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Point Beach 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Significance: G Jul 14, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Identify Non-Conforming Conditions after Receipt of Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Related Part 21 Report

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and an associated (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the licensee's failure to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, after receiving and reviewing the Flowserve 10 CFR Part 21 report, the licensee misunderstood the information provided and failed to identify 36 safety-related valves that were nonconforming. Of these 36 valves, 14 were identified as being susceptible to pin failure based on their torque setting, 6 of which had open or close safety functions. The licensee captured the inspectors concern in the CAP as AR 02212531, and AR 02212915. In addition, the licensee performed operability evaluations that concluded the affected valves remained operable.

The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System and Initiating Event cornerstones, and adversely affected the cornerstone individual objectives. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," the finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) by answering "No" to the questions contained in Exhibit 1, and in accordance with Exhibit 2, it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems. The team did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the most significant cause for the error was not reflective of current performance. Specifically, the Part 21 report and associated review by the licensee occurred in February 2013. (Section 1R21.5.b(1))

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jul 14, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with a Seismic Interaction of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Piping

Green. The NRC identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the licensee failure to correct a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) associated with a seismic piping interaction affecting the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) system. Specifically, the licensee identified a flange clearance to the Unit 1 MDAFW suction piping was nonconforming and captured it in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Action Request (AR) 01684524. However, the licensee closed the AR without correcting the CAQ. The licensee captured the inspectors concern in the CAP as AR 02212810 and performed an evaluation that reasonably concluded the MDAFW remained operable.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems. Specifically, the licensee performed an operability determination which concluded the stresses resulting from the seismic interaction would reasonably be bounded by the applicable stress operability limits. The team did not identify a cross cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance because the performance deficiency occurred more than 3 years ago. Specifically, the licensee closed AR 01684524 without correcting this CAQ on September 20, 2011. (Section 1R21.3.b (1))

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Evaluate Operating Experience

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to follow program description PI-AA-102, "Operating Experience Program," Revision 3. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate operating experience that applied to Point Beach that identified the potential for cable connectors to disconnect due to machine vibration. PI-AA-102, Section 5, Instructions, Step 5.1(3), Screening Operating Experience Items, states, "If the initial screening indicates potential applicability to a NextEra Energy nuclear plant, program (including corporate administered programs), policy, process, or procedure; then an evaluation is conducted." Subsequently, a disconnected magnetic speed sensor cable on the G-04 emergency diesel generator caused a failure during a surveillance run attempt. The licensee's short term corrective actions included reconnecting the G-04 EDG magnetic speed sensor cable and installing lock-wire to prevent the connector from unintentionally disconnecting. The licensee's long-term corrective actions included changing their maintenance procedures to check connector tightness on the diesels periodically.

The inspectors determined that the failure to evaluate the external operating experience was contrary to licensee program description PI-AA-102 and was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the failure to evaluate operating experience was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Reliability and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," issued October 7, 2016, to this

finding. The inspectors answered "Yes" to question A within Table 3, "Significance Determination Process Appendix Router," and transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated May 9, 2014. The inspectors referenced Exhibit 3 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "No" to the screening questions. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect. The cause of the finding occurred in 2012 and was not reflective of present performance.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Scaffolding Constructed Without Required Engineering Approvals

A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified by inspectors for the licensee failing to follow step 4.1.3 (2) of procedure MA AA-100-1002, "Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Requests." Specifically, the licensee failed to obtain and document engineering approval for multiple scaffolds constructed in the cable spreading room that did not meet the separation criteria of Attachment 1 of MA-AA-100-1002. The licensee's short term corrective actions included obtaining the appropriate engineering evaluations for the affected scaffolding and conducting a stand-down and information sharing with the scaffold builders to ensure they were aware of the importance obtaining engineering approvals.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, had the potential to become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if the licensee continued to construct scaffolding without obtaining required engineering approvals, scaffolding could be constructed that was not seismically qualified and adversely affected the operability of surrounding SSCs. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," issued on June 19, 2012. Specifically, the inspectors used IMC 0609 Appendix A "SDP for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions" to screen the finding. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "No" to the screening questions. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Teamwork (H.4), in the area of Human Performance, for the failure of individuals and work groups to communicate and coordinate their activities across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the scaffold building team failed to communicate with the engineering organization to ensure the engineering evaluations were complete.

Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

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