

Quad Cities 1 1Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Jun 30, 2015

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

INADEQUATE ZONE OF PROTECTION FOR ELECTRICAL BUS MAINTENANCE

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, “Procedures,” was self-revealed on March 14, 2015, for the licensee’s failure to implement a clearance order in accordance with procedure OP-AA-109-101, “Clearance and Tagging,” for electrical maintenance on Bus 12, Cubicle 9. The clearance order failed to provide a safe zone of protection for all physical work to be performed under the clearance order or for required equipment protection. Immediate corrective actions included stopping all electrical work and verifying electrical work boundaries prior to re-commencing work. The licensee documented the issue in the corrective action program (CAP) under Issue Report 2468511.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to properly control and de-energize equipment prior to performing maintenance could have an impact on safety-related equipment (including equipment damage and potential loss of off-site power). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 0609.04, “Initial Characterization of Findings.” Because the finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and Unit 1 was shut down at the time of the event, the inspectors determined the finding could be further evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, “Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings.” The inspectors answered “No” to all questions in Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1 and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Management because the licensee did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee failed to plan, control, and execute a clearance order that provided a safe zone of protection for all physical work to be performed under the clearance order or for required equipment protection during maintenance on Bus 12, Cubicle 9 [H.5].

Inspection Report# : [2015002](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO EVALUATE DEGRADED OR NON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS FOR OPERABILITY

A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified by the inspectors for the licensee’s failure to document degraded or non conforming conditions in the corrective action program (CAP) and route or discuss the

issue with Operations shift management so that operability of the affected components could be evaluated. Immediate corrective actions included entering the issues into the CAP and evaluating the issues for operability. The licensee captured the issue in the CAP as Issue Reports (IRs) 2537968 and 2537936.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to identify degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions in the CAP and bring those conditions to the attention of Operations shift management so that the operability of safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs) may be evaluated could lead to those SSCs being in an inoperable condition without the appropriate Technical Specification (TS) actions taken. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the control room emergency ventilation (CREV) and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems remained operable. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of identification in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, when degraded and non conforming conditions were identified, licensee personnel failed to promptly capture the issues in the CAP [P.1].

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY INSPECT RELAY CONTACTS FOR OXIDATION RESULTS IN RELAY FAILURE

A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was self-revealed for the licensee’s failure to establish a preventive maintenance procedure for HFA relays that was appropriate to the circumstances. Immediate corrective actions included burnishing of the associated relay contacts and testing the associated relays. In addition, the licensee revised their relay inspection procedure and planned future relay replacements during the next refueling outage. The licensee entered the issue into their CAP as IR 2485051.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the failure to perform adequate preventive maintenance on the automatic depressurization system (ADS) logic HFA relay in 2013 resulted in the build up of oxidation on the relay contacts. This build up caused the relay to fail its next scheduled test in 2015. A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation and determined the finding was of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of operating experience in the area of problem identification and resolution, because the licensee did not systematically collect, evaluate, and implement relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee identified several internal and external operating experience events related to relay contact oxidation and failed to implement changes to their relay inspection procedures to ensure that effective corrective actions were implemented [P.5].

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2015

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO CONDUCT POST MAINTENANCE TESTING FOLLOWING MANUAL OPERATION OF RCIC MOV

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, “Procedures,” was self-revealed on March 22, 2015, for the licensee’s failure to conduct procedurally required post-maintenance testing on

reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) motor operated valve (MOV) MO 1-1301-61, following operation of the valve in the manual mode. Immediate corrective actions included manually engaging the motor clutch and functionally stroking the valve from the control room to verify operation. The licensee captured this condition in their CAP as Issue Report 2472416.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee was not able to ensure the operability of the RCIC system when they failed to conduct post-maintenance testing (PMT) on RCIC 1-1301-61. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions." The inspectors answered "No" to all questions in Section A of Exhibit 2 and the finding screened as Green, or very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Documentation, because the licensee did not maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation. Specifically, the licensee failed to document the status of the RCIC valve after placing it in the manual mode of operation to ensure that the required PMT was performed [H.7].

Inspection Report# : [2015002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO CONTROL DEVIATION FROM EQ STANDARD RESULTS IN LIMIT SWITCH SUBMERGENCE

A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was self-revealed on February 2, 2016, when the operators received an alarm due to a steam leak in the

Unit 1 main steam isolation valve room which resulted in the limit switch compartment for Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system motor-operated valve (MOV), MO 1-1301-17 (outboard primary containment steam isolation valve), becoming submerged with water. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that deviations from design standard, "Environmental Qualification Standard 74Q (EQ-74Q)," were controlled during original installation of MO 1-1301-17 such that the valve would not be subjected to a spray or submergence environment. The licensee documented the issue in their corrective action program under Issue Report 2625523. Corrective actions included a temporary repair of the steam leak, removal of water from the limit switch compartment, and compensatory measures that included daily monitoring for steam leaks in the Unit 1 main steam isolation valve room. In addition, the licensee performed an extent of condition review of other valves in the main steam isolation valve room. Planned corrective actions included installing t-drains or weep holes in MOVs that the licensee deemed susceptible to spray or submergence.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to control any environmental qualification design deviations had the potential to impact the ability of MO 1-1301-17 to close on an isolation signal and prevent radioactive releases to the environment. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in

accordance with Exhibit 3, “Barrier Integrity Screening Questions,” because the inspectors answered “No” to all questions in Section B of Exhibit 3. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current performance.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2016

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS AS SAFETY-RELATED

A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, “Quality Assurance,” was identified by the inspectors for the licensee’s failure to identify the structures, systems, and components to be covered by the quality assurance program, in that they did not properly classify a component of the control room emergency ventilation system as safety related. The licensee documented the issue in their corrective action program under Issue Report 2596725. Immediate corrective actions included replacing Differential Pressure Switch (DPS) 0–5795–50 and revising the control room ventilation procedure to allow operators to disable the interlock between the ‘A’ and ‘B’ trains of the control room emergency ventilation system. The procedure change eliminated the need for the DPS to be classified as safety-related (and therefore corrected the violation) because in the event of a failure of the DPS, the system would still be able to perform its safety function. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the ‘B’ train of the control room emergency ventilation system is a habitability system that is provided to ensure control room operators are able to remain in the control room and operate the plant safely and to maintain the plant in a safe condition under accident conditions. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power,” issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 3, “Barrier Integrity Screening Questions,” because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or toxic atmosphere. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current performance.

Inspection Report# : [2016001](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ADEQUATE PROCEDURE TO PRECLUDE UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONING OF THE STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM

A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified by the inspectors for the licensee’s failure to establish a procedure appropriate to the circumstances that precluded unacceptable preconditioning of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system during surveillance testing. The licensee performed an evaluation and concluded the SBGT system was operable and planned additional testing on the relay timing function. Other corrective actions included revising the applicable procedures such that unacceptable preconditioning would not occur. The licensee captured this issue in their CAP as IR 2524699.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases

caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inadequate procedure had the potential to mask the ability of the SBT system to initiate in time to prevent ex-filtration of radioactive gases during a design basis accident. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function for the SBT system. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of questioning attitude in the area of human performance because the licensee did not recognize the possibility of mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that performing the steps in the specified sequence could unacceptably precondition the time-delay relay for the SBT system and mask the ability of the system to perform its function [H.12].

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : July 11, 2016