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## **Indian Point 3 – Quarterly Performance Indicators**

### **1Q/2017 Performance Indicators**


The solid trend line represents the current reporting period.

Licensee's General Comments: 1. EP01 (Drill/Exercise Performance) June 2016 (2Q16) Units 2 and 3 Comment to add in Change Report for EP01 ((Drill/Exercise Performance) for each unit: Revised Drill Opportunities from 8 to 7 based on NRC and NEI Working Group input per position on FAQ 13-07. 2. Comment to be added to the Change Reports for all unit 2 and unit 3 impacted MSPIs MSPI06 (EDG), MSPI07(HHSI), MSPI08(AFW), MSPI09(RHR), MSPI10 (CCW+SW) as a result of resolution of CR-IP2-2016-07044 (inappropriate counting of post maintenance tests as a demand). Time of consideration is 36 months (12Qs). As a result of an NRC RI review comment, an engineering review of the reporting guidelines of NEI 99-02 for recording MSPI data for Demand, Loads, Run Hours and Failures was performed. The review identified a discrepancy in the current method used to record MSPI data for reporting. In accordance with NEI 99-02, post maintenance test (PMT) demands, loads and run hours are to be excluded from the total count, except in cases where failures occurred independent of the maintenance performed. Engineering identified that IPEC did not exclude PMT demands, loads and run hours. Revisions as necessary were made to the previous 36 months of MSPI data to conform to the reporting guidelines of NEI 99-02. Condition was recorded in the Indian Point Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2016-07044.

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- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
- Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)
- Emergency AC Power Systems (MS06)
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- Heat Removal Systems (MS08)
- Residual Heat Removal Systems (MS09)
- Cooling Water Systems (MS10)
- Reactor Coolant System Activity (BI01)
- Reactor Coolant System Leakage (BI02)
- Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)
- Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)
- Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)
- RETS/OCDM Radiological Effluent Occurrence (PR01)
- Protected Area Equipment (PP01)

### Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs



Thresholds: White > 3.0 Yellow > 6.0 Red > 25.0

**Notes**

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Unplanned scrams	2.0	1.0	1.0	0	0	0	0	0
Critical hours	1788.8	1947.1	2157.5	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0	2209.0	1703.0

**Indicator value** 2.7 2.8 3.7 3.5 1.7 0.8 0 0

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
**Licensee Comments:**

4Q/15: PI exceeded Green threshold due to a reactor trip on December 14, 2015, as a result of a Main Generator protective trip (Primary Lockout Relay 86P) due to a 345 kV grid disturbance. This trip is the fourth reactor trip (RT) in 4 quarters. Prior RTs include RT May 9, due to failure of the 31 Main Transformer, RT June 15, due to a 345 kV switchyard breaker failure, manual RT July 8, due to decreasing SG levels caused by main feedwater (FW) pump low suction pressure as a result of a mis-wired circuit board for the FW pump speed control system.

3Q/15: On July 8, 2015, the reactor was manually tripped due to decreasing steam generator levels caused by 31 main feedwater pump speed control locked-in at minimum speed. Direct cause was the 31 main feedwater pump entered a hold condition due to a mis-wired Track and Hold circuit board in the speed control system. LER-2015-007 reported the event.

2Q/15: On May 9, 2015 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine-generator trip as a result of the failure of the 31 main transformer. Direct cause was an internal fault of the A phase high voltage winding in the upper portion of the transformer. LER-2015-004 reported the event. On June 15, 2015, an automatic reactor trip occurred as a result of a turbine-generator trip. Prior to the trip, Con Edison District Operator requested that 345 kV breaker number 1 in the Buchanan Switchyard south ring bus be opened to aid in Con Edison isolation of 345 kV feeder W97 in support of removing a mylar balloon caught in the high voltage wires at Millwood. 345 kV breaker 5 faulted after opening breaker 1 causing breaker 3 to open which initiated a direct generator trip.

**Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs**



Thresholds: White > 6.0

**Notes**


Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Unplanned power changes	1.0	0	0	0	1.0	0	0	0
Critical hours	1788.8	1947.1	2157.5	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0	2209.0	1703.0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>

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Licensee Comments:

2Q/16: On April 26, 2016, the unit reduced power to 48% reactor power to mitigate the failing of the Heater Drain Tank level controllers.  
 3Q/15: On September 15, 2015, a planned shutdown for maintenance was initiated to replace the reactor vessel O-rings due to leakage.  
 2Q/15: On May 7, 2015, the unit initiated a coast down to a planned trip to repair a weld crack on valve BFD-64-10. Valve BFD-64-10 is a low side isolation valve for feedwater flow transmitter FT-438B.

