



Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries > McGuire 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

## McGuire 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

On this page:

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness
- Occupational Radiation Safety
- Public Radiation Safety
- Security

#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Feb 10, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.**

Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable. The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.

Inspection Report# : 2017007 ([pdf](#))

#### Barrier Integrity

#### Emergency Preparedness

#### Occupational Radiation Safety

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.**

A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT))

room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.

The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

## **Public Radiation Safety Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

## **Miscellaneous**

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

*Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017*