

Clinton

2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Dec 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Follow Station Procedures for Plant Activities

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to ensure that activities were accomplished in accordance with prescribed procedures as required by station procedure HU-AA-104-101 "Procedure Use and Adherence." Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples where the licensee failed to adhere to prescribed station procedures when performing activities in the plant. The licensee placed both issues in their corrective action program as AR 02600726 and addressed the nonconformances created by the failure to follow the procedures. The licensee planned to perform an apparent cause evaluation to determine why there was an adverse trend related to procedure adherence.

The inspectors determined that the failure to perform activities in accordance with prescribed procedures as required by station procedure HU-AA-104-101, "Procedure Use and Adherence," was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors identified two instances where the licensee failed to follow procedures when performing activities in the plant. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by not performing activities in accordance with a procedure the licensee could manipulate equipment and challenge the operators, and cause unexpected transients. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Initiating Events cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not cause a reactor trip or the loss of mitigation equipment and it did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenging the unknown which stated, individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Contrary to this, when challenged with unknown conditions, the licensee did not stop and properly evaluate the issues before proceeding, resulting in adverse impacts to station equipment. (H.11)

Inspection Report# : [2015004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE LEAVES CONTROL ROOM CABINET DOORS UNATTENDED IN SEISMICALLY UNANALYSED CONDITION

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to maintain control room doors in a seismically analyzed condition, in accordance with station procedure CPS 1014.11, "6900/4160/480v Switchgear/Circuit Breaker Operability Program," Revision 5a. Specifically, on several occasions the licensee failed

to maintain control room cabinet doors in seismically qualified positions, while performing maintenance or trouble shooting activities, by leaving the doors open and unattended. The licensee documented the issue in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as action request (AR) 02518477. The licensee has revised the station procedure to ensure control room cabinet doors either remain latched closed or are completely removed when unattended and has issued a standing order to ensure the requirements are reinforced.

The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, it was associated with the configuration control performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations and is therefore a finding. Specifically, leaving the control doors in a seismically unanalyzed condition could challenge critical safety functions during a seismic event. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Initiating Events cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA), cause a reactor trip, involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or caused, an initiating event and did not affect mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of resources where leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the personnel performing maintenance and troubleshooting had adequate documentation in written work instructions to maintain control room cabinets in seismically analyzed conditions.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (pdf)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Operability Determination Failed to Examine Test Failures

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions Procedures and Drawings," for the failure to follow Station Procedure OP-AA-108-115, "Operability Determinations," Revision 16. Specifically, after valve 1SX027C, a valve required for residual heat removal operability, failed a surveillance test, the licensee did not base the operability determination on a detailed examination of the deficiency and did not document a basis for why a reasonable expectation of operability existed. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as Action Request (AR) 02553168 and AR 02558101. The licensee revised the in-service testing program evaluation for valve 1SX027C and documented additional details to support declaring the valve operable.

The inspectors determined the failure to follow Station Procedure OP-AA-108-115 was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correctly perform an operability evaluation for valve 1SX027C had the potential to allow an inoperable condition to go undetected. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and

determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding: was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; did not represent a loss of system and/or function; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time; and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of resources, where leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, Station Procedure CPS 9053.04, provided guidance that the valve could remain operable for 96 hours without providing an appropriate basis.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Inadequate Extent of Condition Associate with an ACE

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," for the failure to follow a Quality Assurance Program implementing procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an adequate extent of condition review as required by PI-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program," while evaluating a lack of proficiency in applying the licensing basis for structures, systems and components (SSCs) when implementing the 50.59 process. The licensee documented this issue in their CAP as AR 02641397. Immediate corrective actions included a review of the extent of condition performed by the engineering department and a recommended action of expanding the scope of the review to include additional 50.59 evaluations.

