

## Farley 1

# 2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

---

## Initiating Events

**Significance:** G Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **Failure to properly implement design change**

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct adequate functional testing during implementation of a design change. Incorrect installation of protective relaying circuitry for the 1B Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) was not identified during functional testing and contributed to a trip of the 1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). As a result, Unit 1 was shutdown to hot standby as required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.4.4 Condition A.

The licensee's failure to properly implement a design change that included adequate functional testing of the 1B UAT was more than minor because it adversely affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations in that inadequate functional testing of the 1B UAT contributed to the loss of the 1B UAT and resulted in a partial loss of RCS flow when the 1B RCP tripped in Mode 1. The significance of this finding was evaluated using the initiating events screening questions of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 1, 2012. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in an automatic reactor trip. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of "work management" in the human performance area (H.5), because the planning, controlling, and executing of work activities were inadequate.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

---

## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Perform TS Surveillance Requirements for Safety-Related Batteries (40A2)**

Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 "Procedures", was identified with two examples. The licensee failed to implement and maintain surveillance test procedures for surveillance requirements (SR) 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.2. As a result, the licensee failed to perform actions to satisfy TS surveillance requirements and the battery terminal fasteners corroded and degraded over time.

The licensee's failure to implement and maintain procedure FNP-1-STP-905.0 to meet the surveillance requirements for the Unit 1 "1B" 125VDC auxiliary building battery was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency were more than minor because, if left uncorrected, they had the potential result in excessive corrosion buildup on the battery cell-to-cell and terminal connections which could have led to the inability of the battery to perform its safety-

related function. The significance of the finding was very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not represent a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Resources in the Human Performance area, because the licensee's leaders failed to ensure procedures used to conduct TS surveillance requirements for the "1B" 125 VDC auxiliary building battery were adequate and performed correctly. [H.1] (Section 40A2)

Inspection Report# : [2016002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Feb 04, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Verify Design Assumptions Associated with the Operation of the Atmospheric Relief Valves**

Green. The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to verify design assumptions associated with the operation of the atmospheric relief valves (ARVs) following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). The licensee failed to verify that all credited methods of ARV operation as specified in procedure FNP-1-EEP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," Rev. 27 could be performed within the FSAR specified time limit of 30 minutes. Upon identification of the issue, the licensee initiated Technical Evaluation 952125 and conducted two simulated scenarios using the two credited means of operating the ARVs following a SGTR. The licensee was able to show that the actions could be performed within the specified time, although the time results were marginal and did not account for operator error or repeatability. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10193323.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was not greater than green because it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality as documented in CR 10193323. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R17.b)

Inspection Report# : [2016007](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Evaluate or Test EMI/RFI Effect for Solid State Protection System Power Supply**

An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the licensee's failure to evaluate or test the Electro Magnetic Interference/Radio Frequency Interference (EMI/RFI) effects of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) power supplies to ensure adequacy of design. The licensee initiated a Condition Report (CR) 10078615, EMI/RFI Testing for SSPS Power Supplies, to address this issue. The licensee performed an Immediate Determination of Operability (IDO) and Prompt Determination of Operability (PDO) and determined the power supplies were operable but nonconforming.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and was associated with the cornerstone attribute of Design Control. Failure to evaluate or test the EMI/RFI of SSPS components could cause spurious actuations or failure to actuate. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the reactor protection system's tripping signal to initiate a reactor scram because it would be limited to a single channel at a time, did not involve control manipulation that added positive reactivity, and did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. No

cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because it was not indicative of current licensee performance.  
Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

---

## **Barrier Integrity**

---

## **Emergency Preparedness**

---

## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

---

## **Public Radiation Safety**

---

## **Security**

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

---

## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : August 29, 2016