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## Watts Bar 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

### 2Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Jun 23, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Failure to Maintain an Adequate Record of Qualification**

The NRC identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.49(j), for the licensee's failure to maintain a complete record of qualification for Brand-Rex cables under environmental qualification binder WBNEQ-CABL-050. Specifically, the licensee could not produce a certificate of conformance related to thermal aging test data obtained from Brand-Rex. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1310230.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety related cable systems. Specifically, the irretrievable loss of quality records that demonstrate the equipment is qualified for its application in conformance to Appendix B requirements, impacted the reliability and capability of safety-related cable systems. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of a mitigating SSC and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Inadequate Immediate Determination of Operability for Essential Raw Cooling Water Pumps**

The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to base an immediate determination of operability (IDO) for Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) pumps on information sufficient to conclude that a reasonable expectation of operability existed. The licensee restored compliance on November 30, 2016 when they documented an IDO that met the requirements of OPDP-8. The violation was entered into the licensee's CAP as CR 1237178.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, reasonable assurance of operability did not exist for the ERCW pumps from November 29, 2016 until November 30, 2016. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of function for at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time. The cause of this finding had a cross cutting aspect of "Teamwork" in the Human Performance area, because individuals and work groups failed to communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

## Barrier Integrity

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Inadequate Chemistry Procedure Results in Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves**

A self-revealed severity level (SL) IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when implementing an inadequate procedure resulted in rendering the steam generator chemistry sample containment isolation valves inoperable. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1160910.

The inspectors determined that the use of an inadequate procedure that rendered the containment isolation valves inoperable was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC-2517, Appendix C, because the use of an inadequate procedure rendered the containment isolation valves inoperable. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent a breakdown of the licensee's quality assurance program. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the work management component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the work process did not include the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities [H.5].

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

## Emergency Preparedness

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Maintain Minimum On-Shift Emergency Response Staffing Levels**

The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.47(b)(2) for the licensee's failure to maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan, when on more than one occasion, the number of control room operators fell below minimum staffing, as required by Appendix C of NP-REP Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan (E-Plan). The licensee's corrective actions included entering the issue into their corrective action program as CR 1233650.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the emergency response organization readiness attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, and using Table 5.2-1 - Significance Examples for 50.47(b)(2), determined that this finding represented an example of a staffing process that would permit a shift to go below E-Plan minimum staffing requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee's process, on more than one occasion, failed to ensure that on-shift staffing met E-Plan minimum staffing requirements between March 20 and May 6, 2016. The cause of the finding was determined to be associated with the cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation of problems in the corrective action component of the problem identification and resolution area because the organization failed to periodically analyze information from the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues

Inspection Report# : 2016501 (*pdf*)

## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

### **Public Radiation Safety**

#### **Security**

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

## **Miscellaneous**

Current data as of : September 05, 2017

*Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017*