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Beaver Valley 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Inoperable 'A' River Water Train

A self-revealing NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for FENOC's failure to assure that activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with procedures. Specifically, FENOC failed to follow NOP-OP-1001, "Clearance/Tagging Program," and clearance 1W11-30-MNM-002 when removing the clearance for the 'A' bay of the main intake structure. This resulted in disabling the automatic start capability of the standby 'C' river water pump and made the 'A' river water train inoperable and unavailable. FENOC's immediate corrective action was to rack the breaker for the 'A' river water pump to the disconnect position, which cleared the annunciator and restored operability to the 'A' train of river water. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2016-14253.

The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, FENOC incorrectly racked the 'A' river water pump breaker onto the 1AE 4160 volts alternating current (VAC) safety bus while the 'C' river water pump was already racked onto the bus. This caused the 'A' train of river water to be inoperable and unavailable because the automatic start capability of the 'C' pump was disabled. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system and/or function, an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or an actual loss of function of one non-technical specification train designated as high safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because the operators did not plan for the possibility of

mistakes and did not implement appropriate error-reduction tools.

Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity
Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety
Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A May 15, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Follow the ASME OM Code for a Failed Relief Valve Set Pressure Test

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.55a(z), 'Alternatives to codes and standards requirements,' for FENOC's failure to obtain prior authorization for implementing an alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (ASME OM Code). Specifically, until prompted by the inspectors, FENOC did not submit to the NRC and receive an alternative to the ASME OM Code requirement to not test the residual heat removal (RHR) relief valve, RV-1RH-721, during a recent refueling outage for Unit 1 when the charging system letdown relief valve, RV-1CH-203, failed to lift within three percent of set-pressure. FENOC's immediate corrective actions included performing a prompt operability determination, submitting a relief request, and entering the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2017-03937.

The inspectors determined that this violation impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, and was therefore subject to traditional enforcement. Section 2.2.1.c of the Enforcement Policy states that failure to receive prior NRC approval for changes in licensed activities when required is an example of impacting the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function. After considering the factors in Section 2.2.1.c of the Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was a Severity Level IV violation because the change implemented by FENOC would likely be approved by the NRC. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an associated finding that is more than minor, the inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B.

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

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