater than 50,000 disintegrations per minute (DPM) per 100cm². This performance deficiency was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The licensee entered the issue into their CAP (CR 1219539) and, since the work created airborne radioactivity in the area, performed in-vivo monitoring on the affected workers to assess doses from the intake of radioactive material. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, [H.12], because, considering the contamination levels present, RP staff underestimated the risk for potential airborne radioactive material in the area

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : February 01, 2018

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017