

Watts Bar 2 3Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Jun 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Follow Operability Procedure Results in Potential Inoperability of 2A-A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s failure to follow procedure OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Condition for Operation Tracking, Revision 22. Specifically, the 2A-A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFW) was potentially inoperable in mode 3 due to inadequate compensatory measures that were being controlled outside of the operability process.

The failure to follow procedure OPDP-8 requirements for compensatory measures needed to achieve operability was determined to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety, involving safety-related SSCs. Specifically, failure to appropriately use the operability process when measures must be established to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions can lead to SSC inoperability. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. Traditional enforcement, (i.e., the use of severity levels), was used since the cornerstone associated with this finding is not ready for tracking under the reactor oversight process (ROP). Traditional Enforcement actions for reactors in the operating phase are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. However, traditional enforcement actions, for cornerstones not transitioned to the ROP, are assigned cross-cutting aspects in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 2517 . The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Work Management in the Human Performance area because the minor maintenance work order created to compensate for the oil loss from the 2A-A MDAFW pump was never reviewed by operations, which could have identified the out of process error [H.5].

Inspection Report# : [2016002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: N/A Jun 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Perform TDAFW Surveillance in Accordance With Procedures

The NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s failure to follow the surveillance test program procedure by making adjustments to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump control system during the performance of a surveillance instruction.

The failure to follow the surveillance test program procedure by making adjustments to the TDAFW pump control system during the performance of a surveillance was determined to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because making adjustments to the TDAFW pump control system during the performance of a surveillance instruction could invalidate the test and result in the TDAFW pump being inappropriately declared operable. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV, because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a QA criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. Traditional Enforcement actions for reactors in the operating phase are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. However, traditional enforcement actions, for cornerstones not transitioned to the ROP, are assigned cross-cutting aspects in accordance with IMC 2517. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Conservative Bias in the Human Performance area because numerous individuals were aware the speed adjustment had been made while completing the surveillance instruction but did not question the appropriateness of that adjustment until prompted by NRC inspectors. [H.14]

Inspection Report# : [2016002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: N/A Jun 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure Results in Overspeed Trip of the 2C-S Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

A self-revealed Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensee’s failure to follow procedure 0-MI-1.003, Disassembly, Inspection, and Reassembly of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine. Specifically, the valve stem spring coil gap was not set in accordance with 0-MI-1.003 resulting in sluggish governor response to speed control demands, which caused the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump to trip on electrical overspeed when the level control valves (LCVs) were closed.

The failure set the correct coil gap for the valve stem spring coils in accordance with procedure 0-MI-1.003 6.5.3 [22] was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety involving safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The finding was a SL IV violation because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. Traditional Enforcement actions for reactors in the operating phase are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. However, traditional enforcement actions, for cornerstones not transitioned to the ROP, are assigned cross-cutting aspects in accordance with IMC 2517. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the Human Performance area as defined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0310, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the procedure that set the coil spring gap lacked sufficient detail and rigor to ensure that the coil gap would be set appropriately by the technicians. [H.1]

Inspection Report# : [2016002](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : December 08, 2016