Beaver Valley 1 – Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings

2Q/2017 – Plant Inspection Findings

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Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2016
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Inoperable 'A' River Water Train
A self-revealing NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for FENOC's failure to assure that activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with procedures. Specifically, FENOC failed to follow NOP-OP-1001, "Clearance/Tagging Program," and clearance 1W11-30-MNM-002 when removing the clearance for the 'A' bay of the main intake structure. This resulted in disabling the automatic start capability of the standby 'C' river water pump and made the 'A' river water train inoperable and unavailable. FENOC's immediate corrective action was to rack the breaker for the 'A' river water pump to the disconnect position, which cleared the annunciator and restored operability to the 'A' train of river water. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2016-14253.

The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, FENOC incorrectly racked the 'A' river water pump breaker onto the 1AE 4160 volts alternating current (VAC) safety bus while the 'C' river water pump was already racked onto the bus. This caused the 'A' train of river water to be inoperable and unavailable because the automatic start capability of the 'C' pump was disabled. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system and/or function, an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or an actual loss of function of one non-technical specification train designated as high safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because the operators did not plan for the possibility of

mistakes and did not implement appropriate error-reduction tools.

Inspection Report# : 2016004 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Sep 30, 2016
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality Leads to Inoperable Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for FENOC's failure to assure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, FENOC failed to promptly identify and correct a negative trend in setpoint drift and "as found" dropout voltage values in the AB 27N model 411T6375HF 4160 volts alternating current (VAC) and 480 VAC emergency bus degraded voltage relays. FENOC's immediate corrective actions included recalibrating or replacing the relays and entering the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2016-12018.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, FENOC's failure to promptly identify and address a negative trend in dropout voltage setpoint drift and "as found" values resulted in the reduced reliability of safety related bus degraded voltage relays (seven surveillance failures and inoperable degraded bus relays between 2011 and 2016). Inoperable emergency bus degraded voltage relays could lead to damage of safety-related equipment during a loss of offsite power. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not represent a loss of system and/or function, an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of function of one non-technical specification trains designated as high safety significant, and did not involve a loss or degradation of equipment designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Trending, because FENOC did not periodically analyze the results of the degraded voltage relay surveillances to provide early indication of a declining trend. [P.4].
Inspection Report# : 2016003 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity
Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety
Security
The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.

Miscellaneous
Current data as of : August 03, 2017

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