The inspectors determined the failure to follow a Quality Assurance Program implementing procedure was more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if the extent of condition review is too narrowly assessed there is the potential for other safety significant systems to have been impacted by a lack of proficiency in applying the licensing basis. As a result, the SSCs may not perform their intended safety function as defined in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against all cornerstones and determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no reasonable indication that the criteria in Appendix A were met. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of procedure adherence, where individuals follow processes, procedures and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee did not effectively adhere to all available portions of CAP procedures, which led to a narrowly focused extent of condition.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Feb 04, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Perform and Adequate Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (Section 40A4)

The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to follow Step 4.3.4 of procedure PI-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program Procedure." Specifically, the licensee failed to perform Class "B" Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EACE) 2381871, "1SX01PC Failed to Start for Testing," in accordance with PI-AA-125-1003, "Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual," because they: (1) failed to analyze each causal factor to determine contributing causes as required by Step 4.4.1.2; and

(2) failed to assign an effectiveness review for the EACE as required by Step 4.4.9.1. The licensee entered this finding into their Corrective Action Program and revised their EACE to: (1) include three contributing causes; (2) upgrade a corrective action to a corrective action to prevent recurrence; and (3) assign an effectiveness review to determine the effectiveness of the corrective action to prevent recurrence.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, an effectiveness review is required to provide assurance that the Division 3 SX pump design change is successful in preventing recurrence of pump failure before another pump failure occurs, which would be a more significant safety concern. The finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and screened as having very-low safety significance (Green) because although the finding is a deficiency ultimately affecting the design or qualification of the Division 3 SX pump, the pump still maintains its operability. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance (“Conservative Bias”) because although a “B” Apparent Cause Evaluation may have been allowable for investigating the failure of the Division 3 SX pump, had an “A” Root Cause Analysis been performed, a more rigorous investigation process would have been used to identify contributing causes, assign corrective actions, and identify effectiveness reviews for the failure of the Division 3 SX pump. [H.14] (Section 4OA4.02.03.f)

Inspection Report# : [2016008](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Perform Activities Affecting Quality in Accordance with Prescribed Procedures

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions Procedures and Drawings,” for the failure to ensure that activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with the appropriate instructions, procedures and drawings. Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples where the licensee failed to perform activities affecting quality in accordance with prescribed procedures. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02600726 and planned to perform an apparent cause evaluation to address the trend. Separate action requests were also written and immediate corrective actions were taken for each identified example to address the nonconformances created by the failure to follow procedures.

The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with the appropriate instructions, procedures and drawings as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors identified two instances where the licensee failed to follow procedures resulting in impacts to safety related equipment and processes. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by not performing activities affecting quality in accordance with a procedure the licensee could manipulate equipment and challenge the operators by causing unexpected transients or impact safety related equipment. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, “Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 1, issued May 9, 2014, the finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function, it did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its allowed outage time, it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment during shutdown for equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours, and it did not degrade a functional auto-isolation of residual heat removal (RHR) on low reactor vessel level. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenging the unknown which states, individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Contrary to this, when challenged with uncertain conditions, the licensee did not stop and properly

evaluate the issues before proceeding, resulting in adverse impacts to safety related equipment and activities. (H.11)

Inspection Report# : [2015004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Oct 09, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Generate Issue Reports for Conditions Adverse to Quality

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance, and an associated NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," for the failure to perform activities in accordance with procedure PI-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 2, which was a Quality Assurance Program implementing procedure. Specifically, the inspectors identified six examples where the licensee failed to generate IRs for conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) as required by PI-AA-125, until prompted by the inspectors. The licensee documented the issue in the CAP as IR 2518477, and planned on reviewing the apparent cause evaluation to determine if additional actions needed to be taken.

The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by not identifying and documenting conditions adverse to quality the issues would not go through the screening and review process in accordance with the corrective action procedure, which could impact the identification of conditions affecting operability. The finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and determined to be of very low safety significance because the it did not represent a loss of safety system or function, it did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train of two separate trains for greater than its allowed outage time and it did not represent a loss of function of a non-technical specification system designated as highly safety-significant within the licensee's Maintenance Rule Program for greater than 24 hours. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of identification where the organization implements a CAP with a threshold for identifying issues and individuals identify issues completely, accurately and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify issues completely, accurately and in a timely manner, causing them to not recognize issues as CAQs, and therefore not follow their process for handling these issues.

