

Millstone 3

4Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Aug 01, 2014

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Implementation of Dominion's Design Change Process

The NRC identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), in that Dominion did not ensure correct implementation of their design change process procedure when establishing licensing basis requirements for removal of the SPS. Specifically, Dominion did not correctly evaluate the impact of removing the system on the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17 and did not address the failure mechanism of this new design in the design change documents, as required by their design change procedure. Dominion entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution (CR 553967 and CR 551068).

The team determined that Dominion's failure to implement their design change process procedure was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown and power operations. The team performed a risk screening in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," using Exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions," Section C, "Support System Initiators." The answer to the question in Section C would be NO, because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of two transmission lines with one line out of service (OOS), and affect mitigation equipment. The team determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, because the design change process procedure was not adequately followed, in that the impact of the change on the current design basis and licensing bases was not evaluated correctly [H.8]

Inspection Report# : [2014011](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Nov 13, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Change of Pump Reference Values Contrary to ASME OM

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5 because Dominion did not implement the Inservice Testing (IST) Program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code of Record, 2001 through 2003 incorporated addenda. On July 18, 2015, Dominion changed the reference values of the 'B' control building air conditioning booster pump, 3SWP*P2B, prior to determining the cause of the condition which resulted in the pump performing in the Action Range (ISTB-6200(b)) in April 2015.

This finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, as it represented a challenge to the equipment performance attribute of

the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The reliability of 3SWP*P2B was challenged based upon Dominion's change in the pump's reference values contrary to the ASME OM code of record for Millstone Unit 3 which could result in the degradation of the equipment remaining undetected. The finding screened to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the safety function of 3SWP*P2B was not lost based on analysis of design basis flow requirements. The inspectors determined the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, in that the organization failed to evaluate the issue to ensure that resolution addressed causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, Dominion's analysis of the April 2015 pump failures was not thorough enough to understand a new potential failure mode (impeller movement) and how it may impact system performance.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Failure to Identify Charging and Primary Closed Cooling Water Area Heater Transformers Equipment Environmental Qualification Non-Conformance

The inspectors identified a Green, Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI associated with Dominion's failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 CHS (Charging System) & CCP (Component Cooling Primary) area heaters which are required to support operability of the charging system when outside temperature is less than 17F, from September 17, 2014 to February 11, 2015. Dominion completed restoration of the 'B' train CHS & CCP area heaters on February 14, 2015 and has scheduled completion of the 'A' train heater restoration for April 16, 2015

This finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, as it represented a challenge to the equipment performance attribute of the Reactor Safety – Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding screened to be of very low safety significance as safety function of the charging system was not lost based upon the capability of the nonconforming heaters to maintain charging area temperatures greater than 65F. Inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area associated with Procedure Adherence associated with Dominion's failure to adequately screen the condition adverse to quality upon discovery of heater failure and failure to evaluate heater maintenance history when making changes to heater preventive maintenance frequency. (H.8)

Inspection Report# : [2015001](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Nov 13, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

Inadequate Procedural Direction to Mitigate a LOCA and Failure of an RSS Heat Exchanger Tube

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Millstone Unit 3 TS 6.8.1, as specified by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, associated with Dominion's failure to implement adequate procedures to address a hypothetical large break loss of

coolant accident (LBLOCA) inside containment with a failure of a recirculation spray system (RSS) heat exchanger tube resulting in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) that bypasses the containment barrier. Dominion did not provide adequate procedural direction or training to the operators for the control of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) during this hypothetical event in June of 2015. Dominion entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 1008205.

The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, as it represented a challenge to the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was screened to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the deficiency did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, "Barrier integrity Screening Questions," Section B, "Reactor Containment." The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because the organization failed to evaluate the issue to ensure that resolution addressed causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2015003](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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