

## Waterford 3

### 1Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

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## Initiating Events

**Significance:** G Oct 03, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Properly Pre-Plan and Perform Maintenance on the Core Element Assembly Calculators**

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a associated with the licensee's failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance in accordance with EN-DC-153, "Preventative Maintenance Component Classification." The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2015-06438. In their review of the event, the licensee found that, as part of a maintenance-optimization program in 2008, they had changed the classification of the CEACs from "High Critical" to "Low Critical." Consequently, the licensee discontinued the preventive-maintenance programs that had previously affected the CEACs, and had begun replacing them only as required. The licensee restored compliance by properly classifying the components as High Critical in accordance with EN-DC-153, Revision 2, and by initiating development of appropriate preventative-maintenance for the CEACs. In addition, the licensee initiated work to improve the reliability of the CEACs, including reviewing card refurbishments to enhance circuit card reliability.

The failure to pre-plan and perform preventative maintenance on CEAC components as required by EN-DC-153 step 5.2[6](c)(4) was a performance deficiency which was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore is a finding, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, inappropriate preventative maintenance on the circuit cards associated with the CEACs ultimately contributed to a plant trip on October 3, 2015. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2008, the inspectors concluded that the finding does not reflect current licensee performance and therefore did not assign a cross-cutting aspect.

Inspection Report# : [2015004](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Apr 24, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Identify and Secure Potential Tornado-Borne Missile Hazards**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, for the licensee's failure to follow procedure OP-901-521, "Severe Weather and Flooding," Revision 313. Specifically, on April 24, 2015, the licensee failed to assess and control potential tornado-borne missile hazards on-site as

required by the procedure. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2015-02556. The licensee restored compliance by securing the identified hazards.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, in the event of a tornado at the site, the loose items could have become missiles with the potential to initiate a loss of off-site power adversely impacting safety-related equipment and personnel. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 4, "External Event Screening Questions," dated June 12, 2012. The finding required a detailed evaluation because it had the potential to degrade at least one train of a system that supports a risk significant system or function. Therefore, a senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was less than  $1.1E-7$ /year. The finding was not significant with respect to the large early release frequency. The dominant core damage sequences included tornado induced losses of off-site power, and random and common cause diesel generator failures. The ability to recover the diesel generators helped to minimize the significance of the event. The finding has a Resolution cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address the issue after the inspectors identified it during previous tornado watches in 2013 and 2014.

Inspection Report# : [2015002](#) (pdf)

## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Assess and Manage the Increase in Risk from Emergent Maintenance Activities**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," section a(4), for the licensee's failure to assess and manage the increase in risk during an auxiliary component cooling water system work window. Specifically, the licensee failed to re-assess risk when a dry cooling tower fan in the component cooling water system was declared unavailable during the ongoing auxiliary component cooling water system work window. As a result, for approximately 6 hours, on-line risk was maintained as Green when it should have been elevated to Orange, which would have required additional risk management actions. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2016-0660. Corrective actions included restoring the dry cooling tower fan to available status such that risk returned to Green and sending a communication to operations supervisors to re-emphasize the requirements to adequately address unavailability of plant components.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating

events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, by not ensuring the risk assessment was adequate when an additional component was emergently declared unavailable, the licensee proceeded with a maintenance work window with no understanding of the increased risk associated with a different plant configuration. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," dated May 19, 2005, Flowchart 1, "Assessment of Risk Deficit," and determined the need to calculate the risk deficit to determine the significance of this issue. The risk deficits were assumed to be equal to the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) actual and incremental large early release probability (ILERP) actual. The Waterford probabilistic risk assessment model yielded an incremental core damage probability (ICDP), or actual increase in risk during this work window, of  $6.1 \times 10^{-8}$ . The regional senior reactor analyst evaluated the licensee's risk significance evaluation and agreed with the results from the licensee's model. The ILERP, screened out as not risk significant. In accordance with Flowchart 1 in Appendix K, because the ICDP was less than  $1 \times 10^{-6}$  and the ILERP was less than  $1 \times 10^{-7}$ , the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green).

