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Brunswick 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

3Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G May 05, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Nonfunctional Sprinklers in the Service Water Building Without Compensatory Measures

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Significance: G May 05, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Install Flood Barrier Seals Around the EDG 2 Four-Day Fuel Oil Tank Vents

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Significance: G Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Control a Temporary Fire Ignition Source Near the Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control Pump Motor and Cables

An NRC-identified Green NCV of License Condition 2.B.(6), Fire Protection Program, was identified for the licensee's failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 2 standby liquid control (SLC) pump area in accordance with licensee procedure AD-EG-ALL-1523, Temporary Ignition Source Control. Specifically, between January 7,

2017, and January 13, 2017, a temporary electric portable heater was energized 2 feet from a SLC pump motor without continuously attending the temporary ignition source or obtaining a continuous fire watch. The licensee's corrective actions included turning off the heater and removing it from near the SLC pumps. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP as NCR 2091736.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with licensee procedure AD-EG-ALL-1523, was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Events attribute (i.e. fire) of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the temporary ignition source could have affected a nearby safety-related SLC pump motor and cables, which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was screened using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," dated September 20, 2013. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013, the finding was assigned to the Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls category because the portable heater is part of the plants combustible materials control program. Proceeding to Task 1.3.1 of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because even if one train of SLC had been inoperable, the reactor was able to reach and maintain safe shutdown. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the teamwork aspect because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions.

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Significance:  Feb 17, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Correct a Nonfunctional Fire Door

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Enter the Technical Specification for an Inoperable 1D Control Room Air Conditioning Unit

An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System, was identified for the failure to declare the 1D control room AC unit inoperable. Specifically, on December 1, 2016, the licensee failed to declare the 1D control room AC unit inoperable due to extensive corrosion on the support channels. As a result, the 1D control room AC unit was inoperable from December 1, 2016, until the next time it was inspected on January 30, 2017, and exceeded the TS allowed outage time. As corrective actions, the licensee replaced the supports of the 1D and 2D control room AC units and inspected the 2E control room AC unit for corrosion. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as NCRs 2113799 and 2113800.

The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to declare the 1D control room AC unit inoperable and enter TS 3.7.4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the structures, systems, and components (SSC) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this resulted in the 1D control

room AC unit being inoperable from December 1, 2016, to January 30, 2017. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, issued June 19, 2012, the SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not only represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function for the control room and the finding did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or toxic atmosphere. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the resolution aspect because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not correct the degradation of the 1D control room AC unit until the unit was inoperable.

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Submit a Licensee Event Report for a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification

An NRC-identified severity level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) was identified for the failure of the licensee to provide a written report to the NRC within 60 days of identifying a condition which was prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as nuclear condition report (NCR) 2091608.

The inspectors had previously evaluated the underlying technical issue and determined the failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality, which resulted in the condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS), was a performance deficiency. The issue was documented as a Green NCV, 05000325;324/2016002-01, Failure to Identify Broken Auto Start Control Relay on Emergency Diesel Generator 1. The ROP's significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.

Therefore, it was necessary to address this violation which involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and was considered to impact the regulatory process, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9.d.9, the SL assigned to this violation was SL IV, because the licensee failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation also meets the criteria for an NCV because it was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the licensee's CAP. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.

Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

Current data as of : November 29, 2017

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017