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Indian Point 2 – Quarterly Performance Indicators

2Q/2017 Performance Indicators


The solid trend line represents the current reporting period.

Licensee's General Comments: none

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- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
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Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs



Thresholds: White > 3.0 Yellow > 6.0 Red > 25.0

Notes

| Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|--|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Unplanned scrams | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 |
| Critical hours | 2208.0 | 2154.3 | 1584.0 | 319.8 | 2189.0 | 2209.0 | 2159.0 | 2128.9 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.6 |


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Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: On July 6, 2016, an automatic reactor trip was initiated during preparations for testing the reactor protection system logic train B actuation logic. LER-2016-009 reported this event on September 6, 2016.

4Q/15: On December 5, 2015, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to indications of multiple dropped control rods. Initiating event was a fault of Motor Control Center (MCC) 24-2H that caused the upstream supply breaker to open to clear the fault resulting in a loss of power to the operating backup power supply in Rod Control Cabinet 2BD with a degraded primary power supply. The loss of power to the Control Rod System caused the Control Rod stationary grippers to de-energize and rods inserted into the reactor core.

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs



Thresholds: White > 6.0

Notes

| Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Unplanned power changes | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Critical hours | 2208.0 | 2154.3 | 1584.0 | 319.8 | 2189.0 | 2209.0 | 2159.0 | 2128.9 |

| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 0.8 |
|-----------------|---|---|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|-----------------|---|---|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|


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Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: On August 6, 2016, Heater Drain Tank (HDT) level controller failed causing both HDT discharge level control valves to fail open. HDT level lowered and both HDT pumps tripped at the low level setpoint. Operators rapidly reduced load to match steam flow and feedwater flow. During the rapid downpower, the RCS was borated and control rods were inserted. Critical parameters were maintained within limits. Power was stabilized at 78%.

2Q/16: On June 24, 2016, actions were initiated to commence reactor shutdown to comply the Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7 in order to repair a leaking weld on the 20 inch Service Water pipe to nozzle weld on the 21 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger. Entered Mode 3 at 07:59 hours, after normal plant shutdown and reactor trip per normal shutdown procedure 2-POP-3.1 (Plant Shutdown From 45% Power).

Unplanned Scrams with Complications



Thresholds: White > 1.0

Notes


Unplanned Scrams with Complications 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17 2Q/17
 Scrams with complications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Indicator value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

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Licensee Comments: none

Safety System Functional Failures (PWR)



Thresholds: White > 5.0

Notes

Safety System Functional Failures (PWR) 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17 2Q/17

Safety System Functional Failures 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0

Indicator value 0 1 2 2 4 4 3 3

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Licensee Comments:


4Q/16: LER-2016-010 reported on December 21, 2016, a SSFF due to an inoperable containment caused by a through wall defect in a service water supply pipe elbow to the 24 fan cooler unit.

3Q/16: LER-2016-007 reported on August 9, 2016, a safety system functional failure after discovering in Mode 4 two open ECCS sump barrier gates. The condition could have prevented adequate post accident core cooling due to DBA debris blockage of the containment recirculation sump and/or the containment sump. TS requires the ECCS to be operable in Modes 1-4. The licensing and design basis of the ECCS credits flow channeling barriers installed in response to GL-2004-02. On September 29, 2016, a revision of LER-2015-001 was submitted reporting a SSFF in addition to the initial reporting as a TS prohibited condition. Additional Entergy reporting guidance determined that this event was also reportable as a SSFF.

1Q/16: LER-2015-004 reported on February 18, 2016, a SSFF due to an inoperable containment caused by a flawed SW pipe elbow on the 21 FCU motor cooler return pipe.

4Q/15: LER-2015-002 reported a SSFF on October 19, 2015, due to fuses for the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger outlet valves that would not remain operable under degraded voltage conditions.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System

| | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 8.74E-08 | 8.64E-08 | 1.02E-07 | 8.06E-08 | 7.31E-08 | 7.10E-08 | 6.43E-08 | 3.12E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | 3.01E-07 | 3.02E-07 | 3.82E-07 | 1.59E-07 | 1.62E-07 | 1.67E-07 | 1.86E-07 | 1.98E-07 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | 3.90E-07 | 3.90E-07 | 4.80E-07 | 2.40E-07 | 2.40E-07 | 2.40E-07 | 2.50E-07 | 2.30E-07 |

TOP

Licensee Comments:

2Q/17: A periodic update of the Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was performed per the requirements of Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-151 (PSA Maintenance and Update), which requires a periodic model update be performed nominally once every four years, up to a maximum of six years. This update includes plant design and procedure changes and general modeling enhancements identified since issuance of the previous IP2 PSA model of record. This revision of the PSA model includes resolution of all Level A & B findings (F&Os) from the Regulatory Guide 1.200 peer review, as well as incorporation of significant self-identified Model Change Requests (MCRs).


1Q/16: Load failure of 23 EDG recorded on 3/7/16 report # 321856 due to a degraded automatic voltage regulator.

1Q/16: Load failure of 23 EDG recorded on 3/7/16 report # 321856 due to a degraded automatic voltage regulator.