### Unplanned Scrams with Complications



Thresholds: White > 1.0

#### Notes


Unplanned Scrams with Complications	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Scrams with complications	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Indicator value                                    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0

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Licensee Comments: none

### Safety System Functional Failures (PWR)



Thresholds: White > 5.0

#### Notes

Safety System Functional Failures (PWR) 2Q/15 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17

Safety System Functional Failures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0


Indicator value 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1

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Licensee Comments:

4Q/16: LER-2016-001 reported on December 21, 2016, a SSFF due to an inoperable containment caused by a flaw in the 31 fan cooler unit service water return coil line affecting containment integrity.

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

#### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System

	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
UAI (ΔCDF)	4.53E-07	3.79E-07	3.87E-07	3.33E-07	3.86E-07	5.59E-08	6.07E-08	6.71E-08
URI (ΔCDF)	-3.84E-07	-3.84E-07	-8.59E-07	-7.52E-07	-7.53E-07	-8.71E-08	-8.70E-08	-8.81E-08
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Indicator value	6.90E-08	-4.90E-09	-4.70E-07	-4.20E-07	-3.70E-07	-3.10E-08	-2.60E-08	-2.10E-08


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#### Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry condition and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

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### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

**Notes**

**Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System**

	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
UAI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	8.60E-10	1.03E-09	3.55E-10	-1.11E-09	-1.08E-09	-2.19E-10	-2.04E-10	-1.48E-10
URI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	1.31E-08	1.32E-08	1.32E-08	-1.92E-09	-1.95E-09	-4.39E-10	-4.34E-10	-4.39E-10
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>1.40E-08</b>	<b>1.40E-08</b>	<b>1.40E-08</b>	<b>-3.00E-09</b>	<b>-3.00E-09</b>	<b>-6.60E-10</b>	<b>-6.40E-10</b>	<b>-5.90E-10</b>


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Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

#### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System

	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
UAI (ΔCDF)	-2.73E-09	-2.56E-09	-2.17E-09	-3.83E-08	-3.16E-08	2.43E-09	-7.69E-09	2.46E-09
URI (ΔCDF)	1.63E-07	1.57E-07	1.33E-07	-3.29E-07	-3.10E-07	-6.06E-08	-6.04E-08	-6.13E-08
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>1.60E-07</b>	<b>1.50E-07</b>	<b>1.30E-07</b>	<b>-3.70E-07</b>	<b>-3.40E-07</b>	<b>-5.80E-08</b>	<b>-6.80E-08</b>	<b>-5.90E-08</b>

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#### Licensee Comments:

4Q/16: During an interim PRA model update initiated in July 2016, an error was made during CDE update that changed the baseline unplanned unavailability (UABLU) for the 32 Turbine Driven AFW Pump to 6.9E-4 when it should have been changed to 9.1E-4. The value of 6.9E-4 is for the Motor Driven AFW Pumps. The error resulted in the reported CDE UAI value being conservative. The error was recorded in the IPEC Corrective Action Program as CR-IP3-2016-03714.

4Q/16: Changed PRA Parameter(s). During an interim PRA model update initiated in July 2016, an error was made during CDE update that changed the baseline unplanned unavailability (UABLU) for the 32 Turbine Driven AFW Pump to 6.9E-4 when it should have been changed to 9.1E-4. The value of 6.9E-4 is for the Motor Driven AFW Pumps. The error resulted in the reported CDE UAI value being conservative. The error was recorded in the IPEC Corrective Action Program as CR-IP3-2016-03714.


3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R Diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R Diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).



4Q/15: Risk Cap Invoked.  
 4Q/15: Risk Cap Invoked.  
 3Q/15: Risk Cap Invoked.  
 3Q/15: Risk Cap Invoked.  
 2Q/15: Risk Cap Invoked.

**Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System**



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

**Notes**

**Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System**

	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
UAI (ΔCDF)	-1.18E-08	-1.14E-08	-1.14E-08	-1.21E-08	-1.44E-08	-8.78E-09	-8.78E-09	-8.59E-09
URI (ΔCDF)	-1.48E-08	-1.59E-08	-1.58E-08	-1.19E-08	-1.16E-08	-7.03E-09	-6.94E-09	-6.86E-09
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>-2.70E-08</b>	<b>-2.70E-08</b>	<b>-2.70E-08</b>	<b>-2.40E-08</b>	<b>-2.60E-08</b>	<b>-1.60E-08</b>	<b>-1.60E-08</b>	<b>-1.50E-08</b>


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Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: An interim update of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R Diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

3Q/16: Changed PRA Parameter(s). An interim update of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R Diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

