Farley 2
2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Feb 04, 2016
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Verify Design Assumptions Associated with the Operation of the Atmospheric Relief Valves
Green. The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to verify design assumptions associated with the operation of the atmospheric relief valves (ARVs) following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). The licensee failed to verify that all credited methods of ARV operation as specified in procedure FNP-1-EEP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," Rev. 27 could be performed within the FSAR specified time limit of 30 minutes. Upon identification of the issue, the licensee initiated Technical Evaluation 952125 and conducted two simulated scenarios using the two credited means of operating the ARVs following a SGTR. The licensee was able to show that the actions could be performed within the specified time, although the time results were marginal and did not account for operator error or repeatability. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10193323.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was not greater than green because it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality as documented in CR 10193323. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R17.b)
Inspection Report# : 2016007 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Dec 31, 2015
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions for the 2A Service Water Pump Motor Cable Connections
A self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4 "Procedures," was identified for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for installing the 2A service water (SW) pump motor cable connections. As a result, the connection degraded over time, which degraded the Raychem insulation that caused the circuit breaker to trip on overcurrent. The licensee repaired the 2A SW pump motor cable connection under WO SNC717176 and returned the pump to service on October 16, 2015. This event was captured in the licensee's corrective action program with CR 10135057.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective because the inadequate procedure resulted in the pump circuit breaker trip due to an overcurrent condition. The significance of this finding was

determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution area. [P.2]

Inspection Report# : 2015004 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 29, 2016