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Hatch 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

2Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 30, 2016

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Unit Downpower Caused by RFP Vent Line Failure

A self-revealing finding was identified when the licensee failed to install a reactor feed pump (RFP) vent line weld in accordance with plant procedures resulting in a failure that required an unplanned Unit 1 power reduction greater than 20%.

Failure to install the correct weld thickness on the unit 1 "B" RFP vent line, as required by procedures, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the 'Equipment Performance' attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that an unplanned reactor power reduction was required from 100 percent to 60 percent RTP. The inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because there was not a reactor trip or loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the 'Resolution' aspect of the problem identification and resolution area, because the organization did not take effective corrective actions to address the previous weld configuration issue. [P.3]

Inspection Report# : 2016003 (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits

An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that personnel subject to work hour controls did not exceed 72 hours in a work week. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 10214872 and restored compliance when the affected individuals received an adequate rest period.

The failure to ensure that work hours for personnel subject to work hour controls were tracked in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to appropriately implement work hour limitations for "covered" workers could adversely impact the conduct and oversight of work on safety significant components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause any known effects to plant safety due to worker fatigue. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to assess which workers were subject to work hour limits. [H.13]
Inspection Report# : 2016003 (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance: G Dec 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Establish Icing Controls on CAD Subsystem

An NRC-identified NCV of Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4, "Procedures," was identified when procedures did not include inspection criteria for ice buildup of the Unit 1 nitrogen storage tank piping. The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action plan as CR10296584, and performed de-icing activities to remove the ice buildup.

Failure to establish controls to ensure that ice buildup on the Unit 1 CAD subsystem piping did not exceed ten inches was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, ice buildup on the CAD system may lead to CAD subsystem inoperability. The finding screened as Green, because the CAD subsystem remained operable. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the 'Initiation' aspect of the problem identification and resolution area, because the licensee did not initiate a condition report upon initially identifying the issue. [P.1]

Inspection Report# : 2016004 (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous

Current data as of : August 03, 2017

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