This finding has a procedure adherence cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because individuals did not follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, when the additional dry cooling tower fan was declared unavailable, the licensee did not re-assess risk as soon as practical as specified in site procedures [H.8].  
Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Establish Design Control Measures for Safety-Related Emergency Feedwater System Valves**

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," because the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the design of the emergency feedwater system. As a result, on June 3, 2015, following a manual plant trip that occurred due to a loss of the main feedwater system, the emergency feedwater back-up flow control valves oscillated so severely that control room personnel removed the system from automatic operations and manually controlled flow to the steam generators. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2015-03565. Long term corrective actions are to

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develop a modification to the system for better flow control, and complete testing that would demonstrate the automatic function of these valves.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure that the safety-related emergency feedwater back-up flow control valves would perform as designed, impacted the system's ability to perform its safety function during the feedwater loss event on June 3, 2015. A bounding detailed risk evaluation determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and was not significant to the large early release frequency. The dominant sequences included losses of off-site power, failure of the backup essential feedwater valves in the closed direction, and random failures of the primary essential feedwater flow control valves in the closed direction. The primary essential feedwater flow control valves and the diversity of the emergency feedwater system helped to minimize the risk.

The finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency of not identifying the design flaws or the need for a test occurred more than two years ago and did not reflect current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to Follow Procedures when Changing Materials Used for Feedwater Heater Level Control Valves**Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (pdf)**Significance:**  Sep 17, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Inadequate Procedures for a Design Basis Tornado Event**

Green. The team identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, which states, in part, “Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained, covering the activities including procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A.6.w, Acts of Nature (e.g., tornado, flood, damn failure, earthquakes).” Specifically, in the first example, prior to August 27, 2015, the licensee failed to establish adequate procedures to ensure the manual actions required within specified time limits can be completed before full draindown of the ultimate heat sink (wet cooling tower basins) after a tornado event. In the second example, prior to August 27, 2015, the licensee failed to establish adequate procedures to clarify whether the main steam isolation valve area was considered outdoors and therefore subject to the requirements for unmonitored items stored in the protected area. Unsecured scaffold material stored in this area had not been evaluated for potential to become projectiles and endangering nearby safety-related equipment during high winds. In response to this issue, the licensee inspected the area and secured all loose debris. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-WF3-2015-05624 and CR-WF3-2015-05601.

The team determined that the failure to maintain adequate procedures to ensure compliance with technical specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.33 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish adequate procedures to ensure availability of mitigating equipment during and after an event involving acts of nature. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, “Mitigating Systems Screening Questions.” The issue screened to Exhibit 4, “External Events Screening Questions,” because both examples involved a design basis tornado. Per Exhibit 4, the issue screened to a more detailed risk evaluation because: 1) the first issue could starve safety systems of water, failing the safety function, and 2) the second issue could cause a plant trip and a loss of condenser heat sink initiating event. Therefore, the Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a more detailed risk evaluation that included both issues. Given that there was no change in core damage frequency for the first issue, and the change in core damage frequency for the second example was  $1.2 \times 10^{-9}$  per year, combined, the analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, evaluation, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance (P.2).

Inspection Report# : [2015008](#) (pdf)

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**Barrier Integrity**

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Sep 30, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

### **Failure to Make a Report Required by 10 CFR 21.21**

The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 21.21 that occurred when the licensee failed to submit a report or interim report on a deviation in a basic component within 60 days of discovery.

The failure of the licensee to adequately evaluate deviations in basic components and to report defects is a performance deficiency. The NRC's significance determination process (SDP) considers the safety significance of findings by evaluating their potential safety consequences. This performance deficiency was of minor safety significance. The traditional enforcement process separately considers the significance of willful violations, violations that impact the regulatory process, and violations that result in actual safety consequences. Traditional enforcement applied to this finding because it involved a violation that impacted the regulatory process. Supplement VII to the version of the NRC Enforcement Policy that was in effect at the time the violation was identified provided as an example of a violation of significant regulatory concern (Severity Level III), "An inadequate review or failure to review such that, if an appropriate review had been made as required, a 10 CFR Part 21 report would have been made." Based on this example, the NRC determined that the violation met the criteria to be cited as a Severity Level III violation. However, because of the circumstances surrounding the violation, including the removal from service of the affected components by an unrelated manufacturer's recall, the severity of the cited violation is being reduced to Severity Level IV. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.

Inspection Report# : [2013004](#) (*pdf*)

Inspection Report# : [2014008](#) (*pdf*)

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