

McGuire 1 1Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 31, 2014

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement adequate design control measures for rod control power supply replacement resulting in reactor trip

A self-revealing finding (FIN) was identified for the licensee's failure to implement adequate design control measures for the rod control power supply modification which resulted in the loss of 24VDC power in the 1AC rod control power cabinet.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to implement adequate design control measures was more than minor because it affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the insufficient margin in the rod control power supply OVP function caused a multiple drop rod event which resulted in a reactor trip. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 40A3)

Inspection Report# : [2014002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Jun 30, 2013

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement adequate venting instructions for condensate booster pump trip instrumentation resulting in reactor trip

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to implement adequate instructions for venting condensate booster pump (CBP) emergency low suction pressure trip instrumentation which resulted in air entrainment causing a non-conservative shift in the trip setpoint. During a subsequent secondary side transient involving a heater drain tank pump trip, the non-conservative trip setpoint resulted in a premature trip of all three CBPs ultimately causing a reactor trip.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the inadequate venting allowed air entrainment in the instrumentation lines resulting in a reactor trip. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to the likelihood of both a reactor trip and that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. No cross cutting aspect was identified.

Inspection Report# : [2013003](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2014

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to adequately control the use of self-extinguishing fire lids

An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, FPP, was identified for the licensee's failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in waste receptacles equipped with self-extinguishing fire lids in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee took actions to correct all waste receptacles in the plant that were filled beyond the manufacturer's specification or had loosely fitted lids. This condition was placed in the licensee's corrective action program.

The licensee's failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with the requirements of NSD-313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the self-extinguishing function was not retained which could allow the spread of the fire and adversely affect mitigating system equipment in the area. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.2)

Inspection Report# : [2014002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 30, 2014