Inspection Report# : [2015007](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT AND COMPLY WITH TRANSIENT EQUIPMENT/MATERIALS PROGRAM

The inspectors identified a green finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" for the licensee's failure to implement and comply with station procedure CPS 1019.05, "Transient Equipment/Materials," Revision 23, to ensure that transient equipment and materials are controlled so there is no impact to safe operation of plant equipment. Specifically, on numerous occasions the inspectors identified equipment and materials improperly staged, improperly secured or in areas without engineering evaluations. The licensee documented the issue in the CAP as action requests (AR) 02507167 and AR 02529227. In each occasion identified by the inspectors the licensee subsequently removed the items identified to restore compliance with the station procedures.

The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to implement and comply with station procedures to ensure that transient equipment and materials are controlled so there is no impact to safe operation of plant equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Screening," dated

September 7, 2012, because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, transient equipment and material in proximity of safety related components has the potential of impacting these components during a seismic event, potentially rendering them unable to fulfill their safety function. The performance deficiency is also associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that response to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of system or function, it did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for > its TS allowed outage time and it did not represent an actual loss of one or more not TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule program. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of field presence where leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, reinforcing standards and expectation. Deviations from standards and expectations are corrected promptly. Specifically, after various examples of material placement being an issue, the licensee didn't perform in field observations, caching and reinforcement of standards and expectations in the identified areas.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Identify a Degraded Safety-Related Support

. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that a safety-related support associated with control room ventilation 'B' was degraded to the point it no longer conformed to the seismic analysis and required an evaluation to determine whether it was still capable of performing its safety function during a seismic event. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP as AR 2639317. The licensee's immediate corrective actions included performing an evaluation that concluded the remaining three supports would be able to withstand the stresses imposed during a seismic event and creating an action to update the seismic calculation to incorporate the evaluation performed for the degraded support. The licensee also planned to re-apply a coating to the supports as well as research and install insulation that was more breathable to minimize moisture accumulation and preclude any further degradation.

The inspectors determined that the failure to identify a condition adverse to quality in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by failing to identify the support was degraded, and correct the condition, the loss of material due to corrosion could potentially progress to the point where the remaining supports would no longer be able to perform their safety function. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against radiological conditions or a smoke or toxic atmosphere. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution, in the aspect of evaluation, which states, "The organization

thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance.” Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the issue identified by the inspectors and therefore did not recognize the degradation on the supports constituted a condition adverse to quality.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Assess and Manage Risk Increase for a Proposed Maintenance Activity

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) was identified on January 20, 2016, due to the licensee’s failure to assess and manage the risk increase from a proposed maintenance activity. Specifically, the licensee failed to manage the risk associated with racking out the continuous containment purge (CCP) ‘A’ breaker, which resulted in the loss of both CCP trains, and led to an increase in primary to secondary containment differential pressure which exceeded the TS value. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as AR 02614832. The proposed corrective actions to address this issue included creating a checklist to ensure validation of initial conditions is performed and providing training that reinforces the need to properly screen work order tasks with the appropriate risk factors.

The inspectors determined that the failure to assess and manage the risk increase of a proposed maintenance activity, as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4), was more than minor because it was associated with the maintenance procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, by not properly assessing the risk of racking out the CCP ‘A’ breaker the licensee did not recognize the CCP ‘B’ train would be impacted, which resulted in exceeding the TS value for primary to secondary containment differential pressure. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” and Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power,” issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical reactor containment, containment isolation system or heat removal components and it did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, in the aspect of challenging the unknown, which states, “individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions; risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.” Specifically, when the licensee was preparing the work package for maintenance on the CCP system it was uncertain what activities had already been completed as part of a concurrent evolution. Instead of stopping and validating the configuration of plant equipment, assumptions were made, and the risk of the activity was not properly assessed or managed.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Feb 11, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Perform Adequate Evaluation of Crane and Crane Support Structure Elements

