



Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries > South Texas 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

South Texas 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

On this page:

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness
- Occupational Radiation Safety
- Public Radiation Safety
- Security

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Establish Procedures for Control of High-Energy Line Break Barriers

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to establish adequate procedures for the control of high-energy line break barriers. Specifically, on July 21, 2016, the inspectors identified that Procedure OPGP03 ZA-0514, "Controlled System or Barrier Impairment," Revision 14, did not have any guidance on the control of barriers used for high energy line breaks, despite the fact that the auxiliary feedwater pump room watertight doors are credited in the safety analyses for protection against such breaks. After discussing the acceptability of having both doors open simultaneously, the licensee shut the watertight door to auxiliary feedwater pump room for train A, and entered this condition into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2016-9006.

The failure to prescribe procedures for the control of high-energy line break doors was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Procedure OPGP03 ZA-0514, "Controlled System or Barrier Impairment," Revision 14, did not provide adequate procedures for the control of hazard barriers, which called the operability of the train A auxiliary feedwater system into question. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant

due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The NRC determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. Specifically, the auxiliary feedwater pump evaluation was performed in 2000; therefore, the performance deficiency occurred outside of the nominal 3-year period for "present performance."

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure To Establish Adequate Procedures To Ensure Emergency Diesel Generator Access Flood Panels Would Meet Their Safety Function

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to provide adequate written instructions for performing preventative maintenance to ensure the emergency diesel generator building access flood panels remain capable of performing their safety function. Specifically, the preventative maintenance work order model number 61046 was not adequate to detect degraded seal conditions, which were revealed during the flooding event on March 17, 2017. This issue was entered into the licensees' corrective action program as Condition Report 2017-12897. The licensee assembled a panel of individuals who were familiar with the design, and individuals responsible for the maintenance of these access panels and is still considering options to prevent future leakage.

The failure to provide adequate written instructions for performing preventative maintenance to ensure diesel generator building access flood panels remain capable of performing their safety function was a performance deficiency. Specifically, preventative maintenance work order model number 61046 was not adequate to detect degraded seal conditions, which were revealed during the flooding event on March 17, 2017. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to identify degrading flood barriers could result in emergency diesel generator inoperability or failure during a design basis flooding event. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated July 1, 2012, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating System Screening Questions," the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component; did not represent a loss of system and/or function; did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more than non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high-risk significance for greater than 24 hours. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. Specifically, the emergency diesel generator access panels had not allowed water intrusion due to flooding within the last 3 years and, therefore, the licensee did not have a recent opportunity to understand that the preventative maintenance work order instructions were inadequate.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Feb 10, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Provide 8-hour Emergency Lighting for All Alternative Shutdown Manual Actions

The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.E for the failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators perform manual actions required during an alternative shutdown. As a compensatory measure, the licensee added flashlights to the procedure box in the essential cooling water intake structure. The team

noted that operators were also required to carry a flashlight while on shift. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 17-1741.

The failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators perform manual actions required during an alternative shutdown was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting could adversely affect the ability of operators to perform the manual actions required for an alternative shutdown.

The team determined this finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," dated September 20, 2013, because it affected the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown conditions in case of a fire. The team determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in Task 1.3.1 because it had a low degradation rating.

The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of present performance in that the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago. Specifically, the team determined that the performance deficiency existed since original construction.

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Sep 04, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Conduct Drills In Accordance with the Site Emergency Plan

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) associated with the licensee's failure to conduct correctly scoped drills as required by the site emergency plan in 2015 and 2016. Annually, the licensee was required to conduct a radiological monitoring drill involving taking samples on-site and offsite of air, vegetation, soil, and water samples. Semiannually, the licensee was required to conduct health physics drills which involved response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples. During these years, the licensee failed to evaluate emergency response personnel demonstrating abilities addressing all of these criteria. This violation is not an immediate safety concern because drills were conducted involving the site health physics staff during the time period. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program in Condition Reports 17-15971 and 17-15974.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the emergency response organization performance (drills and exercises) cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone objective of being capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," dated September 22, 2015. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was not associated with the risk-significant planning standards, and was not a loss of a planning standard function. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee's procedure defining drill objectives and demonstration criteria did not address the entire scope of the drill types in question [H.1].

Inspection Report# : 2017010 (*pdf*)

Occupational Radiation Safety**Public Radiation Safety****Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017