3Q/15: 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

3Q/15: Changed PRA Parameter(s). 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System

| | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | -1.41E-10 | -1.51E-10 | -1.46E-10 | -3.14E-10 | -3.27E-10 | -3.27E-10 | -3.29E-10 | -2.53E-10 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | -5.90E-10 | -6.00E-10 | -6.20E-10 | -7.80E-10 | -7.90E-10 | -7.90E-10 | -7.90E-10 | -6.30E-10 |


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Licensee Comments:

2Q/17: A periodic update of the Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was performed per the requirements of Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-151 (PSA Maintenance and Update), which requires a periodic model update be performed nominally once every four years, up to a maximum of six years. This update includes plant design and procedure changes and general modeling enhancements identified since issuance of the previous IP2 PSA model of record. This revision of the PSA model includes resolution of all Level A & B findings (F&Os) from the Regulatory Guide 1.200 peer review, as well as incorporation of significant self-identified Model Change Requests (MCRs).

3Q/15: Changed PRA Parameter(s). 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System

| | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 1.40E-08 | 6.84E-09 | 1.05E-08 | 1.24E-08 | 1.56E-08 | 1.79E-08 | 2.52E-08 | 2.71E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | -2.73E-08 | -2.84E-08 | -3.07E-08 | -3.22E-08 | 9.18E-08 | 9.20E-08 | 1.07E-07 | 1.19E-07 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | -1.30E-08 | -2.20E-08 | -2.00E-08 | -2.00E-08 | 1.10E-07 | 1.10E-07 | 1.30E-07 | 1.50E-07 |

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
Licensee Comments:

2Q/17: A periodic update of the Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was performed per the requirements of Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-151 (PSA Maintenance and Update), which requires a periodic model update be performed nominally once every four years, up to a maximum of six years. This update includes plant design and procedure changes and general modeling enhancements identified since issuance of the previous IP2 PSA model of record. This revision of the PSA model includes resolution of all Level A & B findings (F&Os) from the Regulatory Guide 1.200 peer review, as well as incorporation of significant self-identified Model Change Requests (MCRs).

3Q/15: 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

3Q/15: Changed PRA Parameter(s). 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System

| | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | -3.99E-09 | -4.26E-09 | -4.13E-09 | -8.89E-09 | -8.26E-09 | -9.38E-09 | -9.30E-09 | -5.70E-09 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | 2.70E-07 | 2.70E-07 | 2.67E-07 | 2.65E-07 | 2.65E-07 | 2.65E-07 | 2.69E-07 | 1.62E-07 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | 2.70E-07 | 2.70E-07 | 2.60E-07 | 2.60E-07 | 2.60E-07 | 2.60E-07 | 2.60E-07 | 1.60E-07 |

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
Licensee Comments:

2Q/17: A periodic update of the Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was performed per the requirements of Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-151 (PSA Maintenance and Update), which requires a periodic model update be performed nominally once every four years, up to a maximum of six years. This update includes plant design and procedure changes and general modeling enhancements identified since issuance of the previous IP2 PSA model of record. This revision of the PSA model includes resolution of all Level A & B findings (F&Os) from the Regulatory Guide 1.200 peer review, as well as incorporation of significant self-identified Model Change Requests (MCRs).

3Q/15: The planned unavailability hours changed for the 21 and 22 RHR pump (0.0 hrs to 0.8 hrs) to reflect the final OE that the valves were inoperable as a result of the response to a CDBI inspection question and a final determination that the normally closed 21 and 22 RHR Pumps Heat Exchanger outlet valves (MOV-746 & MOV-747) would not adequately operate under degraded voltage conditions as a result of inadequate fuses. This resulted in both trains of RHR being considered inoperable. LER-2015-002 reported this event as a safety system functional failure. On December 29, 2015, ICES input data for the RHR event was determined to be complete which included a Maintenance Rule functional failure and MSPI safety system functional failure of both RHR Hx outlet valves. The ICES report was completed in ICES and initiated for review by INPO December 29, 2015. This action caused MSPI to be recalculated.

3Q/15: Changed PRA Parameter(s). 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes made were to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems

| | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 3.42E-09 | 3.50E-09 | 3.67E-09 | 1.43E-08 | 1.07E-08 | 1.08E-08 | 1.12E-08 | 1.22E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | -2.07E-08 | -1.95E-08 | -2.02E-08 | -2.03E-08 | -2.06E-08 | -2.10E-08 | -2.04E-08 | -9.10E-09 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | -1.70E-08 | -1.60E-08 | -1.60E-08 | -6.00E-09 | -9.80E-09 | -1.00E-08 | -9.30E-09 | 3.10E-09 |

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
Licensee Comments:

2Q/17: A periodic update of the Unit 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) was performed per the requirements of Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-151 (PSA Maintenance and Update), which requires a periodic model update be performed nominally once every four years, up to a maximum of six years. This update includes plant design and procedure changes and general modeling enhancements identified since issuance of the previous IP2 PSA model of record. This revision of the PSA model includes resolution of all Level A & B findings (F&Os) from the Regulatory Guide 1.200 peer review, as well as incorporation of significant self-identified Model Change Requests (MCRs).