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” was identified by the inspectors for the failure of the licensee’s design control measures to provide for the verifying or checking the adequacy of design of the fuel handling building crane and crane support structure elements. Specifically, calculations involving the crane trolley rails, crane rail clips, and crane rail clip bolts had not been verified or checked to ensure the design basis requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1-2004; American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition; and Updated Safety

Analysis Report (USAR) Section 3.8.4.5 were included. The licensee documented these issues in its corrective action program and initiated actions to restore compliance.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern if independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) loading was conducted. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," Appendix A, Exhibit 3 – Barrier Integrity Screening Questions (Section D). Based on answering "No" to all the questions in Exhibit 3, Section D, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors identified a Human Performance, Design Margin (H.6) cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the crane trolley rails, crane rail clips, and crane rail clip bolts reflected the intended design margins of the design and licensing basis.

Inspection Report# : [2016010](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: 6 Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO OBTAIN A LICENSE AMENDMENT PRIOR TO MAKING MODIFICATIONS TO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1), "Changes, Tests, and Experiments" for the licensee's failure to provide a written evaluation, which provided the basis for determining that the change to the secondary containment completed on December 18, 2014 did not require a license amendment. Specifically, the licensee made a change pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c), to the secondary containment, and eliminated the tornado wind and tornado missile loading condition from the FB Railroad Airlock (the enclosure walls and roof) and associated outer door (1SD1-31) Seismic Category I requirements and did not provide a written evaluation to provide a basis for the determination that this change would not result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system or component important to safety.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to provide a written evaluation, which provided the basis for determining that the change to the secondary containment completed on December 18, 2014 did not require a license amendment was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee made a change pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c) to the secondary containment and eliminated the tornado wind and tornado missile loading condition from the FB Railroad Airlock (the enclosure walls and roof) and associated outer door and did not provide a written evaluation to provide a basis for the determination that this change would not result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. In addition, the associated violation was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine if the changes to secondary containment would have required NRC prior approval. The licensee documented the issue in the CAP as action request (AR) 02534694. The licensee is complying with technical specifications anytime the inner railroad bay door is opened by entering the applicable action statements, evaluating weather conditions and impact to plant risk and establishing the necessary mitigating actions required prior to opening the door. Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the SDP because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. However, if possible, the underlying technical issue is evaluated under the SDP to determine the severity of the violation. In this case, the inspectors used IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the barrier integrity cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance

(Green) because the finding did not represent a degradation only of the radiological barrier function for the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system nor did it represent a degradation of the function of the control room against smoke or toxic atmosphere. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of procedure adherence where individuals follow processes, procedures and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the 50.59 regulatory process as defined in station procedure LS-AA-104-1000, "50.59 Resource Manual," Revision 9.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO ENTER APPROPRIATE TS ACTION STATEMENT FOR INOPERABLE RADIATION MONITORS DURING OPDRV ACTIVITIES

The inspectors identified a green finding and associated NCV of T.S. 3.3.6.1 "Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation" and 3.3.6.2 "Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," for the failure to enter the appropriate action statement and take the associated actions related to inoperable containment radiation monitor instrumentation during operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel. Specifically, with the containment ventilation dampers closed, the containment radiation monitor instrumentation would not be able to perform its safety function of sending a containment isolation signal for elevated containment radiation levels as required during OPDRVs. At the time of discovery the licensee had already concluded OPDRV activities and was therefore no longer in a mode of applicability. The licensee documented the issue in the CAP as action request (AR) 2566708. When this issue was identified the maintenance on the VR/VQ system was complete and no OPDRVs were in progress, therefore the T.S. noncompliance was no longer in effect.

