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McGuire 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

2Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 31, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to adequately control transient combustibles using a receptacle with a self-closing lid.

An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the McGuire Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, "Fire Protection Program" (FPP), was identified for the licensee's failure to adequately implement fire protection procedures for a waste receptacle fitted with a self-closing fire lid used to store plastic hard hats in the Unit 1 "B" train electrical penetration room. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to empty the receptacle (Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 2100090).

The licensee's failure to properly implement transient combustible control requirements for a waste receptacle equipped with a self-closing fire lid was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, specifically fire, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, a fire ignited in the overfilled receptacle without a functioning self-closing lid could damage safety related cabling running directly overhead. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions in that a postulated fire in the overfilled receptacle did not present the possibility of impacting more than one train of safe shutdown equipment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance, because personnel did not follow procedural requirements of procedure AD-EG-ALL-1520. [H.8] (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : 2017001 (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance: **G** Feb 10, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.

Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable. The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.

Inspection Report# : 2017007 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance: **G** Jun 30, 2017

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.

A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT) room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.

The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.

Inspection Report# : 2017002 (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : August 03, 2017

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