3Q/15: The September 2015 CCWP demands and run hours were revised. 21 CCP demands changed from 0 to 1, run hours changed from 0.0 to 0.58; 22 CCP demands changed from 0 to 1, run hours changed from 720.0 to 719.48; 23 CCP demands changed from 0 to 1; run hours changed from 720.0 to 719.47.

3Q/15: Changed PRA Parameter(s). 3Q15 report includes changes to the Unit 2 MSPI PSA parameters as a result of a PRA model interim update approved on May 6, 2015 from the EDG MSPI Margin Improvement Plan. Changes were made to Monitored Component PRA information to be effective July 1, 2015. Also included were changes in the plant specific EAC planned baseline unavailability in MSPI.

Reactor Coolant System Activity



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

Notes

Reactor Coolant System

| Activity | 7/15 | 8/15 | 9/15 | 10/15 | 11/15 | 12/15 | 1/16 | 2/16 | 3/16 | 4/16 | 5/16 | 6/16 |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------|------|------|
| Maximum activity | 0.000206 | 0.000202 | 0.000203 | 0.000216 | 0.000260 | 0.000223 | 0.000271 | 0.000245 | 0.000150 | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Technical specification limit | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | N/A |


| Reactor Coolant System Activity | 7/16 | 8/16 | 9/16 | 10/16 | 11/16 | 12/16 | 1/17 | 2/17 | 3/17 | 4/17 | 5/17 | 6/17 |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Maximum activity | 0.000134 | 0.000131 | 0.000150 | 0.000126 | 0.000145 | 0.000139 | 0.000150 | 0.000150 | 0.000168 | 0.000144 | 0.000146 | 0.000186 |
| Technical specification limit | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

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Licensee Comments:

6/16: Plant started refueling outage 3/7/16. No RCS coolant activity calculated.

Reactor Coolant System Leakage



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

Notes

| Reactor Coolant System Leakage | 7/15 | 8/15 | 9/15 | 10/15 | 11/15 | 12/15 | 1/16 | 2/16 | 3/16 | 4/16 | 5/16 | 6/16 |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Maximum leakage | 0.060 | 0.070 | 0.080 | 0.080 | 0.060 | 0.070 | 0.050 | 0.060 | 0.040 | N/A | N/A | 0.020 |
| Technical specification limit | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |


| Indicator value | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | N/A | N/A | 0.2 |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage | 7/16 | 8/16 | 9/16 | 10/16 | 11/16 | 12/16 | 1/17 | 2/17 | 3/17 | 4/17 | 5/17 | 6/17 |
| Maximum leakage | 0.024 | 0.030 | 0.090 | 0.030 | 0.040 | 0.020 | 0.040 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.040 | 0.040 | 0.040 |
| Technical specification limit | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Indicator value | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |

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Licensee Comments:

6/16: Plant started refueling outage which was extended due to degraded RV baffle-former bolts. Unit startup was 6/16/16. No RCS Leak Rate was determined during outage due to plant in outage.

Drill/Exercise Performance



Thresholds: White < 90.0% Yellow < 70.0%

Notes


| Drill/Exercise Performance | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Successful opportunities | 146.0 | 28.0 | 26.0 | 62.0 | 103.0 | 93.0 | 23.0 | 18.0 |
| Total opportunities | 147.0 | 28.0 | 26.0 | 63.0 | 105.0 | 94.0 | 24.0 | 18.0 |

Indicator value **98.9% 98.8% 98.9% 99.0% 98.9% 98.7% 98.7% 98.8%**

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Licensee Comments: none

ERO Drill Participation



Thresholds: White < 80.0% Yellow < 60.0%

Notes


| ERO Drill Participation | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Participating Key personnel | 105.0 | 103.0 | 103.0 | 101.0 | 100.0 | 104.0 | 108.0 | 105.0 |
| Total Key personnel | 105.0 | 103.0 | 103.0 | 101.0 | 100.0 | 104.0 | 108.0 | 105.0 |

Indicator value **100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%**

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Licensee Comments: none

Alert & Notification System



Thresholds: White < 94.0% Yellow < 90.0%

Notes


| Alert & Notification System | 3Q/15 | 4Q/15 | 1Q/16 | 2Q/16 | 3Q/16 | 4Q/16 | 1Q/17 | 2Q/17 |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Successful siren-tests | 1105 | 1046 | 1188 | 1050 | 1081 | 1201 | 1203 | 1203 |
| Total sirens-tests | 1109 | 1046 | 1188 | 1050 | 1081 | 1204 | 1204 | 1204 |

Indicator value **99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9%**

▲ TOP

Licensee Comments: none

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness



Thresholds: White > 2.0 Yellow > 5.0

Notes


Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17 2Q/17

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| High radiation area occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Very high radiation area occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unintended exposure occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

TOP

Licensee Comments: none

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent



Thresholds: White > 1.0 Yellow > 3.0

Notes

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17 2Q/17

RETS/ODCM occurrences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Indicator value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Licensee Comments: none

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page.

Current data as of: July 26, 2017

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017