Indian Point 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Significance: G Dec 31, 2016
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Follow RPS Logic Train B Actuation Logic Test
A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a), "Procedures," was identified because Entergy did not follow procedure 2-PT-2M3A, "Reactor Protection System Logic Train B Actuation Logic Test and Tadot," required by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, during planned testing on July 6, 2016, resulting in a Unit 2 reactor trip. Specifically, Entergy positioned key #183 in the channel B reactor logic key lock switch to the defeat position without procedural guidance and prior to commencing 2-PT-2M3A. 2-PT-2M3A requires that the reactor trip bypass breaker B be racked in when the channel B reactor protection logic key lock switch is taken to defeat to prevent a reactor trip. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2016-04320. The corrective actions include procedure enhancements, operations work challenges, and a site all hands meeting.

This finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Entergy operated plant equipment without direction from procedural guidance which resulted in an unplanned reactor trip. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition, high energy line-breaks, internal flooding, or fire. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Field Presence, because Entergy leaders did not reinforce standards and expectations with regard to procedure use and adherence. Specifically, Entergy did not have sufficient urgency for changing worker behaviors through the work observation program.
Inspection Report# : 2016004 *(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems
Barrier Integrity
Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety
Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

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