

Prairie Island 2

4Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 24, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

21 safeguards diesel exhaust fan connectors not fully engaged or aligned

A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to ensure the 21 safeguards diesel exhaust fan main contact connectors were fully engaged and aligned as required per electrical maintenance procedures to ensure proper operation of the breaker. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee aligned and re-engaged the main contact connectors as necessary. In addition, the licensee ensured maintenance personnel were aware of the operating experience to prevent the same issue from occurring in the future. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 1525844.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and the breaker failure led to the inoperability of the 21 safeguards diesel exhaust fan and impacted the availability of the 22 cooling water system diesel driven pump. This finding represented a loss of the 22 safeguards diesel cooling water pump function for longer than the Technical Specification allowed

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outage time of 7 days and therefore required a detailed risk evaluation. The regional senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation of this finding using the Prairie Island Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model revision 8.19 and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not indicative of current performance.

Inspection Report# : [2016007](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 24, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to perform required operability evaluations

A finding of very low safety significance with two examples and an associated non-cited violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to accomplish the requirements of procedure FP-OP-OL-01, "Operability/Functionality Determination," Revisions 14 and 15. Specifically, on two

occasions, the licensee failed to properly evaluate potential operability concerns associated with the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) day tanks and the Unit 2 train 'A' cooling water (CL) system piping. The licensee entered the issues into the Corrective Action Program as Action Requests 1525842 and 1526070. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to accomplish the requirements of procedure FP-OP-OL-01, "Operability/Functionality Determination," Revisions 14 and 15, to properly evaluate the operability issues associated with the Unit 2 EDG day tank fuel oil level and the Unit 2 CL system piping (both safety-related, mitigating systems) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency, with two examples, was determined to be more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Equipment Performance (for the Unit 2 EDGs) and Protection against External Factors (for the Unit 2 CL piping) and adversely affected the Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems to respond to initiating events. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," and determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) since the inspectors answered "Yes" to Question 1 of Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions." The inspectors concluded that this issue was cross-cutting in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution in the aspect of Evaluation. As defined in IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," this aspect states, "The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance." Specifically, the licensee had not thoroughly evaluated the operability issues associated with the Unit 2 EDG day tank levels and the Unit 2 CL piping structural integrity. [P.2](Section 4OA2.1.b(2)(B))
Inspection Report# : [2016007](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Feb 12, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Maintain Cold Shutdown Repair Procedure (Section 1R05.9b)

The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1.d for the licensee's failure to maintain Procedure F5 Appendix B. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the procedure to reflect physical changes made in the plant that resulted in the licensee not being able to perform the procedure as written. The licensee entered the issue into their Corrective Action Program, and planned to update drawings and label components in the field and include the proper tools to accomplish the actions specified in the procedure.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because the licensee's failure to maintain Procedure F5 Appendix B would have resulted in a delay in achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not impact the licensee's ability to reach hot shutdown. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it because it was not reflective of current performance. (Section 1R05.9b)

Inspection Report# : [2016008](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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