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## Prairie Island 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

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#### Occupational Radiation Safety

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#### Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

#### Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Mar 20, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Failure to Make an 8-Hour Report Required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)**

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the licensee's failure on March 20, 2017, to report an unanalyzed condition within 8 hours of discovery. Specifically, removing the lower latch assembly of a transom above Door 225, a SEB, during maintenance resulted in the inoperability of the Units 1 and 2 safeguards batteries and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) systems, and Unit 1 safeguards

bus as determined by CAP 1549724.

The inspectors determined that the failure to submit a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 for the unanalyzed condition described above was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this issue had the potential to impact the regulatory process based, in part, on the information that 10 CFR 50.72 reporting serves. Since the issue impacted the regulatory process, it was dispositioned through the Traditional Enforcement process. The inspectors determined that this issue was a SL IV violation based on Example 6.9.d.9 in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Example 6.9.d.9 specifically states, "A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73." Because the issue has been evaluated under the Traditional Enforcement process, there was no cross cutting aspect associated with this violation.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

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