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Point Beach 2 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

2Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Scaffolding Constructed Without Required Engineering Approvals

A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified by inspectors for the licensee failing to follow step 4.1.3 (2) of procedure MA AA-100-1002, "Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Requests." Specifically, the licensee failed to obtain and document engineering approval for multiple scaffolds constructed in the cable spreading room that did not meet the separation criteria of Attachment 1 of MA-AA-100-1002. The licensee's short term corrective actions included obtaining the appropriate engineering evaluations for the affected scaffolding and conducting a stand-down and information sharing with the scaffold builders to ensure they were aware of the importance obtaining engineering approvals.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, had the potential to become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if the licensee continued to construct scaffolding without obtaining required engineering approvals, scaffolding could be constructed that was not seismically qualified and adversely affected the operability of surrounding SSCs. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," issued on June 19, 2012. Specifically, the inspectors used IMC 0609 Appendix A "SDP for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions" to screen the finding. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "No" to the screening questions. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Teamwork (H.4), in the area of Human Performance, for the failure of individuals and work groups to communicate and coordinate their activities across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the scaffold building team failed to communicate with the engineering organization to ensure the

engineering evaluations were complete.

Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : August 03, 2017

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 10, 2016