

## North Anna 1 4Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

#### **Inadequate Translation of Design Calculations into Compensatory Measures when Removing Missile Barriers Could Result in EDGs and SBO Diesel Inoperable (Section 1R13)**

Green. The NRC identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the inadequate translation of design calculations into compensatory measures when removing missile barriers. The inadequate translation of design calculations into compensatory measures when removing required passive missile shields is a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the inadequate compensatory measure resulted in the licensee having to make required changes to the compensatory measures in order to resolve missile protection concerns. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 4, "External Events Screening Questions," dated July 1, 2012. The finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the safety function of the onsite emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the function of the station blackout (SBO) diesel were assumed to be completely failed due to inadequate compensatory missile protection measures for a high wind event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the conservative bias attribute because individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop [H.14]. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR)1034958. (Section 1R13)

Inspection Report# : [2016002](#) (*pdf*)

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### Barrier Integrity

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### Emergency Preparedness

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### Occupational Radiation Safety

## Public Radiation Safety

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### Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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### Miscellaneous

Last modified : February 01, 2017