**Notes**

**Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems**

	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
UAI (ΔCDF)	2.41E-08	2.12E-08	2.74E-08	2.19E-08	2.01E-08	7.60E-09	1.39E-08	1.72E-08
URI (ΔCDF)	3.41E-08	-2.85E-08	-2.86E-08	-2.60E-08	-2.55E-08	-2.35E-08	-2.35E-08	-2.28E-08
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>5.80E-08</b>	<b>-7.30E-09</b>	<b>-1.20E-09</b>	<b>-4.20E-09</b>	<b>-5.40E-09</b>	<b>-1.60E-08</b>	<b>-9.60E-09</b>	<b>-5.60E-09</b>


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Licensee Comments:

3Q/16: An interim update of the Unit 3 Probabilistic Assessment (PSA) was prepared and issued as an Engineering Report to incorporate a recent procedural enhancement which allows the Unit 3 SBO/Appendix R Diesel Generator (ARDG) to be credited for scenarios other than Appendix R fires and Station Blackout. Specifically, the plant procedures and operator training now provide instructions (including the required entry conditions and cues) for aligning the ARDG to a 480 Volt AC Safeguards Bus in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with failure of one or more Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

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### Reactor Coolant System Activity



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0


**Notes**

Reactor Coolant System Activity	4/15	5/15	6/15	7/15	8/15	9/15	10/15	11/15	12/15	1/16	2/16	3/16
Maximum activity	0.000099	0.000090	0.000108	0.000109	0.000117	0.000121	0.000127	0.000132	0.000130	0.000158	0.000142	0.000156
Technical specification limit	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Reactor Coolant System Activity	4/16	5/16	6/16	7/16	8/16	9/16	10/16	11/16	12/16	1/17	2/17	3/17
Maximum activity	0.000144	0.000161	0.000158	0.000162	0.000170	0.000172	0.000176	0.000206	0.000203	0.000189	0.000214	0.000206
Technical specification limit	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

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Licensee Comments: none

### Reactor Coolant System Leakage



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

**Notes**

Reactor Coolant System Leakage	4/15	5/15	6/15	7/15	8/15	9/15	10/15	11/15	12/15	1/16	2/16	3/16
Maximum leakage	0.030	0.040	0.040	0.050	0.410	0.410	0.050	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.060
Technical specification limit	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Reactor Coolant System Leakage	4/16	5/16	6/16	7/16	8/16	9/16	10/16	11/16	12/16	1/17	2/17	3/17
Maximum leakage	0.050	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.060	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040
Technical specification limit	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0


<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>
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Licensee Comments:

9/15: August and September RCS leak rate elevated due to reactor vessel O-ring leakage which was repaired in a planed maintenance outage in September.

**Drill/Exercise Performance**



Thresholds: White < 90.0% Yellow < 70.0%

**Notes**


Drill/Exercise Performance	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Successful opportunities	71.0	146.0	28.0	26.0	62.0	103.0	93.0	23.0
Total opportunities	72.0	147.0	28.0	26.0	64.0	105.0	94.0	24.0

**Indicator value**                    **98.6% 98.9% 98.8% 98.9% 98.8% 98.8% 98.6% 98.6%**

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Licensee Comments: none

**ERO Drill Participation**



Thresholds: White < 80.0% Yellow < 60.0%

**Notes**


ERO Drill Participation	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Participating Key personnel	104.0	105.0	103.0	103.0	101.0	100.0	104.0	108.0
Total Key personnel	104.0	105.0	103.0	103.0	101.0	100.0	104.0	108.0

**Indicator value**                    **100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%**

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Licensee Comments: none

### Alert & Notification System



Thresholds: White < 94.0% Yellow < 90.0%

#### Notes


Alert & Notification System	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
Successful siren-tests	917	1105	1046	1188	1050	1081	1201	1203
Total sirens-tests	917	1109	1046	1188	1050	1081	1204	1204

Indicator value                    99.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 99.9%

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Licensee Comments: none

### Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness



Thresholds: White > 2.0 Yellow > 5.0

**Notes**


Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	2Q/15	3Q/15	4Q/15	1Q/16	2Q/16	3Q/16	4Q/16	1Q/17
High radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very high radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unintended exposure occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

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Licensee Comments: none



### RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent



Thresholds: White > 1.0 Yellow > 3.0

**Notes**

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent 2Q/15 3Q/15 4Q/15 1Q/16 2Q/16 3Q/16 4Q/16 1Q/17

RETS/ODCM occurrences                    0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0

**Indicator value**                            0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0

[TOP](#)

Licensee Comments: none

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page.

Current data as of: May 5, 2017

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017