The inspectors determined that the failure to enter T.S. 3.3.6.1 and 3.3.6.2 when the radiation monitor instrumentation was not able to perform its safety function during an OPDRV, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that when the containment ventilation dampers were closed, the radiation monitors could not detect the radiation levels in primary containment and therefore could not fulfill their safety function of sending containment isolation signals in the case of elevated radiation levels in containment. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because, it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the automatic containment isolation signal function of the radiation monitors was impacted when the containment ventilation dampers were closed during OPDRV operations. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix G, Attachment 1, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated May 9, 2014, the finding was screened against the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and determined to need a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represents a degradation of the ability to close or isolate the containment. Using Appendix G Exhibit 4, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," the Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) determined that the finding degraded the ability to close or isolate the containment per Section B, "Containment Barrier," Question 6. Therefore, the evaluation was continued using IMC 0609 Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process." The SRA determined this to be a "Type B" finding, because it was related to a degraded condition that had implications for containment integrity without affecting the likelihood of core damage. The SRA used Section 6.2 of Appendix H, "Approach for Assessing Type B Findings at Shutdown." Based on information from the inspectors, during all OPDRV time windows, the reactor water level was confirmed to be greater than the minimum level required for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies (i.e., greater than 22'8" above the flange). This plant condition meets the definition of "Plant Operating State 3 (POS 3) of Appendix H. Therefore, based on the plant being in POS 3 during the OPDRV time windows, the finding screens as Green based on Step 2.1 of Section 6.2 of Appendix H. The

inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of conservative bias where individuals use decision making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simple allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, the licensee relied solely on the successful completion of the surveillance requirements to determine the radiation monitor instrumentation was operable rather than considering the impact the closed dampers would have on their ability to fulfill their safety function.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for failing to report an event or condition, that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, to the NRC within eight hours. Specifically, control room operators placed both divisions of reactor water cleanup differential flow instruments in bypass, which rendered the instruments inoperable and resulted in a loss of the isolation function. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as AR 02645140 and created an action to submit an licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

The inspectors determined that the failure to report an event or condition, that at the time of discovery could have

prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, to the NRC within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with IMC 0612 and the Enforcement Manual. Violations of 10 CFR 50.72 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. The inspectors reviewed Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this violation was Severity Level IV because the licensee's failure to make the report, as required by 10 CFR 50.72, did not cause the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake substantial further inquiry. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned because cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement only violations.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Report Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for failing to report to the NRC, within 60 days of discovery, a condition prohibited by the plant's TS. Specifically, the licensee failed to notify the NRC of two instances where they failed to comply with TS 3.3.6.1 and TS 3.3.6.2 and enter the limiting condition for operation action statements when required. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as AR 02619114 and subsequently issued a licensee event report on March 16, 2016.

The inspectors determined that the failure to report a condition prohibited by the plant's TS as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), within 60 days of discovery, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with IMC 0612 and the Enforcement Manual. Violations of 10 CFR 50.73 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. The inspectors reviewed Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this violation was Severity Level IV because the licensee's failure to make the report, as required by 10 CFR 50.73, did not cause the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake substantial further inquiry. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned because cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement only violations.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO UPDATE THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) - HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEM

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.71(e), "Periodic Update of the FSAR", for the licensee's failure to update the FSAR after installing a hydrogen water chemistry system into the plant to reduce rates of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in recirculation piping and reactor vessel internals. Specifically, the licensee did not update Section 5.4.15, "Hydrogen Water Chemistry System" of the FSAR to include a design basis and description of process and system used to periodically injection noble metals. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as AR 02594259 and is revising the FSAR include additional the design basis and additional system description for noble metal injection.

The inspectors determined that the failure to update the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Periodic Update of the FSAR", with the design basis and description of the process and system used to periodically injection noble metals was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC inspection manual chapter 0612 and the NRC enforcement manual. Violations of 10 CFR 50.71 (e) are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. The inspectors reviewed section 6.1.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement

Policy and determined this violation was Severity :Level IV because the licensee's failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) had not yet resulted in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. No cross cutting aspect was assigned because cross cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement only violations. Inspection Report# : [2015004](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : August 29, 2016